Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 21
Articulus I. De tentatione primorum parentum.
Quaestio I. Quid moverit principaliter diabolum ad tentandum hominem.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, quid moverit principaliter diabolum ad tentandum hominem. Et quod invidia, videtur:
Fundamenta. 1. Primo per illud quod dicitur Sapientiae secundo1: Invidia diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum; introitus autem mortis fuit per tentationem et seductionem hominis: ergo ad tentandum hominem invidia diabolum commovit.
2. Item, Gregorius in Moralibus2: «In paradiso diabolus invidens homini superbiae vulnus inflixit»: ergo cum vulnus inflixerit per tentationem, tentatio fuit ex invidia.
3. Item, diabolus tentando hominem factus est homicida, secundum quod dicitur Ioannis octavo3: Ille homicida erat ab initio; sed homicidium procedit ex odio, odium autem procedit ex invidia: ergo a primo, tentatio hominis, in qua diabolus fuit homicida, processit ex invidia.
4. Item, qui desiderat casum alterius sine suo fructu, non movetur ex amore commoditatis propriae, sed ex odio felicitatis alienae; sed diabolus casum hominis desiderabat absque suo fructu, sicut constat: ergo movebatur odio felicitatis humanae ad tentandum hominem. Sed tale odium non est aliud quam invidia4: ergo etc.
Ad oppositum. Sed contra: 1. Omnis invidia est respectu paris, vel superioris, secundum quod dicit Gregorius5 super illud Iob: Parvulum occidit invidia, superioris, inquam, saltem secundum reputationem: sed diabolus non reputabat hominem superiorem sibi: ergo videtur, quod ei non invidebat: ergo si ipsum tentabat, hoc non erat ex invidia.
2. Item, invidia est respectu boni, quod aliquo modo potest acquiri; sed diabolus non poterat pervenire ad aeternam beatitudinem, quia lapsus erat irreparabiliter6: ergo videtur, quod propter illius acquisitionem non invidebat homini.
3. Item, invidia est respectu boni, quod desideratur; nullus enim invidet alicui de aliquo, nisi cum illud amat et cupit; sed diabolus non cupiebat mandatis Dei obedire nec ad supernam patriam ascendere nec amicus Dei esse, propter sui desperationem: ergo videtur, quod hoc in homine non invideret: ergo etc.
4. Item, invidia non est nisi respectu eius quod est natum diminuere bonum proprium7; sed beatitudinis acquisitio nullius bonum potest diminuere: ergo non est aliquid, quod ab aliquo invideri possit: ergo videtur, quod si diabolus aliquo appetitu hominem cadere fecit, ex invidia motus non fuit.
Conclusio. Diabolus ex superbia quidem, sed immediate ex invidia motus est ad hominem tentandum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut praetactum fuit8, ista duo peccata sunt, quae maxime possident mentem diaboli, superbia et invidia. Unde, sicut habitum fuit supra, et Augustinus dicit, ex his duobus, qui prius erat lucifer, diabolus factus est: et sunt quasi haec duo inseparabilia, ita quod unum concomitatur ad alterum9. Superbus enim amat excellentiam, et ita nullum vult habere parem, ac per hoc statim appetit excellentiam singulariter possidere; et ideo statim vel actu, vel habitu invidet, cum nolit, bonum consimile bono, quod appetit, ab alio communicari. — Mens igitur diaboli, ab his duobus vitiis possessa, videlicet superbia et invidia, videns hominem in statu, in quo poterat cadere sub diabolica potestate et in quo poterat ascendere ad supernam felicitatem10, ex qua ipse ceciderat — et ex superbia motus est et ex invidia ad ipsum tentandum. Ex superbia namque, ut ipsum sibi subiiceret; ex invidia vero, ut ipsum a superna felicitate impediret. Et superbia fuit sicut movens11 primum, invidia vero sicut movens proximum et immediatum. — Esto enim, quod non posset dominium super hominem acquirere, adhuc studuisset ipsum a paradisi gaudiis impedire; et ideo Scriptura dicit, et eius expositores, diabolum ad tentandum hominem ex invidia motum esse. — Et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod invidia est respectu superioris, vel paris; dicendum, quod non solum est respectu superioris eius qui est superior, sed etiam eius qui potest esse. Quamvis autem diabolus in statu illo non reputaret hominem superiorem se; invidebat tamen, ne merito obedientiae sublimaretur ad statum gloriae, in quo statu ipsum superiorem se non dubitaret. — Aliter potest etiam dici, quod tunc reputabat ipsum superiorem se in hoc, quod poterat pervenire ad illam gloriam, ad quam diabolus ascendere non poterat.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod invidia est respectu boni, quod potest acquiri; respondendum est per interemptionem12, quia non solum invidet aliquis illud quod potest obtinere, sed etiam illud quod natus est habere, quamvis non possit, sicut truncatus et caecus invidet aliis visum et progressum. Licet autem diabolus non posset ad beatitudinem pervenire, tamen habebat ad hoc naturalem aptitudinem.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod invidia est respectu boni desiderati; dicendum, quod invidia non tantum venit ex desiderio alicuius boni privati, immo ex odio boni alieni13. — Alia solutio. Quia tamen desiderium boni proprii videtur esse principium omnis peccati, ideo potest aliter dici, quod invidia non solummodo est respectu eius boni, quod desideratur, sed etiam respectu eius boni, cuius obtentu minuitur bonum desideratum, vel aestimatur minus. Et quoniam diabolus desiderat singulariter efferri, ideo ex exaltatione hominis aestimabat suum bonum impediri; et ideo invidebat et ex invidia oppugnabat.
