Dist. 37, Dubia
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 37
## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illo verbo Augustini, quod dicit: Opera diaboli, quae vitia dicuntur, actus sunt, non res. Sed contra: Fulgentius dicit, et habetur in Glossa super tertium ad Romanos1: «Deus illius rei est ultor, cuius non est actor»: ergo si Deus est ultor peccati, peccatum est res. — Item, videtur, quod contraria implicentur in illo verbo: omne enim ens est aliqua res; sed vitium est actus, sicut ipse dicit2, et actus est quaedam differentia entis: ergo idem est dicere, vitia esse actus et non res, quod affirmare inferius et negare superius de eodem; quod est impossibile. — Item, ipse Augustinus videtur sibi contradicere, cum dicit in Enchiridio3 quod «aliquae sunt res, quibus homines mali sunt»; tales non sunt nisi vitia et peccata: ergo vitia sunt res.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod res accipitur communiter et proprie et magis proprie. Res, secundum quod communiter dicitur, dicitur a reor, reris; et sic comprehendit omne illud, quod cadit in cognitione, sive sit res exterius, sive in sola opinione. Proprie vero dicitur res a ratus, rata, ratum, secundum quod ratum dicitur esse illud quod non tantummodo est in cognitione, immo est4 in rerum natura, sive sit ens in se, sive in alio; et hoc modo res convertitur cum ente. Tertio modo dicitur res magis proprie, secundum quod dicitur a ratus, rata, ratum, prout ratum dicitur illud quod est ens per se et fixum; et sic res dicitur solum de creaturis et substantiis per se entibus5. — Si igitur res accipiatur primo modo, peccatum est res et quantum ad actionem substratam et quantum ad deformitatem; et sic accipit Fulgentius. Si vero res dicatur secundo modo, sic peccatum dicitur res non ratione deformitatis, sed ratione actus substrati; et sic accipit Augustinus in Enchiridio. Tertio modo accipiendo hoc nomen res, sic peccatum nec est res ratione deformitatis, nec ratione actus substrati; et sic accipit Augustinus in verbo proposito, cum dicit, quod opera diaboli vitia sunt, non res. Et per hoc patet responsio ad totum6.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quod natura non est Deus non fecit. Videtur enim hoc esse falsum, quia multa sunt, quae fiunt praeter naturam, et tamen constat, quod a Deo sunt, sicut multa accidentia, quae inducuntur7 per acquisitionem et per violentiam, et etiam per gratiam et per miraculum. — Item, omne quod est natura aliqua, vel est substantia, vel proprietas ei naturaliter inhaerens; sed multa sunt, quae nec naturaliter insunt, nec per se sunt: ergo non videtur esse verum illud quod dicitur, quod Deus non fecit illud quod natura non est.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut hoc nomen res tripliciter accipitur, ita hoc nomen natura. Uno enim modo dicitur natura res, quae naturaliter est, vel proprietas, quae naturaliter inest. Secundo modo dicitur natura largius, non solum res per se ens, vel proprietas naturaliter inhaerens, sed etiam omne quod conservat naturam, vel quod saltem aliquo bono non privat; et istos duos modos ponit Magister in littera8. Tertio modo dicitur natura largissime omne ens, quod est in aliqua re naturali, sive sit naturaliter inhaerens, sive non; sive sit salvativum, sive non. — Cum ergo dicit Augustinus, quod natura est omne quod Deus fecit, potest natura accipi tribus modis, secundum quod facere Dei accipitur tripliciter. Uno enim modo facere dicitur Deus creando; secundo modo concreando; tertio modo cooperando; et ita, secundum quod extenditur verbum faciendi, extenditur nomen naturae; sicut facere dicitur Deus actionem substratam peccato cooperando libero arbitrio, sic etiam nomen naturae se extendit ad illam actionem; et sicut facere Dei nunquam se extendit ad deformitatem, sic nec natura. Et ideo ex hac auctoritate non potest haberi, quod actio substrata deformitati non sit a Deo, sed hoc tantum habetur, quod deformitas non sit a Deo9.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de illa ratione, quam Magister in littera dimittit insolutam. Ait enim sic: Quid mirum, si Deus non dicitur esse actor[^10] peccatorum, in quantum nihil sunt, cum nihili nullus actor existere queat. Videtur enim efficaciter arguere. Cum enim peccatum aliquo modo habeat actorem, et non possit habere, secundum quod nihil est: habet ergo, secundum quod aliquid est. Si ergo nullo modo habet Deum actorem, videtur, quod peccatum, in quantum actus est, a Deo non sit.
