Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 26, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus

p. 582

# Dubia circa litteram Magistri

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illa definitione, quam ponit, cum dicit: Spes est virtus, qua spiritualia et aeterna bona sperantur. Si enim bonum aeternum est unum solum, videtur, quod male dicat pluraliter: qua aeterna bona sperantur. — Item, nullum aeternum est temporale; sed omne futurum est temporale: igitur cum per spem exspectantur futura bona, sicut dicitur in alia^p582-1 definitione; videtur, quod per ipsam non exspectentur bona aeterna.

Propter hoc quaeritur, quae sit differentia inter illa duo membra, videlicet inter spiritualia bona et aeterna.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod spes definitur hic per comparationem ad obiectum proprium. Obiectum autem ipsius spei est ipsum bonum aeternum et gloriosum. Hoc autem est duplex, scilicet creatum et increatum; et respectu utriusque est spes, principaliter tamen respectu Boni increati^p582-2. — Et secundum hoc dupliciter potest intelligi praedicta definitio; et si intelligatur de Bono increato, tunc spes dicitur exspectare aeterna bona, quae quidem, quantum est in se, carent principio et fine. Si autem intelligatur de bono creato, tunc dicitur exspectare bona aeterna, id est perpetua. — Utroque tamen modo pluraliter dicitur exspectare bona aeterna, non quia plura sint bona summa, sed quia bonum aeternum, quod est ipsa immensa Bonitas, omnia bona excellit per sui eminentiam; et bonum perpetuum, quod est beatitudo creata, omnia bona comprehendit per aequivalentiam. Et ideo pluraliter dixit aeterna, non propter aeternitatis multitudinem, sed propter boni exspectati omnimodam plenitudinem.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod est exspectatio boni futuri; dicendum, quod nihil impedit, aliquod bonum esse aeternum in se, et temporaliter ab aliquo haberi in praemio; et sic est in mercede, quae exspectatur per spem, quod^p582-3 aeterna est in se, et tamen futura est exspectanti, qui ad eam nondum pervenit.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quae differentia sit inter illa duo membra; dicendum, quod primum membrum explicatur per secundum, quia ibi ponitur et pro id est^p582-4, ut sit sensus: spiritualia, id est aeterna. — Vel potest dici, quod per hanc differentiam spiritualia distinguitur spes ab affectione naturali; per hoc autem, quod dicitur aeterna, distinguitur a virtute cardinali, et tangitur propria ratio spei, quae est in bonum sub ratione aeterni^p582-5. — Vel potest dici, quod per hoc quod dicitur spiritualia, tangitur obiectum generale, quod habet rationem materialis, secundum quod consuevit dici, quod spes quaedam est veniae, quaedam gratiae, quaedam gloriae. Per hoc autem quod dicitur aeternum, tangitur obiectum proprium et formale sive motivum^p582-6.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de alia definitione, quam ponit ibi: Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis, proveniens ex gratia et meritis; quia, secundum quod dicit Philosophus^p582-7, «peccat qui definit, quod est in motu per id quod est in quiete, et e converso»; sed exspectare est quiescere, sperare quodam modo est tendere in rem speratam: ergo male definitur per exspectationem. — Item, «omnis notificatio debet dari per propria^p582-8»; sed beatitudo et gratia et merita sunt ceteris virtutibus communia: ergo inconvenienter spes definitur per illa.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum «unius rei sit unum esse, et ita una definitio^p582-9», quomodo differt praedicta notificatio ab aliis notificationibus, quae consueverunt assignari de spe?

p. 583

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod spes est nomen affectionis et est nomen virtutis. Secundum quod est nomen affectionis, sic definitur a Philosopho^p583-1: «Spes est suspicio futuri boni». — Secundum autem quod est nomen virtutis et nominat habitum, sic habet definiri et notificari per suum actum. Actus autem ille tripliciter potest comparari: vel ad obiectum tantum, et sic est illa definitio Magistri^p583-2: «spes est virtus, qua spiritualia et aeterna bona sperantur»; vel ad obiectum et principium, et sic est illa Haymonis^p583-3: «Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis, veniens ex gratia et meritis»; vel ad obiectum et habitum praeambulum, et sic est illa Augustini de Civitate Dei^p583-4: «Spes est virtus, qua quis se ad illud quod credit, perventurum praesumit».

Aliter etiam potest assignari distinctio inter istas notificationes, quod prima sit formalis, data per genus et differentias; secunda causalis, data per actum et causam; tertia vero partim causalis, partim formalis, quia datur per genus^p583-5 spei et aliam virtutem praeambulam, scilicet fidem, quae tangitur in verbo credendi.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod exspectatio est quies; dicendum, quod quamvis sit quies corporalis, tamen est quaedam sollicitatio mentis. Qui enim exspectat adventum desiderat exspectati; exspectatio vero, secundum quod ponitur in definitione spei, non est exspectatio corporalis, sed magis mentalis, quae est quaedam inhiatio^p583-6 et protensio respectu finis assequendi.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec notificatio data est per communia; dicendum, quod illa communia, secundum quod in hac notificatione ponuntur, sunt appropriata. Nam beatitudo appropriatur ipsi spei ratione ultimae dotis, quae quidem est perfecta tentio, correspondens ipsi spei, et ea ratione, qua nomine beatitudinis intelligimus bonum excellens et indeficiens^p583-7. Similiter gratia et merita eidem appropriantur, prout iunguntur insimul. Gratia enim respicit Dei benignitatem et misericordiam; merita vero Dei aequitatem et iustitiam. Quoniam vero virtutis spei est proprie utrumque respicere, ut liberet a desperatione et praesumtione, quae solummodo alterum intuentur; ideo proprie convenit ipsi spei, quod dicitur «veniens ex gratia et meritis»: meritis, inquam, praecedentibus vel in proposito, vel in radice, vel in usu, sicut in praecedentibus^p583-8 fuit ostensum.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Et sicut fides, ita et spes est de invisibilibus. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia, si fides et spes communicant in obiecto: ergo sunt eadem virtus. — Item, in temporalibus ita bene potest quis sperare pecuniam, quam videt, sicut pecuniam, quam non videt: ergo pari ratione et in spiritualibus: ergo spes non debet dici esse de invisibilibus. — Item, spes respicit ipsum affectum, visibile autem et invisibile respicit intellectum: ergo si obiectum et habitus respiciunt eandem potentiam, male dicitur spes esse de invisibilibus^p583-9.

