Dist. 32, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 32
Quaestio II.
Utrum concupiscentia sit a Deo.
Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, a quo sit ipsa concupiscentia tanquam a principio. Et est quaestio, utrum sit a Deo. Et quod non, videtur:
1. Ad Romanos sexto1: Vetus homo noster crucifixus est; Glossa: « Vetus homo est fomes, qui ex nobis est, non ex Deo ».
2. Item, Augustinus in libro Quinque Responsionum2: « Credite, malum ex diabolo, non bonum ex Deo esse libidinem »; sed libido et concupiscentia idem sunt: ergo etc.
3. Item, « Dei Filius assumsit omne quod in nostra natura plantavit »3; sed concupiscentiam non assumsit: ergo concupiscentia non est in nobis a Deo.
4. Item, omne quod est a Deo, est bonum et de se ad bonum ordinatum; sed concupiscentia malum est et ad malum ordinata, cum eius usus, scilicet actus concupiscendi, sit malus: ergo videtur, quod concupiscentia non sit a Deo.
5. Item, fomes4, in quantum huiusmodi, est causa originalis in prole, et ita est causa originalis necessaria et determinata, quod non attenditur ibi libertas voluntatis; sed quod est causa alicuius rei, necessario et determinate ordinatae ad malum, est causa mali. Si ergo fomes esset a Deo, tunc sequeretur, quod peccatum originale esset a Deo. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod et primum.
Sed contra:
1. Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio5: « Omnis poena peccati iusta est et supplicium nominatur »; sed concupiscentia, quae remanet post baptismum, poena est: ergo iusta est. Sed omne quod iustum est, a Deo est: ergo etc.
2. Item, omnis poena aut est acta, aut inflicta, aut contracta6; sed fomes non est poena acta, quia est in parvulis, qui nihil boni vel mali egerunt. Non est poena contracta, quia fuit in Adam, qui non processit ex alio parente. Restat igitur, quod est poena inflicta. Sed omnis talis poena est a divina iustitia: ergo etc.
3. Item, concupiscentia dicit amoris intensionem, amoris autem intensio dicit positionem; sed omne quod dicit aliquam positionem, est ab illo, a quo procedit omne ens7: ergo etc.
4. Item, eius est auferre dominium, cuius est et dare: si ergo Deus dedit dominium homini vel spiritui rationali super vires inferiores; videtur, quod illius solius fuit auferre. Sed auferre dominium non est aliud quam infligere deordinationem concupiscentiae in sensualitate, ob quam caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem8.
Si ergo illud dominium a Deo est ablatum, videtur, quod concupiscentiae vitium ab ipso sit inflictum.
5. Item, quod bestiae homini non obtemperent, hoc est ex divina dispositione, secundum quam sapienter omnia reguntur: ergo pari ratione, quod vires inferiores non obediant superiori, hoc est ex ultione divina. Et quod istud verum sit, multae auctoritates Sanctorum9 videntur dicere, quae innuunt, quod ideo rebellio est homini inflicta, quia homo fuit rebellis Deo; haec autem rebellio nihil aliud est quam concupiscentiae vitium.
Conclusio.
Concupiscentia, prout dicit poenam ad culpam ordinatam et appetitum substratum, est a Deo, non vero, prout est proprie concupiscentia sive prout dicit appetitus excessum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de ipsa concupiscentia: aut secundum quod est poena, aut secundum id quod est concupiscentia10. Si loquamur de ipsa, secundum quod est poena, sic dicit ordinem ad culpam; et hoc modo habet causam promerentem et causam ordinantem. Meretur enim homo habere talem rebellionem ex sua culpa et inobedientia; Deus vero hoc malum ad aliud praeexistens ordinat ex sua iustitia. — Alio modo est loqui de concupiscentia, secundum id quod est; et sic concupiscentia duo dicit. Dicit enim appetitum, dicit nihilominus in actu appetitus excessum. Appetitus, inquam, ille substratus bonus est et a Deo est. Excessus autem ille in appetendo, etsi videatur esse positio, plus tamen est privatio, nec habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem. Et ideo, quia Deus nullius est causa deficiens, hoc modo non ponitur esse a Deo, sed potius a libero arbitrio per culpam deficientem, et a diabolo instigante.
Quod autem concupiscentia ratione excessus privationem dicat, quamvis videatur dicere positionem, hoc planum est. Hoc enim est concupiscentia respectu virtutis appetitivae, quod est paralysis respectu motivae. Et quemadmodum membrum paralyticum tremulat et movetur velocissime; et hoc non venit ex virtutis augmento, sed potius ex virtutis decremento, nec ex virtutis fortificatione, sed potius ex dissolutione: sic et in concupiscentia intelligendum est, quod appetitus in amore rei temporalis exardescit, nec potest se ipsum continere, immo in continuo motu et concupiscentiae iteratione consistit: hoc, inquam, intelligendum est provenire ex defectu retinaculi, sicut moventur ferae, ruptis vinculis, et naves, destructis gubernaculis11. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod concupiscentia non sit a Deo, prout concludunt de concupiscentia, secundum id quod est.