Respondeo: Dicendum est ad hoc, quod illud argumentum deficit, quia aliter peccatum est nihil, aliter est nihil illud quod nullo modo est. Peccatum enim formaliter nihil est, nihilominus tamen circa aliquid est, et alicuius boni privatio est. Et quamvis illud quod nullo modo est, non possit habere actorem, tamen illud quod dicit defectum circa ens, potest habere actorem, non, inquam, actorem efficientem, sed deficientem. Et sic patet, quod ratio illa non recte procedit11.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Iniquitas ipsa non est substantia. Aut enim substantia dicitur proprie, aut dicitur communiter. Si dicitur proprie; nec etiam iustitia est substantia. Si dicitur communiter; ergo omne quod habet aliquam essentiam, dicitur substantia. Sed habitus malus habet aliquam essentiam, in quantum habitus: ergo videtur, quod possit dici substantia12: ergo videtur, quod malus habitus, ut luxuria, debeat laudare Deum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut nomen natura multipliciter accipitur, ita et nomen substantiae. Praeter enim illos quatuor modos, quos dicit Philosophus13, quod substantia dicitur materia, forma, compositum et essentia uniuscuiusque, potest aliter distingui substantia iuxta verba beati Augustini14: uno modo, ut dicatur res permanens et per se stans; alio modo, ut dicatur res permanens, non tamen per se stans, sed alii inhaerens; tertio modo, ut dicatur substantia quaelibet essentia actu ens, sive per se stans, sive non; et hoc modo substantia se extendit ad omne ens. Et sic accipit Augustinus15, cum dicit: «Quod nulla substantia est nihil omnino est». Cum ergo dicitur, quod iniquitas substantia non est; dicendum, quod iniquitas accipitur abstracte pro ipsa deformitate, non pro habitu, circa quem deformitas consistit.
Dub. V.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Poenarum Deus actor est. Videtur enim hoc esse falsum, quia nullius est Deus actor, nisi quod habet exemplar in Deo16; sed poena, secundum quod poena non habet exemplar in Deo: ergo videtur, quod Deus non sit actor poenae. — Item, «idem est fieri Deo auctore et Deo volente17». Sed, sicut dicit Damascenus, «Deus non plasmavit nos ad puniendum»: ergo si Deo non placent mala poenae, videtur, quod non sint ab ipso tanquam ab actore.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quaedam sunt, quae habent exemplar in Deo secundum conformitatem, quae attenditur quantum ad esse eorum speciale; quaedam vero secundum conformitatem, quae attenditur quantum ad esse generale. Quamvis igitur poena sive passio non habeat correspondens in Deo passionem vel poenam, habet tamen correspondens in genere entis et in genere ordinis; et istud sufficit ad hoc, quod aliquid habeat in Deo exemplar.
Ad aliud dicendum, quod voluntas in Deo duplex est, videlicet antecedens et consequens; et quamvis poena non sit a voluntate antecedente, nihilominus tamen est a voluntate consequente.
Qualiter autem poena sit a Deo et quae, hoc determinatum est supra distinctione praecedenti18. Licet enim Magister dicat, poenas a Deo esse, non tamen hoc intelligendum est universaliter. — Ideo ad hoc, quod ista verba, quae dicuntur in hac distinctione, intelligantur sane, necessario oportet istas quatuor propositiones tanquam regulas19 infallibiles supponere. Quarum prima est, quod omne illud quod dicit positionem aliquam, est a Deo. Secunda est, quod omne illud quod aliquem ordinem dicit, in quantum huiusmodi, est a Deo. Tertia est, quod nullus defectus, secundum quod huiusmodi, est a Deo, propter hoc quod hoc repugnat divinae potentiae. Quarta est haec, quod nullum inordinatum, secundum quod huiusmodi, est a Deo, quia repugnat divinae sapientiae.
His autem tanquam manifestis praesuppositis, oportet etiam scire distinguere. Primo circa poenam quantum ad rationem poenae, et quantum ad illud quod substernitur. Secundo oportet scire, quod aliqua poena est acta, aliqua contracta, aliqua inflicta. Tertio oportet intelligere distinctionem huius nominis res, quoniam dicitur tripliciter. Quarto oportet intelligere distinctionem huius nominis natura et substantia, secundum quod distincta sunt supra20. Et his intellectis, manifestantur ea quae dicuntur in littera.
