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Dist. 12, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 12

Textus Latinus
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Articulus II. De ipsius materiae quantitate.

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de ipsius materiae quantitate, circa quam triplex versatur inquisitio.

Primo, quantum ad numerum. Secundo, quantum ad tempus. Tertio, quantum ad locum.

Quaestio I. Utrum caelestium et terrestrium una sit materia quantum ad esse.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum caelestium et terrestrium una sit materia quantum ad esse; supra1 enim quaesitum est de unitate materiae quantum ad essentiam. Et quod sit una, videtur.

Arg. pro parte affirmativa.

1. Communiter secundum expositores nomine terrae, cum dicitur: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram2, intelligitur materia omnium visibilium citra caelum empyreum: ergo si illa una fuit et habuit aliquam formam, ut supra3 visum est, ergo videtur, quod caelestia et terrestria ex una materia quantum ad esse sint producta.

2. Item, materia illa, ex qua formata sunt corpora, nec habebat formam caelestem nec elementarem nec consequentem ad has: ergo si aliquam habebat formam, habebat formam ad has communem et indifferentem4: ergo videtur, quod secundum aliquod esse formale sit ponere, caelestium et terrestrium materiam esse communem.

3. Item, extensio consequitur materiam non secundum suam essentiam, sed secundum aliquod esse, cum sit accidens5: ergo si communiter reperitur extensio in corporibus superioribus et inferioribus, ergo videtur, quod una sit materia communis secundum esse in caelestibus et terrestribus.

4. Item, lux est natura communis, reperta in omnibus corporibus tam caelestibus quam terrestribus, sive sit substantia, sive accidens6: ergo si forma ista corporalis non est in materia nisi secundum aliquod esse, videtur idem quod prius.

5. Item, perspicuitas est natura similiter reperta in omnibus corporibus, tam superioribus quam inferioribus, secundum plus et minus7; sed perspicuitas non tantum consequitur materiam, sed etiam formam et esse materiae, non tantum essentiam: ergo videtur, quod in omnibus corporibus, sive caelestibus sive terrenis, est ponere materiam unam secundum esse.

6. Item, rari et densi secundum esse ponitur una materia8, ergo pari ratione luminosi et opaci: et si hoc, ergo caeli et elementi.

Pro parte negativa.

Contra:

1. «Corruptibilium et incorruptibilium non est materia una», sicut vult Philosophus9; sed corpora superiora sunt incorruptibilia, et inferiora corruptibilia: ergo etc.

2. Item, quae habent eandem materiam sunt ad invicem transmutabilia10; sed corpora caelestia et terrestria non sunt ad invicem transmutabilia: ergo etc.

3. Item, materia subiecta privationi et quae

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non est subiecta privationi differunt secundum esse11; sed in caelestibus materia non est subiecta privationi, in terrestribus vero est subiecta: ergo etc.

4. Item, corpus caeleste et elementare non tantummodo differunt forma ac qualitate, sed etiam discontinuitate12: si ergo continuitas venit ab unitate materiae secundum esse, cum ista ad invicem sint discontinua, quod patet, quia unum movetur, reliquum quiescit, videtur, quod secundum esse caelestium et terrestrium non possit esse materia una.

Conclusio.

Corporum caelestium et terrestrium una fuit materia secundum esse incompletum, quod materia ante productionem habuit; sed post productionem et secundum esse completum differt eorum materia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum corpora caelestia et terrestria sint ex eadem materia secundum esse, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut secundum esse, quod materia habuit ante productionem, aut secundum esse, quod materia habet post productionem.

Conclusio 1. Si secundum esse, quod materia habuit ante productionem13, sic sine dubio una fuit materia corporum caelestium et terrestrium, quia una fuit moles, habens unam formam incompletam.

Conclusio 2. Si secundum esse, quod habet materia post productionem, quod quidem est esse completum, sic absque dubio differt materia caelestium et terrestrium quantum ad esse, tum quia sub una forma est corruptibilis, sub alia incorruptibilis, tum quia sub una forma est subiecta privationi, sub alia non. Et hoc non solum facit diversitatem in materia secundum esse quantum ad actum, immo etiam quantum ad potentiam ordinatam ad actum; quae quidem diversitas non est in materia, secundum quod est formis elementaribus subiecta. Nam etsi materia subiecta igni et aëri habeat aliud et aliud esse actuale, tamen, quia utrobique subiecta est transmutationi et privationi et possibilis ad utrumque, ideo dicuntur habere unam materiam secundum esse; in caelestibus autem corporibus et elementaribus non contingit hoc reperire.

