Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 20
Quaestio III. Utrum in emissione seminis in statu innocentiae fuisset delectationis intensio.1
Tertio quaeritur, utrum in illa seminis emissione esset delectationis intensio. Et quod sic, videtur.
Ad oppositum. 1. Natura bene disposita desiderat superfluum emittere: ergo melius disposita magis desiderat illud emittere; sed natura instituta multo melius erat disposita quam natura lapsa: ergo vis generativa multo magis desiderabat semen emittere, quod est superfluum. Sed ubi maius est desiderium, ibi in completione multo maior est delectatio; ergo in seminis decisione multo maior esset delectationis intensio, quam sit modo.
2. Item, « delectatio est ex coniunctione convenientis cum convenienti et sensu eiusdem2 »; et ideo dicunt naturales, delectationem esse in coitu propter transitum humoris per locum nervosum, in quo maxime viget sensus. Si ergo tanta erat tunc convenientia vel maior, quam sit modo, et sensus tunc magis vigebat quam modo; videtur, quod in seminis decisione maior tunc, quam nunc esset delectationis intensio.
3. Item, unaquaeque virtus cognoscitiva delectatur in facilitate et complemento suae operationis; hoc per se verum est3: ergo quanto maior esset completio et facilitas, tanto maior esset delectatio. Sed vis generativa, in qua viget sensus tactus, facilius et completius exisset tunc in actum suum quam nunc: ergo maior esset ibi delectationis intensio.
4. Item, oculus Adae plus delectabatur in aspectu lucis, et auditus in auditu cantus sonori, quam aspectus vel auditus hominis lapsi4: ergo pari ratione in gustu et tactu, apposito sibi convenienti, multo plus haberet delectari: ergo cum cognovisset uxorem, vel cum comedisset, maiorem delectationem habuisset.
Sed contra. — Fundamenta. 1. Augustinus dicit de Civitate Dei5, quod si homo non peccasset, sic membra genitalia applicarentur ad invicem, sicut modo applicatur manus ori; sed in applicatione manus ad os aut nulla aut modica habetur delectatio: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod nec in contactu illorum membrorum.
2. Item, si tanta esset delectationis intensio tunc, quanta est nunc, cum modo sit deordinatio in actu generandi propter intensionem delectationis; tunc fuisset generativa deordinata: ergo non esset generativa instituta, sed destituta.
3. Item, si in actu illo, natura stante, esset delectationis intensio, cum, fortificata una virtute, minoretur usus alterius6, videtur, quod sicut nunc in illo opere absorbetur usus rationis, ita et tunc; sed hoc non potest esse sine hominis subversione: ergo non esset natura ordinata, sed inordinata et subversa.
4. Item, si tanta esset tunc delectatio in praesentia et coniunctione sexuum, quanta est nunc, ergo similiter tantus esset appetitus in absentia, quantus est nunc; sed vehementia desiderii et appetitus7 excitat pruritum, et pruritus vehementia facit membra illa inobedientia rationi et repugnantia: ergo in statu ante lapsum esset pugna et controversia; quod est contra omnes Sanctos et contra fidem sinceram. Restat ergo, quod tempore naturae institutae in sexuum commixtione non erat delectatio intensa.
Conclusio.
In statu innocentiae non fuisset tanta in actu generationis delectationis intensio, quanta nunc est.
Respondeo: Intelligendum est, hic duplicem modum esse dicendi.
Opinio 1. Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod tanta vel maior erat delectatio tunc quam nunc; et tamen non erat immoderata: tanta erat propter naturalis virtutis perfectionem, immoderata non erat propter inferiorum virtutum subiectionem. Ratio enim dominabatur illi delectationi et eam deferebat in suum finem; et ideo non absorbebatur, nec erat ibi repugnantia. Et per hoc volunt solvere obiecta.
Opinio 2. Est et alius modus dicendi, qui magis concordat verbis Augustini et probabilitati rationis, scilicet Conclusio. quod in decisione seminum et commixtione sexuum tempore naturae institutae aliqua fuisset delectatio, moderata tamen et mensurata, secundum quod exigebat hominis rectitudo, et secundum quod eam volebat temperare hominis ratio; et ideo non erat tanta, quanta est modo. Nunc enim, quia virtus illa maxime exivit rationis imperium, dum ratio amisit originalis iustitiae vinculum et retinaculum, per quod imperabat viribus inferioribus; ideo, laxatis sibi habenis, toto impetu et conatu se praecipitat in delectabile sibi oblatum, non propter intensionem virtutis moventis, sed propter defectum virtutis retardantis. Unde sicut equus lascivus, rupto freno, velocius currit et impetuosius, quam cum infrenatur et detinetur a suo sessore, licet non habeat maiorem virtutem; sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus de Civitate Dei8: « Nuptiae illae dignae felicitate paradisi, si peccatum non fuisset, et diligendam prolem gignerent et pudendam libidinem non haberent ».
Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod non esset tunc tanta delectationis intensio, quanta est nunc, cum modo tanta sit, ut modum et ordinem debitum non observet.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod natura desiderat emittere superfluitatem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed illud desiderium habet terminum et limitem et in natura instituta illum terminum non exiret; nunc autem exit, et ratio prius tacta est.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod delectatio venit ex coniunctione convenientis cum convenienti et sensu eiusdem; dicendum, quod non tantum venit ex coniunctione, sed etiam ex virtutis conversione super delectabile. In statu autem naturae institutae, etsi esset coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti et sensus, non tamen tanta esset virtutis incurvatio et inclinatio, quanta est modo: et ideo non esset tam improba et tam intensa delectatio.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus delectatur in completione et facilitate sui actus; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen adhuc ista delectatio terminum praefixum debet habere, et haberet utique, si homo stetisset. Et quoniam illum merito peccati egreditur, hinc est, quod amplius delectatur, quamvis delectationis materia non sit maior.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amplius delectaretur homo in sensu visus et auditus; dicendum, quod verum est de delectatione naturali, sed non est verum de delectatione curiositatis. Nec est simile de delectatione, quae est in visu et quae est in tactu, quoniam visus delectatur in obiecto, quod est p. 482nobile et magis accedit ad naturam spiritualem, similiter et auditus; et ideo in Beatis delectatio visus potissime intenditur. Tactus vero delectatur in re magis grossa et materiali; et ideo intensio suae delectationis magis repugnat statui spirituali et magis reddit hominem carnalem et animalem, qualis est homo in statu miseriae. Et sic patet, quod illud non est simile.
De hac et sequente quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 89. m. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. a. 3. et dub. lit. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2.
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Question III. Whether in the emission of seed in the state of innocence there would have been intensity of delight.1
Thirdly it is asked whether in that emission of seed there would have been intensity of delight. And that it would, seems thus:
To the contrary. 1. A well-disposed nature desires to emit what is superfluous: therefore one better disposed desires more to emit it; but instituted nature was much better disposed than fallen nature: therefore the generative power much more desired to emit seed, which is superfluous. But where the desire is greater, there in completion the delight is much greater; therefore in the discharge of seed the intensity of delight would have been much greater than it now is.
2. Likewise, "delight arises from the conjunction of the fitting with the fitting and the sensation of the same"2; and so the natural philosophers say that delight in coitus arises from the passage of fluid through the nervous place, in which sense most flourishes. If therefore there was then as great or greater fittingness than now, and sense was then more vigorous than now, it seems that in the discharge of seed the intensity of delight would have been greater then than it is now.
3. Likewise, every cognitive power delights in the ease and completion of its operation; this is self-evident3: therefore the greater the completion and ease, the greater the delight. But the generative power, in which the sense of touch flourishes, would then have gone forth into its act more easily and more completely than now: therefore the intensity of delight would have been greater there.
4. Likewise, the eye of Adam delighted more in the sight of light, and the hearing in the hearing of sonorous song, than the sight or hearing of fallen man4: therefore by parity of reasoning in taste and touch, with the fitting object set before it, one would have had to delight much more: therefore when he had known his wife, or when he had eaten, he would have had a greater delight.
On the contrary. — Foundations. 1. Augustine says in On the City of God5 that if man had not sinned, the genital members would have been applied to one another just as the hand is now applied to the mouth; but in the application of the hand to the mouth either no delight or only moderate delight is had: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that neither in the contact of those members.
2. Likewise, if the intensity of delight then were as great as it is now, since now there is disorder in the act of generating on account of the intensity of delight, then the generative power would have been disordered: therefore it would not have been an instituted generative power but a destituted one.
3. Likewise, if in that act, nature standing, there were intensity of delight, since, when one power is strengthened the use of another is diminished6, it seems that, as now in that work the use of reason is absorbed, so also then; but this cannot be without the overthrow of man: therefore nature would not have been ordered but disordered and subverted.
4. Likewise, if the delight in the presence and conjunction of the sexes were then as great as it is now, then similarly the appetite in absence would have been as great as it is now; but the vehemence of desire and appetite7 excites itching, and the vehemence of the itching makes those members disobedient to reason and resistant: therefore in the state before the fall there would have been struggle and controversy; which is against all the saints and against sincere faith. It remains, therefore, that in the time of instituted nature in the commingling of the sexes there was no intense delight.
