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Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 42

Textus Latinus
p. 960

Articulus I. De comparatione peccati operis ad peccatum voluntatis.

Quaestio I. Utrum peccatum voluntatis et operis sint duo peccata, vel unum.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum voluntatis et operis sint duo peccata, vel unum. Et quod sint plura, videtur.

1. Super illud ad Romanos primi1: Repletos homicidiis: Glossa: « Pluraliter dicit homicidiis, quia aliud est homicidium voluntatis, et aliud homicidium operis ». Si sic est in homicidio, ergo pari ratione et in aliis peccatis.

2. Item, multiplicato inferiori, multiplicatur superius2; sed fornicatio exterior peccatum est speciale, voluntas etiam fornicandi peccatum est speciale; sed voluntas fornicandi est aliud quam ipse actus fornicationis: ergo si ista sunt diversa et sunt peccata, loquendo formaliter: ergo sunt diversa peccata.

3. Item, multiplicato subiecto, multiplicatur accidens, quod consistit per illud subiectum3; sed deformitas comparatur ad actionem, tanquam accidens ad subiectum: ergo ubi sunt multae actiones deformes, ibi multae deformitates, et ubi multae deformitates, ibi multa peccata; et actio interior et exterior sunt diversae: ergo sunt in eis diversae deformitates: ergo et diversa peccata.

4. Item, multiplicato uno oppositorum, multiplicatur et reliquum4, quia « tantum unum uni opponitur »; sed peccatum repugnat praecepto: cum igitur aliud sit praeceptum, quo prohibetur actus interior, et aliud, quo prohibetur actus exterior, quia aliud mandatum est: Non concupisces, et aliud: Non moechaberis: ergo videtur, quod sicut illa duo sunt praecepta, ita actio interior et exterior sunt duo peccata.

5. Item, magis convenit voluntas interior cum voluntate interiori, quam voluntas interior cum actu exteriori; sed voluntas interior cum alia voluntate facit duo peccata diversa: ergo multo fortius voluntas interior cum actu exteriori sunt diversa peccata.

Sed contra: 1. Per se et per accidens non ponunt in numerum, sicut cum diligo vinum, quia dulce, non dicor diligere duo, sed unum6; sed actio exterior non est peccatum nisi propter voluntatem interiorem: igitur voluntas interior cum actu exteriori non ponit in numerum: ergo non sunt duo peccata sed unum.

2. Item, actio inchoata non ponit in numerum, cum se ipsa consummata; sed peccatum inchoatur in voluntate et consummatur in opere, secundum quod dicitur Iacobi primo7: Concupiscentia, cum conceperit, parit peccatum; peccatum vero, cum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem: ergo etc.

3. Item, bonum opus non ponit in numerum cum bona voluntate in ratione meriti — unde cum aliquis voluntarie bene operatur, non est ibi duplex meritum, sed unum — ergo pari ratione, nec voluntas interior cum opere exteriori ponet in numerum in ratione demeriti sive peccati.

4. Item, formale in peccato, secundum quod peccatum, est libido, vel potius contemptus Dei sive aversio8; sed cum quis voluntarie opus nefarium perpetrat, non sunt duo contemptus, sed unus, nec duae aversiones, sed una: ergo voluntas interior et actus exterior non sunt duo peccata, sed unum.

5. Item, multis peccatis multiplex debet infligi poena, sive remuneratoria, sive satisfactoria; sed pro peccato exterius consummato non debetur alicui poena multiplex, nec diversae imponuntur satisfactiones, sed una: ergo voluntas interior et actio exterior non sunt diversa peccata.

Conclusio. Voluntas peccandi et actus exterior, si ordinata sint ad invicem, unum sunt peccatum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit comparari peccatum operis exterioris et voluntatis interioris: uno modo, prout ista duo coniuncta p. 961sunt et ordinata, ita quod unum est ex altero; et sic voluntas interior cum actu exteriori non facit diversa peccata, pro eo quod unus est ibi contemptus et una aversio et una est conversio. Voluntas enim est quae contemnendo avertitur, dum ad bonum commutabile convertitur, non solum quantum ad actum proprium, sed etiam quantum ad actum inferioris potentiae, quae9 ei subiicitur. Quia ergo peccatum, secundum quod huiusmodi, dicit deordinationem per contemptum et aversionem a Deo et conversionem ad creaturam; hinc est, quod cum ibi sit una deordinatio prima10, quod peccatum voluntatis et operis unum est, loquendo formaliter, prout illa coniuncta sunt. Licet autem ibi sit una ratio deordinandi, plura tamen sunt ibi deordinata; et ideo, quamvis peccatum illud unum sit formaliter, plura tamen sunt materialiter.

