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Dist. 4, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 4

Textus Latinus
p. 137

QUAESTIO II. Utrum malis Angelis revelari potuerit ipsorum damnatio.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum malis angelis revelari potuit suus casus. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Omnis certa cognitio futurae poenae et miseriae est poenalis; sed si Angelus certitudinaliter sciret, se peccaturum, cum certo iudicatorio1 cognosceret, peccatum esse puniendum, et peccatorem a Deo separatum esse miserum, haberet praecognitionem certam suae miseriae: ergo poenam ante culpam haberet. Sed hoc est contra ordinem divinae iustitiae: ergo si Deus contra ordinem divinae iustitiae non potest facere, Deus non potuit revelare.

2. Item, omnis praecognitio certa de amissione alicuius boni cogit hominem desperare de illo; sed Deus neminem innocentem potest cogere ad desperationem, quia non potest cogere ad peccatum: ergo non potuit Angelo revelare casum suum.

3. Item, fiat argumentum Anselmi in libro de Casu diaboli2: «Si diabolus sciebat casum suum, aut volebat, aut non. Si volebat: ergo iam ceciderat, ergo non praesciebat, se casurum. Si praesciebat et nolebat; sed quanto magis nolebat, tanto plus dolebat; et quanto magis nolebat, tanto iustior erat; et quanto magis dolebat, tanto erat miserior: ergo quanto iustior, tanto miserior. Sed hoc omnino est inconveniens»: ergo etc.

4. Item, fiat argumentum Magistri3: «Si praescierunt, aut ergo vitare potuerunt et voluerunt, et ita non ceciderunt; aut vitare voluerunt et non potuerunt, et ita fuerunt miseri; aut vitare potuerunt et noluerunt, et ita fuerunt stulti et maligni». Si ergo quodlibet istorum est impossibile, impossibile est, quod habuerunt praescientiam sui casus.

Sed contra: 1. Dominus potuit praedicere Petro sine peccato suum casum, sicut dicitur Matthaei vigesimo sexto4 et in aliis Evangeliis: ergo pari ratione potuit revelare lucifero.

2. Item, Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis5 tractans illud verbum Isaiae decimo quarto: Ponam sedem meam ad aquilonem: «Puto per aquilonem reprobandos homines fuisse designatos; per sedem, potestatem in illos». Et in sequentibus dicit, quod «in praescientia Dei suum praevidit principatum», scilicet quod debebat praeesse malis; et ideo dixit: Ponam sedem. Ergo principatus sequebatur casum; et potuit praevidere principatum: videtur similiter, quod potuit praevidere casum.

3. Item, videtur, quod rationes de poena non valeant, duplici ex causa. Deus enim potest separare quae naturaliter sunt coniuncta, ut in igne calorem a luce, sicut dicit Basilius6: ergo multo fortius cognitionem praedictam a poena. Praeterea, quantumcumque aliquid sit punitivum, tamen non punit, nisi subiectum punibile sit — unde si anima Petri esset in inferno, non puniretur7 — ergo cum Angelus in statu illo esset innocens et nullo modo ad poenam dispositus, patet etc.

4. Item, videtur quod ratio de desperatione non valeat, quia sicut praecognitio damnationis est occasio desperationis, ita praecognitio gloriae est occasio praesumtionis; sed praesumtio non impedit, quin Deus possit revelare futuram glorificationem: ergo pari ratione lapsum8. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia ex parte illa est occasio, hic est necessitas; contra: desperare est actus voluntatis deliberativae et actus, qui est peccatum; sed nihil potest cogere voluntatem ad aliquid, maxime ad peccatum: ergo etc.

5. Item, praescientia Dei non ponit necessitatem9, ergo nec praescientia diaboli: ergo si sciret, quod posset aliter esse, ergo posset adhuc sperare: non ergo cogeretur desperare.