Et ex his patent obiecta ad utramque partem.

Ad argg. pro parte affirm.

Primae enim rationes, quae ostendunt, quod caelestia corpora et elementaria communicant in materia secundum esse, loquuntur de materia quantum ad illud esse, quod habuit ante productionem, et quantum ad proprietates, quae consequuntur illud esse, sicut sunt extensio et perspicuitatis participatio.

6. Ultima tamen ratio non concludit, quae procedit per simile de raro et denso et caelesti et elementari. Non enim est simile, quia rarum et densum sunt ad invicem transmutabilia, non sic corpora caelestia et elementaria; et loquor de potestate14 transmutandi secundum naturam, non secundum virtutem divinam.

Ad argg. pro parte negat.

Rationes vero ad oppositum concludunt, quod materia secundum esse non est eadem in caelestibus et terrestribus post ipsorum productionem, sicut patet discurrendo per singulas.

Alius modus distinguendi.

Aliter posset dici, et quasi in idem redit, quoniam quadrupliciter potest intelligi et esse unitas in materia: aut quantum ad essentiam, aut quantum ad esse incompletum et a completione remotum, aut secundum esse incompletum, completioni proximum, aut secundum esse simpliciter completum. Et secundum hoc distinguitur materia, quod quaedam est subiecta formae substantiali tantum, quaedam formae substantiali et extensioni sive quantitati, quaedam formae substantiali et quantitati et contrarietati, quaedam formae substantiali et quantitati, non contrarietati, et in omnibus suis partibus uniformitati. —

Conclusiones.

Primo modo dicitur esse eadem materia spiritualium et corporalium, sicut supra fuit ostensum15; secundo modo, caelestium et terrestrium, sive corruptibilium corporum et incorruptibilium; tertio modo, corporum elementarium et ad invicem transmutabilium; quarto modo, corporum specie et natura similium. Primo igitur et secundo modo eadem est materia caelestium et terrestrium, sicut primae rationes ostendunt; tertio et quarto modo non, sicut concludunt rationes inductae ad oppositum.

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Scholion

I. Haec quaestio orta est ex opinione tunc communi et nunc obsoleta, quae tenebat, corpora caelestia esse naturaliter incorruptibilia. Dissensio autem in solvenda hac nostra quaestione fuit iam inter philosophos Arabes, scil. Avicennam et Averroem, quorum primus unitatem materiae esse in omnibus corporibus affirmavit, alter negavit, immo in libro de Substantia orbis docet, caelum esse substantiam simplicem et materia carentem. Cum B. Alberto et Richardo a Med. S. Thomas (hic q. unica, a. 1; S. I. q. 66. a. 2.) sententiae negativae magis adhaeret. Has opiniones Petr. a Tar. (hic q. unica, a. 1.) sic explanat: «Dicunt quidam, quod non secundum essentiam nec secundum esse est una et eadem materia horum, nec in genere nec in specie nec numero — nisi genus accipiatur secundum communitatem analogicam, sicut si ens diceretur genus ad decem praedicamenta — sed diversa propter diversitatem potentiae continentis ipsa. Alii vero dicunt, quod eadem est per essentiam etiam numero, sed differt secundum esse, prout accipitur ut concreta formis diversis vel genere vel specie vel numero». Ipse utramque sententiam iudicat esse probabilem. — S. Bonav. sequitur secundam opinionem, et clare eam determinat in fine totius quaestionis. Consentiunt Ægid. R. (hic q. 3. a. 1.), Scot. (I. Sent. d. 14. q. 1. n. 4; de Rerum princip. q. 8. a. 4.) et etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 44. m. 2.), qui tamen aliter sentit quoad empyreum. De hac materia plura dicta sunt supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3.

II. Praeter citatos: B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 1. a. 4; S. p. II. tr. I. q. 4. m. 1. a. 1. partic. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 7. 9. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Article II. On the quantity of matter itself.

