Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7
Quaestio II. Utrum in daemonibus sit malae voluntatis continuatio.
Supposito, quod in voluntate daemonum non sit possibilis rectificatio, quaeritur secundo, utrum sit in eis malae voluntatis continuatio. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Secundae ad Corinthios sexto1: Quae conventio Christi ad Belial? Glossa: « Sicut Christus omnia bene facit, ita diabolus omnia male »; sed semper facit aliquid, quia est substantia spiritualis, non lassata in operando: ergo etc.
2. Item, primae Ioannis tertio2: Diabolus ab initio peccat; Glossa: « Ab initio suae creationis incipiens, peccat continue usque in praesens ».
3. Item, Augustinus, de Fide ad Petrum3, loquens de daemonibus dicit: « Nec mala possunt voluntate carere nec poena ». Si tu dicas, quod loquitur de habitu, non de actu; obiicitur, quod de actu, per Hieronymum4, qui dicit, quod « diabolus adhuc idem sibi arrogat, quod prius praesumserat ».
4. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Diabolus est obstinatus; sed obstinatio est confirmatio in priori malo: ergo diaboli voluntas est confirmata in malo, quod commisit, ergo ab illo non potest recedere: ergo etc.
5. Item, Angeli confirmati in bono, continue habent bonam voluntatem habitu et actu, et eandem, quam habuerunt in sui glorificatione: ergo ab oppositis similiter videtur de daemonibus, cum sint obstinati in malo, sicut illi confirmati in bono.
6. Item, si5 posset ab actu malae voluntatis desistere, posset aliquo modo se ad gratiam praeparare, quia dimittere actum peccati est praeparare se ad gratiam; sed ipse nullo modo hoc potest, sicut supra6 probatum est: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Iacobi secundo7: Daemones credunt et contremiscunt; sed credere et timere non sunt actus malae voluntatis: ergo videtur, quod aliquando moventur sine obliquitate, et ita aliqua est interpolatio.
2. Item, si contremiscunt, et timor retrahit a malo actu, ergo videtur, quod aliquando desistant.
3. Item, secundae Petri secundo8: Daemones non portant adversus se execrabile iudicium; Glossa: « Magnitudine poenarum territi, a iudicio praesumtionis desistunt »: ergo videtur, quod cessaverit in eis praesumendi perversitas, saltem quantum ad actum.
4. Item, daemones naturaliter diligunt Deum, unde dicit Augustinus9, quod « nullius conscientia potest Deum odisse »; et si non diceret, videtur verum, quia « vitium non delet extrema naturae vestigia ». Si igitur diligere Deum est naturale, ergo adhuc sunt habiles et apti ad hunc actum. Esto ergo, quod exeant in actum, cum non moveantur simul pluribus motibus; tunc, ut videtur, cessant ab actu malae voluntatis.
5. Item, diabolus, tentans hunc hominem, potest desistere ab actu exteriori, ita quod nihil mali exterius nec illi nec alii faciat; sed plus sumus domini actuum interiorum quam exteriorum: ergo potest desistere, ut nihil actu male velit.
6. Item, videtur, quod voluntas prima superbiendi in eo desierit, quia cessante causa cessat p. 179 effectus; sed ratio, quae movit diabolum ad appetendam divinam celsitudinem, fuit pulcritudo et strenuitas naturalium et praeexcellentia respectu omnium — ideo speravit posse obtinere et appetiit — sed modo non habet in se istam celsitudinem: ergo, ut videtur, nec illam voluntatem: ergo videtur in eo variata affectio.
7. Item, differt dilectio et appetitus, quia dilectio est boni, sed appetitus est boni ut unibilis, quia homo appetit bonum sibi, et bonum sibi non est nisi unibile sibi; sed diabolus bene videt, quod non potest ad Dei celsitudinem pervenire, quia revelata est ei sua damnatio, et ut dicit Augustinus de Mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae10, « ad suae damnationis cumulum desperavit ».