Si autem comparemus voluntatem interiorem ad opus exterius, prout sunt separata, ita quod unus peccet voluntate tantum, alius peccet voluntate et opere; sic peccatum voluntatis et operis sunt diversa peccata non solum materialiter, verum etiam formaliter, pro eo quod actus voluntatis, in quo consistit prima ratio deordinandi, numeratur et est alius et alius. — Hoc autem modo non quaerit Magister in littera11, utrum voluntas interior et actio exterior sint diversa peccata — hoc enim non est dubium, quod diversis peccatis peccat quis, si una vice tantum velit malum, alia vice velit et perficiat — sed de hoc quaerit, utrum voluntas interior et actio exterior sint diversa peccata, secundum quod unum ab altero procedit, et unum alteri coniungitur. Et ad hoc respondendum, quod quamvis sint plura opera culpabilia et plura deordinata, quia tamen una est ratio deordinandi et unus est ibi actus voluntatis, nec alter est culpabilis nisi propter illum; unum est ibi peccatum. Et huic modo dicendi magis concordat Magister in littera, respondens obiectionibus, quae fiunt pro parte altera, quae dicebant4-2, illa esse diversa peccata. Et recte facit in hoc quod, quamvis aliquid possit dici numerari — ex quadam improprietate — solum ex parte principii materialis; tamen, proprie loquendo, non numeratur aliquid ex parte principii materialis, nisi quia cum numeratione ex parte principii materialis concurrit numeratio ex parte formalis, sicut albedo numeratur in duobus hominibus albis. — Non sic autem est in proposito; et ideo rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, scilicet voluntatem interiorem et actionem exteriorem esse peccatum unum, concedendae sunt.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Glossa, dicendum, quod Glossa aut loquitur materialiter, aut loquitur de homicidio interiori et exteriori, prout disiuncta sunt, ita quod unum alteri non continuatur.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multiplicato inferiori, multiplicatur suum superius; dicendum, quod illud verum est de illo inferiori, cui suum superius est essentiale, vel ad quod suum superius comparatur essentialiter. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia peccatum, etsi dicatur de voluntate et actione5, non dicitur praedicatione essentiali, sed magis accidentali.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multiplicato subiecto, multiplicatur accidens; dicendum, quod illud verum est, si subiectum per se multiplicetur6-2 et illud in quo primo est accidens. Deformitas autem peccandi non attenditur primo et principaliter circa exteriorem actionem nec est ibi tanquam circa subiectum per se, sed est ibi ratione voluntatis interioris coniunctae; quod patet, quia, si actio illa procederet ab alio principio quam a voluntate, iam non esset culpabilis. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod illud intelligitur, quando subiectum plurificatur et secundum rem et secundum illam rationem, qua dicitur subiectum, ita quod non solum sunt plures res, sed etiam plura subiecta. Quamvis autem actio interior et exterior sint diversae res, non tamen sunt diversa subiecta deformitatis, sed unum, pro eo quod, sicut ordo potest esse in pluribus, quorum unum est ab altero, tanquam in uno subiecto; sic etiam et deordinatio. Quoniam igitur deformitas peccati dicit deordinationem a fine, hinc est, quod circa actionem interiorem et exteriorem consistit tanquam circa unum subiectum, quamvis sint diversae actiones et res. — Posset etiam instari contra illud verbum, quod hoc intelligitur de accidente absoluto7-2, non de accidente relato. Tale enim unum potest esse in pluribus, dum tamen illa sint ad invicem relata et ordinata; et per hunc modum se habent actio interior et exterior, quia una procedit ab altera.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multiplicato uno oppositorum, multiplicatur et reliquum; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod ei opponitur. Praeceptum autem, quo prohibetur actus exterior et voluntas interior, non est aliud et aliud nisi ex hoc, quod in uno prohibetur voluntas cum opere, in altero prohibetur voluntas etiam absque opere; et hoc modo bene concedo, quod voluntas interior et actio exterior, prout sunt disiuncta, sunt plura peccata. Sed hoc modo non procedit inquisitio praesens nec inquisitio Magistri.