Consequently the question is asked concerning the second article, namely concerning the quantity of matter itself, about which a threefold inquiry is conducted.

First, as regards number. Second, as regards time. Third, as regards place.

Question I. Whether the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is one as regards being.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and asks whether the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is one as regards being; for above1 the question was asked concerning the unity of matter as regards essence. And that it is one, seems [to be the case].

Argument for the affirmative.

1. According to expositors, by the name earth, when it is said: In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth2, is commonly understood the matter of all visible things this side of the empyrean heaven: therefore if that [matter] was one and had some form, as was seen above3, therefore it seems that celestial and terrestrial things were produced from one matter as regards being.

2. Likewise, that matter from which the bodies were formed had neither celestial form nor elemental form nor any form consequent upon these: therefore if it had some form, it had a form common and indifferent to these4: therefore it seems that, as regards some formal being, one must hold that the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is common.

3. Likewise, extension follows upon matter not according to its essence, but according to some being, since it is an accident5: therefore if extension is commonly found in superior and inferior bodies, therefore it seems that there is one common matter as regards being in celestial and terrestrial things.

4. Likewise, light is a common nature, found in all bodies, both celestial and terrestrial, whether it be a substance or an accident6: therefore if that corporeal form is not in matter except according to some being, it seems the same as before.

5. Likewise, transparency is a nature similarly found in all bodies, both superior and inferior, according to more and less7; but transparency follows not only upon matter, but also upon form and the being of matter, not only upon essence: therefore it seems that in all bodies, whether celestial or earthly, one must posit one matter according to being.

6. Likewise, one matter is posited as regards being for the rare and the dense8; therefore by parity of reasoning, for the luminous and the opaque; and if this, therefore for the heaven and the element.

For the negative.

On the contrary:

1. «Of corruptible and incorruptible things there is not one matter», as the Philosopher holds9; but the superior bodies are incorruptible, and the inferior corruptible: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, things which have the same matter are mutually transmutable10; but celestial and terrestrial bodies are not mutually transmutable: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, matter subject to privation and [matter] which is not subject to privation differ as regards being11; but in celestial things matter is not subject to privation, whereas in terrestrial things it is subject [to it]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a celestial body and an elemental body differ not only in form and quality, but also in discontinuity12: if therefore continuity comes from the unity of matter as regards being, since these are mutually discontinuous — which is clear, because one moves while the other rests — it seems that as regards being there cannot be one matter of celestial and terrestrial things.

Conclusion.

Of celestial and terrestrial bodies there was one matter according to the incomplete being which matter had before production; but after production and according to complete being, their matter differs.

I respond: It must be said that, when one asks whether celestial and terrestrial bodies are from the same matter as regards being, this can be understood in two ways: either as regards the being which matter had before production, or as regards the being which matter has after production.

Conclusion 1. If as regards the being which matter had before production13, thus without doubt the matter of celestial and terrestrial bodies was one, because it was one mass, having one incomplete form.

Conclusion 2. If as regards the being which matter has after production, which is indeed complete being, thus beyond doubt the matter of celestial and terrestrial things differs as regards being, both because under the one form it is corruptible, under the other incorruptible, and because under the one form it is subject to privation, under the other not. And this produces diversity in matter as regards being not only with respect to act, but also with respect to potency ordered to act; which diversity is not in matter insofar as it is subject to elemental forms. For although matter subject to fire and to air has one and another actual being, nevertheless, because in both cases it is subject to transmutation and privation and is capable of both, therefore they are said to have one matter as regards being; in celestial bodies and elemental ones, however, it does not happen that this is found.

And from these things the objections to either side are plain.

To the arguments for the affirmative.

For the first reasons, which show that celestial bodies and elemental bodies share in matter as regards being, speak of matter as regards that being which it had before production, and as regards the properties which follow upon that being, such as extension and the participation of transparency.

6. The last reason, however, does not conclude, which proceeds by likeness from the rare and the dense to the celestial and the elemental. For there is no likeness, because the rare and the dense are mutually transmutable, but not so celestial and elemental bodies; and I am speaking of the power14 of transmuting according to nature, not according to divine power.

