Dist. 32, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 32
Articulus II.
De morbo concupiscentiae.
Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, scilicet de morbo concupiscentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.
Primo quaeritur, in quo sit concupiscentia tanquam in subiecto.
Secundo quaeritur, a quo sit tanquam a principio effectivo.
Quaestio I.
Utrum concupiscentia sit in anima, vel in carne ut in subiecto.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, in quo sit concupiscentia tanquam in subiecto, videlicet, utrum sit in anima, vel in carne. Et quod in carne, videtur:
Ad oppositum.
1. Ad Romanos septimo1 dicit Apostolus: Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae; Glossa: Video aliam legem, id est « fomitem peccati, qui regnat » in membris meis, « ut in oculo ad concupiscendum, in manu ad operandum »: ergo concupiscentia est in oculo.
2. Item, Hugo de sancto Victore2: « Vitium originis humanae duplici corruptione inficit naturam: ignorantia mentem, et concupiscentia carnem ». Si igitur ignorantia est in mente tanquam in subiecto, videtur, quod et concupiscentia sit in carne tanquam in subiecto.
3. Item, sicut se habet lex mentis ad mentem, ita se habet lex carnis ad carnem; sed lex mentis est in mente tanquam in subiecto: ergo pari ratione et lex carnis est in carne tanquam in subiecto. Sed lex carnis est concupiscentia, sicut saepe dicitur ad Romanos septimo3: ergo etc.
4. Item, concupiscentia carnis non est in anima, nisi quamdiu anima est unita carni: si ergo proprietas salvari habet in proprio subiecto, videtur, quod concupiscentia ipsa non sit in anima, quae separabilis est a carne, immo in carne ipsa.
5. Item, cuius est actus, eius est et habitus; sed carnis est concupiscere, sicut dicitur ad Galatas quinto4: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum: ergo concupiscentia est a carne.
Sed contra:
1. Augustinus de Verbis Apostoli5: « Vitium concupiscentiae est, quod anima pertrahit ex carne »; sed illud quod anima pertrahit, proprie est in anima: ergo concupiscentiae vitium est in ipsa sicut in subiecto.
2. Item, Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum6: « Concupiscentia est turpis affectio, qua anima inferiora sectatur, quae magis proprie cupiditas dicitur »; sed affectio habet esse in anima tanquam in subiecto: ergo etc.
3. Item, illius solius est concupiscere, cuius est cognoscere: ergo in illo solo est concupiscentia, in quo est cognitio; sed cognitio est in anima tanquam in subiecto: ergo et concupiscentia.
4. Item, in illo solo est concupiscentia tanquam in subiecto, in quo potest esse culpa: sed tale non est caro, sed anima: ergo etc.
5. Item, anima recedente a carne, non plus concupiscit caro quam lapis; anima vero praeter carnem concupiscere potest et desiderare, sicut et dolere: ergo videtur proprie, quod concupiscentia esse habeat in anima ut in subiecto proprio.
Conclusio.
Concupiscentia est in carne causaliter, in ratione formaliter, in sensualitate utroque modo et proprie in coniuncto.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod concupiscentia dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo dicitur concupiscentia omne desiderium nimis intensum et immoderatum, sive sit respectu boni interioris, sive exterioris sive inferioris. Et hoc modo accipitur ad Romanos septimo7 ubi dicitur in Glossa: « Bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omnia mala prohibet ». Et sic concupiscentia habet esse in vi animae appetitiva, sive dicatur vis appetitiva brutalis, sive dicatur vis appetitiva rationalis. — Alio modo sumitur concupiscentia pro appetitu delectabilis secundum tactum; et sic accipitur Ecclesiastici nono8: Propter speciem mulieris multi perierunt, et ex hoc concupiscentia quasi ignis exardescit. Haec autem concupiscentia dicitur esse in carne et in sensualitate et in rationali parte. Sed in carne est causaliter, in rationali vero parte est formaliter, in sensualitate vero utroque modo, videlicet causaliter et formaliter. — Ideo dico, quod in rationali parte et in sensualitate est formaliter, quoniam actus, qui est concupiscere, sicut vult Augustinus9 est proprie ipsius animae. Ideo vero causaliter dicitur esse in carne, quia caro infecta, iuncta animae, ex sua infectione reddit eam concupiscentem. Unde si quis vellet proprie subiectum concupiscentiae carnalis assignare, nec tantum diceret carnem, nec tantum diceret animam, sed ipsum coniunctum, ut, sicut sentire est actus coniuncti, sic etiam actus coniuncti est delectari carnaliter et concupiscere.