Conclusio
Daemon non tantum quoad malae voluntatis deformitatem et pronitatem continuitatem habet, sed etiam semper omnem actum deformat et depravat, et ita continuo peccat.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod loqui contingit de mala voluntate tripliciter, scilicet quantum ad deformitatem, quantum ad pronitatem et quantum ad actualitatem. — Quantum ad deformitatem est in mala voluntate diabolus continue, ita quod nulla intervenit variatio per deformitatis desitionem sive minorationem, quia ita adhaesit macula peccati voluntati diaboli, ut nullo modo possit ab illa separari. — Quantum ad pronitatem est continuatio eiusdem, ita tamen, quod intervenit variatio quantum ad modum inclinandi. Diabolus enim ad id ipsum, quod primo appetiit, etiam nunc pronitatem habet, sed differenti modo quam prius. Prius enim appetiit cum proposito obtinendi, unde dixit: Ponam sedem meam ad aquilonem11 etc.; nunc appetit quantum in se est, sicut ambitiosus, qui sperat obtinere episcopatum, et si non obtineat, non recedit ambitio, sed modus ambiendi variatur; sic et in diabolo est. — Quantum vero ad actualitatem est continuatio in actu peccandi, sed tamen intervenit variatio quantum ad genus, quia non peccat continue peccato unius generis, cum non moveatur simul motibus diversis. Modo enim peccat superbia, modo invidia, modo aliis modis; tamen voluntas eius nunquam requiescit, quia nunquam lassatur, cum sit incorruptibilis. Et cum in ea regnet perversitas, semper omnem actum, quem elicit, deformat et depravat, et ita continue peccat. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod credunt et contremiscunt; dicendum, quod12 actus iudicatur bonus dupliciter: aut ex se, ut puta, quando est actus virtutis elicientis ipsum, ut abstinere a voluptatibus, et consimiles; aut ex adiuncto, sicut ire ad sanctum Iacobum. Sic actus dicitur malus dupliciter: aut quia directe elicitur a vitio, ut velle praeesse; aut quia vitium deformans concomitatur, ut dare eleemosynam propter vanam gloriam vel cum murmure et impatientia. Et hoc modo deformat diabolus actum credendi, quia cum murmure et impatientia et displicentia illius quod credit, movetur in actum illum; et ita credendo peccat, non quia credit, sed quia non eo modo credere debet, quo credit. Similiter iudicandum est, si diabolus Deo obediat.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de timore, dico, quod verum est, quod timent; sed tamen timor ita exilis est, et voluntas peccandi adeo est improba, quod propter hoc non cessat13, sicut in latrone, qui licet timeat furcas, tamen propter appetitum furandi non cessat a furto; et in ipso timore peccat, quia displicet ei Dei iustitia, quam formidat.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod a iudicio praesumtionis desistunt; dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, quamvis non audeant appetere quod primo ausi sunt, tamen improba voluntate non desistunt appetere; et si viam possent invenire, per quam crederent attingere, absque dubio idem praesumerent. Unde quamvis iudicium sit variatum propter poenarum intuitum; tamen appetitus non est avulsus nec malum desiderium, immo regnat actu.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de motu naturali, respondent quidam, quod natura, etsi non sit exstincta, est tamen adeo consopita et liberi arbitrii malitia superata, quod in actum suum non potest exire. — Aliter tamen potest dici, quod, sicut libera voluntas deformabat actum credendi, ita etiam deformat actum naturalem, cum ei adiungitur. Exemplum huius est hoc. Licet avarus naturaliter appetat beatitudinem, tanta est perversitas iudicii in eo et voluntatis, ut non dicat esse beatitudinem nisi in divitiis; et ita nunquam exit in appetitum beatitudinis, nisi ut est in divitiis; et ita appetendo illam beatitudinem peccat, quia motum illum, quem natura inchoat incitando, voluntas consummat deformando. Sic intelligendum, quod diabolus naturaliter diligit Deum ut conservatorem, sed voluntas diaboli illam dilectionem refert ad propriam utilitatem; ideo peccat, quia, etsi Deum diligat, tamen propter se diligit. Bene igitur concedo, quod exit in actum naturalem, sed nunquam in pure naturalem. p. 180 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest desistere ab actu exteriori; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia cum diabolus non obdormiat, semper in eo vigent interiores virtutes, et ita semper sunt in actu, velit nolit, sicut in homine vigilante. Sed opus ad alterum subest omnino libero arbitrio, ideo potest cessare ab hoc et ab omni14; in interiori potest cessare ab hoc vel ab illo secundum diversas conversiones, sed nunquam ab omni. — Quod ergo dicitur, quod magis sumus domini actuum interiorum; si intelligatur quantum ad cohibitionem propriam, manifeste falsum est; si quantum ad cohibitionem alienam, verum est, quia aliquis potest me cohibere ab actu exteriori et compellere: non sic est de interiori.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non videtur modo superbire, quia cessavit causa; dicendum, quod est causa inducens, sed tamen non efficiens nec conservans; et hac cessante, non cessat effectus, sicut patet manifeste; et talis fuit in diabolo pulcritudo. Est alia efficiens et conservans; et talis fuit voluntas diaboli obliqua et aversa15, et haec semper est in diabolo, ideo semper est in eo superbia; et quamvis non assurgat ad illud obtinendum, tamen adhuc assurgit ad illud quod potest, et amplius quam potest, quia ad dominium hominum, et maxime Sanctorum.
7. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod appetitus est rei unibilis; dicendum, quod appetitus absolutus et deliberatus est rei unibilis et possibilis; et iste est appetitus cum eligentia. Sed appetitus velleitatis, qui est impossibilium, non est rei unibilis secundum veritatem, sed rei, quae desideratur, sicut aliquis appetit esse velox sicut hirundo et similia16. Diabolus autem quod prius appetiit, eo modo quo appetiit, voluntate eligentiae non appetit, sed solum quantum est ex se. — Si tamen aliquis contendat, quod appetit; fatendum est, quod iudicium eius est perversum sive aestimatio, saltem intellectus practici, quo iudicat, se ad illud17 posse pervenire, quamvis iudicium speculationis dictet contrarium.
I. Quaestio est de actibus voluntatis deliberatis in daemonibus, non de naturalibus, qui certe in se sunt boni, ut procedunt a natura bona. Alii doctores proponunt quaestionem hanc sub terminis magis restrictis, v. g. utrum omnes actus daemonis sint mali. — Supponit S. Doctor, voluntatem creatam posse sine gratia facere aliquod opus naturaliter honestum et de se ordinabile in finem ultimum (cfr. infra d. 28. a. 2. q. 3.); item, actum in genere bonum posse fieri moraliter malum, quando pravitate finis vel alicuius circumstantiae maculetur (cfr. infra d. 36. d. 5.).
Si quaeritur de facto, communiter affirmatur, omnes actus daemonum non naturales esse malos, licet actum ex genere bonum facere possint, sed non nisi mala voluntate. Etiam Scot. hoc censet esse probabile. Cum autem quaeritur, utrum impossibile sit, eosdem aliquos actus moraliter bonos, at non meritorios elicere posse, Scot. (hic q. unica, n. 22. seqq., Report. hic q. 3.), variis circa bonum usus distinctionibus, asseruit, hanc impossibilitatem non posse probari. — Licet autem damnatus semper faciat male, tamen, ut dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.), non « semper demerebitur, proprie loquendo de demerito, secundum quod demeritum dicitur culpa, pro qua secundum decretum divini iudicii infligi debet a iudice peccati poena; quia pro malo actu liberi arbitrii post iudicium non infligetur sibi a Deo poena. Nec tamen remanebit ille actus impunitus, quia ille actus erit ipsi diabolo et culpa et punitio, ita quod erit diabolo poena acta, non inflicta. Sed usque ad iudicium malus actus liberi arbitrii est diabolo et culpa et demeritum, quia pro quolibet malo actu liberi arbitrii indigetur sibi poena a iudice; in quo [iudicio] recipiet totius poenae sibi infligendae a iudice complementum ». Quod sit pro illo statu intermedio aliquod demeritum et augmentum poenae accidentalis, approbant Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 102. m. 1. et m. 3. a. 9.) et S. Bonav., ut iam supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 4. 2. observatum est, et magis patebit ex quaestione sequenti. Ipse S. Thom. in Comment. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) ex parte consentit dicens: « Culpa dicitur crescere non quantum ad intensionem malitiae, sed quantum ad multiplicitatem actus. Poena etiam essentialis non crescit, sed accidentalis ».