To the arguments for the negative.

The reasons to the contrary, however, conclude that matter is not the same as regards being in celestial and terrestrial things after their production, as is plain by running through them one by one.

Another way of distinguishing.

It could be put otherwise, and almost amounts to the same thing, since unity in matter can be understood and exist in a fourfold way: either as regards essence, or as regards incomplete being and being remote from completion, or as regards incomplete being proximate to completion, or as regards simply complete being. And accordingly matter is distinguished thus: that some is subject to substantial form alone, some to substantial form and extension or quantity, some to substantial form and quantity and contrariety, some to substantial form and quantity, not to contrariety, and to uniformity in all its parts. —

Conclusions.

In the first way, the matter of spiritual and corporeal things is said to be the same, as was shown above15; in the second way, of celestial and terrestrial things, or of corruptible and incorruptible bodies; in the third way, of elemental bodies, mutually transmutable; in the fourth way, of bodies similar in species and nature. Therefore in the first and second way, the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is the same, as the first reasons show; in the third and fourth way, not, as the reasons brought forward to the contrary conclude.

Scholion

I. This question arose from the then-common and now-obsolete opinion which held that celestial bodies are naturally incorruptible. The disagreement, however, in solving this our question already existed among the Arabian philosophers, namely Avicenna and Averroes, of whom the first affirmed the unity of matter to be in all bodies, the other denied it, and indeed in the book On the Substance of the Orb teaches that heaven is a simple substance lacking matter. With Blessed Albert and Richard of Mediavilla, St. Thomas (here, sole question, a. 1; Summa I, q. 66, a. 2) more strongly adheres to the negative opinion. Petrus a Tarantasia (here, sole question, a. 1) explains these opinions thus: «Some say that neither according to essence nor according to being is the matter of these things one and the same, neither in genus nor in species nor in number — unless genus be taken according to analogical commonality, as if being were called the genus of the ten predicaments — but they are diverse on account of the diversity of the potency which contains them. Others, however, say that it is the same by essence even in number, but it differs according to being, insofar as it is taken as concreted with diverse forms whether of genus or of species or of number». He himself judges each opinion to be probable. — St. Bonaventure follows the second opinion, and clearly determines it at the end of the whole question. Giles of Rome (here q. 3, a. 1), Scotus (I Sent. d. 14, q. 1, n. 4; On the Principles of Things q. 8, a. 4), and also Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. II, q. 44, m. 2) agree, the latter however taking a different view regarding the empyrean. On this matter more was said above at d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2–3.