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that saying of Augustine, who says: The works of the devil, which are called vices, are acts, not things. But on the contrary: Fulgentius says, and it is found in the Gloss on the third chapter of Romans1: «God is the avenger of that thing of which He is not the author»: therefore if God is the avenger of sin, sin is a thing. — Likewise, it seems that contraries are involved in that saying: for every being is some thing; but a vice is an act, as he himself says2, and act is a certain difference of being: therefore it is the same thing to say that vices are acts and not things, which is to affirm below and to deny above concerning the same thing; which is impossible. — Likewise, Augustine himself seems to contradict himself, when he says in the Enchiridion3 that «there are certain things by which men are evil»; such things are nothing but vices and sins: therefore vices are things.
I respond: It must be said that thing is taken commonly, properly, and more properly. A thing, according as it is said commonly, is named from reor, reris [to reckon]; and thus it comprehends everything that falls under cognition, whether it be a thing externally or in opinion alone. But properly a thing is named from ratus, rata, ratum [reckoned, fixed], according as that is said to be fixed which is not only in cognition but rather is4 in the nature of things, whether it be a being in itself or in another; and in this mode thing is convertible with being. In the third mode a thing is said more properly, according as it is named from ratus, rata, ratum, inasmuch as that is called fixed which is a being per se and fixed; and thus thing is said only of creatures and of substances that are beings per se5. — If, therefore, thing be taken in the first mode, sin is a thing both as regards the underlying action and as regards the deformity; and thus Fulgentius takes it. But if thing be said in the second mode, then sin is called a thing not by reason of the deformity, but by reason of the underlying act; and thus Augustine takes it in the Enchiridion. Taking this name thing in the third mode, sin is neither a thing by reason of the deformity nor by reason of the underlying act; and thus Augustine takes it in the saying proposed, when he says that the works of the devil are vices, not things. And by this the response to the whole is clear6.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: What is not a nature God did not make. For this seems to be false, because there are many things which come about beyond nature, and yet it is established that they are from God, as many accidents which are induced7 through acquisition and through violence, and also through grace and through miracle. — Likewise, everything that is some nature is either a substance or a property naturally inhering in it; but there are many things which neither inhere naturally nor exist per se: therefore that which is said does not seem to be true, namely that God did not make that which is not a nature.
I respond: It must be said that just as this name thing is taken in three ways, so too this name nature. For in one mode a nature is called a thing which exists naturally, or a property which inheres naturally. In the second mode nature is said more broadly, not only a thing being per se, or a property naturally inhering, but also everything that conserves nature, or that at least does not deprive of some good; and these two modes the Master sets down in the text8. In the third mode nature is said most broadly of every being which is in some natural thing, whether it inheres naturally or not; whether it be conserving or not. — When, therefore, Augustine says that nature is everything that God made, nature can be taken in three modes, according as God's making is taken in three ways. For in one mode God is said to make by creating; in the second mode by con-creating; in the third mode by cooperating; and so, according as the word of making is extended, the name of nature is extended; just as God is said to make by cooperating with free will in the action underlying sin, so too the name of nature extends itself to that action; and just as God's making never extends itself to deformity, so neither does nature. And therefore from this authority it cannot be held that the underlying action of the deformity is not from God, but only this is held, that the deformity is not from God9.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about that argument which the Master in the text leaves unsolved. For he says thus: What wonder is it, if God is not said to be the author[^10] of sins, inasmuch as they are nothing, since no author of what is nothing can exist. For it seems to argue effectively. For since sin in some mode has an author, and cannot have one according as it is nothing: it has one, therefore, according as it is something. If therefore it in no way has God as author, it seems that sin, inasmuch as it is an act, is not from God.
I respond: It must be said to this that that argument fails, because in one way sin is nothing, in another way that is nothing which in no way exists. For sin is formally nothing, yet nonetheless it is about something, and is the privation of some good. And although that which in no way exists cannot have an author, nonetheless that which states a defect about a being can have an author — not, I say, an efficient author, but a deficient one. And thus it is clear that that argument does not rightly proceed11.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: Iniquity itself is not a substance. For either substance is said properly, or it is said commonly. If it is said properly, then neither is justice a substance. If it is said commonly, then everything that has some essence is called a substance. But an evil habit has some essence, inasmuch as it is a habit: therefore it seems that it can be called a substance12: therefore it seems that an evil habit, such as lust, ought to praise God.