p. 962 Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis communicat voluntas interior cum voluntate quam cum actu exteriori; dicendum, quod est convenientia formalis, et convenientia ordinis. Cum ergo dicitur, quod voluntas interior magis convenit cum voluntate quam cum actione exteriori; dicendum, quod verum est de convenientia formali, sed non de convenientia ordinis; quia non sic est voluntas a voluntate, sicut est exterior operatio ab interiori voluntate; et ideo, cum sint duae voluntates, duae sunt principales deordinationes, et propter hoc sunt duo peccata. Cum vero opus exterius iunctum est voluntati interiori, a qua procedit, una est ibi deordinatio et unum actuale principium deordinationis; et ideo unum peccatum est ex ista parte, et ex illa parte plura12.

Scholion

I. Primae quaestionis solutio satis plana est. De ea agunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. 3. § 3, q. 116. m. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; de Malo, q. 2. a. 2. ad 11. (cfr. 1. II. q. 20. a. 2.). — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 139. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica.

II. De principiis, quae adhibentur in solutione seq. (2.) quaestionis, et de dissidentibus auctorum opinionibus iam actum est supra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. Praeter auctores ibi citatos; Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 4. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. dub. lat. 1.

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English Translation

Article I. On the comparison of the sin of deed to the sin of will.

Question I. Whether the sin of will and the sin of deed are two sins, or one.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the sin of will and the sin of deed are two sins, or one. And that they are several, it seems.

1. On that text of Romans, chapter one1: Filled with murders: the Gloss: « It says murders in the plural, because the murder of will is one thing, and the murder of deed another ». If it is so in murder, then by parity of reasoning so also in other sins.

2. Likewise, when the lower is multiplied, the higher is multiplied2; but exterior fornication is a special sin, and the will to fornicate is also a special sin; but the will to fornicate is other than the very act of fornication: therefore if these are diverse and are sins, speaking formally: therefore they are diverse sins.

3. Likewise, when the subject is multiplied, the accident is multiplied which subsists through that subject3; but deformity is compared to the action as an accident to a subject: therefore where there are many deformed actions, there are many deformities, and where there are many deformities, there are many sins; and the interior action and the exterior are diverse: therefore there are in them diverse deformities: therefore also diverse sins.

4. Likewise, when one of two opposites is multiplied, the other too is multiplied4, because « only one is opposed to one »; but sin is repugnant to a precept: since therefore there is one precept by which the interior act is prohibited, and another by which the exterior act is prohibited, because one command is: Thou shalt not covet, and another: Thou shalt not commit adultery: therefore it seems that, just as those are two precepts, so the interior action and the exterior are two sins.

5. Likewise, the interior will agrees more with an interior will than the interior will with an exterior act; but the interior will with another will makes two diverse sins: therefore much more are the interior will with an exterior act diverse sins.

On the contrary: 1. The per se and the per accidens do not constitute a number, just as when I love wine because it is sweet, I am not said to love two things, but one6; but the exterior action is not a sin except on account of the interior will: therefore the interior will with the exterior act does not constitute a number: therefore they are not two sins but one.

2. Likewise, an action begun does not constitute a number with the same action completed; but sin is begun in the will and completed in the deed, according to what is said in James, chapter one7: Concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; but sin, when it has been completed, begets death: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a good work does not constitute a number with a good will in the account of merit — hence when someone voluntarily acts well, there is not there a double merit, but one — therefore by parity of reasoning, neither will the interior will with the exterior work constitute a number in the account of demerit or sin.

4. Likewise, the formal element in sin, insofar as it is sin, is inordinate desire, or rather contempt of God or aversion8; but when someone voluntarily perpetrates a wicked deed, there are not two contempts, but one, nor two aversions, but one: therefore the interior will and the exterior act are not two sins, but one.

5. Likewise, for many sins a manifold penalty ought to be inflicted, whether remunerative or satisfactory; but for a sin completed exteriorly no manifold penalty is owed to anyone, nor are diverse satisfactions imposed, but one: therefore the interior will and the exterior action are not diverse sins.

Conclusion. The will to sin and the exterior act, if they are ordered to one another, are one sin.