II. De intensione malitiae explicite agitur in seq. quaest. Neminem inter antiquos invenimus, qui data opera de hoc disputet, nisi Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. m. 3. a. 9. et q. 101. m. 10.), B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 3. q. 23. m. 1. a. 1.) et Dionys. Carth., qui (hic q. 2.) aliqua verba ex S. Bonav. transcribit. — Opinionem in corp. primo loco positam sequitur S. Thom. in Comment., ut ex verbis modo relatis patet; quae sententia non penitus placet nostro Doctori, qui etiam aliam distinctionem adhibet. — De vi administrativa in Angelis cfr. infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. in corp.
III. De hac 2. quaest. praeter citatos in praeced. scholio: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 102. m. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.
---
Question II. Whether in demons there is a continuation of evil will
Granted that in the will of demons there is no possible rectification, it is asked, secondly, whether in them there is a continuation of evil will. And that there is, seems [to be the case].
1. 2 Corinthians 61: What concord hath Christ with Belial? The Gloss: "As Christ does all things well, so the devil does all things evilly"; but he always does something, because he is a spiritual substance, not wearied in operating: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, 1 John 32: The devil sinneth from the beginning; the Gloss: "Beginning from the very beginning of his creation, he sins continually right up to the present."
3. Likewise, Augustine, On Faith, to Peter3, speaking of demons, says: "They can neither be without evil will nor without punishment." If you say that he is speaking of habit, not of act; it is objected that [he speaks] of act, through Jerome4, who says that "the devil still arrogates to himself the same thing that he had presumed before."
4. Likewise, this seems [so] by reason. The devil is obstinate; but obstinacy is confirmation in a prior evil: therefore the devil's will is confirmed in the evil that he committed, therefore he cannot withdraw from it: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, the angels confirmed in good continually have a good will in habit and in act, and the same [will] that they had in their glorification: therefore from the opposites it likewise seems [so] concerning the demons, since they are obstinate in evil, as those [angels are] confirmed in good.
6. Likewise, if5 he could desist from the act of evil will, he could in some way prepare himself for grace, because to lay aside the act of sin is to prepare oneself for grace; but he can in no way do this, as was proved above6: therefore, etc.
On the contrary: 1. James 27: The demons believe and tremble; but to believe and to fear are not acts of evil will: therefore it seems that they are sometimes moved without obliquity, and so there is some interruption.
2. Likewise, if they tremble, and fear draws [them] back from an evil act, then it seems that they sometimes desist.
3. Likewise, 2 Peter 28: The demons do not bring against themselves an execrable judgment; the Gloss: "Terrified by the magnitude of the punishments, they desist from the judgment of presumption": therefore it seems that the perversity of presuming has ceased in them, at least as to act.
4. Likewise, demons naturally love God, whence Augustine says9 that "no one's conscience can hate God"; and even if he did not say [it], it seems true, because "vice does not destroy the last traces of nature." If, therefore, to love God is natural, then they are still capable and apt for this act. Grant, then, that they go forth into act, since they are not moved by several motions at once; then, as it seems, they cease from the act of evil will.
5. Likewise, the devil, tempting this man, can desist from the exterior act, such that he does nothing evil exteriorly either to him or to another; but we are more masters of interior acts than of exterior ones: therefore he can desist, so as to will nothing evil in act.
6. Likewise, it seems that the first will of being proud in him has ceased, because, the cause ceasing, the p. 179 effect ceases; but the reason that moved the devil to desire the divine sublimity was the beauty and vigor of his natural endowments and his pre-eminence in relation to all — and so he hoped to be able to obtain [it] and desired [it] — but now he does not have that sublimity in himself: therefore, as it seems, neither [does he have] that will: therefore it seems that the affection in him has been changed.
7. Likewise, love (dilectio) and appetite (appetitus) differ, because love is of the good, but appetite is of the good as unitable, since a man desires the good for himself, and the good for himself is nothing but what is unitable to himself; but the devil sees well that he cannot attain to God's sublimity, because his damnation has been revealed to him, and as Augustine says On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture10, "he despaired, to the heaping up of his damnation."
Conclusion
The demon not only has continuity as to the deformity and the proneness of evil will, but also always deforms and depraves every act, and so sins continually.
