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Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 21

Textus Latinus
p. 494

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum tentatio per serpentem fuerit conveniens.

Secundo quaeritur de tentatione primorum parentum quantum ad instrumentum medium. Et dicitur in Genesis tertio1, quod diabolus tentavit hominem per serpentem. Et quod iste modus non fuerit conveniens, ostenditur primo sic.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Quanto tentatio est occultior, tanto est ad decipiendum efficacior: si ergo diabolus, quanta maiori calliditate poterat, hominem decipere conabatur, videtur, quod ipsum debuisset tentare spirituali tentatione absque alicuius corporis assumtione.

2. Item, tanto tentatio est efficacior, quanto tentans est in suggerendo affabilior; sed actus locutionis proprie debetur humanae effigiei2: ergo videtur, quod diabolus ad tentandum magis debuit assumere effigiem hominis quam bruti animalis, cum brutum animal sua locutione potius esset ad terrorem quam ad persuasionem.

3. Item, quanto tentans magis simulat et induit speciem sanctitatis, tanto magis praevalet in tentando3; sed multa sunt animalia, quae magis in suis proprietatibus sanctitatem praetendunt quam serpens, sicut columba et agnus: ergo videtur, quod illa magis debuerit assumere diabolus ad tentandum.

4. Item, instrumentum sive organum debet conformari exercitio per ipsum facto4; sed tentatio erat ad decipiendum: ergo diabolus debuit assumere animal maxime dolosum et callidum. Sed plus est de dolositate in vulpe quam in serpente: ergo magis debuit assumere vulpem quam serpentem.

*Nota.* Ad oppositum sunt rationes; sed quoniam verum concludunt, possunt claudi in responsione.

CONCLUSIO.

Quod homo tentaretur a diabolo sub specie animalis bruti, et quidem serpentis, congruum esse, tripliciter insinuatur.

*Notandum. Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod modus ille tentandi non tantum fuit ex diabolica electione, sicut dicit Augustinus[^5], sed etiam ex divina permissione. Non enim licuit diabolo tentare omni modo, quo vellet et posset, sed eo modo, quo Dominus permitteret. Concessit autem divina Sapientia, quae omnia ordinat et gubernat, et permisit[^6], quod diabolus tentaret hominem in effigie animalis bruti, et non cuiuscumque, sed serpentis; sic enim exigebat congruentia ordinis. Conclusio bimembris.*

*Congruitas triplex prob. conclusionis. Quod enim homo tentaretur a diabolo in effigie bruti animalis, congruum erat tum respectu operis, tum respectu finis intenti, tum etiam respectu divini iudicii. Respectu operis, quia homo natus est inclinari ad bonum ut nunc[^7], maxime ex parte sensibili et brutali; et ideo congruum erat, ipsum tentari in effigie animalis bruti. — Respectu finis intenti similiter congruum erat, quia ad hoc ordinabatur tentatio, ut homo efficeretur similis animali bruto, cum, contempto bono incommutabili, adhaereret bono commutabili et ibi quiesceret[^8]; et ideo ad hoc insinuandum in specie animalis bruti debuit tentari. — Respectu divini iudicii* etiam congruum fuit, quoniam Dominus iustus et fidelis non permittit hominem tentari ultra, quam possit9. Et ideo sic patitur diabolum in tentatione latere, ut nihilominus possit ab homine deprehendi: et ideo non passus est, quod diabolus hominem tentaret omnino in specie consimili, et per hoc non in specie vel effigie humana, sed potius brutali. — Triplex ergo congruentia ordinis exigebat, ut homo a diabolo in brutali effigie tentaretur.

*Conclusione pro 2. Hac etiam[^10] triplici congruentia exigente, permissus est homo tentari a diabolo non in quolibet animali bruto, sed in serpente. Primum ratione operis. Quia enim tentatio fiebat per suggestionis ingressum, quae intrat ad cor ad modum serpentis et ibi virus peccati diffundit, ex quo homo habet spiritualiter mori; ideo, ut exterior effigies operi responderet interiori, congruum fuit, hominem a diabolo tentari in effigie serpentis, cuius est serpere et venenum diffundere et diffundendo hominem interimere[^11]. — Respectu etiam finis intenti congruum erat. Quia enim intendebat diabolus faciem hominis et caput et superiorem mentem convertere deorsum et totum prosternere, et sic prosternendo ad malum finem deducere, proponendo sibi praemium aliquod delectabile: ideo permissus est tentare in serpente, qui secundum totum suum corpus habet terrae in suo incessu adhaerere[^12]. — Congruum etiam erat respectu divini iudicii*. Quia enim ex illa tentatione divino iudicio inter tentatum et tentatorem debebat inimicitia exoriri13; ideo tentatio hominis in serpente debuit fieri, quem post lapsum maxime exhorret, et qui maxime sua calliditate insidiatur hominem laedere. — Et sic patet multiplex congruentia, quare diabolus permissus est hominem tentare in effigie serpentina.

*Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod tentatio tanto est efficacior, quanto occultior; dicendum, quod etsi diabolus se manifestaret exterioribus sensibus in effigie serpentis, nihilominus tamen in illa manifestatione plus se occultabat, quam manifestabat. Unde mulier non credidit, eum qui loquebatur in serpente, esse adversarium, sed etiam potius bonum consiliarium[^14]: et ideo ita occulta erat illa tentatio, sicut si diabolus loqueretur ad cor interius. — Alia solutio.* Aliter potest responderi, quod iusto iudicio Dei non est permissus tentare interius, quia non habebat posse ingredi interius, nisi homo praeberet sibi aditum; et ideo tentavit ab exteriori per sensum, et voce sensibili magis quam voce spirituali; non enim debebat aliter permitti.

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2. Ad illud de maiori affabilitate iam patet responsio. Verum est enim, quod si fuisset in effigie humana, affabilior fuisset; sed divina providentia non debuit hoc permittere, sed cautelam diaboli debuit temperare; et ideo concessum est sibi corpus serpentis, quod tamen habebat faciem virginis, sicut dicit Beda15, et reliquum corpus erat serpentis16, ut sic ex una parte posset latere, ex altera deprehendi.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de amicabilitate, iam patet responsio: quia sic debuit permitti ostendi effigies amicitiae, ut posset deprehendi veritas inimicitiae. Nam tentator, qui effigiem amicitiae praetendebat, secundum veritatem inimicus erat. Ideo huic operi animal maxime competebat, quod haberet aspectum humanum, corpus vero eius animalis, quod natum est homini esse maxime inimicum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo de calliditate, dicendum, quod etsi sint aliqua animalia callidiora et prudentiora, tamen in nocendo et insidiando homini serpens est animal callidissimum. Et quia calliditas tentantis erat ad hominem offendendum, hinc est, quod inter cetera animalia magis permissus est tentare per serpentem.

SCHOLION.

I. Hanc et sequentem quaest. alii Scholastici plerumque una quaestione absolvunt, tractando speciatim de sequente. De hac autem (2.) explicite tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 103. m. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 86. m. 2. — Petr. de Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. dub. lat. 3.

II. De sequente (3.) quaest.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 7 et 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 165. a. 2. — B. Albert., loc. cit. m. 1. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. et dub. lat. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

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English Translation

Question II.

Whether the temptation through a serpent was fitting.

Secondly it is asked concerning the temptation of the first parents with respect to the intermediate instrument. And it is said in Genesis chapter three1 that the devil tempted man through a serpent. And that this manner was not fitting is shown first as follows.

*For the opposite.*

1. The more hidden a temptation is, the more efficacious it is for deceiving: if therefore the devil was attempting to deceive man with the greatest cunning he could, it seems that he ought to have tempted him by a spiritual temptation without the assumption of any body.

2. Likewise, a temptation is the more efficacious, the more affable the tempter is in suggesting; but the act of speech belongs properly to the human form2: therefore it seems that the devil, in order to tempt, ought rather to have assumed the form of a man than of a brute animal, since a brute animal by its speech would be more for terror than for persuasion.

3. Likewise, the more the tempter simulates and puts on the appearance of holiness, the more he prevails in tempting3; but there are many animals which in their properties pretend to holiness more than the serpent, such as the dove and the lamb: therefore it seems that the devil ought to have assumed those rather for tempting.

4. Likewise, the instrument or organ ought to be conformed to the exercise carried out through it4; but the temptation was for deceiving: therefore the devil ought to have assumed an animal most crafty and cunning. But there is more cunning in the fox than in the serpent: therefore he ought rather to have assumed a fox than a serpent.

*Note.* For the opposite side there are reasons; but since they conclude what is true, they can be closed within the response.

Conclusion.

That man should be tempted by the devil under the species of a brute animal, and indeed of a serpent, is shown to be fitting in a threefold way.