I respond: It must be said that just as the name nature is taken in many ways, so too the name substance. For besides those four modes which the Philosopher states13 — that substance is said to be matter, form, the composite, and the essence of each thing — substance can be otherwise distinguished according to the words of blessed Augustine14: in one mode, so that it be called a thing permanent and standing per se; in another mode, so that it be called a thing permanent, yet not standing per se, but inhering in another; in the third mode, so that any essence actually a being be called a substance, whether standing per se or not; and in this mode substance extends itself to every being. And thus Augustine takes it15, when he says: «What is no substance is altogether nothing». When, therefore, it is said that iniquity is not a substance, it must be said that iniquity is taken abstractly for the deformity itself, not for the habit about which the deformity consists.
Doubt V.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: God is the author of punishments. For this seems to be false, because God is the author of nothing except what has an exemplar in God16; but punishment, according as it is punishment, has no exemplar in God: therefore it seems that God is not the author of punishment. — Likewise, «it is the same thing to come about with God as author and with God as willing17». But, as Damascene says, «God did not fashion us for punishing»: therefore if the evils of punishment do not please God, it seems that they are not from Him as from an author.
I respond: It must be said that there are certain things which have an exemplar in God according to a conformity which is regarded as to their special being; but certain others according to a conformity which is regarded as to their general being. Although, therefore, punishment or passion has no corresponding passion or punishment in God, it nonetheless has something corresponding in the genus of being and in the genus of order; and this suffices for something to have an exemplar in God.
To the other it must be said that the will in God is twofold, namely antecedent and consequent; and although punishment is not from the antecedent will, nonetheless it is from the consequent will.
But in what manner punishment is from God, and which [punishment], this was determined above in the preceding distinction18. For although the Master says that punishments are from God, yet this is not to be understood universally. — Therefore, in order that these words, which are said in this distinction, may be understood soundly, it is necessary to presuppose these four propositions as infallible rules19. Of these the first is, that everything that states some position is from God. The second is, that everything that states some order, inasmuch as it is such, is from God. The third is, that no defect, according as it is such, is from God, on account of the fact that this is repugnant to the divine power. The fourth is this, that nothing disordered, according as it is such, is from God, because it is repugnant to the divine wisdom.
These things being presupposed as manifest, it is also necessary to know how to distinguish. First, concerning punishment as to the formal account of punishment, and as to that which is subjected. Secondly, it must be known that some punishment is done, some contracted, some inflicted. Thirdly, one must understand the distinction of this name thing, since it is said in three ways. Fourthly, one must understand the distinction of this name nature and substance, according as they were distinguished above20. And these things being understood, those things which are said in the text are made manifest.
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- Vers. 5: Nunquid iniquus est Deus, qui infert iram? — Glossa, quae sumta est ex Fulgentii libro I. ad Monimum, c. 19, habetur apud Petr. Lombardum loc. hic cit. Codd. et primae edd. hic signant Rom. I.Verse 5: Is God unjust, who inflicts wrath? — The Gloss, which is taken from Fulgentius' book I to Monimus, c. 19, is found in Peter Lombard at the place here cited. The codices and the first editions here mark Rom. I.
- Hic c. I. et supra d. XXXV. c. 2. seq., ubi etiam verba Augustini inveniuntur. — Quod actus sit differentia entis, vide Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 20, IX. text. I. et XII. text. 8. (III. c. 3, VIII. c. 1. et XI. c. 2.). — Paulo inferius pro quod affirmare codd. H K T V W X Y Z et alii cum edd. 1, 2 quam affirmare.Here c. 1 and above d. 35, c. 2 and following, where the words of Augustine are also found. — That act is a difference of being, see Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 20, IX, text 1, and XII, text 8 (III, c. 3; VIII, c. 1; and XI, c. 2). — A little below, for quod affirmare the codices H K T V W X Y Z and others, with editions 1, 2, read quam affirmare.
- Cap. 19. n. 6. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 5. circa finem.Chapter 19, n. 6. Cf. above the text of the Master, d. 34, c. 5, near the end.
- Cod. T bene etiam.Codex T reads bene etiam.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. dub. 3.Cf. I Sent., d. 25, dub. 3.
- Vide supra d. 34, a. 2. q. I seqq. Cfr. etiam B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa m.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 3.See above d. 34, a. 2, q. 1 and following. Cf. also Bl. Albert, here a. 2; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, here near the middle; Giles of Rome, here in the doubt on the text, 3.
- Codd. K W ee et ed. I ducuntur, cod. T dicuntur.Codices K W ee and edition 1 read ducuntur; codex T reads dicuntur.
- Hic c. I. — Paulo inferius pro re naturali edd. praeter I cum paucis codd. re materiali.Here c. 1. — A little below, for re naturali the editions except 1, with a few codices, read re materiali.
