Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum in statu innocentiae in commixtione fuisset seminum decisio.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in illa commixtione esset seminum decisio. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Ad oppositum:*

1. « Generare est de substantia sua aliquem producere¹ »; sed nemo producit aliquem de substantia sua, nisi det ei partem substantiae suae, cum totam dare non possit nisi solus Deus; partem autem substantiae non dat nisi decidendo a se: ergo etc.

2. Item, filius a patre et matre generatur non tantum effective, sed etiam materialiter; sed quandocumque aliqua duo sunt materia unius, necesse est ad invicem uniri et commisceri secundum se tota, vel secundum aliquid sui; illud autem, in quo uniuntur, non solum habet rationem materialis, sed etiam effectivi, et tale vocamus semen²: ergo si homo stetisset, generatio nihilominus esset per commixtionem seminum.

3. Item, vir ex suo coitu mulierem fecundaret, sed hoc non esset, nisi aliquid impartiretur mulieri; sed constat, quod non impartiretur necessarium, quia natura illud sibi reservat: ergo impartiretur alimenti superfluum, et hoc est semen³: ergo fieret seminum commixtio.

4. Item, a primaria conditione habuerunt vir et mulier vasa susceptibilia et idonea ad humoris seminarii generationem et decisionem et commixtionem; et illa sunt quae sunt organa virtutis generativae: ergo in generatione prolis naturale est semen decidere: ergo si homo generaret tunc, secundum quod competebat naturae, in statu innocentiae fuisset commixtio seminum.

*Sed contra:*

1. Semen est superfluum nutrimenti; ubicumque autem est superfluitas, ibi est vitiositas; sed in natura instituta non erat vitiositas; ergo nec superfluitas: ergo nec humor seminarius.

2. Item, semen est superfluitas tertiae digestionis; sed si homo stetisset, non esset in eo superfluitas secundae digestionis, utpote stercus et urina: ergo nec superfluitas tertiae. Prima patet per Philosophum⁴; secunda manifesta est, quia illae superfluitates nunquam sunt sine foeditate et ignominia: ergo si foeditas et ignominia non sunt in homine nisi per culpam, nullo modo esset in eis talis superfluitas.

3. Item, si esset in eis semen: aut esset conveniens propriae complexioni, aut non. Si non: ergo non videtur, quod de eo deberet vel posset proles generari. Si sic; sed natura naturaliter tenet quod est sibi conveniens, et si expellit, hoc non est per naturam, sed per violentiam: si igitur in statu innocentiae homo hominem generaret non violenter, sed naturaliter; videtur, quod in generatione semen non emitteret.

4. Item, actualis decisio partis a parte est via ad corruptionem; sed homo in statu innocentiae ad corruptionem non tendebat: ergo generando semen non decidebat⁵.

Conclusio. In statu innocentiae et vir et mulier per seminis decisionem generassent.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum generatio prolis, quantum est de ordine et potestate naturae, habeat fieri per coniunctionem et commixtionem duorum sexuum in hominibus, qui respectu prolis se habent per modum materialis et efficientis, ita quod ratio materialis plus residet penes mulierem, efficientis sive activi plus residet penes virum; necesse est ad generationem, aliquas particulas tam a muliere quam a viro decidi, in quibus esset

virtus et ratio seminalis respectu corporis propagandi. Quia igitur hic est ordo naturae, non solum modo lapsae, sed etiam institutae, ideo dicendum est, quod in statu innocentiae et vir et mulier per decisionem seminum generassent.