4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum, quia, etsi hominis glorificatio et exaltatio secundum veritatem alicuius bonum non diminueret, tamen secundum aestimationem falsam credi potuit, esse alicuius boni diminutivum, et ex illa aestimatione oriri invidia. Affectiones enim non tantum oriuntur ex iudiciis certis, sed etiam ex suspicionibus14 et aestimationibus falsis.
I. Quid sit tentatio, explicatur infra a. 2. q. I. et diffusius ab Alexandro Hal., S. p. II. q. 101. m. 1; cfr. etiam S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. et S. I. q. 114. a. 2; II. II. q. 97. a. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2. — De variis speciebus tentationis vide egregiam doctrinam hic dub. 3. positam. — De causis, quare permittatur tentatio, vide infra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3.
II. De ipsa quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 1; S. I. q. 114. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 86. m. 1. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. dub. lat. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. refert tantum verba S. Bonaventurae. — Biel, hic q. unica in fine.
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Article I. On the temptation of our first parents.
Question I. What principally moved the devil to tempt man.
Concerning the first point, the procedure is thus and it is asked what principally moved the devil to tempt man. And that it was envy, it seems:
Fundamenta. 1. First, from what is said in Wisdom 21: By the envy of the devil, death entered the world; but the entrance of death was through the temptation and seduction of man: therefore envy moved the devil to tempt man.
2. Likewise, Gregory in the Morals2: "In paradise the devil, envying man, inflicted the wound of pride": therefore, since he inflicted the wound through temptation, the temptation was from envy.
3. Likewise, the devil by tempting man became a homicide, according to what is said in John 83: He was a homicide from the beginning; but homicide proceeds from hatred, and hatred proceeds from envy: therefore from the first, the temptation of man, in which the devil was a homicide, proceeded from envy.
4. Likewise, one who desires the fall of another without his own profit is not moved by love of his own advantage, but by hatred of another's happiness; but the devil desired man's fall without his own profit, as is plain: therefore he was moved by hatred of human happiness to tempt man. But such hatred is nothing other than envy4: therefore etc.
Ad oppositum. On the contrary: 1. All envy is with respect to an equal or superior, according to what Gregory says5 on that text of Job: Envy slays the little one, "a superior," I say, at least according to reputation: but the devil did not reckon man superior to himself: therefore it seems that he did not envy him: therefore if he tempted him, this was not from envy.
2. Likewise, envy is with respect to a good which in some way can be acquired; but the devil could not attain eternal beatitude, since he had fallen irreparably6: therefore it seems that on account of acquiring it he did not envy man.
3. Likewise, envy is with respect to a good which is desired; for no one envies another concerning anything unless he loves and longs for it; but the devil did not long to obey God's commands nor to ascend to the supernal fatherland nor to be a friend of God, on account of his despair: therefore it seems that he would not envy this in man: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, envy is only with respect to that which is naturally fitted to diminish one's own good7; but the acquisition of beatitude can diminish no one's good: therefore there is nothing which can be envied by anyone: therefore it seems that if the devil by some appetite made man fall, he was not moved by envy.
Conclusion. The devil was moved indeed from pride, but immediately from envy, to tempt man.
I respond: It must be said that, as has been touched upon8, these are the two sins which most possess the mind of the devil, pride and envy. Hence, as has been held above, and as Augustine says, from these two, he who before was Lucifer became the devil: and these are, as it were, two inseparable things, so that one accompanies the other9. For the proud man loves excellence, and so wills to have no equal, and on account of this he immediately desires to possess excellence in singular fashion; and therefore he immediately, either in act or in habit, envies, when he is unwilling that a good similar to the good which he desires be shared by another. — The mind of the devil, therefore, possessed by these two vices, namely pride and envy, seeing man in a state in which he could fall under diabolical power and in which he could ascend to the supernal happiness10 from which he himself had fallen — was moved both from pride and from envy to tempt him. For from pride, that he might subject him to himself; from envy, that he might impede him from supernal happiness. And pride was as the first mover11, but envy as the proximate and immediate mover. — For granted that he could not acquire dominion over man, still he would have striven to impede him from the joys of paradise; and therefore Scripture says, and its expositors, that the devil was moved from envy to tempt man. — And the arguments showing this are to be conceded.
