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Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 8

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum Angeli in corporibus assumtis exerceant operationes convenientes potentiae sensitivae.

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum Angeli in assumtis corporibus habeant operationes convenientes potentiae sensitivae; et quod sic, videtur.

1. «Idem est principium motus et sensus»1, sicut dicit Philosophus; sed Angelus corpori assumto dat motum: ergo et sensum.

2. Item, sicut Angelus assumit corpus habens organa apta ad motum, ita assumit corpus habens organa apta ad sensum — sicut enim illud corpus assumtum habet manus et pedes, ita habet oculos et aures — sed organa sentiendi sine sensu sunt inutilia: ergo si non frustra assumit illa organa, videtur, quod illa sensificet et per illa sentiat.

3. Item, quod habet operationem consequentem proprium speciei habet operationem consequentem proprium generis2; sed sicut proprium hominis est risibile, ita proprium animalis est esse sensibile: ergo sicut Angelus in corpore assumto potest ridere et lugere, sic etiam potest videre et audire.

4. Item, aut Angelus de sua natura habet sensum, aut non habet. Si non; cum sensus sit cognitivus particularium3, non cognoscit particularia, quod plane falsum est. Si vero sensum habet; cum sensus sit potentia, qua mediante sensificantur organa corporalia, patet etc.

5. Item, Angelus existens in corpore assumto cognoscit haec sensibilia; aut igitur potentia immateriali, aut potentia, quae nata sit alligari corpori. Si potentia immateriali, ergo ita bene cognoscit distans, sicut propinquum — igitur Angelus, qui est Romae, audit nos loquentes Parisius — ergo non indigeret moveri et discurrere. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod illa cognoscit potentia, quae est corpori proportionabilis et concernit determinatam distantiam. Si ergo iste est sensus, patet etc.

6. Item, nihil patitur a corpore, nisi sensum habeat corpori proportionabilem; sed Angelus crematur ab igne: ergo si sensus eius potest pati a corpore, multo fortius potest per corpus sentire, cum per naturam magis sit natus in corpus agere quam a corpore poenam suscipere.

7. Item, Angelus, aspiciens me in assumto corpore, suscipit in oculo meam similitudinem, et4 cum oculus sit corpus pervium et tersum, ulterius de sua similitudine iudicat; hoc planum est: si ergo ad sensum nihil plus requiritur quam receptio et iudicium, videtur, quod sentiat per corpus assumtum.

Ad oppositum — Fundamenta.

1. Sensus praesupponit vitam; sed Angelus corpus assumtum non vivificat, sicut probatum est supra5: ergo nec sensificat, ergo per ipsum non sentit.

2. Item, sensus praesupponit actum vegetativae6; sed Angeli in corporibus assumtis non habent opera vegetativae: ergo nec opera sensitivae.

3. Item, si Angelus sentiret per corpus, cum sensus ille, qui fit mediante organo corporali, sit naturae corporeae alligatus, Angelus natus esset, sicut et anima, per naturam uniri corpori: ergo quando non haberet corpus, non haberet esse perfectum.

4. Item, si Angelus sentiret per corpus, cum sentire sit actio coniuncti, Angelus suas operationes ministeriales communicaret corpori: ergo deberet communicare poenam et gloriam, quod est falsum.

5. Item, sentire proprium est animalis: ergo nulli competit sentire, nisi cui competit esse animal; sed hoc nullo modo competit Angelo: ergo etc.

6. Item, si sentire est mediante organo corporeo, ergo non cognosceret hominem clauso oculo nec cognosceret hominem a tergo nec cognosceret hominem in obscuro; quae omnia cum sint falsa, restat, quod Angelus in corpore assumto non habeat opera competentia potentiae sensitivae.

Quaestio connexa. — Quaeritur igitur, quae opera conveniant vel exerceantur ab Angelo in corpore assumto.

Conclusio.

