Dist. 4, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 4
ARTICULUS II. De Angelis quoad futuri eventus praescientiam.
Consequenter circa secundum duo quaeruntur. Primum est, utrum bonis revelari debuerit futura permansio. Secundum est, utrum revelari potuerit malis sua damnatio.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum bonis Angelis revelari debuerit futura permansio.
Primo ergo quaeritur, cum nullis in creatione data sit gloria, nullis etiam data sit gratia, utrum aliquibus data sit futurae glorificationis praescientia. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Deus ab instanti suae conditionis Angelos condidit repletos scientia rerum mundanarum; sed Deo magis placet, quod servi sui habeant scientiam de his quae spectant ad salutem: si ergo praescientia futurae salutis erigit1 animum et delectat, ergo cum aliqui essent salvandi, videtur, quod saltem debuit eis dari praescientia talis; constat enim, quod potuit.
2. Item, si non fuerunt de salute certi, ergo potuerunt rationabiliter dubitare et timere; sed timor poenam habet: ergo poena ante culpam; sed hoc est inconveniens2: ergo videtur, quod illi saltem debuerunt certificari, qui erant salvandi.
3. Item, propinquiores erant Angeli ad gloriam quam nos in miseriis constituti, ergo saltem tantam certitudinem vel maiorem habebant, quantam nos habemus; sed nos habemus certitudinem spei: ergo ipsi habebant hanc vel aliam. Sed non habebant hanc, quia «spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis proveniens ex gratia et meritis3»: cum ergo ipsi non haberent gratiam et merita, certitudinaliter sperare eis fuisset praesumtio: non ergo habebant certitudinem spei. Sed non est aliam dare quam certitudinem praescientiae vel revelationis: ergo videtur, quod aliquibus saltem esset data.
Contra: 1. Plus est dare certitudinem de gloria quam dare gratiam — multis enim Deus dat gratiam, quibus tamen non revelat certitudinaliter suam gloriam — ergo cum non habuerint gratiam, sicut supra4 probatum est, patet, quod nec stabilitatis praescientiam.
2. Item, diabolus sive lucifer non habuit praep. 136scientiam de statu, quia non erat permansurus: ergo si ipse fuit plenus sapientia et perfectus decore5 inter omnes, videtur, quod nulli alii habuerunt.
3. Item, ostenditur per deductionem ad duplex inconveniens. Unum inconveniens est excusatio diaboli sive sui peccati. Posset enim de peccato suo quodam modo se excusare, quia scientiam non habuit, quam Deus aliis Angelis dedit. Aliud inconveniens videtur accusatio Dei, quia ante videtur punisse malos, quam mali fuerint; et quod ante gratiam suam sive donum scientiae subtraxerit, quod aliis dedit, qui non praecellebant ipsos nec merito vitae nec dignitate naturae6.
Conclusio. Nullis Angelis revelata est futura permansio ipsorum.
Respondeo: Circa hoc duplex fuit opinio, sicut tangit Magister in littera7.
Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod bonis, qui permansuri erant, data est revelatio sive praescientia suae stabilitatis, et hoc loco spei, ratione cuius iam quodammodo beati erant. Et innituntur illi verbo Augustini, quod dicit opinando super Genesim ad litteram8: «Forte Deus diabolo revelare noluit, quid facturus vel passurus esset; ceteris vero revelare voluit, quod in veritate mansuri essent».
Alia est positio, quod nullis data est praescientia sui status, quia habere certitudinem de sua permansione est cognitio magis spectans ad statum praemii quam ad statum meriti; et huius signum est, quod Deus aut paucissimis, aut nullis revelat quantumcumque dilectis et amicis, se certitudinaliter glorificandos. Haec enim cognitio potius est expediens ad gaudendum quam ad merendum. Unde quia Angeli erant in statu meriti omnes, quia nondum erant beati; ideo nullis data est haec cognitio. — Et haec positio est magis rationabilis et magis placet Magistro et magis consonat verbis Augustini, sicut patet in littera9 et undecimo de Civitate Dei, ubi dicit, quod pares fuerunt Angeli quantum ad conditiones ante lapsum. Unde si alicubi videtur dicere contrarium, si quis inspiciat adiacentia, aut opinando, aut quaerendo dicit. Et ideo haec positio magis est tenenda.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Deus dedit Angelis praecognitionem rerum mundanarum; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia cognitio universi spectat ad cognitionem naturalem, et perfecta cognitio universi spectat ad perfectionem naturalis cognitionis10; sed certa cognitio sui status spectat ad perfectionem gloriae; et ideo solum debet dari, quando in statu tali ponitur, a quo non potest cadere. Et sic patet illud.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si non erant certi, ergo videtur, quod rationabiliter poterant dubitare et timere; dicendum, quod est certitudo ex parte cognitivae et ex parte affectivae. — Certitudo ex parte cognitivae est duplex, una scilicet infallibilis, ut quando ita scit aliquid, quod non potest falli; altera probabilis, ut quando habet verisimiles rationes ad hoc sive ad unam partem; ita quod ad oppositum aut nullas habet, aut paucas. Et in Angelis fuit certitudo secundo modo, non primo. Ipsi enim rationabiliter poterant coniicere ex his bonis, quae acceperant, quod ad beatitudinem parati erant, maxime, cum in se nullam viderent maculam11. — Certitudo ex parte affectivae est duplex: una in exspectando, alia in tenendo. Exspectare est spei, sed tenere est comprehensionis. Secunda non potuit esse in Angelis ante confirmationem; prima fuit semiplene, et minus plene quam in viris sanctis, quia in his ex gratia et meritis, in illis erat affectione naturae. — Ex his patent obiecta: quia certitudo probabilitatis, quae non habebat rationes ad oppositum, liberabat et a dubitatione et a poenali timore.