I respond: It must be said that one can speak of evil will in three ways, namely as to deformity, as to proneness, and as to actuality. — As to deformity, the devil is continually in evil will, such that no variation intervenes by a ceasing or a lessening of the deformity, because the stain of sin has so adhered to the devil's will that it can in no way be separated from it. — As to proneness, there is a continuation of the same, yet in such a way that a variation intervenes as to the mode of inclining. For the devil even now has a proneness to the very thing that he first desired, but in a different mode than before. For before, he desired with the purpose of obtaining, whence he said: I will set my seat to the north11 etc.; now he desires as far as in him lies, like an ambitious man who hopes to obtain a bishopric, and if he does not obtain it, the ambition does not depart, but the mode of being ambitious is varied; so it is also in the devil. — But as to actuality, there is a continuation in the act of sinning, yet a variation intervenes as to kind, because he does not sin continually with a sin of one kind, since he is not moved by diverse motions at once. For now he sins by pride, now by envy, now in other modes; yet his will never rests, because it is never wearied, since it is incorruptible. And since perversity reigns in it, it always deforms and depraves every act that it elicits, and so sins continually. — And the reasons brought forward for this [conclusion] are to be granted.
1. To that which is objected, that they believe and tremble; it must be said that12 an act is judged good in two ways: either of itself, as for instance when it is the act of a virtue eliciting it, such as abstaining from pleasures, and the like; or from something adjoined, as to go to St. James [of Compostela]. So too an act is called evil in two ways: either because it is directly elicited from a vice, as to will to be in command; or because a deforming vice accompanies [it], as to give alms for the sake of vainglory or with murmuring and impatience. And in this mode the devil deforms the act of believing, because with murmuring and impatience and displeasure at that which he believes, he is moved into that act; and so in believing he sins, not because he believes, but because he ought not to believe in the mode in which he believes. The like is to be judged if the devil obeys God.
2. To that which is objected concerning fear, I say that it is true that they fear; but nevertheless the fear is so slight, and the will of sinning is so wicked, that on account of this he does not cease13, as in the case of a thief who, although he fears the gallows, nevertheless on account of the appetite for stealing does not cease from theft; and in that very fear he sins, because the justice of God, which he dreads, displeases him.
3. To that which is objected, that they desist from the judgment of presumption; it must be said that, as has been said, although they do not dare to desire what they first dared, nevertheless by a wicked will they do not desist from desiring; and if they could find a way by which they believed they might attain [it], without doubt they would presume the same. Whence, although the judgment is varied on account of the consideration of the punishments, nevertheless the appetite is not torn away nor [is] the evil desire, but rather it reigns in act.
4. To that which is objected concerning the natural motion, some respond that nature, even if it is not extinguished, is nevertheless so lulled to sleep and overcome by the malice of free choice that it cannot go forth into its own act. — Yet it can be said otherwise: that, just as the free will deformed the act of believing, so too it deforms the natural act when it is joined to it. An example of this is the following. Although the miser naturally desires beatitude, so great is the perversity of judgment in him and of will, that he says beatitude to be nothing except in riches; and so he never goes forth into the appetite of beatitude except as it is in riches; and so in desiring that beatitude he sins, because the motion that nature begins by inciting, the will consummates by deforming. So it is to be understood that the devil naturally loves God as preserver, but the devil's will refers that love to his own utility; therefore he sins, because, although he loves God, nevertheless he loves [Him] for his own sake. I therefore grant well that he goes forth into a natural act, but never into a purely natural one. p. 180 5. To that which is objected, that he can desist from the exterior act; it must be said that it is not the same, because, since the devil does not fall asleep, the interior powers are always vigorous in him, and so they are always in act, whether he will or not, as in a waking man. But work directed to another is wholly subject to free choice, and therefore he can cease from this and from all14; in the interior [act] he can cease from this or from that according to diverse turnings, but never from all. — As for what is said, then, that we are more masters of interior acts; if it is understood as to restraint by oneself, it is manifestly false; if as to restraint by another, it is true, because someone can restrain me from an exterior act and compel [me]: it is not so concerning the interior.