Angelus in corpore assumto opera potentiae sensitivae non exercet, quatenus sunt actus sentiendi per organa, sed quatenus sunt ab anima ut movente.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum anima uniatur corpori ut perfectio et ut motor, triplex est genus operationum: quaedam sunt operationes, quae consequuntur ipsam animam in corpore, ut est motor; quaedam, ut est perfectio; quaedam

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partim sic, et partim sic. Triplex modus operandi. — Differenti autem modo exercet anima in corpore operationes, quae consequuntur ipsam ut motorem, et ut perfectionem. Nam operationes, quae consequuntur animam ut motorem, sic exercet per corpus, quod illas easdem exercet in corpus, quia non solum movet alia corpora, sed etiam corpus proprium. Operationes vero, quae consequuntur animam in corpore, ut est perfectio, sic exercet anima in corpore per corpus, quod exercet eas cum corpore, sicut patet: anima clauso oculo corpus aliquod videre non potest. Tertias autem operationes exercet in corpore quasi utroque modo7. Et ideo primae competunt animae, ut est hoc aliquid et motor differens a mobili, secundae vero, ut est forma iuncta materiae.

Ad quaestionem connexam. — Quoniam igitur Angelus unitur corpori assumto non ut perfectio, sed ut motor, ideo primas operationes exercet plene in eodem corpore, secundas minime, tertias vero quodammodo sic, quodammodo non. — Et hoc melius patet, si descendamus exemplificando. Motus progressivus, sive quicumque alius sit membrorum exteriorum, est ab anima in corpore, ut est motor vel motrix; et ideo competit Angelo. Sentire vero per organa corporis competit animae, ut est illorum organorum perfectio — sicut enim anima perficit totum corpus, ita visus sive potentia visiva perficit oculum — et hoc non convenit Angelo in corpore assumto. Ridere vero est operatio, quae partim competit animae, ut est motor, partim ut est perfectio. Ibi enim est quaedam cordis exhilaratio, et haec est ab anima, ut est perfectio; est ibi etiam quaedam genarum motio, et haec est ab anima, ut est motor. Ratione primi non convenit Angelo, sed solum ratione secundi.

Conclusio bimembris. — Ex hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Si enim vocentur opera potentiae sensitivae ipsi actus sentiendi per organa, sic breviter dicendum, quod Angelus non exercet ea per corpus assumtum. Si autem extendantur opera potentiae sensitivae ad ea quae sunt ab anima ut movente, sic communicat ea corpori. — Rationes igitur probantes, Angelum non sensificare corpus8 assumtum, concedendae sunt.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod idem est principium motus et sensus; dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de9 animalibus, in quibus vult, quod cor sit principium sensus, sicut et principium motus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corpus illud habet organa facta10 ad sentiendum; dicendum, quod Angelus non tantum assumit corpus humanum ut instrumentum ad operandum, sed etiam ut signum conveniens ad se ostendendum. Et quia corpus carens organis debitis homini non esset convenienter angelici spiritus ostensivum; ideo corpus habens omnia organa assumit, non ad ipsorum organorum sensificationem, sed potius ad sui ipsius ostensionem.

3. Notandum. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod communicat corpori operationem consequentem speciem etc.; dicendum, quod ridere non est actus consequens speciem hominis, prout dicit motum solum genarum exteriorum, quia sic consequitur animam ut motorem, sed prout cum hoc dicit aliquem actum interiorem, qui consequitur existentiam animae in corpore, ut est perfectio11; hoc autem modo non competit Angelo, sed solum primo.