p. 584

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in aeternis bonis perfecte videre habere est, sicut dicit Augustinus^p584-1; propter quod dicitur Ioannis decimo septimo: Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te verum Deum etc. Ideo respectu eorundem bonorum spiritualium non videre et non habere se mutuo concomitantur. Quoniam ergo spes est de non habitis — quia nemo sperat illud quod habet, sed illud quod habendum est — et respectu aeternorum bonorum non habitum est non visum; hinc est, quod Magister dicit, quod sicut fides est de invisibilibus, ita et spes. In hoc tamen est differentia^p584-2, quod fides est de invisibilibus, secundum quod sunt invisibilia; spes autem est de invisibilibus, secundum quod sunt non habita, sed habenda. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod communicant in obiecto; dicendum, quod non sub eadem ratione respiciunt illud obiectum, sed sub alia et alia.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in temporalibus bene potest quis sperare quod videt, sic et^p584-3 in spiritualibus; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia videre corporalia non est illa habere; sed bona aeterna videre est illa possidere.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod invisibile respicit intellectum; dicendum, quod verum est sub ratione invisibilis; nihilominus potest respicere affectum sub ratione non habiti^p584-4.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Spes non est nisi bonarum rerum nec nisi futurarum et ad eum pertinentium, qui sperat. Contra hoc enim obiicitur primo ratione primi membri: quia dicit poëta^p584-5:

Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem:

ergo spes est malarum rerum. — Item, sicut aliquis exspectat propriam exaltationem, ita exspectat adversarii sui confusionem: ergo sicut exspectat bonum suum, ita exspectare potest malum alienum.

Item, obiicitur contra secundum membrum, quod dicit nonnisi futurarum: quia beatitudo est futura nec habenda a praescito: ergo si spes non est nisi rerum futurarum, nullus praescitus habet spem.

Item, obiicitur contra tertium membrum, quod dicit ad eum pertinentium: quia Lucae ultimo^p584-6 dicitur: Nos autem sperabamus, quod ipse redempturus esset Israel: ergo contingit sperare bonum commune: non ergo tantum spes est respectu boni proprii. — Item, Augustinus^p584-7 dicit, quod «de nemine desperandum est, dum est in via»; sed de quo contingit desperare, et sperare: ergo videtur, quod de alio contingit sperare. — Item, cum fides et caritas possint non tantummodo esse de bonis propriis, sed et de bonis communibus, quare non similiter est hoc reperire de spe?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod spes est respectu futuri, respectu futuri boni et respectu futuri boni proprii, secundum quod accipitur proprie pro ipsa virtute. Respectu futuri est, in quantum distinguitur a gaudio et dolore et convenit cum timore, quia illae duae affectiones sunt respectu praesentium, sed istae duae respectu futurorum. — Respectu boni est, in quantum distinguitur a timore, quia timor est respectu disconvenientis, spes respectu convenientis^p584-8. — Respectu boni proprii est, in quantum non solum distinguitur ab aliis affectibus, sed etiam in quantum distinguitur ab aliis virtutibus, utpote a credulitate fidei; ipsa enim spes procedit ex gratia et meritis. Et quoniam meritum non assecurat de beatitudine nisi eum qui meretur, quia unicuique retribuetur secundum merita sua; hinc est, quod per virtutem spei nemo sperat nisi sibi. Et secundum hoc patet, quod illa differentia, quam assignat Augustinus^p584-9 inter fidem et spem, recte et convenienter assignatur; sumitur enim spes proprie pro ipsa virtute. — Si autem accipiatur spes communiter pro ipsa suspicione, sic potest esse non tantum boni, sed etiam mali; et sic accipit poëta^p584-10.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum: ille enim est extensus et improprius modus accipiendi ipsam spem. Si vero spes dicatur minus communiter de quacumque exspectatione boni, sic potest esse exspectatio quod^p584-11 solum proprii boni, sed etiam communis. Et sic accipitur Lucae ultimo^p585-1 et etiam ab Augustino. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illas duas auctoritates. — Prout autem accipitur proprie pro ipsa spe, quae est «exspectatio veniens ex gratia et meritis^p585-2»; sic non est nisi respectu proprii boni, quia nemo redditur securus de salute nisi per merita propria; ideo non est simile de fide et caritate. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum obiectum.

p. 585

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod si spes est tantum futurarum rerum, sic praescitus non habet spem; dicendum, quod futurum dicitur dupliciter: vel quantum ad eventum, vel quantum ad ordinem. Quantum ad eventum dicitur futurum quod evenit; quantum ad ordinem dicitur futurum quod est ordinatum ad eveniendum^p585-3; vel futurum dicit eventum simpliciter, non respectu exspectationis. Et hoc ultimo modo dicitur spes esse futurorum; ipse autem obiicit, prout accipitur primo modo, et ideo non valet^p585-4.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quibusdam non indocte videtur, fidem et spem in Christo non fuisse, sicut in Sanctis iam beatificatis vel in Angelis non sunt. Obiicitur contra primum, quia in Psalmo^p585-5: In te, Domine, speravi etc.; dicitur in Glossa: «Hoc dicitur in persona Christi»: ergo Christus habuit spem. — Item, hoc videtur ratione: quia Christus fuit simul viator et comprehensor; et in quantum viator defuit sibi stola corporis^p585-6: si ergo Christus fuit perfecte viator, sicut et perfectus comprehensor; videtur, quod debuit habere omnia dona gratiarum et omnes virtutes, quae respiciunt statum viae.

Item, obiicitur contra secundum de Sanctis iam beatificatis, quia dicitur Apocalypsis sexto^p585-7, quod dictum est eis, ut exspectarent adhuc modicum tempus: ergo si spes est exspectatio, videtur etc. — Item, animae sanctae in patria exspectant glorificationem suorum corporum, quae est quaedam pars beatitudinis: Resumendo enim corpora perfectius contemplabuntur; quoniam, sicut dicit Augustinus^p585-8, «animae propter desiderium corporum retardantur, ne omnino ferantur in summum caelum».

Item, obiicitur contra tertium, quia videtur, quod Angeli habeant spem; dicitur enim primae Petri primo^p585-9: In quem desiderant Angeli prospicere; desiderium autem est respectu non habiti: ergo si de eodem potest esse spes, de quo et desiderium; videtur ergo, quod Angeli sperent. — Item, Angelis accrescet gloria quaedam et decor de nostra glorificatione et beatitudine^p585-10: si ergo hanc exspectant et nondum habent, videtur, quod habeant spem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister, nec Christus nec animae beatae nec sancti Angeli, proprie loquendo, habent spem. Et ratio huius est, quia spes est exspectatio praemii substantialis; omnes autem hi praedicti substantiale praemium habent; et ideo carent spe proprie dicta. — Alia etiam ratio est, quia spes habet annexam fidem; fides autem est cognitio aenigmatica. Et quia claritas visionis divinae tollit omne aenigma, per consequens evacuat fidem, et evacuando fidem evacuat ipsam spem. Et ob hanc duplicem rationem, sicut Magister innuit in littera^p585-11, convenienter dicitur, quod nec Christus nec Sancti nec Angeli beati habeant spem.