Conclusion.
In the state of innocence there would not have been such an intensity of delight in the act of generation as there is now.
I respond: It must be understood that here there is a twofold mode of speaking.
First opinion. For some have wished to say that the delight was then as great as or greater than now; and yet it was not immoderate: it was so great on account of the perfection of the natural power, but it was not immoderate on account of the subjection of the lower powers. For reason dominated that delight and directed it to its end; and so it was not absorbed, nor was there resistance there. And by this they wish to resolve the objections.
Second opinion. There is also another mode of speaking, which more agrees with the words of Augustine and with the probability of reason, namely Conclusion. that in the discharge of seed and in the commingling of the sexes in the time of instituted nature there would have been some delight, moderate however and measured, according to what man's rectitude required, and according to what man's reason wished to temper it; and therefore it was not so great as it is now. For now, because that power has greatly gone forth from reason's command, since reason has lost the bond and check of original justice, by which it commanded the lower powers; therefore, the reins being slackened to it, with full impetus and effort it precipitates itself into the delightful thing offered to it, not on account of the intensity of the moving power, but on account of the defect of the restraining power. Hence as a wanton horse, the bridle broken, runs more swiftly and more impetuously than when it is bridled and held back by its rider, although it does not have greater strength; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood to be. And this is what Augustine says in On the City of God8: "Those nuptials worthy of the felicity of paradise, had sin not been, would both beget offspring to be loved and not have a shameful lust."
And therefore the reasons showing that the intensity of delight would not then have been as great as it is now must be conceded, since now it is so great that it does not observe the due measure and order.
Solution of the contrary arguments. 1. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that nature desires to emit what is superfluous; it must be said that it is true; but that desire has a term and a limit, and in instituted nature it would not have gone beyond that term; now however it does go beyond it, and the reason has been touched on above.
2. To that which is objected, that delight comes from the conjunction of the fitting with the fitting and the sensation of the same; it must be said that it comes not only from the conjunction, but also from the turning of the power upon the delightful thing. In the state of instituted nature, however, although there was a conjunction of the fitting with the fitting and of sense, nevertheless the bending and inclination of the power would not have been as great as it is now: and so the delight would not have been so wanton and so intense.
3. To that which is objected, that the power delights in the completion and ease of its act; it must be said that it is true; but yet this delight ought still to have a fixed term, and it would have, if man had stood. And because he goes beyond it by the merit of sin, hence it is that he delights more, although the matter of delight is not greater.
4. To that which is objected, that man would delight more in the sense of sight and hearing; it must be said that it is true of natural delight, but it is not true of the delight of curiosity. Nor is it similar regarding the delight which is in sight and that which is in touch, since sight delights in an object which is noble and more approaches spiritual nature, and likewise hearing; and so among the Blessed the delight of sight is most especially intensified. But touch delights in a thing more gross and material; and so the intensity of its delight more conflicts with the spiritual state and more renders man carnal and animal, such as man is in the state of misery. And so it is plain that it is not similar.
On this and the following question: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. II q. 89 m. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 2. 3. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 1 a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1 q. 3. 4. — Giles of Rome, here q. a. 3 and lit. dub. 1. — Durandus, here q. 2.
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- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion on the preceding question.
- De hac definitione, quae est Avicennae, VIII. Metaph. c. 7, vide tom. I. pag. 38, nota 4.On this definition, which is from Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII c. 7, see tom. I p. 38, note 4.
- Cfr. Aristot., X. Ethic. c. 4.Cf. Aristotle, Ethics X c. 4.
- Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 89. m. 2. addit rationem: et hoc, quia maioris harmoniae et maioris vigoris praediti erant sensus illius.Alex. of Hales, Summa p. II q. 89 m. 2, adds the reason: and this, because the senses of that man were endowed with greater harmony and greater vigor.
- Libr. XIV. c. 23, 24, secundum sensum. Verba huius dicti magis sumta videntur ex Magistro, hic c. 1, ubi allegatur August. IX. de Gen. ad lit. c. 10. n. 18.Book XIV cc. 23, 24, according to the sense. The words of this saying seem rather taken from the Master, here c. 1, where Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter IX c. 10 n. 18, is alleged.
- Cfr. supra pag. 260, nota 1.Cf. above p. 260, note 1.
- Cod. T vehementia et desiderium. appetitus.Codex T reads vehementia et desiderium. appetitus.
- Libr. cit. c. 23. n. 2.The cited book c. 23 n. 2.