4. Sentire dicitur tripliciter. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Angelus habet sensum, quia cognoscit singularia; dicendum, quod sentire potest accipi communiter et proprie et magis proprie. Communiter sentire idem est, quod rem ut praesentem cognoscere, secundum quem modum accipit Augustinus ad Paulinam in libro de Videndo Deo12. Secundo modo sentire idem est, quod rem ut hic et nunc cognoscere; et sic accipit Boethius13, cum dicit, quod «sensus est particularium, et intellectus universalium». Tertio modo sentire idem est, quod speciem existentem in materia praeter materiam mediante organo corporeo suscipere: et sic accipit Philosophus in secundo de Anima14, cum dicit, quod «sensus est susceptivus specierum in materia praeter materiam». Primis duobus modis non differt sensus ab intellectu re, sed ratione tantum, et hoc modo bene ponitur in Angelo; Angelus enim per suam potentiam intellectivam cognoscit rem ut praesentem et ut hic et nunc, dirigendo aspectum super ipsam15. Tertio vero modo differt potentia sensitiva ab intellectiva re et ratione, et illo tertio modo sensus est potentia alligata corpori; et hoc modo spiritui angelico non convenit.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si cognoscat potentia immateriali, tunc nihil facit ad hoc distantia; dicendum, quod dum singularia cognoscit et sentit, potentia immateriali cognoscit, aspectum tamen super rem cognitam dirigit; et ideo, si res illa non est ei praesens sive immediate coniuncta, necesse est, vel virtutem Angeli deferri usque ad ipsam, vel e converso. Et quoniam tam virtus Angeli quam obiecti est virtus finita, ideo nec cogno-

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scit nec potest cognoscere in quantacumque distantia. Hoc autem non est propter virtutis materialitatem, sicut est in sensu corporis, sed propter virtutis finitatem.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod patitur ab igne; dicendum, quod illud non concludit, sicut melius ostendetur in quarto16; sensus enim et affectus spiritualis sufficit ad sentiendum verum dolorem, sicut ostendetur ibidem.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod recipit et iudicat; dicendum, quod cum ista duo sint in sensu, videlicet receptio et iudicium; receptio est principaliter ratione organi, sed iudicium ratione virtutis. In sensu autem corporeo sic est receptio in organo, quod est receptio pariter et in virtute: et sic est iudicium virtutis illius in organo, quod non praeter organum: et ideo tam receptio quam iudicium est totius coniuncti. In oculo vero Angeli sic est receptio in organo, quod non est receptio in virtute aliqua illi organo alligata; et sic est iudicium a virtute in organo, quod etiam praeter organum. Unde Angelus ita bene perciperet aliquem clausis oculis, sicut apertis; et ideo nec est ibi receptio et iudicium, secundum quod competit sensui; ac per hoc non est ibi sensus exterior. Nec etiam oculus Angeli dicitur oculus nisi aequivoce; et tale17 corpus plus habet rationem instrumenti quam organi, licet organicum possit dici propter assimilationem, quam habet cum corpore naturali. Et sic patet totum18.

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English Translation
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Question II. Whether the Angels in assumed bodies exercise operations belonging to the sensitive power.

Secondly it is asked on this point, whether Angels in assumed bodies have operations belonging to the sensitive power; and that they do so, seems clear.

1. "The same is the principle of motion and of sense"1, as the Philosopher says; but the Angel gives motion to the assumed body: therefore also sense.

2. Likewise, just as the Angel assumes a body having organs apt for motion, so he assumes a body having organs apt for sense — for just as that assumed body has hands and feet, so it has eyes and ears — but organs of sensing without sense are useless: therefore if he does not in vain assume those organs, it seems that he ensouls them with sense and senses through them.

3. Likewise, that which has an operation following on its specific property has an operation following on its generic property2; but just as the property of man is to be risible, so the property of animal is to be sensible: therefore just as the Angel in an assumed body can laugh and weep, so also he can see and hear.

4. Likewise, either the Angel has sense by his own nature, or he does not. If he does not — since sense is cognitive of particulars3 — he does not know particulars, which is plainly false. But if he does have sense — since sense is a power by means of which corporeal organs are ensouled with sense — it is plain, etc.

5. Likewise, the Angel existing in an assumed body knows these sensible things; either, therefore, by a power immaterial, or by a power which is by nature bound to a body. If by an immaterial power, then he knows what is distant just as well as what is near — therefore the Angel who is at Rome hears us speaking at Paris — therefore he would not need to be moved and to go about. But if this is false, it remains that he knows by a power which is proportioned to a body and concerns a determinate distance. If, then, this is sense, it is plain, etc.