*Solutio oppositorum:*

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de seminis superfluitate, dicendum, quod est superfluitas residuitatis, et est superfluitas impuritatis. Superfluitas residuitatis est in semine, et haec superfluitas necessitatem non excludit, immo idem ipsum, quod est necessarium, est superfluum, sed necessarium speciei, superfluum individuo, necessarium virtuti generativae, sed superfluum nutritivae; et haec superfluitas non repugnat bonitati et completioni⁶ naturae, quia non sonat in vitium, sed in complementum. Est et alia superfluitas impuritatis, sicut stercus et urina, defluxus rheumatis et emissio sudoris et consimilia; et haec est in duplici differentia. Quaedam venit ex debilitate virtutis contentivae et conversivae, sicut rheuma et sudor; et talis non fuisset in Adam, propterea quia virtutes naturales in ipso erant in suis operationibus efficaces. Alia vero est, quae venit ex nutrimenti qualitate et nutriti puritate⁷; et haec fuisset in Adam, qualis est superfluitas egestionis et urinae, quae sunt propter separationem puri ab impuro, ut illud quod purum et idoneum est, assumatur in alimentum, illud vero quod est minus idoneum, abiiciatur exterius, licet non cum tanto foetore et foeditate, sicut nunc. Et hoc satis indicant vasa et intestina et foramina, quae sunt homini a sua prima conditione naturaliter deputata.

1. Et per hoc patet responsio quasi ad omnia obiecta. Nam primum quod obiicit, quod ubi est superfluitas, ibi est vitiositas; non valet, quia non habet veritatem de superfluitate residuitatis, qualis est superfluitas seminis.

2. Secundum autem, quod obiicit, quod superfluitas secundae digestionis est cum foeditate, et ita cum poenalitate, similiter non valet; quia, quamvis illa separatio puri ab impuro sit in nobis cum foeditate, in istis esset sine aliqua foetoris corruptione, in attestationem virtutis potentiae conversivae et puritatis nutritivae.

3. Similiter tertium non multum cogit; quia semen, cum sit superfluum nutritivae, est necessarium generativae, non⁸ convenit cum natura, ut salvans ipsam in se, sed ut salvans eam in altero. Et ideo natura non appetit sibi illud retinere, sed in alterum transfundere; et quamvis non conveniat naturae generantis in se, ut sic est, convenit tamen naturae generati.

4. Similiter ultimum non cogit, quod dicit, quod decisio est via ad corruptionem. Hoc enim locum habet, ubi est decisio partis necessariae cum quadam violentia, et ubi est decisio sine restauratione. Hoc autem non est in seminis decisione, sicut ostensum est. — Et ita omnia obiecta possunt solvi per distinctionem prius factam et alia etiam plura media, quae ad hoc possunt adduci⁹.

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Question II. Whether in the state of innocence in that intercourse there would have been a cutting-off of seed.

Secondly it is asked whether in that intercourse there would have been a cutting-off of seed. And that there would be, seems to be the case.

*For the affirmative:*

1. « To generate is to produce someone from one's own substance¹ »; but no one produces another from one's own substance unless one gives him a part of one's substance, since to give the whole is possible to God alone; but one does not give a part of one's substance except by cutting it off from oneself: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the son is generated from the father and the mother not only effectively, but also materially; but whenever any two things are matter of one thing, it is necessary that they be united to one another and commingled either according to their whole selves, or according to some part of themselves; but that in which they are united has the character not only of the material but also of the effective, and such a thing we call seed²: therefore, if man had stood firm, generation would nonetheless have been by commingling of seed.

3. Likewise, the man by his intercourse would impregnate the woman, but this would not happen unless something were imparted to the woman; but it is clear that what is necessary would not be imparted, because nature reserves it to itself: therefore there would be imparted the superfluity of nourishment, and this is seed³: therefore there would occur a commingling of seed.

4. Likewise, from the original constitution man and woman had vessels suited and apt for the generation, cutting-off, and commingling of the seminal humor; and these are the organs of the generative power: therefore in the generation of offspring it is natural for seed to be cut off: therefore if man had generated then, according to what was fitting to nature, in the state of innocence there would have been a commingling of seed.

*On the contrary:*

1. Seed is a superfluity of nourishment; but wherever there is superfluity, there is defect; but in instituted nature there was no defect; therefore neither superfluity: therefore neither seminal humor.