Solution of the opposing arguments. 1. To that, then, which is first objected, that envy is with respect to a superior or equal; it must be said that it is not only with respect to one who is superior in being superior, but also with respect to one who can be. For although the devil in that state did not reckon man superior to himself; he nevertheless envied him, lest by the merit of obedience he be raised to the state of glory, in which state he would not doubt him to be superior to himself. — Otherwise it can also be said that he then reckoned him superior to himself in this, that he could attain that glory to which the devil could not ascend.
2. To that which is objected, that envy is with respect to a good which can be acquired; it must be answered by way of qualification12, because someone envies not only that which he can obtain, but also that which he is naturally fitted to have, although he cannot, just as a mutilated and blind man envies sight and walking in others. Now although the devil could not attain to beatitude, nevertheless he had a natural aptitude for it.
3. To that which is objected, that envy is with respect to a desired good; it must be said that envy comes not only from the desire of some private good, but rather from hatred of another's good13. — Another solution. Yet since the desire of one's own good seems to be the principle of every sin, it can therefore be said otherwise that envy is not only with respect to that good which is desired, but also with respect to that good by whose attainment the desired good is diminished, or is reckoned less. And since the devil desires to be singularly exalted, therefore from the exaltation of man he reckoned his own good to be impeded; and so he envied and from envy fought against him.
4. And by this is plain the response to the last argument, because, although the glorification and exaltation of man would not according to the truth diminish anyone's good, nevertheless according to false estimation it could be believed to be diminutive of someone's good, and from that estimation envy could arise. For affections arise not only from certain judgments, but also from suspicions14 and false estimations.
I. What temptation is, is explained below a. 2 q. 1, and more diffusely by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II q. 101 m. 1; cf. also St. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 1 and Summa I q. 114 a. 2; II–II q. 97 a. 1; Blessed Albert, here aa. 1, 2. — On the various species of temptation, see the excellent doctrine set forth here, dub. 3. — On the causes why temptation is permitted, see below d. 23 a. 1 qq. 1, 2, 3.
II. On the question itself: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 1 ad 1; Summa I q. 114 a. 2. — Blessed Albert, Summa p. II tr. 14 q. 86 m. 1 partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1 q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2 a. 1 dub. lat. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2, reports only the words of St. Bonaventure. — Biel, here quaestio unica at the end.
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- Vers. 24.Verse 24.
- Libr. XXXI. c. 1. n. 1: In paradiso sano homini diabolus invidens superbiae etc. — In fine argumenti Vat. perperam invidia pro ex invidia.Book XXXI c. 1 n. 1: In paradise the devil, envying healthy man, [inflicted] the [wound] of pride, etc. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition wrongly reads invidia for ex invidia.
- Vers. 44. — Paulo superius verbo tentando multi codd. et ed. 1 praefigunt in. Paulo inferius post a primo cod. F adiicit ad ultimum.Verse 44. — A little above, to the word tentando many codices and ed. 1 prefix in. A little below, after a primo, cod. F adds ad ultimum.
- August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 14. n. 18. invidiam definit odium felicitatis alienae. Cfr. Aristot., II. Rhetor. c. 13. (c. 10.), ubi et principia tanguntur, quae in seqq. argg. proponuntur.Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis XI c. 14 n. 18, defines envy as hatred of another's happiness. Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II c. 13 (c. 10), where the principles which are proposed in the following arguments are also touched upon.
- Libr. V. Moral. c. 46. n. 84. super Iob 5, 2: Invidere enim non possumus nisi eis, quos nobis in aliquo meliores putamus.Book V of the Morals c. 46 n. 84, on Job 5:2: For we cannot envy except those whom we reckon better than ourselves in some respect.
- Cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Vat. irrecuperabiliter.Cf. above d. 7 p. I a. 1 q. 1. — The Vatican edition reads irrecuperabiliter.
- Cfr. Gregor., V. Moral. c. 46. n. 86.Cf. Gregory, Morals V c. 46 n. 86.
- Dist. 5. a. 1. q. 1, ubi et dictum Augustini occurrit, quod mox memoratur et habetur in eius libro de Sancta Virginitate, c. 31. n. 31. Cfr. etiam XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 14. n. 18, et c. 16. n. 21.Dist. 5 a. 1 q. 1, where also occurs that saying of Augustine which is presently mentioned and is found in his book On Holy Virginity c. 31 n. 31. Cf. also XI de Gen. ad lit. c. 14 n. 18, and c. 16 n. 21.
- Vat. concomitatur alterum.The Vatican edition reads concomitatur alterum.
- Codd. cc et ed. 1 civitatem.Codices cc and ed. 1 read civitatem ("city") [for felicitatem].
- Cod. T ee movens ipsum.Cod. T reads ee movens ipsum.
- Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 87, nota 4.Cf. Volume 1, p. 87, note 4.
- Quare invidia a Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 14. definitur: tristitia de alienis bonis. — Aliquanto inferius Vat. minui pro minus.Hence envy is defined by Damascene, II On the Orthodox Faith c. 14, as: sadness over the goods of others. — A little below, the Vatican edition reads minui for minus.
- Edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. suspicationibus.The editions, excepting ed. 1, with many codices read suspicationibus.