Ad rationes autem ad oppositum respondetur faciliter, pro eo quod, licet in eis non ponatur spes proprie dicta, secundum quod est exspectatio praemii substantialis, potest tamen, large accipiendo spem pro quacumque exspectatione, videlicet stolae secundae et alicuius gaudii accidentalis, poni in Christo et in Angelis et in animabus beatis. — Sed quare spes-virtus non est respectu praemii accidentalis, sed substantialis; et quare etiam in Sanctis evacuatur: hoc infra^p585-12 melius manifestabitur, cum agetur de evacuatione virtutum.

Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur de desiderio, dicendum, quod non est simile de desiderio et spe: quia spes est respectu non habiti, sed desiderium potest esse respectu habiti, ut continuetur et tollatur fastidium; et sic est in Angelis^p585-13. — Similiter ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Psalmi, consuevit

p. 586

dici, quod hoc dicitur de Christo ratione membrorum^p586-1. Alia satis patent.

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: De antiquis vero Patribus, qui apud inferos tenebantur, dici potest, quod fidem et spem habuerunt. Sed contra: spes se commetitur statui viae; sed illi non erant in statu viae: ergo non habebant spem. — Item, spes datur homini ad hoc, quod mereatur^p586-2: ergo si illi erant extra statum meriti, non videtur, quod habuerint spem.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur de animabus, quae sunt in purgatorio, utrum habeant spem. Et quod sic, videtur, quia adhuc non habent apertam visionem per speciem^p586-3: ergo spes non est evacuata in eis. — Sed contra hoc est, quia ipsi certi sunt, quod non possunt damnari: ergo videtur, quod non indigeant fulcimento spei.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum daemones aliquo modo habeant spem. Et quod sic, videtur, quia dicitur Iob quadragesimo^p586-4 de Behemoth: Ecce spes eius frustrabitur: ergo ipse habet spem. Sed contra: sciunt, peccatum suum esse irremediabile, ergo desperant: ergo non habent spem. Et Augustinus^p586-5 dicit de diabolo, quod «ad cumulum damnationis suae desperavit».

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quia spes non tollitur nisi per subsequens praemium et per contrarium habitum; et Sancti in limbo et animae in purgatorio nec erant assecuti praemium nec inciderant in contrarium habitum sive in defectum: hinc est, quod spem habebant, sicut dicit Beda^p586-6, et habetur in quarto libro, distinctione prima, quod «Patres in limbo felici spe ingressum ianuae caelestis exspectabant». — Daemones vero et alii damnati, qui habent contrarium habitum spei, scilicet desperationem, spem habere non possunt. Similiter sancti Beati assecuti sunt praemium, per quod spes evacuatur, sicut infra^p586-7 manifestabitur.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod spes commetitur se statui viae et datur ad merendum; dicendum, quod sancti Patres quodam modo erant in via et nondum pervenerant ad patriam. Praeterea, meritum non respicit ipsam spem universaliter, sed secundum statum^p586-8.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in purgatorio certi sunt^p586-9, quod damnari non possunt; dicendum, quod hoc non est propter assecutionem gloriae, sed propter confirmationem liberi arbitrii, quod est extra statum merendi et demerendi; et illa confirmatio non evacuat spem, quamvis ponat extra statum vertibilitatis ipsius liberi arbitrii, et ideo demeriti.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de Behemoth, dicendum, quod spes accipitur ibi improprie pro exspectatione dilationis iudicii, in quo acrius quam modo punietur; vel etiam pro exspectatione iudicii divini diutius continuandi^p586-10 super peccatores, quorum utroque frustrabitur diabolus in die iudicii et citius, quam vellet, iudicabitur. — Et ex his patent illa dubia, quae supra^p586-11 de subiecto spei quaerebantur.

English Translation

p. 582

# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that definition which he sets down, when he says: Hope is a virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for. For if the eternal good is one only, it seems that he speaks wrongly in the plural: by which eternal goods are hoped for. — Likewise, no eternal thing is temporal; but everything future is temporal: therefore since through hope future goods are awaited, as is said in the other^p582-1 definition; it seems that through it eternal goods are not awaited.

On account of this it is asked what is the difference between those two members, namely between spiritual goods and eternal ones.

I respond: It must be said that hope is here defined through comparison to its proper object. But the object of hope itself is the eternal and glorious good. And this is twofold, namely created and uncreated; and hope is with respect to each, principally however with respect to the uncreated Good^p582-2. — And according to this the aforesaid definition can be understood in two ways; and if it is understood of the uncreated Good, then hope is said to await eternal goods, which indeed, as far as they are in themselves, lack beginning and end. But if it is understood of the created good, then it is said to await eternal goods, that is, perpetual ones. — Yet in either way it is said in the plural to await eternal goods, not because the supreme goods are many, but because the eternal good, which is the immense Goodness itself, excels all goods by its eminence; and the perpetual good, which is created beatitude, comprehends all goods by equivalence. And therefore he said eternal in the plural, not on account of a multitude of eternity, but on account of the all-encompassing fullness of the good awaited.

But to that which is objected, that there is an awaiting of a future good; it must be said that nothing prevents some good from being eternal in itself, and being had temporally by someone as a reward; and thus it is in the recompense which is awaited through hope, which^p582-3 is eternal in itself, and yet is future to the one awaiting it, who has not yet attained to it.

To that which is asked, what difference there is between those two members; it must be said that the first member is explained by the second, because there and is set for that is^p582-4, so that the sense is: spiritual, that is, eternal. — Or it can be said that by this difference spiritual hope is distinguished from natural affection; but by this, that it is called eternal, it is distinguished from the cardinal virtue, and the proper account of hope is touched on, which is toward the good under the account of the eternal^p582-5. — Or it can be said that by this, that it is called spiritual, the general object is touched on, which has the character of the material, according as it is wont to be said that one hope is of pardon, another of grace, another of glory. But by this, that it is called eternal, the proper and formal or motive object is touched on^p582-6.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about the other definition which he sets down there: Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, proceeding from grace and merits; because, according as the Philosopher says^p582-7, «he errs who defines that which is in motion through that which is at rest, and conversely»; but to await is to be at rest, to hope is in some way to tend toward the thing hoped for: therefore it is badly defined through expectation. — Likewise, «every notification ought to be given through what is proper^p582-8»; but beatitude and grace and merits are common to the other virtues: therefore hope is unsuitably defined through them.