Propter quod nota, quod caro dupliciter sumitur in Scriptura. Aliquando dicitur caro homo exterior, carnalis et sensualis; et sic comprehendit carnem cum potentia animae sensitiva10; et hoc modo proprie est subiectum carnalis concupiscentiae. Alio modo dicitur caro pars hominis constitutiva; et hoc modo non est concedendum, quod concupiscentia sit in carne, nisi dicatur in ea esse sicut in causa. — Rationes igitur ostendentes, quod concupiscentia magis proprie est in anima quam in carne, concedendae sunt.
1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de verbo Apostoli: Video aliam legem in membris meis etc.; dicendum, quod membrum non tantum vocatur ibi caro exterior, sed etiam accipitur ibi pro carne et virtute appetitiva.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Hugone, responderi potest similiter, quod carnem accipit pro homine carnali; aut11 si caro dicatur ipsum corpus, tunc intelligit de praedicatione causali, ut concupiscentia dicatur carnem inficere, id est carnis foeditas vel corruptio, ex qua concupiscentia ipsa oritur.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de lege carnis, dicendum, quod caro accipitur ibi pro homine carnali et exteriori; et similiter in ultima auctoritate, qua dicitur: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum.
4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod in anima separata non est concupiscentia carnalis; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod caro sit proprium subiectum concupiscentiae, sed ex hoc bene sequitur, quod concupiscentia non inest animae, nisi ut carni unitae.
5. Ad ultimum iam patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt. Cum enim dicitur: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, caro ibi, secundum quod Glossa12 exponit, dicitur homo carnalis sive sensualitas carnis.
I. In utraque huius articuli quaestione solvenda Scholastici conveniunt.
De 1. quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 3. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 30. a. 1. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 108. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2.
II. Quoad 2. quaestionem Petr. a Tar. (loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2.) doctrinam S. Bonaventurae sic concise contrahit: « Concupiscentia dupliciter potest considerari: vel in comparatione ad malum, a quo est, et sic habet rationem poenae; vel in comparatione ad malum, ad quod est. Primo modo dupliciter etiam potest considerari; vel in comparatione ad causam meritoriam, sic est a nobis; vel ad causam ordinantem, sic est ex Deo. Secundo item modo dupliciter potest considerari; vel in quantum nominat appetitum, sic aliquid est, et a Deo; vel in quantum nominat excessum appetitus, sic non est a Deo, quia magis est privatio quam positio [cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1.]... Sciendum vero, quod poena duplex est: quaedam enim consistit in positione, scilicet in actione contrarii affligentis, et haec simpliciter a Deo est efficiente et movente; quaedam in privatione, scilicet in remotione alicuius perfectionis, et haec non est a Deo simpliciter (quia, quantum est in se, paratus est omnem perfectionem influere), sed secundum quid, in quantum propter dispositionem contrariam suscipientis voluntarie cessat influere. Talis autem poena est concupiscentia ». — De distinctione duplicis poenae, hic a Petro et a S. Thoma (loc. cit.) adhibita, quam S. Bonav. in hac quaestione tantum insinuat, cfr. infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 2, ubi etiam tertia species poenae distinguitur.
III. De 2. quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. loc. cit. a. 4. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit. — B. Albert., loc. cit. m. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
---
Article II.
On the disease of concupiscence.
Consequently it is asked concerning the second principal [point], namely concerning the disease of concupiscence. And about this two [questions] are asked.
First it is asked, in what concupiscence is as in a subject.
Secondly it is asked, from what it is as from an effective principle.
Question I.
Whether concupiscence is in the soul, or in the flesh as in a subject.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, in what concupiscence is as in a subject, namely, whether it is in the soul, or in the flesh. And that it is in the flesh, it seems:
To the opposite.
1. To the Romans, seventh [chapter]1, the Apostle says: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind; the Gloss: I see another law, that is, « the tinder of sin, which reigns » in my members, « as in the eye for concupiscing, in the hand for operating »: therefore concupiscence is in the eye.
2. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor2: « The vice of human origin infects nature by a twofold corruption: ignorance [infects] the mind, and concupiscence the flesh ». If therefore ignorance is in the mind as in a subject, it seems that concupiscence too is in the flesh as in a subject.
3. Likewise, as the law of the mind is related to the mind, so the law of the flesh is related to the flesh; but the law of the mind is in the mind as in a subject: therefore by parity of reasoning the law of the flesh too is in the flesh as in a subject. But the law of the flesh is concupiscence, as is often said to the Romans, seventh [chapter]3: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, the concupiscence of the flesh is not in the soul, except as long as the soul is united to the flesh: if therefore a property is to be preserved in its proper subject, it seems that concupiscence itself is not in the soul, which is separable from the flesh, but rather in the flesh itself.