II. Besides those cited: Bl. Albert, II Sent. d. 1, a. 4; Summa, p. II, tr. I, q. 4, m. 1, a. 1, partic. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 7, 9. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Dist. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. seq.
    Distinction 3, part I, article 1, question 2 and following.
  2. Gen. 1, 1. — Cfr. supra d. 11. lit. Magistri, c. 4. et ibid. in Comment. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et infra dub. 1. — Mox cod. aa sed per terram intelligitur... et per caelum caelum empyreum.
    Gen. 1, 1. — Cf. above d. 11, the Littera Magistri, c. 4, and ibid. in the Commentary, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, and below, dubium 1. — Just below, codex aa [reads] but by «earth» is understood... and by «heaven» the empyrean heaven.
  3. Art. praeced. q. 1. seq.
    The preceding article, q. 1 and following.
  4. Notum est, Scotum aliosque multum disputare pro forma corporeitatis. Cfr. etiam Avicenna, l. Sufficientiae, c. 2. seq. — Gul. Mara, hic q. 4. hoc arg. ita exhibet: Forma corporeitatis est unius rationis in omnibus, ergo et materia, quia propriae formae correspondet propria materia. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 26. (c. 2.) et II. de Anima, text. 26. (c. 2.). — Paulo superius plures codd. ad haec pro ad has.
    It is well known that Scotus and others greatly debated on behalf of a form of corporeity. Cf. also Avicenna, Sufficientia, c. 2 and following. — William of Mara, here q. 4, sets out this argument thus: The form of corporeity is of one nature in all things; therefore so is the matter, because to a proper form corresponds proper matter. Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 26 (c. 2), and On the Soul II, text 26 (c. 2). — A little above, several codices [read] ad haec for ad has.
  5. Cfr. Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 17. (II. c. 5.) et VII. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text 17 (II, c. 5), and VII, text 8 (VI, c. 3).
  6. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 68. (c. 7.). — Quaestio illa: utrum lux sit substantia, an accidens, solvitur infra d. 13. a. 2. q. 2.
    Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 68 (c. 7). — That question — whether light is a substance or an accident — is resolved below at d. 13, a. 2, q. 2.
  7. Aristot., de Sensu et sens., c. 3.
    Aristotle, On Sense and the Sensible, c. 3.
  8. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 84. (c. 9.).
    Aristotle, Physics IV, text 84 (c. 9).
  9. Libr. VIII. Metaph. text. 12. seqq. et XII. text. 10. et 26. (VII. c. 4. et XI. c. 2. et 5.). Cfr. supra pag. 97, nota 2.
    Metaphysics VIII, text 12 and following, and XII, text 10 and 26 (VII, c. 4, and XI, c. 2 and 5). Cf. above p. 97, note 2.
  10. Cfr. supra pag. 91, nota 6. et pag. 93, nota 8, ubi verba Augustini et Boethii allegantur.
    Cf. above p. 91, note 6, and p. 93, note 8, where the words of Augustine and Boethius are alleged.
  11. Averroes, X. Metaph. text. 26. (IX. c. 10.) ait: Illud enim, per quod differt corruptibile ab incorruptibili, est differentia privationis diversarum potentiarum duarum, scil. quod corruptibile differt ab incorruptibili, quia alterum habet ad corruptionem potentiam, et alterum non habet potentiam ad corruptionem; contraria vero, quae sunt in eodem genere, differunt, quoniam in genere communi eis sunt duae potentiae diversae, quarum una recipit alterum contrariorum, et altera alterum. Et ideo corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt diversa non secundum formam tantum, sed secundum formam et genus.
    Averroes, Metaphysics X, text 26 (IX, c. 10) says: For that by which corruptible differs from incorruptible is the difference of privation of two diverse potencies, namely that corruptible differs from incorruptible because the one has a potency for corruption and the other does not have a potency for corruption; contraries, however, which are in the same genus, differ because in the genus common to them there are two diverse potencies, of which one receives one of the contraries and the other the other. And therefore corruptible and incorruptible are diverse not according to form alone, but according to form and genus.
  12. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 11. seq. (IV. c. 6.) inter ea quae unum dicuntur, recenset illa quae una sunt «aut continuatione, aut forma, aut ratione... Quare maxime linearum circuli linea una est, quoniam tota et perfecta est». Quae verba Averroes applicat ad corpus caeleste, dicens: «Et ideo corpus caeleste est unum per continuationem et per formam totalem et per motum unum continuum». Insuper, II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 30. et 47. (c. 4. et 8.), Aristot. docet, corpora caelestia non esse continua cum istis inferioribus, sed tantum in se.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 11 and following (IV, c. 6), among the things which are called one, recounts those which are one «either by continuity, or by form, or by account (ratione)... Wherefore the line of the circle is most of all one among lines, because it is whole and perfect». Which words Averroes applies to the celestial body, saying: «And therefore the celestial body is one through continuation and through total form and through one continuous motion». Furthermore, in On the Heaven and the World II, text 30 and 47 (c. 4 and 8), Aristotle teaches that celestial bodies are not continuous with these lower ones, but only among themselves.
  13. In cod. Y additur id est, antequam ex illa corpora producerentur distincta, scilicet superiora et inferiora, quando scilicet habebat adhuc istud esse incompletum sub forma incompleta.
    In codex Y is added that is, before from it the bodies were produced as distinct, namely superior and inferior, that is, when it still had this incomplete being under an incomplete form.
  14. Ed. 1 cum Vat. possibilitate.
    Edition 1 with the Vatican [edition reads] possibilitate [for potestate].
  15. Dist. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. seq. — Paulo superius fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 et contrarietati pro non contrarietati, sed contra subnexa.
    Distinction 3, part I, article 1, question 2 and following. — A little above, almost all codices with edition 1 [read] et contrarietati for non contrarietati, but the contrary is subjoined.
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