In connection with this it is asked: since «of one thing there is one being, and so one definition^p582-9», how does the aforesaid notification differ from the other notifications which are wont to be assigned of hope?

p. 583

I respond: It must be said that hope is a name of an affection and is a name of a virtue. According as it is a name of an affection, thus it is defined by the Philosopher^p583-1: «Hope is a surmise of a future good». — But according as it is a name of a virtue and names a habit, thus it must be defined and notified through its act. And that act can be compared in three ways: either to the object only, and thus there is that definition of the Master^p583-2: «hope is a virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for»; or to the object and the principle, and thus there is that of Haymo^p583-3: «Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from grace and merits»; or to the object and the preambular habit, and thus there is that of Augustine in On the City of God^p583-4: «Hope is a virtue by which one presumes that he will attain to that which he believes».

Otherwise too a distinction can be assigned among those notifications, that the first is formal, given through genus and differences; the second causal, given through act and cause; the third indeed partly causal, partly formal, because it is given through the genus^p583-5 of hope and another preambular virtue, namely faith, which is touched on in the word of believing.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that expectation is rest; it must be said that although it is a bodily rest, yet it is a certain solicitude of the mind. For he who awaits a coming desires the thing awaited; but expectation, according as it is set down in the definition of hope, is not a bodily expectation, but rather a mental one, which is a certain longing^p583-6 and stretching-forth with respect to the end to be attained.

To that which is objected, that this notification is given through common things; it must be said that those common things, according as they are set down in this notification, are appropriated. For beatitude is appropriated to hope by reason of the ultimate endowment, which indeed is a perfect possessing, corresponding to hope itself, and by that account by which under the name of beatitude we understand an excelling and unfailing good^p583-7. Likewise grace and merits are appropriated to it, inasmuch as they are joined together. For grace regards God's kindness and mercy; but merits regard God's equity and justice. But since it belongs properly to the virtue of hope to regard both, that it may free from desperation and presumption, which look to only one or the other; therefore it properly belongs to hope, that it is called «coming from grace and merits»: merits, I say, preceding either in purpose, or in root, or in use, as in the preceding [discussions]^p583-8 was shown.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: And just as faith, so also hope is concerning invisible things. For it seems to be false to say so, because, if faith and hope share in the object: therefore they are the same virtue. — Likewise, in temporal things one can hope for money which he sees just as well as money which he does not see: therefore by parity of reasoning also in spiritual things: therefore hope ought not to be said to be concerning invisible things. — Likewise, hope regards the affect itself, but the visible and the invisible regard the intellect: therefore if the object and the habit regard the same power, hope is badly said to be concerning invisible things^p583-9.

p. 584

I respond: It must be said that in eternal goods to see perfectly is to have, as Augustine says^p584-1; on account of which it is said in the seventeenth chapter of John: This is eternal life, that they know you the true God etc. Therefore with respect to those same spiritual goods not-seeing and not-having accompany each other mutually. Since therefore hope is concerning things not had — because no one hopes for that which he has, but that which is to be had — and with respect to eternal goods what is not had is not seen; hence it is that the Master says that just as faith is concerning invisible things, so also hope. In this, however, there is a difference^p584-2, that faith is concerning invisible things, according as they are invisible; but hope is concerning invisible things, according as they are not had, but are to be had. — And through this the response to the objections is clear.

For to that which is first objected, that they share in the object; it must be said that they do not regard that object under the same account, but under one and another.

To that which is objected, that in temporal things one can well hope for what he sees, so also^p584-3 in spiritual things; it must be said that it is not alike, because to see bodily things is not to have them; but to see eternal goods is to possess them.

To that which is objected, that the invisible regards the intellect; it must be said that it is true under the account of the invisible; nevertheless it can regard the affect under the account of what is not had^p584-4.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: Hope is only of good things, nor except of future things and of things pertaining to him who hopes. For against this it is objected first by reason of the first member: because the poet says^p584-5:

If I could hope for so great a grief as this:

therefore hope is of evil things. — Likewise, just as someone awaits his own exaltation, so he awaits the confusion of his adversary: therefore just as he awaits his own good, so he can await another's evil.

Likewise, it is objected against the second member, which says only of future things: because beatitude is future, nor to be had by one foreknown [to damnation]: therefore if hope is only of future things, no one foreknown has hope.

Likewise, it is objected against the third member, which says of things pertaining to him: because in the last chapter of Luke^p584-6 it is said: But we were hoping that he would be the one to redeem Israel: therefore it happens that one hopes for a common good: therefore hope is not only with respect to one's own good. — Likewise, Augustine^p584-7 says that «no one is to be despaired of, while he is on the way»; but of whom it happens to despair, [of him] also to hope: therefore it seems that one hopes concerning another. — Likewise, since faith and charity can be not only of one's own goods, but also of common goods, why is this not similarly to be found concerning hope?

I respond: It must be said that hope is with respect to the future, with respect to a future good and with respect to a future good of one's own, according as it is taken properly for the virtue itself. It is with respect to the future, inasmuch as it is distinguished from joy and grief and agrees with fear, because those two affections are with respect to present things, but these two with respect to future things. — It is with respect to the good, inasmuch as it is distinguished from fear, because fear is with respect to the unfitting, hope with respect to the fitting^p584-8. — It is with respect to one's own good, inasmuch as it is distinguished not only from the other affects, but also inasmuch as it is distinguished from the other virtues, as from the belief of faith; for hope itself proceeds from grace and merits. And since merit does not give assurance of beatitude except to him who merits, because to each one it will be rendered according to his merits; hence it is that through the virtue of hope no one hopes except for himself. And according to this it is clear that that difference which Augustine assigns^p584-9 between faith and hope is rightly and suitably assigned; for hope is taken properly for the virtue itself. — But if hope is taken commonly for the surmise itself, thus it can be not only of good, but also of evil; and thus the poet takes it^p584-10.