6. Likewise, nothing suffers from a body unless it have a sense proportioned to a body; but the Angel is burned by fire: therefore if his sense can suffer from a body, much more can he sense through a body, since by nature he is more apt to act upon a body than to suffer punishment from a body.

7. Likewise, the Angel, looking at me in an assumed body, receives in his eye my likeness, and4 since the eye is a transparent and polished body, he further passes judgment on his likeness; this is plain: if therefore nothing more is required for sense than reception and judgment, it seems that he senses through the assumed body.

On the contrary — Foundations.

1. Sense presupposes life; but the Angel does not vivify the assumed body, as was proved above5: therefore neither does he ensoul it with sense, therefore he does not sense through it.

2. Likewise, sense presupposes an act of the vegetative power6; but Angels in assumed bodies have no operations of the vegetative power: therefore neither operations of the sensitive.

3. Likewise, if the Angel were to sense through a body — since that sense which occurs by means of a corporeal organ is bound to corporeal nature — the Angel would be by nature, just as the soul is, united to a body: therefore when he had no body, he would not have perfect being.

4. Likewise, if the Angel were to sense through a body — since to sense is the action of what is conjoined — the Angel would communicate his ministerial operations to the body: therefore he ought to communicate punishment and glory, which is false.

5. Likewise, to sense is proper to the animal: therefore it belongs to none to sense except to him to whom it belongs to be an animal; but this in no way belongs to the Angel: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if to sense is by means of a corporeal organ, then he would not know a man with his eye closed, nor would he know a man from behind, nor would he know a man in the dark; all of which since they are false, it remains that the Angel in an assumed body does not have operations belonging to the sensitive power.

A connected question. — It is asked, therefore, what operations are fitting to, or are exercised by, the Angel in an assumed body.

Conclusion.

The Angel in an assumed body does not exercise operations of the sensitive power, insofar as these are acts of sensing through organs, but insofar as they are from the soul as mover.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, since the soul is united to the body as perfection and as mover, there is a threefold kind of operations: some operations follow upon the soul itself in the body as it is mover; some, as it is perfection; some

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partly the one way, partly the other. Threefold mode of operating. — Now the soul exercises in the body in a different way those operations which follow upon it as mover and as perfection. For operations which follow upon the soul as mover it so exercises through the body that it exercises those same operations upon the body, because it moves not only other bodies but also its own body. But operations which follow upon the soul in the body as it is perfection — these the soul exercises in the body through the body in such a way that it exercises them with the body, as is clear: the soul with the eye closed cannot see any body. The third kind of operations it exercises in the body in both ways at once7. And therefore the first belong to the soul as it is something this (hoc aliquid) and a mover distinct from the moved; the second, as it is a form joined to matter.

To the connected question. — Since therefore the Angel is united to the assumed body not as perfection but as mover, he exercises the first operations fully in that same body, the second by no means, and the third in some manner yes, in some manner not. — And this will be plainer if we come down to examples. Progressive motion, or any other motion of the outer members, is from the soul in the body as it is mover or moving principle; and therefore it belongs to the Angel. But sensing through the organs of the body belongs to the soul as it is the perfection of those organs — for just as the soul perfects the whole body, so vision or the visive power perfects the eye — and this does not belong to the Angel in an assumed body. But to laugh is an operation which belongs partly to the soul as it is mover, partly as it is perfection. For there is in it a certain gladdening of the heart, and this is from the soul as it is perfection; there is also in it a certain motion of the cheeks, and this is from the soul as it is mover. By reason of the first it does not belong to the Angel, but only by reason of the second.

A two-membered conclusion. — From this is plain the answer to the question proposed. For if by works of the sensitive power are called the acts themselves of sensing through organs, then it must be said briefly that the Angel does not exercise them through the assumed body. But if the works of the sensitive power are extended to those which are from the soul as mover, then he does communicate them to the body. — The reasons, therefore, proving that the Angel does not ensoul8 the assumed body with sense are to be conceded.

Solution of the opposed arguments.