- In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 desunt haec ultima verba inde a sed hoc tantum usque ad finem. — Huius dubii solutionem exhibent etiam Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.In the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 these last words from sed hoc tantum to the end are lacking. — The solution of this doubt is also given by Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
- Ita edd. 1, 2, 3 et plurimi (fortasse omnes) codd. pro auctor, quod vocabulum hic habet Vat., sed paulo post eadem nullus actor. Idem dicendum de hoc verbo, quoties infra in hoc et 5. dubio occurrit. In edd. Magistri legitur semper auctor. Quod autem non incongrue in his locis secuti simus antiquos codd. et edd., sequitur ex contextu. De differentia inter vocabula auctor et actor vide Forcellini, Lexicon etc.Thus editions 1, 2, 3 and most (perhaps all) codices read, instead of auctor, which word the Vatican edition has here, but shortly after the same reads nullus actor. The same is to be said of this word, as often as it occurs below in this and the fifth doubt. In the editions of the Master it is always read auctor. That we have not unfittingly followed the ancient codices and editions in these places follows from the context. On the difference between the words auctor and actor see Forcellini, Lexicon, etc.
- Plura de hac re habentur supra d. 34. a. I. et 2. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 3.More on this matter is found above d. 34, a. 1 and 2. — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here in the doubt on the text, 3.
- Edd., excepta I, omittunt hanc primam conclusionem: ergo videtur... dici substantia.The editions, except 1, omit this first conclusion: therefore it seems... to be called a substance.
- Libr. II. de Anima, text. 2. (c. I.); V. Metaph. text. 15, VII. text. 7. et 53, XII. text. 14. (IV. c. 8, VI. c. 3. et 15, XI. c. 3.); Averroes, Epitom. in libr. Metaph. tr. I. et 2.On the Soul II, text 2 (c. 1); Metaphysics V, text 15, VII, text 7 and 53, XII, text 14 (IV, c. 8; VI, c. 3 and 15; XI, c. 3); Averroes, Epitome on the Metaphysics, tracts 1 and 2.
- Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. I. seq. — Mox pro non tamen non pauci codd., inter quos F K T cc, cum ed. I non tantum.See here the text of the Master, c. 1 and following. — Soon, for non tamen not a few codices, among them F K T cc, with edition 1 read non tantum.
- Enarrat. in Ps. 68. serm. 1. n. 5. Verba integra huius loci vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Huius dubii solutionem videsis etiam apud S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 6.Enarration on Psalm 68, sermon 1, n. 5. See the full words of this passage here in the text of the Master, c. 2. — You may also see the solution of this doubt in St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here in the doubt on the text, 6.
- Ut monstratum est I. Sent. d. 36. per totam, praecipue a. 3. q. 1. — De minori cfr. supra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. seq.As was shown in I Sent., d. 36, throughout, especially a. 3, q. 1. — On the minor premise cf. above d. 36, a. 3, q. 1 and following.
- Secundum August., 83 Qq. q. 3. — Textus integer verborum Damasceni, quae habentur II. de Fide orthod. c. 29, reperitur tom. I. pag. 728, nota 2. Loc. cit. Damascenus profert etiam distinctionem voluntatis in voluntatem antecedentem et consequentem, de qua paulo inferius sermo est et de qua videsis etiam I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1.According to Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 3. — The full text of the words of Damascene, which are found in On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 29, is found in tome I, page 728, note 2. At the cited place Damascene also sets forth the distinction of the will into antecedent and consequent will, of which there is mention a little below and on which you may also see I Sent., d. 46, q. 1.
- Art. 3. q. 1. seq. — Subinde pro Licet enim edd., excepta 1, substituunt Licet autem. Paulo ante cod. W et quare pro et quae.Art. 3, q. 1 and following. — Thereafter, for Licet enim the editions, except 1, substitute Licet autem. A little before, codex W reads et quare for et quae.
- Codd. E F subiungunt necessarias et, codd. A B D K O P Q R S T W et alii negativas, cod. C adiicit negativas et.Codices E F append necessarias et; codices A B D K O P Q R S T W and others read negativas; codex C adds negativas et.
- Hic dub. 1. 2. 3. — Regulae et distinctiones in huius dubii solutione exhibitae quasi fundamentum efficiunt omnium, quae a d. 34. usque huc de malo prolata sunt. Vide de hoc dub. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2, dub. lat.Here doubts 1, 2, 3. — The rules and distinctions set forth in the solution of this doubt constitute, as it were, the foundation of all that has been brought forward concerning evil from d. 34 up to this point. See on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 2, in the doubt on the text. ---