*Notandum. I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that that manner of tempting was not only from diabolical choice, as Augustine says[^5], but also from divine permission. For it was not permitted to the devil to tempt in every manner he wished and could, but only in that manner which the Lord would permit. Now divine Wisdom, which orders and governs all things, conceded and permitted[^6] that the devil should tempt man in the form of a brute animal, and not of just any one, but of a serpent; for the fittingness of order so required. Two-membered conclusion.*

*Threefold fittingness, proof of conclusion. For that man should be tempted by the devil in the form of a brute animal was fitting both with respect to the deed, with respect to the intended end, and also with respect to the divine judgment. With respect to the deed, because man is born to be inclined to the good as it now is[^7], chiefly on the sensible and brutal side; and therefore it was fitting that he be tempted in the form of a brute animal. — With respect to the intended end it was likewise fitting, because the temptation was ordered to this, that man might be made like a brute animal, when, with the unchangeable good despised, he would cling to the changeable good and there rest[^8]; and therefore for the insinuating of this he had to be tempted in the species of a brute animal. — With respect to the divine judgment* also it was fitting, because the Lord, just and faithful, does not permit man to be tempted beyond what he is able9. And therefore he so allows the devil to lie hidden in the temptation that nonetheless he can be detected by man: and therefore he did not allow that the devil should tempt man altogether in a like species, and through this not in human species or form, but rather in a brutal one. — Therefore the threefold fittingness of order required that man be tempted by the devil in a brutal form.

*For the second conclusion. This same[^10] threefold fittingness requiring, man was permitted to be tempted by the devil not in just any brute animal, but in the serpent. First by reason of the deed. For since the temptation came about through the entry of suggestion, which enters into the heart after the manner of a serpent and there spreads the poison of sin, from which man comes to die spiritually; therefore, so that the exterior form might correspond to the interior deed, it was fitting that man be tempted by the devil in the form of a serpent, whose nature it is to creep and to spread venom and by spreading it to kill man[^11]. — With respect also to the intended end it was fitting. For since the devil intended to turn the face and head and higher mind of man downward and to prostrate the whole, and so by prostrating to lead him to an evil end, proposing to him some delectable reward: therefore he was permitted to tempt in the serpent, which through its whole body has to cleave to the earth in its going[^12]. — It was fitting also with respect to the divine judgment*. For since from that temptation by divine judgment an enmity was to arise between the tempted and the tempter13; therefore the temptation of man had to come about in the serpent, which after the fall he most abhors, and which most by its cunning lies in wait to harm man. — And thus the manifold fittingness is plain why the devil was permitted to tempt man in serpentine form.

*Solution of the opposed. 1. To that therefore which is first objected, that a temptation is the more efficacious the more hidden it is; it must be said that, although the devil manifested himself to the exterior senses in the form of a serpent, nevertheless in that manifestation he was hiding himself more than manifesting himself. Whence the woman did not believe that he who was speaking in the serpent was an adversary, but rather a good counselor[^14]: and therefore that temptation was as hidden as if the devil were speaking to the inner heart. — Another solution.* It can be answered otherwise: that by the just judgment of God he was not permitted to tempt interiorly, because he had no power to enter within, unless man should give him an opening; and therefore he tempted from outside through the senses, and by a sensible voice rather than by a spiritual voice; for he was not to be permitted otherwise.

2. To that concerning the greater affability the response is now plain. It is true indeed that if he had been in human form, he would have been more affable; but divine providence ought not to have permitted this, but rather to have tempered the wariness of the devil; and therefore there was conceded to him the body of a serpent, which however had the face of a virgin, as Bede says15, and the rest of the body was that of a serpent16, so that on one side he might lie hidden, on the other be detected.

3. To that which is objected concerning friendliness, the response is now plain: because the appearance of friendship had to be permitted to be shown thus, so that the truth of enmity might be detected. For the tempter, who pretended the appearance of friendship, was in truth an enemy. Therefore for this work an animal was most suited which had a human aspect but the body of that animal which is born to be most an enemy to man.

4. To that which is objected last concerning cunning, it must be said that, although there are some animals more cunning and prudent, nevertheless in harming and lying in wait against man the serpent is the most cunning animal. And because the cunning of the tempter was for offending man, hence it is that among other animals he was rather permitted to tempt through the serpent.

Scholion.

I. This and the following question other Scholastics generally resolve in one question, treating specifically of the following. But of this (2.) explicitly there treat Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 103. m. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6; Summa p. II. tr. 14. q. 86. m. 2. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. dub. lat. 3.

