Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3
QUAESTIO II.
Utrum Angelus per cognitionem naturalem divinam essentiam cognoverit in se ipsa sine medio et creaturae adminiculo.
Secundo quaeritur circa hoc de naturali cognitione Angeli respectu creatricis essentiae. Et est quaestio, utrum Angelus per cognitionem naturalem divinam essentiam cognoverit in se ipsa sine omni medio et creaturae adminiculo. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. «Angelus per naturam habet deiformem intellectum», sicut vult Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus1; sed intellectus humanus, quando factus est deiformis, cognoscere potest Deum in luce sua — non enim efficitur deiformis nisi per gloriam — ergo et hoc poterat Angelus per naturam.
2. Item, «Angelus per naturam est speculum clarum ipsius supremi luminis2»; sed illud lumen semper, quantum est de se, et naturaliter supersplendet speculo intellectuali. Si ergo speculum mundum, obiectum soli, claritatem suscipit per naturam, ergo et Angelus claritatem illius supernae lucis: ergo cum possit oculum ad illam supernam lucem, nullo obsistente, dirigere, sed et dirigendo cognoscere, ergo videtur, quod naturali cognitione ipsam divinam lucem in se ipsa cognoscat. Si dicas, quod acies intellectus angelici retunderetur propter improportionabilitatem luminis: contra: semper manet improportionabilitas, quidquid detur Angelo: ergo nunquam videret.
3. Item, quae sunt essentialiter et praesentialiter in potentia cognoscente cognoscuntur per sui praesentiam et essentiam, sicut dicit Augustinus de Trinitate3 et super Genesim ad litteram, quod «anima se ipsam et habitus suos per essentiam et praesentiam cognoscit». Si ergo Deus praesentissimus erat intellectui angelico, et hoc per naturam: ergo naturaliter ipsam divinam essentiam in se ipsa cognoscebat.
4. Item, omne illud quod est ens cognoscibile per se, aut cognoscitur per sui essentiam, aut per speciem. Si ergo Angelus cognoscebat Deum naturaliter, ut dicit Magister in littera4, aut per speciem, aut in sua essentia; sed non per speciem; ergo etc. Quod autem non per speciem, videtur. Species enim est maioris simplicitatis et abstractionis et puritatis, quam illud cuius est species; sed nihil Deo simplicius: ergo Deus speciem non habet: ergo non poterat Angelus Deum nosse per speciem; et noverat per speciem vel essentiam: ergo etc.
5. Item, Angelus per naturalem cognitionem Deum cognoscebat, aut ergo sub velatione, aut facie revelata. Non sub velatione, quia velamen non est nisi propter culpam vel propter molem carnis coniunctam; sed in Angelo nulla erat macula culpae5, nulla moles carnis coniuncta nec phantasmatum obsistentia: ergo sua naturali cognitione summam essentiam in sua luce videbat.
6. Item, si Angelus cognoscebat Deum, aut ergo per medium, aut sine medio. Si sine medio, ergo videbat Deum in se ipso. Si per medium, ergo inter mentem Angeli et Deum aliquid erat medium; quod est contra Augustinum6 et contra rationem. Nam illud medium aut esset magis proportionabile Deo quam mens Angeli, aut minus. Si magis, ergo aliqua creatura superior Angelo; si minus, ergo potius impediebat cognitionem, quam adiuvaret. Restat igitur, quod Angelus per cognitionem naturalem cognoscebat divinam essentiam in se ipsa.
CONTRA: 1. Ioannis decimo septimo7: Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te Deum, ergo in visione Dei est beatitudo summa: si ergo hoc habebat Angelus per naturam, ergo per naturam erat beatus.
2. Item, adhuc naturalia salva sunt in Angelis malis, maxime quae spectant ad intellectum8: si ergo per naturam poterant divinam lucem conspicere in se, ergo et nunc possunt: ergo non sunt in tenebris damnationis, quod aperte falsum est.
3. Item, proximior est Deo anima habens gratiam, quam sit Angelus habens sola naturalia; sed anima exuta cum gratia non potest aspicere lucem summam, nisi adiuvetur per gloriam, sicut patet de his qui sunt in purgatorio, et fuerunt in limbo: ergo videtur, quod nec Angelus per naturam.
4. Item, lux divinae essentiae est supra omnem intellectum creatum, quantumcumque ille intellectus sit excellens in naturalibus: ergo nunquam intellectus creatus in illam intuendam ascendet virtute sua, nisi Deus condescendat per gratiam: ergo impossibile est, quod Angelus naturali cognitione cognoscat divinam essentiam in se ipsa9.
5. Item, multo plus est Deus supra intellectum angelicum, quam sit Angelus supra intellectum humanum; sed homo non potest nosse Angelum, nisi Angelus condescendat ei: ergo nec Angelus ipsam divinam lucem in se ipsa.