1. Ad illud vero Augustini, qui dicit, quod omnis poena iusta est; dicendum, quod intelligit de poena sub ratione poenae; sic enim iusta est ratione iustae ordinationis ad praecedentem culpam. — Posset tamen dici, quod intelligit de poena, quae pure poena est, hoc est, quae ita poena est, quod nec est culpa, nec de se ordinata ad culpam. Concupiscentia vero, aut culpa est, aut ordinata ad culpam; et ideo non habet locum hic auctoritas illa12.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis poena aut est acta, aut inflicta, aut contracta; dicendum, quod concupiscentia in Adam fuit acta, pro eo quod peccando se ipsum privavit originali iustitia et induxit in se concupiscentiam. In nobis vero est poena contracta, pro eo quod a parentibus contrahimus carnem infectam, quae facit, concupiscentiam esse in anima sibi unita.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis positio a Deo est, et concupiscentia dicit positionem etc.; dicendum, quod sicut claudicatio et tremulatio positionem dicit quandam, quia ponit actum et virtutem progressivam; dicit etiam nihilominus defectum et privationem — claudicatio enim defectum in crure ponit13, tremulatio vero defectum in virtute movente sive ineptitudinem circa mobile — sic et in proposito intelligendum est esse, ut prius explanatum est. Et ratione eius quod est ibi positionis, absque dubio a Deo est; ratione vero eius quod est ibi defectus et privationis, non est quaerenda causa efficiens, sed deficiens.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Dei14 est auferre dominium, cuius est dare; dicendum, quod ipse, cui datum est dominium, ex mala custodia potest amittere. Et sic intelligendum est, hominem perdidisse dominium illud, quod habebat ratio super vires inferiores; et hoc, non quia sit ei ablatum violenter, sed quia, cum esset in sua potestate tale dominium in se conservare, ex propria incuria et negligentia noluit15 et amisit; sicut homo, dum peccat, a semetipso fugat gratiam divinam, et Deus dicitur auferre, quia iusto suo iudicio ultra non apponit, dum homo reddit se ipsum indignum ad donum Dei percipiendum.
5. Et per hoc etiam posset responderi ad sequens obiectum de amissione dominii bestiarum. — Potest tamen et aliter dici, quod non est simile, quia quod bestia non obtemperat homini, hoc non ponit culpam, nec in bestia, quae non subiacet, nec in homine, qui non praesidet; secus tamen est in sensualitate et ratione. Cum enim sensualitas rationi repugnet movendo et inclinando ad illicitum, ipsa talis repugnantia est ei culpa; et ideo proprie non debet dici talis rebellio esse a Deo, nec Deum inflixisse concupiscentiam. Et si aliquae tales auctoritates inveniantur, intelligendae sunt et exponendae, ut loquantur de concupiscentia, secundum quod est poena. Et sic patent obiecta16.
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Question II.
Whether concupiscence is from God.
Secondly it is asked concerning this, from what concupiscence itself is as from a principle. And the question is, whether it is from God. And that it is not, it seems:
1. To the Romans, sixth [chapter]1: Our old man is crucified; the Gloss: « The old man is the tinder, which is from us, not from God ».
2. Likewise, Augustine in the book Of Five Responses2: « Believe that lust is an evil from the devil, not a good from God »; but lust and concupiscence are the same: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, « The Son of God assumed everything that He planted in our nature »3; but He did not assume concupiscence: therefore concupiscence is not in us from God.
4. Likewise, everything that is from God is good and of itself ordained to the good; but concupiscence is an evil and ordained to evil, since its use, namely the act of concupiscing, is evil: therefore it seems that concupiscence is not from God.
5. Likewise, the tinder4, insofar as [it is] of this kind, is an original cause in the offspring, and so it is an original cause [so] necessary and determinate that there is no consideration there of freedom of the will; but that which is the cause of some thing necessarily and determinately ordained to evil, is the cause of evil. If therefore the tinder were from God, then it would follow that original sin were from God. But if this is false, it remains that the first [is false] also.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine, On Free Choice5: « Every punishment of sin is just and is named a chastisement »; but concupiscence, which remains after baptism, is a punishment: therefore it is just. But everything that is just is from God: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, every punishment is either acted, or inflicted, or contracted6; but the tinder is not an acted punishment, because it is in little children, who have done nothing of good or evil. It is not a contracted punishment, because it was in Adam, who did not proceed from another parent. It remains therefore that it is an inflicted punishment. But every such punishment is from divine justice: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, concupiscence states an intensification of love, but the intensification of love states a position; but everything that states some position is from Him from whom proceeds every being7: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, to take away dominion belongs to him whose it is also to give: if therefore God gave dominion to the human or to the rational spirit over the lower powers; it seems that it was His alone to take it away. But to take away dominion is nothing other than to inflict the disorder of concupiscence in the sensuality, on account of which the flesh concupisces against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh8.