1. To the first thing brought forward to the contrary, that the same is the principle of motion and of sense; it must be said that the Philosopher is speaking of9 animals, in which he holds that the heart is the principle of sense, just as it is the principle of motion.

2. To the objection that that body has organs made10 for sensing; it must be said that the Angel does not only assume the human body as an instrument for operating, but also as a sign fitting for showing himself. And since a body lacking the organs due to a man would not be fittingly indicative of an angelic spirit, therefore he assumes a body having all the organs, not for the ensouling-with-sense of those organs themselves, but rather for the showing of himself.

3. To be noted. — To the objection that he communicates to the body an operation following on the species, etc.; it must be said that to laugh is not an act following on the species of man insofar as it names only the motion of the outer cheeks, because thus it follows on the soul as mover; but insofar as together with this it names a certain inner act which follows on the existence of the soul in the body as it is perfection11; and in this mode it does not belong to the Angel, but only in the first.

4. Sense is said in three ways. — To the objection that the Angel has sense, because he knows singulars; it must be said that to sense can be taken commonly, properly, and more properly. Commonly, to sense is the same as to know a thing as present, in which mode Augustine takes it To Paulina in the book On Seeing God12. In the second mode, to sense is the same as to know a thing as here and now; and so Boethius13 takes it when he says that "sense is of particulars, intellect of universals". In the third mode, to sense is the same as to receive a species existing in matter apart from the matter by means of a corporeal organ; and so the Philosopher takes it in the second book On the Soul14, when he says that "sense is receptive of species in matter apart from matter". In the first two modes sense does not differ from intellect in reality but only in account; and in this mode it is well placed in the Angel; for the Angel by his intellective power knows a thing as present and as here and now, directing his gaze upon it15. But in the third mode the sensitive power differs from the intellective in reality and in account, and in that third mode sense is a power bound to the body; and in this mode it does not belong to the angelic spirit.

5. To the objection that, if he knows by an immaterial power, then distance contributes nothing; it must be said that while he knows and senses singulars, he knows by an immaterial power, yet he directs his gaze upon the known thing; and therefore, if that thing is not present to him or immediately conjoined to him, it is necessary either that the power of the Angel be carried across to it, or conversely. And since both the power of the Angel and that of the object is a finite power, therefore he neither knows

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nor can know at any distance whatever. But this is not on account of the materiality of the power, as is the case in bodily sense, but on account of the finitude of the power.

6. To the objection that he suffers from fire; it must be said that this does not conclude, as will be better shown in the fourth book16; for a spiritual sense and affection suffices for sensing true pain, as will be shown there.

