Bonaventure

I. Communiter docetur, subiectum virtutis theologicae, huius est spes, esse voluntatem rationalem; a qua doctrina auctor noster non discedit, licet doceat, eandem esse in vi irascibili. Ut autem eiusdem modus loquendi differens ab eo, quem s. Thomas, Scotus aliique posteriores communiter sequuntur, intelligatur, duo breviter discutere debemus, scilicet, utrum in voluntate rationali, simili modo ut in sensibili, admittenda sit distinctio aliqua inter vim concupiscibilem et irascibilem; tum, hoc concesso, utrum spes speciali modo sit in irascibili.

1. Quoad 1. quaestionem non defuerunt qui in superiori parte animae distinguerent irascibilem tanquam potentiam diversam a potentia concupiscibili. Alii vero cum Henrico Gandav. (Quodl. 8. q. 15.) in una potentia voluntatis rationalis duplicem vim, scilicet concupiscibilem et irascibilem, distinxerunt. Contra hunc Henrici modum loquendi arguit Scot. (hic n. 6. seqq.); et communiter posteriores Scholastici cum S. Thoma (cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. q. 2. a. 3.) non admittunt in voluntate rationali irascibilem proprie dictam, tamen aliquid simile eidem attribuunt. Quod etiam Scot. (III. Sent. d. 31. n. 13.) minime negat dicens: «In parte autem rationali possunt habere similem distinctionem obiectorum, sicut in parte sensitiva: nam voluntati est aliquid primo delectabile, puta bonum sibi conveniens secundum se, vel conveniens appetitui sensitivo, cui coniungitur in eodem supposito. Potest etiam habere voluntas obiectum offendens ei secundum rectam rationem et contra rectam rationem, et respicere illud ut offendens actu nolendi repulsivo et imperioso. Non tamen est tanta distinctio horum in voluntate, quanta est in appetitu sensitivo... nec oportet dicere magis, quod alterum istorum est vis, et alterum potentia, quam e converso... De vi autem nescio quid oporteat loqui; est enim verbum superfluum» etc. — Aliter loquitur S. Bonav., qui (II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. I. in corp. circa finem et cfr. ibi q. 3.) de concupiscibili et irascibili in voluntate affirmat, quod «potius dicuntur diversae vires quam diversae potentiae»; quod etiam expressius repetit infra d. 33. q. 3. in corp. et etiam ad I. Idem (II. Sent. d. 23. p. I. q. 6. ad 2.): «Voluntas autem non dicit aliam potentiam per essentiam a concupiscibili et irascibili, sed nominat ipsum appetitum ut ratiocinatum sive rationi coniunctum, et sic eius regere est et imperare. Concupiscibilis autem et irascibilis eandem potentiam affectivam nominant, in quantum tamen habent regi; et ita dicuntur inferiores, non quantum ad naturam potentiae, sed quantum ad officium» etc. Praescindendo a modo loquendi, reapse sententia Seraphici et Alexandri Hal. quoad hanc distinctionem vix differt a communiore opinione, secundum quam Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 7.) dicit, quod in parte rationali animae probabilius irascibilis non sit «secundum proprietatem, sed secundum aliquam aequivalentem similitudinem». Quidquid enim potest virtus inferior, potest superior, et non econverso; unde sicut a parte cognitivae ratio recompensat sensus interioris et exterioris apprehensionem, sic a parte motivae voluntas, tanquam superior, habet in se concupiscibilis et irascibilis actum et virtutem modo nobiliori. Spes ergo est in voluntate, in quantum ipsa habet actum irascibili similem¹ (cfr. s. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 10. a. I. q. 2. ad 4. et scholion).