And through this the response to the first objection is clear: for that is an extended and improper way of taking hope itself. But if hope is said less commonly of any expectation whatever of a good, thus there can be an expectation not^p584-11 only of one's own good, but also of a common one. And thus it is taken in the last chapter of Luke^p585-1 and also by Augustine. — And through this the response to those two authorities is clear. — But according as it is taken properly for hope itself, which is «an expectation coming from grace and merits^p585-2»; thus it is only with respect to one's own good, because no one is rendered secure of salvation except through his own merits; therefore it is not alike concerning faith and charity. — And through this the response to the last objection is clear.

p. 585

But to that which is objected, that if hope is only of future things, thus one foreknown does not have hope; it must be said that the future is said in two ways: either as to the event, or as to the order. As to the event, that is called future which comes to pass; as to the order, that is called future which is ordered to coming to pass^p585-3; or the future signifies the event simply, not with respect to expectation. And in this last way hope is said to be of future things; but he objects according as it is taken in the first way, and therefore it is invalid^p585-4.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: To some it seems not unlearnedly that faith and hope were not in Christ, as they are not in the Saints already beatified or in the Angels. It is objected against the first, because in the Psalm^p585-5: In you, O Lord, have I hoped etc.; it is said in the Gloss: «This is said in the person of Christ»: therefore Christ had hope. — Likewise, this seems [so] by reason: because Christ was at once wayfarer and comprehensor; and inasmuch as wayfarer the robe of the body^p585-6 was lacking to him: if therefore Christ was perfectly a wayfarer, as also a perfect comprehensor; it seems that he ought to have had all the gifts of graces and all the virtues which regard the state of the way.

Likewise, it is objected against the second concerning the Saints already beatified, because it is said in the sixth chapter of the Apocalypse^p585-7 that it was said to them that they should await yet a little time: therefore if hope is an expectation, it seems etc. — Likewise, the holy souls in their fatherland await the glorification of their bodies, which is a certain part of beatitude: For having resumed their bodies they will contemplate more perfectly; since, as Augustine says^p585-8, «souls are held back by the desire for their bodies, lest they be wholly borne into the highest heaven».

Likewise, it is objected against the third, because it seems that the Angels have hope; for it is said in the first chapter of the first letter of Peter^p585-9: On whom the Angels desire to look; but desire is with respect to what is not had: therefore if there can be hope concerning the same thing as desire; it seems therefore that the Angels hope. — Likewise, there will accrue to the Angels a certain glory and adornment from our glorification and beatitude^p585-10: if therefore they await this and do not yet have it, it seems that they have hope.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says, neither Christ nor the blessed souls nor the holy Angels, properly speaking, have hope. And the reason for this is that hope is the expectation of a substantial reward; but all these aforesaid have the substantial reward; and therefore they lack hope properly so called. — There is also another reason, because hope has faith annexed to it; but faith is enigmatic cognition. And because the clarity of the divine vision takes away every enigma, consequently it evacuates faith, and by evacuating faith it evacuates hope itself. And for this twofold reason, as the Master intimates in the text^p585-11, it is suitably said that neither Christ nor the Saints nor the blessed Angels have hope.

But to the reasons for the opposite it is answered easily, for the reason that, although hope properly so called, according as it is the expectation of a substantial reward, is not posited in them, yet, taking hope broadly for any expectation whatever, namely of the second robe and of some accidental joy, it can be posited in Christ and in the Angels and in the blessed souls. — But why hope-the-virtue is not with respect to an accidental reward, but a substantial one; and why also in the Saints it is evacuated: this will be better made manifest below^p585-12, when treatment is made of the evacuation of the virtues.

Yet to that which is objected concerning desire, it must be said that it is not alike concerning desire and hope: because hope is with respect to what is not had, but desire can be with respect to what is had, that it may be continued and weariness be removed; and thus it is in the Angels^p585-13. — Likewise to that which is objected concerning the authority of the Psalm, it is wont

p. 586

to be said that this is said of Christ by reason of his members^p586-1. The other things are clear enough.

Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: But concerning the ancient Fathers, who were held in the lower regions, it can be said that they had faith and hope. But on the contrary: hope is commensurate with the state of the way; but they were not in the state of the way: therefore they did not have hope. — Likewise, hope is given to man for this, that he may merit^p586-2: therefore if they were outside the state of meriting, it does not seem that they had hope.

In connection with this it is asked concerning the souls which are in purgatory, whether they have hope. And that they do, it seems, because they do not yet have the open vision through the species^p586-3: therefore hope is not evacuated in them. — But against this is that they are certain that they cannot be damned: therefore it seems that they have no need of the support of hope.

In connection with this it is asked whether the demons in any way have hope. And that they do, it seems, because it is said in the fortieth chapter of Job^p586-4 concerning Behemoth: Behold, his hope shall be frustrated: therefore he has hope. But on the contrary: they know that their sin is irremediable, therefore they despair: therefore they do not have hope. And Augustine^p586-5 says of the devil, that «to the heaping-up of his damnation he despaired».

I respond: It must be said that since hope is taken away only through a subsequent reward and through a contrary habit; and the Saints in limbo and the souls in purgatory had neither attained the reward nor fallen into a contrary habit or into a defect: hence it is that they had hope, as Bede says^p586-6, and is held in the fourth book, distinction one, that «the Fathers in limbo awaited with happy hope the entrance of the heavenly gate». — But the demons and the other damned, who have the contrary habit of hope, namely desperation, cannot have hope. Likewise the holy Blessed have attained the reward, through which hope is evacuated, as below^p586-7 it will be made manifest.

But to that which is objected, that hope is commensurate with the state of the way and is given for meriting; it must be said that the holy Fathers were in some way on the way and had not yet arrived at the fatherland. Furthermore, merit does not regard hope universally, but according to the state^p586-8.

To that which is objected, that in purgatory they are certain^p586-9 that they cannot be damned; it must be said that this is not on account of the attainment of glory, but on account of the confirmation of free choice, which is outside the state of meriting and demeriting; and that confirmation does not evacuate hope, although it places [the soul] outside the state of changeableness of free choice itself, and therefore of demerit.

To that which is objected concerning Behemoth, it must be said that hope is taken there improperly for the expectation of a delay of judgment, in which he will be punished more sharply than now; or also for the expectation of the divine judgment being continued longer^p586-10 over sinners, in both of which the devil will be frustrated on the day of judgment, and he will be judged sooner than he would wish. — And from these things are clear those doubts which above^p586-11 were asked concerning the subject of hope.