7. To the objection that he receives and judges; it must be said that since these two things are present in sense, namely reception and judgment; reception is principally by reason of the organ, but judgment by reason of the power. In bodily sense the reception is in the organ in such a way that it is reception in the power likewise; and so the judgment of that power is in the organ in such a way that it is not apart from the organ; and therefore both reception and judgment are of the whole conjoined being. But in the eye of the Angel the reception is in the organ in such a way that it is not a reception in any power bound to that organ; and so the judgment is from the power in the organ in such a way that it is also apart from the organ. Hence the Angel would perceive someone as well with the eyes closed as with them open; and therefore there is not there reception and judgment in the way in which it belongs to sense; and through this there is not there an outer sense. Nor is the Angel's eye called an eye except equivocally; and such17 a body has more the character of an instrument than of an organ, although it may be called organic by reason of the likeness it has to a natural body. And so the whole18 is plain.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. De Somno et vigilia, c. 3. (c. 2.); III. de Part. animal. c. 3. seq., ubi in animalibus cor ut principium motus et sensus statuitur.
    Aristotle, On Sleep and Waking, c. 3 (c. 2); On the Parts of Animals, III, c. 3 sqq., where in animals the heart is established as principle of motion and of sense.
  2. Cfr. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1. et V. c. 3. (c. 4.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Topics, IV, c. 1, and V, c. 3 (c. 4).
  3. Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. text. 14. 20. 24. (c. 18. 24. 31.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, texts 14, 20, 24 (c. 18, 24, 31).
  4. Ita codd. cum edd. 1, 2. Vat. hic omittit et, quod dein post tersum addit; qua lectione propositio causalis: cum oculus etc., rationem reddit, quare passiva receptio speciei in organo fieri possit. In nostra autem lectione ratio redditur, quare passiva illa receptio quasi progredi possit, ut active ab anima iudicetur. Ad rem cfr. hic ad 7. et infra d. 25. p. II. q. 6, ubi legitur: «In sentiendo receptio speciei est a corpore, sed iudicium est a virtute» (scil. sensitiva). S. Thom. (Quodl. 8. q. 2. a. 3.): «Sensus exteriores suscipiunt tantum a rebus per modum patiendi, sine hoc quod aliquid cooperetur ad sui formationem; quamvis iam formati habeant propriam operationem, quae est iudicium de propriis obiectis». Hic modus loquendi est sumtus ex Nemesii Episc. Emes., de Natura hominis c. 6.
    So the codices with editions 1 and 2. The Vatican here omits et, which it then adds after tersum; on which reading the causal proposition cum oculus, etc. gives the reason why the passive reception of the species can occur in the organ. But in our reading the reason is given why that passive reception can, as it were, advance further, so as to be actively judged by the soul. On the matter cf. here ad 7, and below d. 25, p. II, q. 6, where one reads: "In sensing, the reception of the species is from the body, but the judgment is from the [sensitive] power". St. Thomas (Quodl. 8, q. 2, a. 3): "The outer senses receive only from things by way of being-acted-upon, without anything cooperating to their formation; although, once formed, they have their proper operation, which is judgment about their proper objects". This way of speaking is taken from Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa, On the Nature of Man, c. 6.
  5. Quaest. praeced. et a. 2. q. 1.
    The preceding question and a. 2, q. 1.
  6. Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 30. seqq. (c. 3.).
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, II, text 30 sqq. (c. 3).
  7. Verba anima clauso oculo usque utroque modo desiderantur in antiquioribus mss.; exstant tamen in Vat., cod. cc et ed. 1. — Dictio ut est hoc aliquid, quae mox recurrit, significat idem ac ut est substantia prima; cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 3.
    The words anima clauso oculo through utroque modo are wanting in the older manuscripts; they are however present in the Vatican, codex cc, and edition 1. — The phrase ut est hoc aliquid, which recurs presently, signifies the same as ut est substantia prima; cf. above page 197, note 3.
  8. Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 non sentire per corpus pro non sensificare corpus.
    Several codices, together with edition 1, read non sentire per corpus in place of non sensificare corpus.
  9. Ita codd. I aa; Vat. cum aliis edd. in.
    So codices I and aa; the Vatican with the other editions reads in.
  10. Vat. apta.
    The Vatican reads apta.
  11. Cfr. Aristot., III. de Part. animal. c. 10.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, III, c. 10.
  12. Sive Epist. 147. c. 2. n. 7.
    Or rather Letter 147, c. 2, n. 7.
  13. Libr. I. Comment. in Porphyr. in fine et V. de Consol. prosa 4.
    Book I of the Commentary on Porphyry at the end, and On the Consolation [of Philosophy], V, prose 4.
  14. Text. 121. (c. 12.).
    Text 121 (c. 12).
  15. Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, ubi etiam ea inveniuntur, quae serviunt pro solutione seq. obiectionis.
    See above d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, where also those things are found which serve for the solution of the following objection.
  16. Dis. 14. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Nomine sensus non intelligas potentiam sensitivam, sed perceptionem animae, ut ibidem explicatur. — Fide cod. cc et ed. 1 bis substituimus ostendetur pro ostenditur.
    [IV Sent.,] dist. 14, p. II, a. 3, q. 2. — By the name of sense understand not the sensitive power, but the perception of the soul, as is there explained. — On the authority of codex cc and edition 1 we have twice substituted ostendetur for ostenditur.
  17. Plures codd. totale.
    Several codices read totale.
  18. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion appended to the preceding question. ---
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