In hoc unico Scot. recedit a nostro auctore, quod ille irascibili tribuit non nisi actum nolendi et vindicandi obiectum offendens, ita dicens (hic d. 34. n. 11.): «Irascibilis igitur habet pro obiecto arduum sive appetibile, quod est obiectum concupiscibilis, sed ipsum offendens, ita quod actus eius adaequatus est rem vindicare, vel nolle offendens» etc. Una posita opinione, iam sequitur, quod spes non possit esse in irascibili, et quod spes et caritas solummodo perficiant concupiscibilem, quia Deus, quem habent pro obiecto, «est tantum volibilis, non nollibilis» (ibid. n. 11.). — Sed S. Bonav. irascibili praeter illum actum respuendi malum, tribuit etiam alium actum, scilicet erigendi se ad arduum. Dicit enim (II. Sent. d. 10. a. I. q. 2. ad 5, et passim hic et q. praeced.), quod actus irascibilis «vel consistit respectu disconvenientis vincendi, vel respectu ardui aggrediendi, et ita vel arduum, vel disconvenientiam dicit». Quo supposito, etiam Beatis qualiscumque actus irascibilis non disconvenit (infra d. 33. q. 3. ad I.).

2. Quaestio 2. a S. Thoma, Scoto, Richardo aliisque posterioribus solvitur responsione negativa, a S. Bonav. vero, Alexandro Hal. et B. Alberto (qui tamen rem aliter explicat) affirmativa; quae differentia ex praedictis, praesertim ex verbis Petri a Tar., fere componi potest. Unde S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 2. ad I.) ad mentem S. Bonaventurae responsionem negativam sic limitat: «nisi forte ipsam Voluntatem, in quantum habet actus similes actibus irascibilis, dicamus irascibilem. Sed tunc irascibilis et concupiscibilis non erunt diversae potentiae, sed nominabunt eandem potentiam, scilicet voluntatem, secundum diversos actus». Quando autem S. Bonav. cum Alexandro

approbat effatum, «quod consuevit dici, quod tres virtutes theologicae sunt in rationali et concupiscibili et irascibili» (II. Sent. d. 23. p. I. q. 6. ad 2.); non in eo sensu vult distinguere spem a caritate, quasi spes sit primo et per se in sola irascibili, qualem ipse attribuit voluntati; caritas vero in concupiscibili; sed, ni fallimur, ideo asserit, caritatem (quae habet pro obiecto proprio solam Dei bonitatem in se) solam concupiscibilem perficere, quia ipsa praescindit a quocumque respectu ad malum, sive illud sit oppositum ipsi summo bono, quod est cavendum, sive sit minus conveniens subiecto deficienti, id est ipsi speranti ut aliquod arduum, quod vires eius excedit; spem autem ita docet perficere concupiscibilem, ut etiam irascibilem erigat ad arduum summum superandum (cfr. scholion ad praecedentem quaest.). Simili explicatione Matth. Hauzeur (Collatio totius theol. t. II. col. 566.) ipsius Scot. verba in concordiam cum doctrina Alexandri Hal. et Bonaventurae redigere conatur.

II. Praeter locos citatos: S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 18. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 3.

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I. It is commonly taught that the subject of the theological virtue—of which kind is hope—is the rational will; from which doctrine our author does not depart, although he teaches that the same is in the irascible faculty. But in order that his manner of speaking, differing from that which St. Thomas, Scotus, and other later writers commonly follow, may be understood, we must briefly discuss two things, namely, whether in the rational will, in a manner similar to that in the sensible, some distinction is to be admitted between the concupiscible and the irascible faculty; then, this being granted, whether hope is in a special way in the irascible.