Apparatus Criticus

Vide dub. seq.
See the following doubt.
Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. seq. et a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro carent edd. currunt sine.
Cf. above, a. 1, q. 2 f., and a. 2, q. 1. — A little below, in place of carent the editions read currunt sine [run without].
Superius Vat. omittit sed omne futurum est temporale. — Vat. quae; cod. K pro quod [intellige: scil. quod] pariterque mox pro qui substituit quia. Superius pro aequivalentiam cod. aa aequipollentiam.
Above, the Vatican edition omits sed omne futurum est temporale [but everything future is temporal]. — The Vatican edition reads quae; codex K for quod [understand: namely quod], and likewise soon for qui substitutes quia. Above, in place of aequivalentiam codex aa reads aequipollentiam.
Edd. omittunt et pro id est, atque proxime ante pro quia exhibent quod.
The editions omit et pro id est [and for that is], and just before, in place of quia exhibit quod.
Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et a. 1. q. 3, ubi etiam in arg. 3. ad oppos. vidisses de triplici genere spei, de quo paulo inferius mentio fit.
Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1, in the body, and a. 1, q. 3, where also in argument 3 for the opposite you would have seen concerning the threefold kind of hope, of which mention is made a little below.
De hoc dubio cfr. S. Thom., hic circa lit.
On this doubt cf. St. Thomas, here on the text.
Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.). Vide tom. II. pag. 647, nota 1.
Book VI of the Topics, c. 3 (c. 4). See vol. II, p. 647, note 1.
Secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1.
According to Aristotle, VI Topics c. 1.
Cfr. supra pag. 501, nota 2. — Mox ante ab aliis codd. A K interserunt ab ista e. l.
Cf. above p. 501, note 2. — Soon, before ab aliis, codices A K insert ab ista [from this one] in that place.
Vide Plato, Phileb. (ed. Serrani, tom. 2. pag. 39) et Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. 25. (c. 11.). Cfr. ibid. II. c. 15. (c. 12.); de Memoria et reminisc. c. 1. nec IX. Ethic. c. 7. Verba Avicennae vide supra pag. 377, nota 2.
See Plato, Philebus (ed. Serranus, vol. 2, p. 39) and Aristotle, I Rhetoric c. 25 (c. 11). Cf. ibid. II, c. 15 (c. 12); On Memory and Reminiscence c. 1, and IX Ethics c. 7. For the words of Avicenna see above p. 377, note 2.
Hic in lit. c. 1. Vide dub. praeced.
Here in the text, c. 1. See the preceding doubt.
Quae erui potest collat. 17. videre est ex eius exposit. in Epist. ad Rom. c. 5, ubi, quemadmodum in Supplemento Summae Alex. Hal. in v. t. sic legitur: Patientia autem probationem [operatur] meritorum et fidei... probatio vero operatur spem vitae aeternae. Spes est exspectatio futurorum bonorum. Qui ergo inter tribulationes et adversa per patientiam probabiles existunt in fide, illi securi de praemiis futuram beatitudinem exspectant. Spes autem non confundit... Spes ergo non confundit, id est, qui probatus est in fide bonisque operibus et spem habet aeternorum praemiorum, non erubescit, quidquid adversi in hoc saeculo sustinuerit, securus de praemio. Et quare hoc? Quia caritas Dei, qua nos diligit Deus, vel qua diligimus Deum, diffusa est in cordibus nostris tempore baptismatis et tempore manus impositionis per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis, non per meritum nostrum... Ipsa etiam spes per Spiritum sanctum nobis datur, qui facit nos credere quod promittit etc. Libr. II. de Varietate librorum, c. 10. ait Haymo: Spes est bonorum spectatio futurorum, quae exprimit humilitatis affectum et sedulae servitutis obsequium. Spes autem vocata, quod sit pes progrediendi, quasi est pes; unde e contrario dicitur desperatio [Isidor., Etymolog. VIII. c. 2. n. 5: deest enim ibi pes], cui nulla est progrediendi facultas; quia dum quisque peccatum amat, futuram gloriam non sperat; ille enim fiducialiter exspectat qui eius mandata fideliter servat. — In definitione spei cod. Z pro veniens substituit proveniens.
What can be drawn out can be seen in collation 17, from his exposition on the Epistle to the Romans, c. 5, where, as in the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales in v. t. it is so read: But patience works the proving of merits and of faith... but the proving works hope of eternal life. Hope is the expectation of future goods. Those, therefore, who amid tribulations and adversities through patience stand approved in faith, they, secure of the rewards, await future beatitude. But hope does not confound... Hope therefore does not confound, that is, he who is approved in faith and good works and has hope of eternal rewards is not put to shame, whatever adversity in this age he has endured, secure of the reward. And why this? Because the charity of God, by which God loves us, or by which we love God, is poured forth in our hearts at the time of baptism and at the time of the laying-on of hands through the Holy Spirit, who is given to us, not through our merit... Hope itself too is given to us through the Holy Spirit, who makes us believe what he promises, etc. In Book II On the Variety of Books, c. 10, Haymo says: Hope is the awaiting of future goods, which expresses the affect of humility and the obedience of diligent service. And it is called spes [hope], because it is a foot (pes) for advancing, as it were a foot; whence on the contrary it is called desperatio [despair, Isidore, Etymologies VIII, c. 2, n. 5: for there the foot is lacking], to which there is no faculty of advancing; because while anyone loves sin, he does not hope for future glory; for he confidently awaits who faithfully keeps his commandments. — In the definition of hope codex Z substitutes proveniens for veniens.
Etiam B. Albert., hic a. 1, hanc definitionem ut in August. libro de Civ. Dei occurrentem memorat. In Supplemento Summae Alex. Hal., collat. 17. legitur: «Haec definitio, ut dicunt, ponitur in libro de Civ. Dei, ego autem credo, quod sumitur ex verbis Augustini in fine I. Soliloquiorum». Revera Augustinus ibi, c. 6. n. 13, agens de fide, spe et caritate, ait: Sed et ipse aspectus quamvis iam sanos oculos convertere in lucem non potest, nisi tria illa permaneant: fides, qua credat, ita se rem habere, ad quam convertendus aspectus est, ut visa faciat beata; spes, qua cum bene aspexerit, se visurum esse praesumat; caritas, qua videre perfruique desideret. Cfr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 2, ubi S. Doctor docet, quod Christus, Deus-homo, sicut fundavit fidem, in qua ambulamus ad veritatem, sic ipse sit spes perveniendi illuc, quo per fidem tendimus. Sed forsitan formata est ex definitione desperationis, supra pag. 578, nota 2. allata. — Paulo inferius pro distinctio cod. A differentia.