6. Item, impossibile est, quod aliquis oculus perveniat ad cognitionem luminis solaris nisi per immissionem radiorum solis, quantumcumque habeat alia lumina: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquis ad contuitum supernae lucis perveniat per illuminationem aliquam naturalem, vel acquisitam, nisi Deus suae luminositatis radium immittat10; sed immissio haec non est nisi per gratiam: ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua creatura, quantumcumque nobilis, divinam lucem in se ipsa per naturam cognoscat.
CONCLUSIO.
Angelus naturali cognitione divinam essentiam in se ipsa videre non poterat.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Angelus naturali cognitione divinam essentiam videre non poterat in essentia11 sive claritate sua. Et hoc patet, quia haec cognitio est primum praemium, quo habito, mens creata quiescit tanquam beata et perfecta; hoc autem praemium nemo obtinet nisi gratuita Dei influentia.
Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, sane dici potest, quod divina lux propter sui eminentiam est inaccessibilis viribus omnis naturae creatae; et ideo per quandam benignitatis condescensionem facit se cognosci, ita quod in illa cognitione cognoscens multo plus agatur, quam agat. Illa autem condescensio bonitatis quid gratuitum dicit; sed constat, quod non dicit divinae essentiae humiliationem, quia non potest minorari, sed dicit alicuius radii gratuitam immissionem, per quam anima clare cognoscit, cum est immissio in abundantia, sicut erit in gloria. Et ita Angelus divinam essentiam non potest per naturam cognoscere in se ipsa, sicut ostendunt rationes inductae, et sicut colligitur a Dionysio in principio mysticae Theologiae12.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod est deiformis per naturam; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur, quia habeat deiformitatem, quam habet intellectus gloriosus per assimilationem, quae est in statu perfecto, sed deiformis dicitur, quia sine susceptione specierum, per id quod habet in se, actu cognoscit.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est speculum clarum; dicendum, quod Deus refulget in omni creatura tanquam causa in effectu suo, et ex omnibus potest cognosci, et maxime in creatura, quae ipsius Dei est insignita imagine. Sed illa refulgentia luminis, per quam videtur Deus facie ad faciem13, non est naturae, sed condescensionis et gratiae. Nec est simile de luce corporali, quae naturaliter influit lumen in haec inferiora; non sic debet intelligi de luce aeterna.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus praesentialiter est in anima etc.; dicendum, quod esse praesentialiter hoc est dupliciter: vel ut principium movens, conservans et continens, vel ut obiectum immutans. Primo modo est Deus praesens Angelo, ut lux caeco14; secundo modo non. Et ideo non est simile de anima et eius habitibus, quoniam praesentes sunt animae utroque modo. Et ratio huius est, quoniam haec cognoscibilia non superexcedunt cognoscentis potentiam et naturam.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut per speciem, aut per essentiam etc.; dicendum, quod adhuc est tertius modus cognoscendi, scilicet per effectus. Cognoscitur autem Deus per effectus visibiles et per substantias spirituales et per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod «est similitudo quaedam Dei non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferiori natura», sicut dicit Augustinus in nono de Trinitate, et habitum est in primo15. Et ita respondetur illi rationi, quod procedit ex divisione insufficienti.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de velatione, dicendum, quod non posse pertingere ad alicuius cognitionem, hoc est dupliciter: vel propter cordis obscuritatem, vel propter cognoscibilis profunditatem. Si primo modo, sic dicitur impediri velatione; si secundo modo, sic impeditur non propter interpositionem velaminis, sed propter sublimitatem cognoscibilis. Primo modo impeditur homo peccator, secundo modo Angelus. Unde nec videbat sub velamine aenigmatis, nec tamen facie ad faciem, quia medium est inter utrumque, videlicet Deum videre in speculo absque aenigmate16.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut cognoscebat Deum per medium, aut sine medio; dicendum, quod per medium, scilicet per effectum: non quia illud medium magis esset proportionale Deo, sed quia magis erat proportionale intellectui angelico; unde naturaliter videbatur per speculum et per vestigium, quamvis non per aenigma. Nec illud est contra Augustinum, quia, sicut infra melius patebit17, Augustinus vult, quod inter mentem et Deum non cadit medium in ratione causae efficientis, vel influentis, cadit tamen medium manuductionis, quod tamen non habet rationem medii proprie, quia magis subservit potentiae cognoscenti, quam praesit.
SCHOLION.