Conclusio. Angelus malus certam sui casus praescientiam habere non potuit.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod angelus certam praescientiam sui casus habere non potuit. — Cum enim hoc esset contingens, sciri certitudinaliter non potuit10, nisi ab eo qui certitudinaliter omnia cognoscit, et tam necessaria quam contingentia, quia eius cop. 138gnitio ex re non pendet; talis est Deus solus11. Non ergo potuit praescire, nisi Domino revelante. Deus autem sibi revelare non potuit, quia non debuit praedicere, quod potuit — sicut praedixit Petro — quod non voco revelare, sed certam interius illuminationem dare ad praecognoscendum suum lapsum, hoc voco revelationem. Hanc autem dare Deus non potuit de potentia ordinata, quia talis praecognitio de necessitate habet annexam culpam, aut miseriam. Aut enim sibi placeret, quod laberetur, et ita esset impius; aut displiceret, et ita esset miser et dolorosus. Utrumque est Deo impossibile et inordinatum, sive innocenti infligere poenam, sive innocentem, dum est innocens, habere culpam. — Et hoc probat ratio prima, et ratio Anselmi et Magistri. Alia vero ratio de desperatione probat, quod non potuit Angelo revelari sua damnatio, quia impossibile est, certum de damnatione sperare. Unde illa via bona est et concedenda.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod potuit ei Dominus revelare, sicut et Petro; solvitur, quia Petro non revelavit, sed praedixit; unde Petrus non intellexit simpliciter, sed sub conditione, vel etiam non bene advertit usque ad lapsum; sic credo, quod potuit praedicere Angelo. — Tamen aliqui dicunt, quod non est simile, quia lapsus Petri erat reparabilis, non sic lapsus Angeli.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praevidit suum dominium; quare similiter non suum praecipitium? dicendum, quod de ipso Bernardus12 miratur et solvit, quod ita potuit esse, sicut de Ioseph, qui vidit suum principatum et non praevidit suam venditionem. Sed et diabolo potuit Dominus revelare dominium, et non praecipitium, quoniam dominium illud non de necessitate habet annexum praecipitium; potest enim aliquis bonus dominari malis. — Aliqui tamen voluerunt dicere, quod illud quod dictum est ad aquilonem, verbum est Prophetae. Diabolus enim volebat praeesse et aliis sedem dominationis13 suae praeponere; et Propheta praedicens quod eventurum sibi fuerat, dicit aquilonem, in hoc significans malos.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur contra rationem de poena, dicendum, quod ab ista cognitione separare poenam sive dolorem est auferre bonam voluntatem; quia qui praevidet, se facturum malum, et non dolet, hoc ipso est malus; et ita ista cognitio necessaria dispositione disponit animam vel ad poenam, vel ad culpam; nec Deus debet auferre et separare poenam, ut ex hoc redundet culpa. Et sic patet illud.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de desperatione, dico, quod, supposito quod praevideret lapsum et impossibilitatem resurgendi, cogeretur desperare, quia haec cognitio non potest stare cum spe. Unde si quis non credit aliam vitam, necessario desperat de futura vita, quia hoc necessario exigitur ad spem; sic qui certus est de damnatione desperat de salute. Unde non est simile de occasione praesumtionis et praescientia Dei, quia illa non aufert14 quod est necessarium ad humilitatem et salutem; sed haec praecognitio certa necessario aufert certitudinem ad oppositum, et ita certitudinem spei15.

English Translation
p. 137

QUESTION II. Whether their damnation could have been revealed to the evil Angels.

Secondly it is asked whether their own fall could have been revealed to the evil angels. And that [it could] not, it seems.

1. Every certain knowledge of future punishment and misery is penal; but if an Angel were to know with certainty that he would sin, since he would know by a certain judgment1 that sin is to be punished and that the sinner separated from God is wretched, he would have a certain foreknowledge of his own misery: therefore he would have punishment before fault. But this is against the order of divine justice: therefore, if God cannot act against the order of divine justice, God could not reveal [it].

2. Likewise, every certain foreknowledge of the loss of some good compels a man to despair of it; but God cannot compel any innocent [being] to despair, since he cannot compel to sin: therefore he could not reveal to the Angel his own fall.

3. Likewise, let the argument of Anselm in the book On the Fall of the Devil2 be made: «If the devil knew his own fall, either he willed [it] or not. If he willed [it]: then he had already fallen, therefore he did not foreknow that he would fall. If he foreknew [it] and did not will [it]; but the more he did not will [it], the more he grieved; and the more he did not will [it], the more just he was; and the more he grieved, the more wretched he was: therefore the more just, the more wretched. But this is altogether unfitting»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, let the argument of the Master3 be made: «If they foreknew [it], then either they could and willed to avoid [it], and so they did not fall; or they willed to avoid [it] and could not, and so they were wretched; or they could avoid [it] and would not, and so they were foolish and malicious». If therefore any of these is impossible, it is impossible that they had foreknowledge of their own fall.

But on the contrary: 1. The Lord could foretell to Peter, without sin, his own fall, as is said in Matthew 264 and in the other Gospels: therefore by a like reasoning he could reveal [it] to lucifer.

2. Likewise, Bernard, On the Degrees of Humility5, treating that word of Isaiah 14: I will set my seat toward the north: «I think that by the north the reprobate men were designated; by the seat, [his] power over them». And in what follows he says that «in God's foreknowledge he foresaw his own princedom», namely that he was to be set over the evil [ones]; and therefore he said: I will set my seat. Therefore the princedom followed the fall; and he could foresee the princedom: it seems similarly that he could foresee the fall.