3. Patet etiam ultimo obiectum, quia aliquam certitudinem habuerunt; sed tamen non oportet, quod esset maior certitudine spei. Et ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proximiores erant; dicendum, quod proximiores quantum ad statum, quia medii erant inter gloriam et miseriam. Sed tamen magis distabant quantum ad meritum, quia nondum habebant pignus gloriae nec primitias spiritus12, sicut habent viri sancti in hac vita, de quibus dicit Apostolus ad Romanos quinto: Spes autem non confundit, quia caritas Dei etc.
Ad quaest. I. et 2. huius 2. articuli principales Scholastici, coniectantes potius quam asserentes, in eodem sensu, et multi una sola quaestione respondent. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 2. — B. Albert., hic q. 3; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. m. 3. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 3. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
ARTICLE II. On the Angels with respect to the foreknowledge of the future outcome.
Next, concerning the second [head], two [things] are asked. The first is, whether the future perseverance ought to have been revealed to the good [Angels]. The second is, whether their damnation could have been revealed to the evil [ones].
QUESTION I. Whether the future perseverance ought to have been revealed to the good Angels.
First, then, it is asked — since to none was glory given at creation, and to none also was grace given — whether to some was given a foreknowledge of future glorification. And that [it was], it seems.
1. God from the instant of their condition created the Angels filled with knowledge of worldly things; but it pleases God more that his servants have knowledge of those things which pertain to salvation: if therefore the foreknowledge of future salvation lifts up1 the mind and delights [it], therefore, since some were to be saved, it seems that at least such a foreknowledge ought to have been given to them; for it is established that he could [give it].
2. Likewise, if they were not certain of [their] salvation, then they could reasonably doubt and fear; but fear has punishment [in it]: therefore punishment before fault; but this is unfitting2: therefore it seems that at least those ought to have been certified who were to be saved.
3. Likewise, the Angels were nearer to glory than we who are set in miseries, therefore they had at least as much certainty, or more, as we have; but we have the certainty of hope: therefore they had this or another. But they did not have this, since «hope is the certain expectation of future blessedness proceeding from grace and merits3»: since therefore they did not have grace and merits, to hope with certainty would have been presumption for them: therefore they did not have the certainty of hope. But there is no other [certainty] to assign than the certainty of foreknowledge or of revelation: therefore it seems that to some at least it was given.
On the contrary: 1. It is more to give certainty of glory than to give grace — for to many God gives grace, to whom nevertheless he does not reveal their glory with certainty — therefore, since they did not have grace, as was proved above4, it is clear that [they had] not the foreknowledge of stability either.
2. Likewise, the devil, or lucifer, did not have the forep. 136knowledge of [his] state, because he was not going to remain: therefore if he was full of wisdom and perfect in beauty5 among all, it seems that no others had [it].
3. Likewise, it is shown by a deduction to a twofold unfitting [conclusion]. One unfitting [conclusion] is the excuse of the devil or of his sin. For he could in a certain way excuse himself concerning his sin, because he did not have the knowledge which God gave to the other Angels. The other unfitting [conclusion] seems to be an accusation of God, because he seems to have punished the evil [ones] before they were evil; and because he withdrew beforehand his grace, or the gift of knowledge, which he gave to others who did not surpass them either in merit of life or in dignity of nature6.
Conclusion. To no Angels was their future perseverance revealed.
I respond: Concerning this there was a twofold opinion, as the Master touches [on it] in the text7.
For some wished to say that to the good [Angels], who were going to remain, was given the revelation or foreknowledge of their stability, and this in place of hope, by reason of which they were already in a certain way blessed. And they rely on that word of Augustine, which he says by way of opining, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis8: «Perhaps God did not wish to reveal to the devil what he would do or suffer; but to the others he willed to reveal that they would remain in the truth».
Another is the position, that to none was given a foreknowledge of their state, because to have certainty concerning one's perseverance is a knowledge pertaining more to the state of reward than to the state of merit; and a sign of this is that God reveals to very few, or to none — however much beloved and friends — that they will with certainty be glorified. For this knowledge is rather expedient for rejoicing than for meriting. Whence, since the Angels were all in the state of merit, because they were not yet blessed, therefore to none was this knowledge given. — And this position is more reasonable and pleases the Master more and accords more with the words of Augustine, as is evident in the text9 and in the eleventh [book] On the City of God, where he says that the Angels were equal as to [their] conditions before the fall. Whence, if anywhere he seems to say the contrary, if one inspects the surrounding [text], he says [it] either by opining or by inquiring. And therefore this position is rather to be held.