I. Conclusio et principia hic clare exposita conveniunt cum iis quae dicuntur infra (d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.) de modo, quo Adam in statu innocentiae Deum cognovit, et quae in genere de cognoscibilitate Dei dicta sunt (I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. 2.). Vide Schol. ibid. ad q. 1, in quo (n. III.) etiam breviter insinuatum est, quomodo intelligantur verba S. Doctoris, hic ad 4; «per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti». Late de hac doctrina agitur in opusculo a nobis edito: de Humanae Cognitionis ratione anecdota quaedam etc. Ad Claras Aquas 1883.
II. Consentiunt quoad conclusionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 23. m. 3, et q. 24. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 9; Report. hic q. 4; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. et 11. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. a. 1; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. a. 6; S. I. q. 56. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 49; de Verit. q. 8. a. 5. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. a. 2. partic. 2. et quaest. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. a. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 9. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 2. circa finem.
QUESTION II.
Whether the Angel by natural cognition knew the divine essence in itself without a medium and without the assistance of a creature.
In the second place inquiry is made concerning this about the natural cognition of the Angel with respect to the creating essence. And the question is, whether the Angel by natural cognition knew the divine essence in itself without any medium and without the assistance of a creature. And that he did, it seems.
1. «The Angel by nature has a deiform intellect», as Dionysius holds in the book On the Divine Names1; but the human intellect, when it has been made deiform, can know God in His light — for it is not made deiform except through glory — therefore the Angel too could do this by nature.
2. Likewise, «the Angel by nature is a clear mirror of the supreme light itself2»; but that light always, so far as in itself lies, naturally super-shines upon the intellectual mirror. If therefore a clean mirror, set before the sun, receives brightness by nature, then the Angel too receives the brightness of that supernal light: therefore, since it can direct its eye to that supernal light, with nothing standing in the way, and by directing it can know, therefore it seems that by natural cognition it knows the divine light itself in itself. If you say that the keenness of the angelic intellect would be blunted on account of the disproportion of the light: on the contrary: the disproportion always remains, whatever be given to the Angel: therefore it would never see.
3. Likewise, those things which are essentially and presentially in a knowing power are known through their presence and essence, as Augustine says in On the Trinity3 and on Genesis according to the Letter, that «the soul knows itself and its own habits through essence and presence». If therefore God was most present to the angelic intellect, and this by nature: therefore it naturally knew the divine essence itself in itself.
4. Likewise, everything that is a being knowable per se is either known through its own essence or through a species. If therefore the Angel knew God naturally, as the Master says in the text4, either through a species or in His essence; but not through a species; therefore etc. That it was not through a species, it seems. For a species is of greater simplicity and abstraction and purity than that of which it is the species; but nothing is simpler than God: therefore God has no species: therefore the Angel could not know God through a species; and he did know either through a species or through the essence: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, the Angel by natural cognition knew God either under a veiling or with face revealed. Not under a veiling, because a veil exists only on account of fault or on account of the conjoined mass of the flesh; but in the Angel there was no stain of fault5, no conjoined mass of flesh, nor the obstruction of phantasms: therefore by its natural cognition it saw the supreme essence in its own light.
6. Likewise, if the Angel knew God, then either through a medium or without a medium. If without a medium, then he saw God in Himself. If through a medium, then between the mind of the Angel and God something was a medium; which is against Augustine6 and against reason. For that medium would be either more proportionable to God than the mind of the Angel, or less. If more, then some creature is superior to the Angel; if less, then it rather impeded cognition than helped it. It remains therefore that the Angel by natural cognition knew the divine essence in itself.
ON THE CONTRARY: 1. John, the seventeenth chapter7: This is eternal life, that they may know thee, God, therefore in the vision of God is the highest beatitude: if therefore the Angel had this by nature, then by nature he was beatified.
2. Likewise, the natural things are still preserved in the evil Angels, especially those which pertain to the intellect8: if therefore by nature they could behold the divine light in itself, then they can even now: therefore they are not in the darkness of damnation, which is plainly false.
3. Likewise, a soul having grace is nearer to God than is an Angel having natural endowments alone; but a soul, stripped, even with grace cannot gaze upon the supreme light unless it is helped by glory, as is plain concerning those who are in purgatory and were in limbo: therefore it seems that neither does the Angel by nature.
4. Likewise, the light of the divine essence is above every created intellect, however excellent that intellect be in natural endowments: therefore a created intellect will never ascend to the beholding of it by its own power, unless God condescends through grace: therefore it is impossible that the Angel by natural cognition should know the divine essence in itself9.
5. Likewise, God is much more above the angelic intellect than the Angel is above the human intellect; but man cannot know an Angel unless the Angel condescends to him: therefore neither can the Angel know the divine light itself in itself.