3. Likewise, it seems that the reasons concerning punishment are not valid, for a twofold cause. For God can separate things that are naturally conjoined, as in fire heat from light, as Basil says6: therefore much more strongly the aforesaid knowledge from punishment. Moreover, however much something be punitive, yet it does not punish unless the subject be punishable — whence if Peter's soul were in hell, it would not be punished7 — therefore, since the Angel in that state was innocent and in no way disposed to punishment, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, it seems that the reason concerning despair is not valid, because just as the foreknowledge of damnation is an occasion of despair, so the foreknowledge of glory is an occasion of presumption; but presumption does not prevent God from being able to reveal future glorification: therefore by a like reasoning [neither does it prevent revealing] the fall8. If you say that it is not similar, because on that side it is an occasion, [but] here a necessity; on the contrary: to despair is an act of the deliberative will and an act which is a sin; but nothing can compel the will to anything, most of all to sin: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, God's foreknowledge does not impose necessity9, therefore neither [does] the devil's foreknowledge: therefore if he knew that it could be otherwise, then he could still hope: therefore he would not be compelled to despair.

Conclusion. The evil Angel could not have a certain foreknowledge of his own fall.

I respond: It must be said that the angel could not have a certain foreknowledge of his own fall. — For since this was contingent, it could not be known with certainty10 except by him who knows all things with certainty, both the necessary and the contingent, because his knowp. 138ledge does not depend on the thing; such is God alone11. Therefore he could not foreknow [it] except by the Lord's revealing [it]. But God could not reveal [it] to him, because he ought not to foretell what he could [foretell] — as he foretold to Peter — which I do not call revealing; but to give a certain interior illumination for foreknowing one's own fall, this I call revelation. And this God could not give by his ordained power, because such foreknowledge necessarily has fault or misery annexed. For either it would please him that he should fall, and so he would be impious; or it would displease [him], and so he would be wretched and sorrowful. Either is impossible and disordered for God: namely, to inflict punishment on the innocent, or that the innocent, while he is innocent, should have fault. — And this the first reason proves, and the reason of Anselm and of the Master. But the other reason, concerning despair, proves that his damnation could not be revealed to the Angel, because it is impossible to hope with certainty of damnation. Whence that way is good and is to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the Lord could reveal [it] to him, as also to Peter; it is resolved [thus]: because to Peter he did not reveal, but foretold; whence Peter did not understand [it] simply, but under a condition, or also did not advert well [to it] up to the fall; so I believe that he could foretell to the Angel. — Yet some say that it is not similar, because Peter's fall was reparable, not so the Angel's fall.

2. To that which is objected, that he foresaw his own dominion; why similarly not his own downfall? it must be said that Bernard12 himself wonders at this and resolves [it]: that it could be so, as in the case of Joseph, who saw his own princedom and did not foresee his own sale. But also the Lord could reveal to the devil [his] dominion and not [his] downfall, since that dominion does not necessarily have a downfall annexed; for someone good can have dominion over the evil. — Yet some wished to say that what is said toward the north is a word of the Prophet. For the devil wished to be set over [others] and to set his seat of dominion13 before the others; and the Prophet, foretelling what was to befall him, says the north, signifying by this the evil [ones].

3. To that which is objected against the reason concerning punishment, it must be said that to separate punishment or grief from this knowledge is to take away good will; because he who foresees that he will do evil and does not grieve, by this very [fact] is evil; and so this knowledge by a necessary disposition disposes the soul either to punishment or to fault; nor ought God to take away and separate punishment, so that from this fault should redound. And so that [objection] is clear.