If therefore that dominion is taken away by God, it seems that the vice of concupiscence is inflicted by Him.
5. Likewise, that the beasts do not obey the human, this is from the divine disposition, according to which all things are wisely governed: therefore by parity of reasoning, that the lower powers do not obey the higher, this is from divine vengeance. And that this is true, many authorities of the Saints9 seem to say, who intimate that rebellion is therefore inflicted on the human, because the human was rebellious to God; but this rebellion is nothing other than the vice of concupiscence.
Conclusion.
Concupiscence, insofar as it states a punishment ordained to guilt and an underlying appetite, is from God; but not insofar as it is properly concupiscence, or insofar as it states the excess of appetite.
I respond: It must be said that there are two ways of speaking of concupiscence itself: either according as it is a punishment, or according to that which concupiscence is10. If we speak of it according as it is a punishment, thus it states an order to guilt; and in this way it has a meriting cause and an ordaining cause. For the human merits to have such a rebellion from his own guilt and disobedience; but God ordains this evil from His justice to another, pre-existing [end]. — In another way one speaks of concupiscence according to that which it is; and thus concupiscence states two things. For it states an appetite, it states nonetheless an excess in the act of appetite. The appetite, I say, that underlying one, is good and is from God. But that excess in appetition, even though it may seem to be a position, is nevertheless more a privation, and has no efficient cause, but a deficient one. And therefore, because God is the deficient cause of nothing, in this way it is not held to be from God, but rather from free choice deficient through guilt, and from the instigating devil.
But that concupiscence by reason of excess states a privation, although it may seem to state a position, this is plain. For concupiscence is, with respect to the appetitive power, what paralysis is with respect to the motive [power]. And just as a paralyzed member trembles and moves very swiftly; and this comes not from an increase of strength, but rather from a decrease of strength, nor from a strengthening of strength, but rather from its dissolution: so also in concupiscence it must be understood that the appetite blazes up in the love of a temporal thing, nor can it contain itself, but rather consists in continual motion and in the repetition of concupiscence: this, I say, must be understood to come about from a defect of the restraint, just as wild beasts are moved when their chains are broken, and ships when their rudders are destroyed11. — Therefore the reasons showing that concupiscence is not from God are to be granted, insofar as they conclude concerning concupiscence according to that which it is.
1. But to that [argument] of Augustine, who says that every punishment is just; it must be said that he understands it of punishment under the character of punishment; for thus it is just by reason of the just ordination to the preceding guilt. — It could nevertheless be said that he understands it of a punishment which is purely a punishment, that is, which is so a punishment that it is neither guilt, nor of itself ordained to guilt. But concupiscence is either guilt, or ordained to guilt; and therefore that authority has no place here12.
2. To that which is objected, that every punishment is either acted, or inflicted, or contracted; it must be said that concupiscence in Adam was acted, for the reason that by sinning he deprived himself of original justice and induced concupiscence into himself. But in us it is a contracted punishment, for the reason that from our parents we contract infected flesh, which makes concupiscence to be in the soul united to it.
3. To that which is objected, that every position is from God, and concupiscence states a position etc.; it must be said that just as limping and trembling state a certain position, because they posit an act and a progressive power; they also state nonetheless a defect and a privation — for limping posits a defect in the leg13, but trembling a defect in the moving power or an ineptitude regarding the movable — so also in the case at hand it must be understood to be, as was explained before. And by reason of that which is there of position, without doubt it is from God; but by reason of that which is there of defect and privation, no efficient cause is to be sought, but a deficient one.
4. To that which is objected, that to take away dominion belongs to God14, whose it is to give; it must be said that he to whom dominion is given can lose it through bad custody. And thus it must be understood that the human lost that dominion which his reason had over the lower powers; and this, not because it was taken away from him violently, but because, although it was in his power to conserve such dominion in himself, by his own carelessness and negligence he was unwilling15 [to do so] and lost it; just as a human, while he sins, drives away the divine grace from himself, and God is said to take it away, because by His just judgment He no longer applies [it], while the human renders himself unworthy to receive the gift of God.
5. And by this also one could respond to the following objection concerning the loss of dominion over the beasts. — It can nevertheless be said also otherwise, that it is not similar, because that a beast does not obey the human, this posits no guilt, neither in the beast, which is not subject, nor in the human, who does not preside; nevertheless it is otherwise in the sensuality and the reason. For since the sensuality fights against the reason by moving and inclining to the illicit, this very fighting is a guilt for it; and therefore such a rebellion ought not properly to be said to be from God, nor [that] God inflicted concupiscence. And if any such authorities are found, they are to be understood and expounded so that they speak of concupiscence according as it is a punishment. And thus the objections are clear16.