II. Of the following (3.) question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 7 and 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; Summa II. II. q. 165. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, loc. cit. m. 1. 3. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. and dub. lat. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 1. seqq.
    Verses 1 ff. [Gen. 3, 1 ff.].
  2. Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Histor. animal. c. 9; V. de Generat. animal. c. 7; I. Politic. c. 2. (c. 1.) et Problem. sect. 11. n. 1, ubi dicit, soli homini locutionem competere sive loquelam.
    Cf. Aristotle, IV Historia animalium c. 9; V De generatione animalium c. 7; I Politica c. 2 (c. 1) and Problemata sect. 11 n. 1, where he says that speech or speaking belongs to man alone.
  3. Cod. aa tanto magis praebet in tentando suggestionem. Paulo inferius post magis Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 omittit in.
    Codex aa reads tanto magis praebet in tentando suggestionem ["the more he supplies suggestion in tempting"]. A little below, after magis, the Vatican edition with editions 3 and 4 omits in.
  4. Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Part. animal. c. 6; II. de Anima, text. 38. (c. 4.).
    Cf. Aristotle, IV De partibus animalium c. 6; II De anima, text 38 (c. 4).
  5. Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 5. Vide hic in lit. Magistri c. 4.
    Book XI De Genesi ad litteram c. 3 n. 5. See here in the Littera Magistri c. 4.
  6. Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. permittit. Paulo inferius pro ordinis plures codd. ordinationis.
    The Vatican edition with one or two codices reads permittit. A little below, for ordinis several codices read ordinationis.
  7. B. Albert., I. Ethic. tr. 3. c. 3: Bonum per accidens et ut nunc est resonantia boni simpliciter et semper, et ob id tantum movet appetitum. Cfr. supra pag. 123, nota 2, ubi similis exhibetur divisio boni, scil. in bonum absolutum et bonum alicui.
    Bl. Albert, I Ethica tr. 3 c. 3: "Good by accident and as it now is is a resonance of the good simply and always, and on that account only does it move the appetite." Cf. above p. 123, note 2, where a similar division of the good is exhibited, namely into absolute good and good to someone.
  8. Psalm. 48, 13: Homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis.
    Psalm 48, 13: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to the senseless beasts, and is become like to them."
  9. Epist. I. Cor. 10, 13: Fidelis autem Deus est, qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis etc.
    1 Corinthians 10, 13: "God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able" etc.
  10. Codd. T ee Et hac; plures alii cum ed. 1 omittunt etiam.
    Codices T and ee read Et hac; several others with edition 1 omit etiam.
  11. Haec ratio insinuatur a Gregorio, V. Moral. c. 34. n. 58. — Paulo inferius cod. aa id est superiorem pro et superiorem.
    This reason is insinuated by Gregory, V Moralia c. 34 n. 58. — A little below codex aa reads id est superiorem for et superiorem.
  12. Cfr. August., XII. de Trin. c. 11. n. 16. seqq.; XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. n. 2, et Isidor., Comment. in Gen. c. 4.
    Cf. Augustine, XII De Trinitate c. 11 n. 16 ff.; XIV De civitate Dei c. 11 n. 2; and Isidore, Commentary on Genesis c. 4.
  13. Gen. 3, 15: Inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem etc. — Pro tentatio hominis multi codd. et edd. 1. 2 tentatio animalis.
    Genesis 3, 15: "I will put enmities between thee and the woman" etc. — For tentatio hominis many codices and editions 1 and 2 read tentatio animalis.
  14. Qq. veteris et novi Testam. (inter opera August.) q. 31: Admiscens enim se [diabolus] serpenti egit per illum quasi per organum, ut nec mulier occulti diaboli intelligeret dolum, sciens, prudentem esse serpentem. — Paulo inferius Vat. daemon pro Dei.
    Questions of the Old and New Testament (among the works of Augustine) q. 31: "For mixing himself in with the serpent [the devil] acted through it as through an instrument, so that not even the woman might understand the deceit of the hidden devil, knowing the serpent to be prudent." — A little below the Vatican edition reads daemon for Dei.
  15. Cfr. August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 20. seq. — De hac et seqq. solutionibus cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. seqq.
    Cf. Augustine, II De Genesi contra Manichaeos c. 14 n. 20 f. — On this and the following solutions cf. here the Littera Magistri c. 2 ff.
  16. Teste Petro Comestore (de quo cfr. supra pag. 380, nota 4.) in sua Historia scholastica, c. 21. hist. libri Genesis. — Mox pro ut sic non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 et sic.
    On the testimony of Peter Comestor (on whom cf. above p. 380, note 4) in his Historia scholastica, c. 21 of the history of the book of Genesis. — Soon, for ut sic, not a few codices with editions 1 and 2 read et sic.
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