6. To that which is objected, that he does not seem now to be proud, because the cause has ceased; it must be said that there is a cause that induces, but yet does not effect nor preserve; and when this ceases, the effect does not cease, as is plainly evident; and such was the beauty in the devil. There is another [cause] that effects and preserves; and such was the devil's will, oblique and turned away15, and this is always in the devil, therefore pride is always in him; and although he does not rise up to obtain that [sublimity], nevertheless he still rises up to that which he can, and more than he can, because [he rises up] to dominion over men, and especially over the saints.
7. To that which is objected last, that appetite is of a unitable thing; it must be said that absolute and deliberate appetite is of a unitable and possible thing; and this is appetite with choice. But the appetite of velleity, which is of impossible things, is not of a unitable thing according to truth, but of a thing that is desired, as someone desires to be swift like a swallow and the like16. But the devil, by a will of choice, does not desire what he first desired, in the mode in which he desired it, but only as far as in him lies. — If, however, someone contends that he does desire [it]; it must be admitted that his judgment, or estimation, is perverse, at least [that] of the practical intellect, by which he judges that he can attain to that17, although the judgment of speculation dictates the contrary.
I. The question is about the deliberate acts of will in demons, not about the natural ones, which certainly are good in themselves, as they proceed from a good nature. Other doctors propose this question under more restricted terms, e.g. whether all the acts of a demon are evil. — The Holy Doctor supposes that a created will can, without grace, do some work naturally honorable and of itself orderable to the ultimate end (cf. below, d. 28, a. 2, q. 3); likewise, that an act generically good can be made morally evil when it is stained by the depravity of the end or of some circumstance (cf. below, d. 36, d. 5).
If it is asked as to fact, it is commonly affirmed that all the non-natural acts of demons are evil, although they can do an act generically good, but not except with an evil will. Scotus too judges this to be probable. But when it is asked whether it is impossible that they could elicit some of these same acts morally good, but not meritorious, Scotus (here q. unica, n. 22 ff., Reportata here q. 3), using various distinctions concerning the good, asserted that this impossibility cannot be proved. — Although the damned [one] always does evil, nevertheless, as Richard of Mediavilla says (here a. 2, q. 2), he does not "always demerit, speaking properly of demerit, according as demerit is called fault, for which, by the decree of the divine judgment, a punishment for sin ought to be inflicted by the judge; because for an evil act of free choice after the judgment no punishment will be inflicted on him by God. Nor yet will that act remain unpunished, because that act will be to the devil himself both fault and punishment, such that there will be for the devil a punishment enacted, not inflicted. But until the judgment an evil act of free choice is to the devil both fault and demerit, because for any evil act of free choice a punishment is owed to him by the judge; in which [judgment] he will receive the completion of the whole punishment to be inflicted on him by the judge." That there is for that intermediate state some demerit and an increase of accidental punishment, Alexander of Hales approves (S. p. II, q. 102, m. 1 and m. 3, a. 9) and St. Bonaventure, as was already observed above, d. 6, a. 2, q. 4, [obj.] 2, and will be more evident from the following question. St. Thomas himself in the Commentary (here q. 1, a. 2) in part agrees, saying: "Fault is said to grow not as to the intensity of malice, but as to the multiplicity of the act. The essential punishment too does not grow, but the accidental [one does]."
II. Of the intensity of malice it is treated explicitly in the following question. We find no one among the ancients who treats of this on purpose, except Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. m. 3, a. 9, and q. 101, m. 10), B. Albert (S. p. II, tr. 3, q. 23, m. 1, a. 1), and Dionysius the Carthusian, who (here q. 2) transcribes some words from St. Bonaventure. — The opinion set down in the first place in the body [of the article] St. Thomas follows in the Commentary, as is evident from the words just related; which opinion does not entirely please our Doctor, who also employs another distinction. — Concerning the administrative power in angels, cf. below, d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, in the body.
III. On this 2nd question, besides those cited in the preceding scholion: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 102, m. 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2.
---
- Vers. 15. — Glossa invenitur apud Petrum Lombardum in hunc locum. Cfr. etiam Hieronym. in Ps. 33, 15.Verse 15. — The Gloss is found in Peter Lombard on this passage. Cf. also Jerome on Ps. 33, 15.