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- Vers. 6. — Glossa est interlinearis et habetur apud Lyranum.Verse 6. — The Gloss is interlinear and is found in Lyranus.
- Sive Hypogn. IV. c. 4. In textu August. sume malum ut praedicatum, scil. libidinem esse aliquod malum. — In eodem post ex diabolo codd. Q W aa ee et ed. 3 bonum ex Deo esse, non libidinem. Vat. omittit bonum; cod. aa post bonum subiicit vero.Or Hypognosticon IV. c. 4. In the text of Augustine take malum ("evil") as predicate, namely that lust is some evil. — In the same place, after ex diabolo ("from the devil") codd. Q W aa ee and ed. 3 [read] bonum ex Deo esse, non libidinem ("that it is a good from God, not lust"). The Vatican [edition] omits bonum ("good"); cod. aa after bonum adds vero.
- Ut Damascenus ait III. de Fide orthod. c. 6.As Damascene says, III. On the Orthodox Faith c. 6.
- Sive concupiscentia. Cfr. supra d. XXX. lit. Magistri, c. 8. In definiendo fomite Scholastici communiter sequebantur Augustinum, secundum quem concupiscentia sive fomes est quidam morbidus affectus, qui commovet ad desiderium illicitum.Or concupiscence. Cfr. above d. XXX. text of the Master, c. 8. In defining the tinder the Scholastics commonly followed Augustine, according to whom concupiscence or the tinder is a certain morbid affection, which stirs up to illicit desire.
- Libr. III. c. 18. n. 51. Verba vide supra pag. 432, nota 4.Book III. c. 18. n. 51. See the words above p. 432, note 4.
- Praepositivus, S. p. II. in quaest., utrum peccatum iusta poena sit, ait: Dicimus igitur, quod est poena contracta et poena acta et poena illata. Et poena contracta dupliciter: poena quae dicitur vitium mentis, alia infirmitas corporis vel mentis. — Vide infra d. 35. a. I. q. 2. ad 4, ubi etiam docetur, quod in poena acta sit et ratio culpae et ratio poenae.Praepositivus, Summa p. II. in the question whether sin is a just punishment, says: We say therefore that there is a contracted punishment and an acted punishment and an inflicted punishment. And a contracted punishment in two ways: a punishment which is called a vice of the mind, another an infirmity of the body or of the mind. — See below d. 35. a. I. q. 2. ad 4, where it is also taught that in an acted punishment there is both the character of guilt and the character of punishment.
- Cfr. infra d. 37. a. I. et 2.Cfr. below d. 37. a. I. and 2.
- Gal. 5, 17. — Paulo superius pro fuit auferre codd. F T sit auferre.Gal. 5, 17. — A little above, for fuit auferre codd. F T [read] sit auferre.
- Augustinus, XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 13; II. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 22. n. 36; Gregor., XXVI. Moral. c. 17. n. 28.Augustine, XIII. On the City of God, c. 13; II. On the Merits and Remission of Sins etc. c. 22. n. 36; Gregory, XXVI. Morals c. 17. n. 28.
- Augustinus, XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 24. n. 1: In originali malo duo sunt, peccatum atque supplicium... quorum unum de nostra venit audacia, id est peccatum, alterum de iudicio Dei, id est supplicium. — De seqq. cfr. infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. seq. et d. 37. n. 2. q. 1.Augustine, XXII. On the City of God, c. 24. n. 1: In the original evil there are two things, sin and chastisement... of which the one comes from our boldness, that is, sin, the other from the judgment of God, that is, chastisement. — On what follows cfr. below d. 36. a. 3. q. 1 seq. and d. 37. n. 2. q. 1.
- Alluditur ad verba Anselmi, quae habentur supra pag. 749, nota 1.It alludes to the words of Anselm, which are found above p. 749, note 1.
- Vide August., I. Retract. c. 13. n. 2, et infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2.See Augustine, I. Retractations c. 13. n. 2, and below d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2.
- Cfr. August., de Perfectione iustitiae hominis, c. 2. n. 4.Cfr. Augustine, On the Perfection of Human Justice, c. 2. n. 4.
- Edd. cum nonnullis codd. eius.The editions, with some codices, [read] eius.
- Plures codd., ut X Y aa bb ee etc., verbo noluit praemittunt custodire. Mox ante Deus primae edd. cum plurimis codd. omittunt et, pro quo cod. aa substituit quia.Several codices, as X Y aa bb ee etc., prefix custodire ("to guard") to the word noluit ("he was unwilling"). Then before Deus ("God") the first editions, with very many codices, omit et ("and"), in place of which cod. aa substitutes quia ("because").
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion on the preceding question.