2. Likewise, seed is a superfluity of the third digestion; but if man had stood firm, there would not have been in him a superfluity of the second digestion, namely feces and urine: therefore neither a superfluity of the third. The first is shown through the Philosopher⁴; the second is manifest, because those superfluities are never without foulness and shame: therefore if foulness and shame are not in man except through fault, in no way would there be such superfluity in them.

3. Likewise, if there were seed in them: either it would be suitable to one's own complexion, or not. If not: then it does not seem that offspring could or should be generated from it. If yes: but nature naturally retains what is suitable to itself, and if it expels something, this is not by nature but by violence: if therefore in the state of innocence man would generate man not violently but naturally, it seems that in generation he would not emit seed.

4. Likewise, the actual cutting-off of a part from a part is a path toward corruption; but man in the state of innocence was not tending toward corruption: therefore in generating he was not cutting off seed⁵.

Conclusion. In the state of innocence both the man and the woman would have generated by the cutting-off of seed.

I respond: It must be said that, since the generation of offspring, so far as concerns the order and power of nature, takes place through the conjunction and commingling of the two sexes in human beings — who in regard to offspring stand as the material and the efficient, in such wise that the character of the material belongs more to the woman, and that of the efficient or active belongs more to the man — it is necessary for generation that certain particles be cut off both from the woman and from the man, in which there would be the seminal power and account in regard to the body to be propagated. Since therefore this is the order of nature, not only of fallen but also of instituted nature, it must therefore be said that in the state of innocence both the man and the woman would have generated by the cutting-off of seed.

*Solution of the opposites:*

To that, then, which is objected on the contrary about the superfluity of seed, it must be said that there is a superfluity of residuity, and a superfluity of impurity. The superfluity of residuity is in seed, and this superfluity does not exclude necessity; rather, that very same thing which is necessary is superfluous — but necessary to the species, superfluous to the individual; necessary to the generative power, but superfluous to the nutritive; and this superfluity is not repugnant to the goodness and completion⁶ of nature, because it does not sound of vice but of complement. There is also another superfluity of impurity, such as feces and urine, the flow of rheum and the emission of sweat and similar things; and this is of a twofold kind. One sort comes from the weakness of the retentive and conversive power, such as rheum and sweat; and such would not have been in Adam, because the natural powers in him were efficacious in their operations. Another sort comes from the quality of the nourishment and the purity of the one nourished⁷; and this would have been in Adam — such as is the superfluity of excretion and urine, which are for the separation of the pure from the impure, so that what is pure and apt may be taken up as nourishment, and what is less apt may be cast out externally, though not with such great stench and foulness as now. And this is sufficiently shown by the vessels and intestines and openings, which have been naturally assigned to man from his first constitution.

1. And through this is plain the response to virtually all the objections. For the first, which objects that where there is superfluity, there is defect, does not hold, because it has no truth concerning the superfluity of residuity, such as is the superfluity of seed.

2. The second, which objects that the superfluity of the second digestion is with foulness, and so with penality, likewise does not hold; because, although that separation of the pure from the impure is in us with foulness, in them it would have been without any corruption of stench, in attestation of the power of the conversive faculty and of the purity of the nutritive.

3. Likewise the third is not very compelling; because seed, since it is a superfluity of the nutritive, is necessary to the generative; it does not⁸ agree with nature as something saving nature in itself, but as saving nature in another. And therefore nature does not seek to retain it for itself, but to transfuse it into another; and although it does not agree with the nature of the generator in itself, as it is, yet it does agree with the nature of the generated.

4. Likewise the last does not compel — that which says that cutting-off is a path to corruption. For this has place where there is a cutting-off of a necessary part with a certain violence, and where there is a cutting-off without restoration. But this is not the case in the cutting-off of seed, as has been shown. — And thus all the objections can be solved through the distinction made earlier and also through several other middle terms which can be brought to bear on the matter⁹.

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