I respond: It must be said that the sin of the exterior deed and the sin of the interior will can be compared in two ways: in one way, insofar as these two are conjoined p. 961and ordered, such that one is from the other; and thus the interior will with the exterior act does not make diverse sins, because there is there one contempt and one aversion and one conversion. For the will is that which by contemning turns away, while it turns toward a changeable good, not only as to its proper act, but also as to the act of the lower power9 which is subject to it. Since therefore sin, as such, denotes a disorder through contempt and aversion from God and conversion toward the creature; hence it is that, since there is there one first disorder10, the sin of will and of deed is one, speaking formally, insofar as they are conjoined. But although there is there one account of disordering, yet there are several things disordered; and therefore, although that sin is one formally, yet there are several materially.

But if we compare the interior will to the exterior work insofar as they are separated, such that one person sins by will only, another sins by will and deed; thus the sin of will and the sin of deed are diverse sins not only materially, but also formally, because the act of will, in which the first account of disordering consists, is counted and is distinct one from the other. — In this way, however, the Master does not ask in the text11 whether the interior will and the exterior action are diverse sins — for this is not in doubt, that one sins by diverse sins if on one occasion one merely wills evil, and on another occasion wills and accomplishes it — but he asks about this: whether the interior will and the exterior action are diverse sins, according as the one proceeds from the other, and the one is conjoined to the other. And to this it must be answered that, although there are several culpable works and several things disordered, yet because there is one account of disordering and one act of will there, and the other is not culpable except on account of it; there is one sin there. And the Master in the text agrees more with this manner of speaking, when he answers the objections which are made for the other part, which said4-2 that those are diverse sins. And he does rightly in this, that although something can be said to be counted — by a certain impropriety — solely from the side of the material principle; nevertheless, properly speaking, something is not counted from the side of the material principle, except because together with the numbering from the side of the material principle there concurs a numbering from the side of the formal principle, just as whiteness is counted in two white men. — But it is not so in the case at hand; and therefore the reasons which show this, namely that the interior will and the exterior action are one sin, are to be conceded.

To the arguments for the affirmative part:

To 1. As to what is objected from the Gloss, it must be said that the Gloss either speaks materially, or speaks of the interior and exterior murder insofar as they are disjoined, such that one is not continued to the other.

To 2. As to what is objected, that when the lower is multiplied its higher is multiplied; it must be said that this is true of that lower to which its higher is essential, or to which its higher is essentially compared. But it is not so in the case at hand, because sin, even though it is predicated of will and of action5, is not predicated by an essential predication, but rather by an accidental one.

To 3. As to what is objected, that when the subject is multiplied the accident is multiplied; it must be said that this is true if the subject is multiplied per se6-2 and that in which the accident primarily is. But the deformity of sinning is not regarded primarily and principally with respect to the exterior action, nor is it there as in a subject per se, but it is there by reason of the interior will conjoined; which is clear, because, if that action proceeded from another principle than from the will, it would no longer be culpable. — It can also be said otherwise, that this is understood when the subject is multiplied both according to the thing and according to that account by which it is called a subject, such that there are not only several things, but also several subjects. But although the interior and exterior action are diverse things, yet they are not diverse subjects of deformity, but one, because, just as order can be in several things, of which one is from the other, as in one subject; so too disorder. Since therefore the deformity of sin denotes a disorder from the end, hence it is that with respect to the interior and exterior action it subsists as with respect to one subject, although there are diverse actions and things. — One could also press the objection against that statement, that this is understood of an absolute accident7-2, not of a related accident. For such a one can be in several things, provided that they are related and ordered to one another; and in this way the interior and exterior action are disposed, because the one proceeds from the other.

To 4. As to what is objected, that when one of two opposites is multiplied, the other too is multiplied; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is opposed to it. But the precept by which the exterior act and the interior will are prohibited is not distinct except from this, that in the one the will together with the work is prohibited, in the other the will is prohibited even apart from the work; and in this way I readily concede that the interior will and the exterior action, insofar as they are disjoined, are several sins. But it is not in this way that the present inquiry proceeds, nor the inquiry of the Master.

p. 962 To 5. As to what is objected, that the interior will agrees more with the will than with the exterior act; it must be said that there is an agreement of form, and an agreement of order. When therefore it is said that the interior will agrees more with the will than with the exterior action; it must be said that this is true of agreement of form, but not of agreement of order; because the will is not from the will in the way that the exterior operation is from the interior will; and therefore, since there are two wills, there are two principal disorders, and on account of this there are two sins. But when the exterior work is joined to the interior will from which it proceeds, there is there one disorder and one actual principle of disorder; and therefore there is one sin on this side, and on that side several12.