5. Likewise, of whatever the act is, of it is also the habit; but concupiscing belongs to the flesh, as is said to the Galatians, fifth [chapter]4: The flesh concupisces against the spirit: therefore concupiscence is from the flesh.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine, On the Words of the Apostle5: « The vice of concupiscence is that which the soul draws from the flesh »; but that which the soul draws is properly in the soul: therefore the vice of concupiscence is in it [the soul] as in a subject.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Eighty-Three Questions6: « Concupiscence is a base affection, by which the soul pursues lower things, which is more properly called cupidity »; but an affection has its being in the soul as in a subject: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, to concupisce belongs to that alone to which knowing belongs: therefore concupiscence is in that alone in which knowledge is; but knowledge is in the soul as in a subject: therefore concupiscence too.
4. Likewise, concupiscence is as in a subject in that alone in which there can be guilt: but such is not the flesh, but the soul: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, when the soul withdraws from the flesh, the flesh concupisces no more than a stone; but the soul apart from the flesh can concupisce and desire, just as also grieve: therefore it seems properly that concupiscence has its being in the soul as in its proper subject.
Conclusion.
Concupiscence is in the flesh causally, in the reason formally, in the sensuality in both ways, and properly in the conjoined [whole].
I respond: It must be said that concupiscence is taken in two ways. In one way concupiscence is called every too-intense and immoderate desire, whether it be with respect to an interior, or exterior, or lower good. And in this way it is taken to the Romans, seventh [chapter]7, where it is said in the Gloss: « Good is the law, which, while it prohibits concupiscence, prohibits all evils ». And so concupiscence has its being in the appetitive power of the soul, whether it be called the brute appetitive power, or be called the rational appetitive power. — In another way concupiscence is taken for the appetite of the delectable according to touch; and so it is taken in Ecclesiasticus, ninth [chapter]8: On account of the beauty of a woman many have perished, and from this concupiscence is kindled like a fire. But this concupiscence is said to be in the flesh and in the sensuality and in the rational part. But in the flesh it is causally, in the rational part it is formally, in the sensuality in both ways, namely causally and formally. — Therefore I say that in the rational part and in the sensuality it is formally, since the act, which is to concupisce, as Augustine holds9, properly belongs to the soul itself. But it is said to be causally in the flesh, because the infected flesh, joined to the soul, by its own infection renders it concupiscent. Whence if one wished properly to assign the subject of carnal concupiscence, he would say neither only the flesh, nor only the soul, but the conjoined [whole] itself, so that, just as to sense is the act of the conjoined, so also the act of the conjoined is to be delighted carnally and to concupisce.
On account of which note that flesh is taken in two ways in Scripture. Sometimes flesh is called the exterior, carnal, and sensual human; and thus it comprehends the flesh with the sensitive power of the soul10; and in this way it is properly the subject of carnal concupiscence. In another way flesh is called the constitutive part of the human; and in this way it is not to be conceded that concupiscence is in the flesh, unless it be said to be in it as in a cause. — Therefore the reasons showing that concupiscence is more properly in the soul than in the flesh are to be granted.
1. To that therefore which is objected concerning the word of the Apostle: I see another law in my members etc.; it must be said that a member is there called not only the exterior flesh, but is also taken there for the flesh together with the appetitive power.
2. To that which is objected concerning Hugh, it can be answered similarly, that he takes the flesh for the carnal human; or11 if the flesh is called the body itself, then he understands it of causal predication, so that concupiscence is said to infect the flesh, that is, [it is] the foulness or corruption of the flesh, from which concupiscence itself arises.
3. To that which is objected concerning the law of the flesh, it must be said that the flesh is there taken for the carnal and exterior human; and similarly in the last authority, in which it is said: The flesh concupisces against the spirit.
4. To that which is objected, that in the separated soul there is no carnal concupiscence; it must be said that from this it does not follow that the flesh is the proper subject of concupiscence, but from this it well follows that concupiscence is not in the soul, except as united to the flesh.
5. To the last [argument] the response is already plain from those things which have been said. For when it is said: The flesh concupisces against the spirit, flesh there, according as the Gloss12 expounds, is called the carnal human or the sensuality of the flesh.
I. In solving both questions of this article the Scholastics agree.
On the 1st question: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 3. § 1. 2. — St. Thomas, Summa I. II. q. 30. a. 1. — B. Albert, Summa p. II. tr. 17. q. 108. m. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1. a. 4. little-question 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 2.
II. As to the 2nd question Petrus a Tarantasia (in the cited place, little-question 2.) concisely contracts the doctrine of S. Bonaventure thus: « Concupiscence can be considered in two ways: either in comparison to the evil from which it is, and thus it has the character of punishment; or in comparison to the evil to which it [tends]. In the first way it can also be considered in two ways: either in comparison to the meritorious cause, thus it is from us; or to the ordaining cause, thus it is from God. In the second way likewise it can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it names appetite, thus it is something, and from God; or insofar as it names the excess of appetite, thus it is not from God, because it is more a privation than a position [cfr. St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1.]... But it is to be known that punishment is twofold: for one [kind] consists in position, namely in the action of an afflicting contrary, and this is simply from God as efficient and moving [cause]; another [kind] in privation, namely in the removal of some perfection, and this is not from God simply (because, as far as it is in itself, He is ready to pour in every perfection), but in a certain respect, insofar as on account of the contrary disposition of the recipient He voluntarily ceases to pour [it] in. But such a punishment is concupiscence ». — On the distinction of the twofold punishment, here employed by Petrus and by St. Thomas (in the cited place), which S. Bonav. in this question only insinuates, cfr. below d. 36. a. 3. q. 2, where also a third species of punishment is distinguished.