Blessed Albert too, here a. 1, records this definition as occurring in Augustine's book On the City of God. In the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 17, it is read: «This definition, as they say, is set down in the book On the City of God, but I believe that it is taken from the words of Augustine at the end of book I of the Soliloquies». In truth Augustine there, c. 6, n. 13, treating of faith, hope, and charity, says: But the gaze itself, although it cannot yet turn already-healthy eyes into the light, unless those three remain: faith, by which it believes that the matter is so, to which the gaze is to be turned, that, once seen, it may make blessed; hope, by which, when it has gazed well, it presumes that it will see; charity, by which it desires to see and to enjoy. Cf. XI On the City of God, c. 2, where the holy Doctor teaches that Christ, God-man, just as he founded the faith in which we walk toward the truth, so he himself is the hope of attaining thither whither through faith we tend. But perhaps it is formed from the definition of desperation, adduced above p. 578, note 2. — A little below, in place of distinctio codex A reads differentia.
Edd. per obiectum.
The editions read per obiectum [through the object].
Pro inhiatio codd. A K habitudo, cod. O intuitio, cod. Z erectio (cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. in corp.), edd. imaginatio. Nostra lectio, quae innititur auctoritati codd. H U bb, confirmatur corrupta lectione codd. I L aa inviatio. Paulo superius pro sollicitatio cod. A (bb a secunda manu) sollicitudo.
In place of inhiatio codices A K read habitudo, codex O intuitio, codex Z erectio (cf. above, a. 2, q. 1, in the body), the editions imaginatio. Our reading, which rests on the authority of codices H U bb, is confirmed by the corrupt reading of codices I L aa inviatio. A little above, in place of sollicitatio codex A (bb by a second hand) reads sollicitudo.
Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 3. in corp. et a. 2. q. 1. ad 5. — Inferius post spei est cod. A bene omittit proprie.
Cf. above, a. 1, q. 3, in the body, and a. 2, q. 1, to 5. — Below, after spei est codex A rightly omits proprie.
Art. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Supplement. Summae Alex. Hal. collat. 17; B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2.
Article 1, q. 1, to 1. — Cf. on this doubt the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 17; Blessed Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2.
Edd. 1, 2 esse invisibilis. Vat. ultimam conclusionem in hunc modum affert: ergo si obiectum habitus respicit eandem potentiam, quam et habitus, male dicitur spes esse invisibilis.
Editions 1, 2 read esse invisibilis. The Vatican edition gives the last conclusion in this manner: therefore if the object of the habit regards the same power as the habit also, hope is badly said to be invisible.
Epist. 187. (alias 57.) c. 6. n. 21: Unde quem potuerunt illi [superbi sapientes] nosse nec habere, isti [parvuli baptizati] potuerunt habere antequam nosse. Beatissimi autem sunt, quibus hoc est Deum habere quod nosse. Ipsa quippe notitia plenissima, verissima, felicissima est. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Ioan. 17, 3. — Pro habere edd. 1, 2 vivere.
Letter 187 (alias 57) c. 6, n. 21: Whence him whom those [proud wise men] could know but not have, these [baptized little ones] could have before knowing. But most blessed are they for whom this is to have God, which is to know him. For that knowledge itself is most full, most true, most happy. — The following passage of Scripture is John 17:3. — In place of habere editions 1, 2 read vivere [to live].
Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. Versio Arabico-Latina Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 19: Voluptas enim accidit nobis aut per rememorationem eius quod habuimus ex ea, aut per spem ad illud quod habendum est.
Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. The Arabic-Latin version of Aristotle, VII Physics text 19: For pleasure befalls us either through the recollection of that which we have had from it, or through hope toward that which is to be had.
Edd. El haec est differentia.
The editions read Et haec est differentia [And this is the difference].
Edd. ergo et.
The editions read ergo et.
Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 6; St. Thomas, here on the text.
Virgil., Aen. IV. 419.
Virgil, Aeneid IV, 419.
Vers. 21.
Verse 21.
Serm. 71. (alias II. de Verbis Domini) c. 13. n. 21. Cfr. Enarrat. in Ps. 36. serm. 2. n. 11. et tom. II. pag. 832, nota 7, ubi similis sententia allegata est ex I. Retract. c. 19. n. 7.
Sermon 71 (alias II On the Words of the Lord) c. 13, n. 21. Cf. Expositions on the Psalms, Ps. 36, sermon 2, n. 11, and vol. II, p. 832, note 7, where a similar judgment is adduced from I Retractations c. 19, n. 7.
Vide supra a. 2. q. 1. et 4. De seq. propos. cfr. dub. 2. et supra a. 2. q. 2. — Superius pro cum timore, quam lectionem tuentur codd. A K (N a secunda manu) U V bb, alii codd. et edd. cum amore. Mox pro affectibus edd. cum nonnullis codd. affectionibus.
See above, a. 2, q. 1 and 4. On the following proposition cf. doubt 2 and above a. 2, q. 2. — Above, in place of cum timore, which reading codices A K (N by a second hand) U V bb maintain, the other codices and the editions read cum amore [with love]. Soon, in place of affectibus the editions with some codices read affectionibus.
In verbis, quae formant textum huius dubii. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
In the words which form the text of this doubt. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.
Virgil. loc. cit., de quo August., Enchirid. c. 8. n. 2. dicit: Quae duo [timere et sperare] quidam distinguens ait: Liceat sperare timenti [Lucanus, II. Pharsal.]. Non autem ab alio poeta, quamvis meliore, proprie dictum est: Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem. Denique nonnulli in arte grammatica verbi huius utuntur exemplo ad ostendendam impropriam dictionem et aiunt: sperare dixit pro timere. — Verba Si autem accipiatur spes communiter pro ipsa suspicione spectant ad definitionem supra in dub. 2. datam: Spes est suspicio futuri boni.
Virgil at the place cited, of which Augustine, Enchiridion c. 8, n. 2, says: Distinguishing these two [to fear and to hope] someone says: Let it be allowed to one fearing to hope [Lucan, II Pharsalia]. But it is not properly said by another poet, though a better one: If I could hope for so great a grief as this. Finally some in the art of grammar use the example of this word to show an improper expression, and say: he said sperare for timere. — The words But if hope is taken commonly for the surmise itself look to the definition given above in doubt 2: Hope is a surmise of a future good.
Vers. 21.
Verse 21.
Secundum Haymonem; vide supra dub. 2.
According to Haymo; see above, doubt 2.
Cfr. supra d. 24. n. 1. q. 1. ad 3. — Mox pro non respectu Vat. vel respectu.
Cf. above, d. 24, n. 1, q. 1, to 3. — Soon, in place of non respectu the Vatican edition reads vel respectu.
Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 7; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
Psalm. 30, 1. — Glossa sumta est ex August., Enarrat. 2. n. 5. in hunc loc.; habetur ut ordinaria penes Strabum et Lyranum.
Psalm 30:1. — The Gloss is taken from Augustine, Exposition 2, n. 5, on this passage; it is had as the ordinary [Gloss] in Strabo and Lyra.
Cfr. supra pag. 390, nota 5. — Pro defuit edd. deficit.