6. Likewise, it is impossible that any eye should attain to the cognition of the solar light except through the emission of the sun's rays, however many other lights it have: therefore it is impossible that anyone should attain to the beholding of the supernal light through any natural or acquired illumination, unless God send forth a ray of His luminosity10; but this emission is only through grace: therefore it is impossible that any creature, however noble, should by nature know the divine light in itself.
CONCLUSION.
The Angel by natural cognition was not able to see the divine essence in itself.
I respond: It must be said that the Angel by natural cognition was not able to see the divine essence in His essence11 or in His brightness. And this is plain, because this cognition is the first reward, which once had, the created mind rests as beatified and perfected; but this reward no one obtains except by the gratuitous influence of God.
But if the reason for this be asked, it can soundly be said that the divine light, on account of its eminence, is inaccessible to the powers of every created nature; and therefore through a certain condescension of benignity it makes itself known, in such a way that in that cognition the one knowing is acted upon much more than he acts. But that condescension of goodness expresses something gratuitous; yet it is established that it does not express any humiliation of the divine essence, since it cannot be lessened, but expresses the gratuitous emission of some ray, by which the soul knows clearly, when the emission is in abundance, as it will be in glory. And so the Angel cannot by nature know the divine essence in itself, as the adduced arguments show, and as is gathered from Dionysius at the beginning of the Mystical Theology12.
1. To that, then, which is objected, that he is deiform by nature; it must be said that this is not said because he has the deiformity which the glorious intellect has through assimilation, which is in the perfected state, but he is called deiform because, without the reception of species, by that which he has in himself, he knows in act.
2. To that which is objected, that he is a clear mirror; it must be said that God shines forth in every creature as a cause in its effect, and can be known from all things, and especially in the creature which is marked with the image of God Himself. But that refulgence of the light, by which God is seen face to face13, is not of nature but of condescension and grace. Nor is it similar with corporeal light, which naturally pours light into these lower things; it must not be so understood of the eternal light.
3. To that which is objected, that God is presentially in the soul etc.; it must be said that to be presentially is twofold: either as a moving, conserving, and containing principle, or as an object effecting change. In the first way God is present to the Angel, as light to a blind man14; in the second way not. And therefore it is not similar with the soul and its habits, since these are present to the soul in both ways. And the reason for this is that these knowables do not exceed the power and nature of the one knowing.
4. To that which is objected, that either through a species or through the essence etc.; it must be said that there is still a third mode of knowing, namely through effects. Now God is known through visible effects and through spiritual substances and through the influence of a light connatural to the knowing power, which «is a certain likeness of God, not abstracted but infused, inferior to God because in an inferior nature», as Augustine says in the ninth book of On the Trinity, and as has been treated in the first book15. And thus that argument is answered, which proceeds from an insufficient division.
5. To that which is objected concerning the veiling, it must be said that not being able to attain to the cognition of something is twofold: either on account of the darkness of the heart, or on account of the profundity of the knowable. If in the first way, then one is said to be impeded by a veiling; if in the second way, then one is impeded not on account of the interposition of a veil, but on account of the sublimity of the knowable. In the first way the sinful man is impeded, in the second way the Angel. Hence he did not see under the veil of the enigma, nor yet face to face, because a medium is between the two, namely to see God in a mirror without an enigma16.
6. To that which is objected, that he knew God either through a medium or without a medium; it must be said: through a medium, namely through an effect: not because that medium was more proportional to God, but because it was more proportional to the angelic intellect; hence he naturally saw through a mirror and through a vestige, although not through an enigma. Nor is this against Augustine, because, as will better appear below17, Augustine holds that between the mind and God there does not fall a medium in the character of an efficient or influencing cause, yet there does fall a medium of manuduction, which nevertheless does not have the character of a medium properly, because it rather subserves the knowing power than presides over it.
SCHOLION.
I. The conclusion and principles here clearly set forth agree with those things which are said below (d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.) concerning the mode in which Adam in the state of innocence knew God, and with what has been said in general concerning the knowability of God (I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. 2.). See the Scholion there at q. 1, in which (n. III.) it is also briefly intimated how the words of the holy Doctor here, at reply 4, are to be understood; «through the influence of a light connatural to the knowing power». This doctrine is treated at length in the opusculum edited by us: On the Manner of Human Cognition, certain unpublished pieces, etc. At Quaracchi, 1883.
II. Agreeing as to the conclusion: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 23. m. 3, and q. 24. m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 9; Report. here q. 4; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. and 11. — St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. a. 1; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. a. 6; S. I. q. 56. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 49; de Verit. q. 8. a. 5. — B. Albert, S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. a. 2. partic. 2. and quaest. incid. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 4. a. 1. quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Middleton, II. Sent. d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. a. 1. — Henr. of Ghent, Quodl. 4. q. 9. — Durandus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — Dionysius Carth., here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 2. near the end.