III. On the 2nd question: Alexander of Hales, Summa in the cited place a. 4. — St. Thomas, here in the cited place. — B. Albert, in the cited place m. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
---
- Vers. 23. — Glossa, quae est interlinearis, habetur apud Lyranum. — In fine argumenti pro in oculo cod. aa legit in carne.Verse 23. — The Gloss, which is interlinear, is found in Lyranus. — At the end of the argument, for in oculo ("in the eye") codex aa reads in carne ("in the flesh").
- Libr. I. de Sacram. p. VII. c. 26.Book I. On the Sacraments p. VII. c. 26.
- Vers. 5. seqq.Verse 5 and following.
- Vers. 17. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. 1, ubi illa sententia: Cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus.Verse 17. — On the major [premise] cfr. Aristotle, On Sleep and Waking, c. 1, where [is] that statement: For of whatever the potency is, of it is also the act.
- Vide supra d. XXXI. lit. Magistri, c. 5.See above d. XXXI. text of the Master, c. 5.
- Quaest. 33. n. 1: Est enim et turpis [amor scil., quem paulo ante motum vocat], quo animus se ipso inferiora etc.Question 33. n. 1: For there is also a base [love, namely, which a little before he calls a motion], by which the mind [pursues] things lower than itself etc.
- Vers. 7. — Textum Glossae integrum videsis supra pag. 721, nota 2.Verse 7. — You may see the full text of the Gloss above p. 721, note 2.
- Vers. 9, in quo textu pro speciem mulieris plurimi codd. concupiscentiam mulieris.Verse 9, in which text for speciem mulieris ("the beauty of a woman") very many codices [read] concupiscentiam mulieris ("the concupiscence of a woman").
- Libr. X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 20. seq., ubi etiam de relatione inter carnem et spiritum (animam) agitur. Cfr. et XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2.Book X. On Genesis to the Letter c. 12. n. 20 seq., where also the relation between the flesh and the spirit (the soul) is treated. Cfr. also XIV. On the City of God, c. 15. n. 2.
- Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 14. et 64. (c. 1. et 4.). — De duplici significatione, quam s. Scriptura tribuit termino carnis, cfr. August., I. Retract. c. 17. et II. c. 3; Epist. 205. (alias 146.); XI. Contra Faustum, c. 7. et XXIV. c. 2. Vide etiam supra d. XXIV. lit. Magistri, c. 4. seqq. et ibid. in Comment. — Vat. sensitivae.Cfr. Aristotle, I. On the Soul, text 14 and 64 (c. 1 and 4). — On the twofold signification which Holy Scripture attributes to the term carnis ("of flesh"), cfr. Augustine, I. Retractations c. 17 and II. c. 3; Letter 205 (otherwise 146); XI. Against Faustus, c. 7 and XXIV. c. 2. See also above d. XXIV. text of the Master, c. 4 seqq. and in the same place in the Commentary. — The Vatican [edition reads] sensitivae.
- Codd. H K T aa et alii cum edd. 2, 3 perperam ut, Vat. cum ed. 1 vel.Codd. H K T aa and others, with edd. 2, 3, wrongly [read] ut, the Vatican [edition] with ed. 1 [reads] vel.
- Scil. super hunc loc., Gal. 5, 17. Verba Glossae, quae delibata est ex August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 20, haec sunt: Caro enim nihil nisi per animam concupiscit, sed concupiscere dicitur, cum anima carnali concupiscentia spiritui reluctatur. Cfr. etiam apud Lyranum Glossam super v. seq. (18.), quae sumta est ex August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 2. n. 2. et docet, nomine carnis hominem ipsum intelligi iuxta illum dicendi modum, quo totum significetur a parte.Namely on this place, Gal. 5, 17. The words of the Gloss, which is excerpted from Augustine, X. On Genesis to the Letter c. 12. n. 20, are these: For the flesh concupisces nothing except through the soul, but it is said to concupisce, when the soul by carnal concupiscence struggles against the spirit. Cfr. also in Lyranus the Gloss on the following verse (18.), which is taken from Augustine, XIV. On the City of God, c. 2. n. 2, and teaches that by the name of flesh the human himself is understood, according to that manner of speaking by which the whole is signified by a part.