- Vers. 8. — Glossa interlinearis apud Lyranum in hunc locum.Verse 8. — The interlinear Gloss in [Nicholas of] Lyra on this passage.
- Cap. 3. n. 33. Cfr. supra pag. 175, nota 7.Ch. 3, n. 33. Cf. above, p. 175, note 7.
- Cfr. Comment. in Iob. 24, 17, ubi dicit: Divinitatem quoque sibi per superbiam arrogando, quam praesumtione animi sui tentavit invadere, velut fur inventus est... Hic iam in peccatorum suorum tenebris constitutus, vultum malae conscientiae suae obduratione operuit, poenitentiam non acturus; et idcirco divino lumine privatus studet, atque observat, ut ea quae tenebris et caligine sunt digna, committat. Unde in his operibus vitam agens, fodiet sibi domos habitationum in inferis cum illis suis ministris, cum quibus se adversus Deum et creatorem erigere tentavit. — Liber hic non est S. Hieronymi.Cf. the Commentary on Job 24, 17, where he says: "Arrogating to himself even the divine nature by pride, which he attempted to invade by the presumption of his own mind, he was found out like a thief... Now, established in the darkness of his own sins, he covered the face of his evil conscience with hardening, not about to do penance; and therefore, deprived of the divine light, he strives and watches to commit those things that are worthy of darkness and gloom. Whence, leading his life in these works, he will dig for himself dwelling-houses in hell with those ministers of his, with whom he attempted to rise up against God and the Creator." — This book is not St. Jerome's.
- Supple cum cod. Q (a secunda manu) diabolus.Supply, with codex Q (by a second hand), diabolus.
- Quaest. praeced.The preceding question.
- Vers. 19.Verse 19.
- Vers. 11. — Glossam refert Strabus loc. cit.Verse 11. — Strabo reports the Gloss in the place cited.
- Libr. II. de Serm. Domini, c. 14. n. 48. Vide supra d. 5. dub. 1. — Sequens textus est August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 12. n. 2: Nullum quippe vitium ita contra naturam est, ut naturae deleat etiam extrema vestigia.Book II of On the Lord's Sermon [on the Mount], ch. 14, n. 48. See above, d. 5, dub. 1. — The following text is Augustine, City of God XIX, ch. 12, n. 2: "For no vice is so contrary to nature that it destroys even the last traces of nature."
- Libr. I. c. 2: Praeterea quoque ad cumulum diabolici peccati illud accidit, quod statim postquam peccavit, foveam desperationis incurrit.Book I, ch. 2: "Moreover, this too belongs to the heap of the devil's sin, that immediately after he sinned, he fell into the pit of despair."
- Isai. 14, 13. Cfr. supra pag. 137, nota 5.Isaiah 14, 13. Cf. above, p. 137, note 5.
- In cod. I (cod. bb a secunda manu) propter subnexa non male additur sicut.In codex I (codex bb by a second hand), on account of what follows, sicut is not badly added.
- Supple: a malo actu. — Vat. paulo ante timet pro timent. Circa finem solutionis cod. T ita ipso timore pro in ipso timore.Supply: a malo actu (from the evil act). — The Vatican edition, a little before, [reads] timet for timent. Near the end of the solution codex T [reads] ita ipso timore for in ipso timore.
- Vat. cum nonnullis mss. omittit et ab omni; in interiori potest cessare ab hoc; quibus omissis propositio redditur falsa. In his verbis, contextu postulante, ante interiori supplevimus particulam in, quae in codd. et ed. 1 desideratur et facile excidere potuit.The Vatican edition with several manuscripts omits et ab omni; in interiori potest cessare ab hoc; with these omitted the proposition is rendered false. In these words, as the context requires, before interiori we have supplied the particle in, which is wanting in the manuscripts and the first edition and could easily have fallen out.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 perversa.Codex cc and the first edition [read] perversa.
- Cfr. supra pag. 159, nota 3. et scholion ad eandem quaest.Cf. above, p. 159, note 3, and the scholion to the same question.
- Plures codd. cum ed. 1 idem; cod. A illud idem.Several manuscripts with the first edition [read] idem; codex A [reads] illud idem. ---