1. As to the 1st question, there were not lacking those who, in the superior part of the soul, distinguished the irascible as a power diverse from the concupiscible power. Others, however, with Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 8, q. 15), distinguished in the one power of the rational will a twofold faculty, namely concupiscible and irascible. Against this manner of speaking of Henry, Scotus argues (here n. 6 ff.); and the later Scholastics commonly, with St. Thomas (cf. III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 3), do not admit in the rational will an irascible properly so called, yet they attribute something similar to it. Which Scotus too (III Sent. d. 31, n. 13) by no means denies, saying: «In the rational part, moreover, they can have a similar distinction of objects, as in the sensitive part: for to the will there is something first delectable, namely a good agreeable to itself in itself, or agreeable to the sensitive appetite, to which it is joined in the same supposit. The will can also have an object offending it according to right reason and against right reason, and regard it as offending by an act of repulsive and imperious refusal. Yet there is not so great a distinction of these in the will as there is in the sensitive appetite... nor is it necessary to say rather that one of these is a faculty, and the other a power, than conversely... Concerning the faculty, moreover, I know not what one ought to say; for it is a superfluous word» etc. — Otherwise speaks St. Bonaventure, who (II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. I, in corp. near the end, and cf. there q. 3) concerning the concupiscible and irascible in the will affirms that «they are rather called diverse faculties than diverse powers»; which he also more expressly repeats below at d. 33, q. 3, in corp. and also ad I. The same (II Sent. d. 23, p. I, q. 6, ad 2): «The will, moreover, does not name another power essentially distinct from the concupiscible and irascible, but names the appetite itself as reasoned or conjoined to reason, and thus its to-rule is also to-command. The concupiscible and irascible, moreover, name the same affective power, insofar however as they have to be ruled; and so they are called inferior, not as regards the nature of the power, but as regards office» etc. Prescinding from the manner of speaking, in fact the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor and of Alexander of Hales, as regards this distinction, scarcely differs from the more common opinion, according to which Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 7) says that in the rational part of the soul it is more probable that the irascible is not «according to property, but according to some equivalent likeness». For whatever the inferior virtue can do, the superior can, and not conversely; whence just as on the side of the cognitive reason compensates for the apprehension of the interior and exterior sense, so on the side of the motive the will, as superior, has in itself the act and virtue of the concupiscible and irascible in a nobler manner. Hope therefore is in the will, insofar as it has an act similar to the irascible¹ (cf. St. Bonav., I Sent. d. 10, a. I, q. 2, ad 4 and scholion).

In this one thing Scotus recedes from our author, that he attributes to the irascible only the act of refusing and avenging an offending object, thus saying (here d. 34, n. 11): «The irascible therefore has for its object the arduous or appetible, which is the object of the concupiscible, but as offending it, so that its adequate act is to avenge a thing, or to nill an offending thing» etc. With the one opinion posited, it now follows that hope cannot be in the irascible, and that hope and charity perfect only the concupiscible, because God, whom they have for object, «is only willable, not nillable» (ibid. n. 11). — But St. Bonaventure attributes to the irascible, besides that act of rejecting evil, also another act, namely of raising itself to the arduous. For he says (II Sent. d. 10, a. I, q. 2, ad 5, and passim here and in the preceding q.) that the act of the irascible «either consists in respect of a disagreeable thing to be conquered, or in respect of an arduous thing to be attacked, and thus says either the arduous or disagreeableness». Which being supposed, even to the Blessed an act of the irascible of whatever kind is not unfitting (below d. 33, q. 3, ad I).

2. Question 2 is solved by St. Thomas, Scotus, Richard, and other later writers by a negative response, but by St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, and Bl. Albert (who however explains the matter otherwise) by an affirmative one; which difference can, from the foregoing, especially from the words of Peter of Tarentaise, almost be composed. Whence St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 2, ad I) thus limits the negative response to the mind of St. Bonaventure: «unless perhaps we call the Will itself irascible insofar as it has acts similar to the acts of the irascible. But then the irascible and the concupiscible will not be diverse powers, but will name the same power, namely the will, according to diverse acts». But when St. Bonaventure with Alexander

approves the dictum «which it is customary to say, that the three theological virtues are in the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible» (II Sent. d. 23, p. I, q. 6, ad 2); he does not in that sense wish to distinguish hope from charity, as if hope were primarily and per se in the irascible alone, such as he attributes to the will; but charity in the concupiscible; rather, unless we are mistaken, he asserts that charity (which has for its proper object the goodness of God alone in itself) perfects the concupiscible alone, because it prescinds from every respect to evil, whether that be opposed to the supreme good itself, which is to be avoided, or be less agreeable to the deficient subject, that is, to the one hoping, as some arduous thing which exceeds his powers; but hope he so teaches to perfect the concupiscible, that it also raises the irascible to overcoming the supreme arduous thing (cf. the scholion to the preceding question). By a similar explanation Matthew Hauzeur (Collatio totius theol. t. II, col. 566) endeavors to reduce the words of Scotus himself into concord with the doctrine of Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure.

II. Besides the places cited: St. Thomas, S. II–II, q. 18, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5, q. 3.

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