Cf. above p. 390, note 5. — In place of defuit the editions read deficit.
Vers. 11.
Verse 11.
Libr. XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 35. n. 68: Inest ei [spiritui] naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi, quo appetitu retardatur quodam modo, ne tota intentione pergat in illud summum caelum, quamdiu non subest corpus, cuius administratione appetitus ille conquiescat.
Book XII On Genesis according to the Letter c. 35, n. 68: There is in it [the spirit] a certain natural appetite for administering the body, by which appetite it is in some way held back, lest it proceed with its whole intention into that highest heaven, so long as the body is not present, by whose administration that appetite may come to rest.
Vers. 12.
Verse 12.
Ut ostensum est II. Sent. d. 11. a. 2. q. 2.
As was shown in II Sentences, d. 11, a. 2, q. 2.
Hic c. 1. — Edd. sicut multipliciter dicitur in littera.
Here, c. 1. — The editions read sicut multipliciter dicitur in littera [as is said in manifold ways in the text].
Dist. 31. a. 2. et 3.
D. 31, a. 2 and 3.
Cfr. Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 36. n. 1. (In Breviar. Romano, Dominica infr. Oct. Corp. Christi), ubi, differentiam inter delicias corporales et spirituales indicans, ait: Quod corporales deliciae, cum non habentur, grave in se desiderium accendunt, cum vero habitae, eduntur, comedentem protinus in fastidium per satietatem vertunt. At contra spirituales deliciae, cum non habentur, in fastidio sunt, cum vero habentur, in desiderio etc.
Cf. Gregory, II Homilies on the Gospels, homily 36, n. 1 (in the Roman Breviary, Sunday within the Octave of Corpus Christi), where, indicating the difference between bodily and spiritual delights, he says: that bodily delights, when they are not had, kindle in themselves a heavy desire, but when had and consumed, they straightway turn the one consuming them into weariness through satiety. But on the contrary spiritual delights, when they are not had, are in weariness, but when they are had, are in desire, etc.
August., Enarrat. in Ps. 30. (in quo secundum S. Doctorem et alios Ss. Patres loquitur Christus, et etiam in Christo capite membra eius, Christifideles) enarrat. 2. n. 5: Dicamus in Christi corpore, dicamus omnes quasi unus, quia omnes unitas, dicamus: In te, Domine, speravi etc. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., Supplement. collat. 50, ubi et de seq. dubio videsis; B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 5. quaestiunc. 1. et 2; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6. quaestiunc. 1; Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 2.
Augustine, Expositions on the Psalms, Ps. 30 (in which, according to the holy Doctor and the other holy Fathers, Christ speaks, and also in Christ the head his members, the faithful of Christ), exposition 2, n. 5: Let us say in the body of Christ, let us all say as though one, because all are one, let us say: In you, O Lord, have I hoped etc. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Supplement, collation 50, where also see on the following doubt; Blessed Albert, here a. 8; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 5, sub-question 1 and 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 6, sub-question 1; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5, q. 2.
Licet Magister dicat hic in lit. c. 1. (cfr. hic dub. 2.), quod spes veniat ex Dei gratia et praecedentibus meritis; tamen eadem etiam ad merendum requiritur (supra a. 2. q. 2.).
Although the Master says here in the text, c. 1 (cf. here, doubt 2), that hope comes from God's grace and preceding merits; yet the same is also required for meriting (above, a. 2, q. 2).
Vat. et complures codd. spem.
The Vatican edition and very many codices read spem [hope].
Vers. 28.
Verse 28.
Libr. I. de Mirabilibus Scripturae (inter opera August.) c. 2. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 176, nota 5. et pag. 179, nota 1. — Subinde pro quod edd. cum multis codd. et.
Book I On the Marvels of Scripture (among the works of Augustine) c. 2. Cf. vol. II, p. 176, note 5, and p. 179, note 1. — Thereupon, in place of quod the editions with many codices read et.
Libr. I. Homil. homil. 10. in die festo circumcisionis Domini: In sinu Abrahae post mortem beata requie consolati supernae pacis ingressum spe felici exspectabant.
Book I of the Homilies, homily 10, on the feast-day of the Circumcision of the Lord: In the bosom of Abraham, consoled after death with a blessed repose, they awaited with happy hope the entrance of the supernal peace.
Dist. 31. a. 2. q. 2. — Pro sancti Beati assecuti sunt codd. A G H I L T aa sancti Beati et [codd. K Z qui] assecuti sunt, edd. Sancti et Beati assecuti sunt. In propos. seq. pro et nondum cod. L tamen nondum.
D. 31, a. 2, q. 2. — In place of sancti Beati assecuti sunt codices A G H I L T aa read sancti Beati et [codices K Z qui] assecuti sunt, the editions Sancti et Beati assecuti sunt. In the following proposition, in place of et nondum codex L reads tamen nondum.
Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. in corp.
Cf. above, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.
Edd. quod animae in purgatorio certae sunt. Aliquanto inferius edd. omittunt et ideo demeriti. — De ipsa solut. cfr. II. Sent. d. 7. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.
The editions read quod animae in purgatorio certae sunt [that the souls in purgatory are certain]. Somewhat below, the editions omit et ideo demeriti [and therefore of demerit]. — On the solution itself cf. II Sentences, d. 7, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1 ff.
Edd. quam modo puniendus est, et pro exspectatione dilatione [Vat. dilationis] iudicii diutius constituendi. Pro punietur, quod est in codd. K bb, in aliis et edd. punientur. Mox post iudicii non pauci codd. omittunt divini, et deinde pro quam vellet codd. A K Z (aa a secunda manu) quam volet, codd. I L T U V quam nollet.
The editions read quam modo puniendus est [than now he is to be punished], and in place of exspectatione dilatione [Vatican edition dilationis] iudicii diutius constituendi [of the expectation of the judgment being longer appointed]. In place of punietur, which is in codices K bb, in the others and the editions punientur [they will be punished]. Soon after iudicii, not a few codices omit divini [divine], and then in place of quam vellet codices A K Z (aa by a second hand) read quam volet, codices I L T U V quam nollet.
Art. 2. q. 5. in fine. — De hac solut. vide II. Sent. d. 6. a. 2. q. 2. — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 5. quaestiunc. 3. et 4; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 1.
Article 2, q. 5, at the end. — On this solution see II Sentences, d. 6, a. 2, q. 2. — Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 9; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 5, sub-question 3 and 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 6, sub-question 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5, q. 1.

← Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 5