Scholion

I. The solution of the first question is sufficiently plain. On it treat: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 96, m. 3, a. 3, § 3, q. 116, m. 1. — Scotus, in both Scripta, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; On Evil, q. 2, a. 2, ad 11 (cf. I-II, q. 20, a. 2). — Blessed Albert, here a. 1; Summa p. II, tr. 22, q. 139, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following question, here a single question.

II. Concerning the principles which are employed in the solution of the following (2nd) question, and concerning the dissenting opinions of the authors, treatment has already been made above at d. 40, a. 2, q. 1. Besides the authors cited there: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 4, 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, loc. cit. dub. lat. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 29. — Glossa, quae apud Lyranum habetur ut interlinearis, apud Petr. Lombardum sic sonat: Homicidiis pluraliter dicit, quia sunt homicidia actus et voluntatis.
    Verse 29. — The Gloss, which in Lyra is given as the interlinear gloss, in Peter Lombard reads thus: It says murders in the plural, because there are murders of deed and of will.
  2. Ratio continetur his verbis Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1: « Species participant genera » et « individua participant speciem et genus ».
    The reasoning is contained in these words of Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 1: « Species participate in genera » and « individuals participate in species and genus ».
  3. Averroes in IV. Phys. text. 132: Est dispositio in albedine et aliis accidentibus, quae multiplicantur per multiplicationem subiecti. Cfr. supra pag. 119, nota 8.
    Averroes on Physics IV, text 132: There is a disposition in whiteness and in other accidents, which are multiplied through the multiplication of the subject. Cf. above p. 119, note 8.
  4. Vide supra pag. 653, nota 5, ubi similis propositio ex Aristot. allata est. De verbis Aristot., quae sequuntur: « tantum unum uni opponitur », vide supra pag. 812, nota 8. — Loci s. Script. sunt Exod. 20, 17. et 14. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine.
    See above p. 653, note 5, where a similar proposition from Aristotle is adduced. On the words of Aristotle which follow, « only one is opposed to one », see above p. 812, note 8. — The scriptural passages are Exodus 20:17 and 14. — See here the text of the Master, c. 1, near the end.
  5. Vide supra pag. 614, nota 3. et pag. 639, nota 2. Pro in numerum plures codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4 hic et etiam in seqq. numerum tantum, et pro non ponit codd. F T Y non ponunt.
    See above p. 614, note 3, and p. 639, note 2. For in numerum several codices and editions 2, 3, 4 here and also in what follows read merely numerum, and for non ponit codices F T Y read non ponunt.
  6. Vers. 15.
    Verse 15.
  7. Cfr. a. 3. q. 2.
    Cf. a. 3, q. 2.
  8. Vat. qui.
    The Vatican edition reads qui.
  9. Pro prima (i. e. principalis, cfr. infra ad 5.) Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 patet.
    For prima (i.e. principal, cf. below at the reply to 5) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads patet.
  10. Hic c. 1.
    Here c. 1.
  11. Codd. F Y ee et alii nec non ed. 1 dicebat. Paulo post pro in hoc, quod Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et nonnulli codd. in hoc, quia.
    Codices F Y ee and others as well as edition 1 read dicebat. A little later, for in hoc, quod the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 and some codices read in hoc, quia.
  12. Codd. X bb operatione, quod codd. C H K O R S T ee et primae edd. mutarunt in ratione (!).
    Codices X bb read operatione, which codices C H K O R S T ee and the first editions changed into ratione (!).
  13. Cod. cc et ed. 1 multiplicatur.
    Codex cc and edition 1 read multiplicatur.
  14. Cuiusmodi est quantitas et qualitas, quae dicunt formam aliquam, quae dependet a substantia, et cuius esse est ad se nec refertur ad aliud ut ad terminum. Accidens vero relatum (relativum, respectivum) est illud quod ex aliquo, quod extrinsece se habet ad rem resultat, et cuius esse est ad aliud se habere ut ad suum terminum.
    Of which kind are quantity and quality, which signify some form that depends on substance, and whose being is toward itself and is not referred to another as to a term. But a related accident (relative, respective) is that which results from something which is extrinsically disposed toward the thing, and whose being is to be disposed toward another as toward its term.
  15. Edd. addunt peccata. Paulo superius pro iunctum est cod. T habet coniunctum est.
    The editions add peccata [several sins]. A little above, for iunctum est codex T has coniunctum est.
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