1. To that, then, which is objected, that God gave the Angels foreknowledge of worldly things; it must be said that it is not similar, because knowledge of the universe pertains to natural knowledge, and perfect knowledge of the universe pertains to the perfection of natural knowledge10; but the certain knowledge of one's state pertains to the perfection of glory; and therefore it ought to be given only when [one] is placed in such a state from which one cannot fall. And so that [objection] is clear.
2. To that which is objected, that if they were not certain, then it seems that they could reasonably doubt and fear; it must be said that there is a certainty on the part of the cognitive [power] and on the part of the affective. — The certainty on the part of the cognitive is twofold, one namely infallible, as when one so knows something that one cannot be deceived; the other probable, as when one has likely reasons for this, or for one part, such that for the opposite one has either none or few. And in the Angels there was certainty in the second way, not the first. For they could reasonably conjecture from those goods which they had received that they were prepared for blessedness, especially since they saw in themselves no stain11. — The certainty on the part of the affective is twofold: one in expecting, the other in holding. To expect is of hope, but to hold is of comprehension. The second could not be in the Angels before the confirmation; the first was half-full, and less fully than in holy men, because in these [it is] from grace and merits, [while] in those it was from the affection of nature. — From these the objections are clear: because the certainty of probability, which had no reasons for the opposite, freed [them] both from doubt and from penal fear.
3. The last objection too is clear, because they had some certainty; but yet it is not necessary that it should be greater than the certainty of hope. And to that which is objected, that they were nearer; it must be said that [they were] nearer as to state, because they were midway between glory and misery. Yet they were further as to merit, because they did not yet have the pledge of glory nor the first-fruits of the spirit12, as holy men have in this life, of whom the Apostle says to the Romans, chapter 5: But hope does not confound, because the charity of God etc.
To questions 1 and 2 of this second article the principal Scholastics, conjecturing rather than asserting, [respond] in the same sense, and many [respond] with a single question. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 23, m. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 2. — B. Albert, here q. 3; S. p. II, tr. 4, q. 18, m. 3, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 3, 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1, 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 2, 3. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 3.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 exhilarat.Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] exhilarat (gladdens).
- Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51: Omnis autem poena si iusta est, peccati poena est et supplicium nominatur. — Paulo anterius cod. F: ergo poenam habuerunt ante culpam pro ergo poena ante culpam. Circa finem arg. cod. W pro saltem substituit de salute.Cf. Augustine, On Free Choice III, c. 18, n. 51: But every punishment, if it is just, is the punishment of sin and is named a chastisement. — A little earlier codex F [reads] ergo poenam habuerunt ante culpam for ergo poena ante culpam. Near the end of the argument codex W substitutes de salute for saltem.
- Haec definitio spei invenitur in littera Magistri, III. Sent. d. XXVI. et apud Hugonem a S. Vict., Sent. tr. 1. c. 2; eadem a S. Bonav., ibid. dub. 2. tribuitur Haymoni, in quo tamen definitionem ad verbum non invenimus.This definition of hope is found in the Master's text, III Sent. d. XXVI, and in Hugh of St. Victor, Sentences tr. 1, c. 2; the same is attributed by St. Bonaventure, ibid. dub. 2, to Haymo, in whom, however, we have not found the definition word for word.
- Art. I. q. 2. — Plures codd. cum non habuerunt pro cum non habuerint.Art. I, q. 2. — Several codices [read] cum non habuerunt for cum non habuerint.
- Ezech. 28, 12.Ezek. 28:12.
- Vide August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 22. et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 13.See Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis XI, c. 17, n. 22, and On the City of God XI, c. 13.
- In hac distinctione.In this distinction.
- Libr. XI. c. 17. n. 22, in quibus verbis multi codd. contra textum originalem qui in veritate pro quod in veritate.Book XI, c. 17, n. 22, in which words many codices, against the original text, [read] qui in veritate for quod in veritate.
- In hac distinctione, in qua etiam sententia Augustini exponitur, quae XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. 13. et 15. exhibetur.In this distinction, in which also the opinion of Augustine is expounded, which is presented in On the City of God XI, c. 11, 13, and 15.
- Vat. hic omittit ad cognitionem naturalem et perfecta cognitio universi spectat.The Vatican edition here omits ad cognitionem naturalem et perfecta cognitio universi spectat.
- Plures codd. malitiam; cod. cc et ed. 1 dispositionem mali. Cod. U prosequitur Item certitudo etc.Several codices [read] malitiam; codex cc and ed. 1 dispositionem mali. Codex U continues Item certitudo etc.
- Rom. 8, 23. Verba pignus gloriae respicere videntur ad Eph. 1, 14, ubi de Spiritu S. dicitur: Qui est pignus hereditatis nostrae. — Sequens textus est Rom. 5, 5.Rom. 8:23. The words pledge of glory seem to look to Eph. 1:14, where it is said of the Holy Spirit: Who is the pledge of our inheritance. — The following text is Rom. 5:5.