4. To that which is objected concerning despair, I say that, supposing he were to foresee the fall and the impossibility of rising again, he would be compelled to despair, because this knowledge cannot stand with hope. Whence if someone does not believe [in] another life, he necessarily despairs of the future life, because this is necessarily required for hope; so he who is certain of damnation despairs of salvation. Whence it is not similar concerning the occasion of presumption and God's foreknowledge, because that [foreknowledge] does not take away14 what is necessary for humility and salvation; but this certain foreknowledge necessarily takes away the certainty toward the opposite, and so the certainty of hope15.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. iudicio. — Principia huius et seq. argumenti vide hic in lit. Magistri, ubi verba Augustini ex XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 22. afferuntur.
    The Vatican edition [reads] iudicio. — For the beginnings of this and the following argument see here in the Master's text, where the words of Augustine from On the Literal Meaning of Genesis XI, c. 17, n. 22, are adduced.
  2. Cap. 21, pluribus interiectis et mutatis verbis. Plures codd. cum Vat. circa medium textus et quanto dolebat magis, iustior erat pro et quanto magis nolebat, tanto iustior erat, quod habent codd. H L W Y bb cc et ed. 1. Dein ex codd. M aa ante erat miserior supplevimus tanto.
    C. 21, with several [words] interposed and altered. Several codices with the Vatican edition, near the middle of the text, [read] et quanto dolebat magis, iustior erat for et quanto magis nolebat, tanto iustior erat, which codices H L W Y bb cc and ed. 1 have. Then from codices M aa, before erat miserior, we have supplied tanto.
  3. In hac dist. — Vat. omittit primum membrum argumenti.
    In this distinction. — The Vatican edition omits the first member of the argument.
  4. Vers. 34; Marc. 14, 30; Luc. 22, 34; Ioan. 13, 38.
    Verse 34; Mark 14:30; Luke 22:34; John 13:38.
  5. Cap. 10. n. 36. — Isai. 14, 13, ubi Vulgata: «Sedebo in monte testamenti, in lateribus aquilonis». S. Bernardus, loc. cit.: Ponam sedem meam ad aquilonem. Multi codd. hic habent ab Aquilone, sed in solut. ad 2. ad aquilonem. — Conclusio argumenti, quam iuxta fidem maioris partis codd. et edd. 1, 2 exhibuimus, a codd. I W sic profertur: Sed principatus sequebatur casum, ergo si potuit etc.; codd. Q U Ergo si principatus etc. Vat.: Ergo cum principatus... et si potuit etc.
    C. 10, n. 36. — Isa. 14:13, where the Vulgate: «I will sit on the mount of the covenant, on the sides of the north». St. Bernard, loc. cit.: I will set my seat toward the north. Many codices here have ab Aquilone, but in the solution to 2, ad aquilonem. — The conclusion of the argument, which we have presented according to the faith of the greater part of the codices and editions 1, 2, is given by codices I W thus: Sed principatus sequebatur casum, ergo si potuit etc.; codices Q U Ergo si principatus etc.; the Vatican edition: Ergo cum principatus... et si potuit etc.
  6. Hexaem. hom. 6. n. 3. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 730, nota 7.
    Hexaemeron, homily 6, n. 3. Cf. vol. I, p. 730, note 7.
  7. Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 3.
    Cf. below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 3.
  8. Cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. ergo pari ratione desperatio non impedit, quin Deus possit revelare lapsum. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.
    Codex cc, ed. 1, and the Vatican edition [read] ergo pari ratione desperatio non impedit, quin Deus possit revelare lapsum. — Cf. I Sent. d. 40, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.
  9. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 38, a. 2, q. 1.
  10. Vat. scire certitudinaliter omnia non potuit.
    The Vatican edition [reads] scire certitudinaliter omnia non potuit.
  11. Vide I. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo inferius Vat. quia praedicere quidem potuit pro quia non debuit praedicere, quod potuit, quae est lectio maioris partis codd. et edd. 2, 3; alii codd. ab hac lectione in tantum discedunt, quod substituunt praedicere quidem potuit pro praedicere, quod potuit.
    See I Sent. d. 38, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — A little below the Vatican edition [reads] quia praedicere quidem potuit for quia non debuit praedicere, quod potuit, which is the reading of the greater part of the codices and editions 2, 3; other codices depart from this reading so far that they substitute praedicere quidem potuit for praedicere, quod potuit.
  12. Loc. cit. n. 36. seq.; Sed miror, cum in praescientia Dei tuum praevideris principatum, cur non in eadem et praevidisti praecipitium? Nam, si praevidisti, quae insania fuit, ut cum tanta miseria cuperes principari, ut malles misere praeesse, quam feliciter subesse?... Sed credibilius est, quod non praevidisti etc. — Paulo inferius Vat. Sic etiam pro Sed et.
    Loc. cit. n. 36 f.; But I wonder: since in God's foreknowledge you foresaw your princedom, why did you not in the same [foreknowledge] also foresee your downfall? For, if you foresaw [it], what madness was it that, with such great misery, you should desire to rule, so that you would rather be wretchedly set over [others] than happily subject?... But it is more credible that you did not foresee [it] etc. — A little below the Vatican edition [reads] Sic etiam for Sed et.
  13. Vat. damnationis; perperam.
    The Vatican edition [reads] damnationis; wrongly.
  14. Vat. haec et dein sicut pro sic. Plures codd. cum Vat. aliquanto inferius quia illa non auferunt pro quia illa non aufert.
    The Vatican edition [reads] haec, and then sicut for sic. Several codices with the Vatican edition, somewhat below, [read] quia illa non auferunt for quia illa non aufert.
  15. Vide Schol. ad quaestionem praeced.
    See the Scholion to the preceding question.
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