Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 42
Quaestio II. Utrum peccatum operis addat aliquid supra peccatum voluntatis.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum operis addat supra peccatum voluntatis. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Super illud Psalmi2: Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem; Glossa: « Qui addit opus voluntati addit iniquitatem iniquitati »; sed qui hoc facit, aut facit novum peccatum, aut maius; sed non novum: ergo maius.
2. Item, Augustinus3: « Unusquisque miser efficitur mala voluntate, sed miserior potestate, cum desiderium malae voluntatis impletur »; sed non efficitur homo miserior per peccatum, nisi aggravetur peccatum: ergo peccatum voluntatis aggravatur per additionem operis.
3. Item, ratione videtur. Apud humanam iustitiam gravius punitur qui peccat in opere, quam qui peccat voluntate solum, vel voluntate et verbo quam voluntate tantum: ergo si humana iustitia derivatur ab aeterna iustitia et ei conformatur et in opere suo laudabilis est4; videtur, quod maiori sit dignus poena ille qui peccat voluntate et opere, quam qui peccat voluntate tantum. Sed non est quis maiori dignus poena nisi propter maiorem culpam: ergo etc.
4. Item, gravius peccat qui peccat in Deum et in proximum, quam qui peccat in Deum tantum; sed qui peccat voluntate interiori solum non peccat nisi in Deum; qui vero peccat exterius in opere frequenter peccat in proximum, sicut patet in adulterio et homicidio: ergo etc.
5. Item, quanto magis se homo glorificat et in deliciis est, tanto magis dignus est poena5; sed qui peccat voluntate et opere magis se glorificavit et amplius delectatus est, quam qui sola voluntate peccavit: ergo maiori dignus est poena; et si hoc, maiorem perpetrat culpam.
Sed contra: 1. Super illud Psalmi6: Etenim in corde inquitates operamini; Glossa: « Si vis et non potes, Deus factum reputat »; ergo si voluntas reputatur pro facto, videtur, quod factum quantum ad rationem peccati nihil addat supra voluntatem.
2. Item, Augustinus7: « Si contingat, aliquem non concumbere cum uxore aliena, planum autem est, eum cupere, et si potestas daretur, eum esse facturum; non minus reus est, quam si in ipso facto deprehenderetur »: ergo si non est minus reus, non magis peccat, quando consummat in opere, quam quando plene vult in voluntate.
3. Item, gravitas et magnitudo peccati consistit in quantitate contemptus; sed quando voluntas omnino consentit, tunc plena est aversio et contemptus: ergo aequale est peccatum, sive opus adsit, sive desit.
4. Item, opus exterius non est culpabile nisi propter voluntatem interiorem: ergo si tota ratio culpabilitatis ortum habet ab ipsa voluntate, videtur, quod sola voluntate peccati existente, tantum est homo culpabilis, quantum si peccaret in opere.
5. Item, peccata spiritualia, quae sola voluntate consummantur, graviora sunt quam peccata carnalia, quorum consummatio fit in carne. Si ergo prima, quae in sola voluntate consistunt, graviora sunt quam secunda, quae consistunt in voluntate et opere; videtur, quod opus non addat aliquid ad malitiam voluntatis.
Conclusio
Si utrobique voluntas est plena, peccatum operis addit, non ratione maioris contemptus Dei, sed ratione delectationis, vel damnificationis.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum opus addat aliquid ad malitiam voluntatis, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo respectu voluntatis, quae potest in opus procedere, sed tamen non procedit, quia non omnino plene vult; et respectu talis absque dubio malitia operis addit. Cum enim consummatur peccatum in opere, tunc est plenius8 consensus, et non solummodo dicitur manducare mulier, sed etiam vir; et ideo peccatum tunc maius et gravius est ratione maioris conversionis et etiam aversionis. — Alio modo potest intelligi respectu voluntatis, quae quidem in opus non procedit, non quia non velit, sed quia non potest. Et tunc movetur ista quaestio, cum utrobique sit plena voluntas, utrum gravius peccet qui vult et non potest, an qui vult et facit, esto quod uterque moveatur ex aequali amore.
Hoc igitur modo quaestione intellecta, respondendum est, quod unum peccatum dicitur esse maius altero tripliciter: aut ratione maioris contemptus Dei, aut ratione maioris libidinis sive delectationis, aut ratione maioris damnificationis. Primo modo loquendo, opus non addit ad iniquitatem voluntatis, quia voluntas plena9 a Deo avertitur per se, sicut cum est operi coniuncta. Quantum vero ad delectationem sive libidinem addit et aggravat, maxime quantum ad genus peccati carnalis, quo quidem peccat homo in se ipso; similiter quantum ad damnificationem addit, et hoc maxime quantum ad genus peccati, quo quis peccat in proximum. Quantumcumque enim aliquis velit fornicari, nunquam delectatur, sicut quando voluntas coniungitur actui10. Similiter, quantumcumque velit aliquis alterum occidere, non tantum facit damnum, quantum si actu occideret. Et quoniam Deus iustus iudex in puniendo non tantum considerat in peccato magnitudinem contemptus, sed etiam magnitudinem delectationis et magnitudinem damnificationis; hinc est, quod aliquo modo opus addit ad nequitiam voluntatis. — Unde et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt, quamvis non omnes cogant, maxime illa, quae fit de similitudine divinae iustitiae et humanae. Non est enim simile, quia homines considerant quae exterius patent et iustitiam publicam; Deus autem intuetur cor11 et non solum considerat iustitiam publicam, sed etiam privatam.
Ad argumenta pro parte contraria: Ad 1, 2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de Glossa illa et de auctoritate Augustini, quarum una dicit, quod voluntas reputatur pro facto, et altera dicit, quod non minus est reus qui vult et non facit, quam qui vult et facit; dicendum, quod ambae12 procedunt secundum quantitatem peccati, quae attenditur quantum ad plenitudinem consensus et quantum ad magnitudinem contemptus; et sic bene conceditur, quod opus ad talem voluntatem non addit.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicit, quod quantitas peccati consideratur penes quantitatem contemptus; dicendum, quod verum est, non tamen est verum praecise. Deus enim non tantum considerat contemptum sui, immo etiam damnum proximi et delectationem peccantis; unde et proximo patienti iniuriam facit vindictam, et maiorem patienti iniuriam facit maiorem vindictam; sic et eum qui delectatus est, affligit, et eum qui magis delectatus est, magis affligit. Et ideo ratio illa ab insufficienti procedit.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tota ratio peccati est a voluntate; dicendum, quod non est verum, quia aliqua sunt peccata non solum ex improbitate voluntatis facientis, sed etiam ex genere operis, quia sunt contra prohibitionem Dei et contra dictamen iuris naturalis13. Verum est tamen, quod nihil, quod fit ex parte operis, per se sufficit ad faciendum peccatum, nisi adsit voluntarius motus; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod quamvis hoc non possit esse peccatum sine illo, quod hoc non addat ad illud. Et
est simile, quia ferrum non urit absque igne; ignis tamen cum ferro plus urit et plus penetrat, quam faceret per se ipsum; sic et in multis aliis invenitur.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de peccatis spiritualibus, dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod peccata spiritualia spiritualem habent delectationem, quae in suo genere maiorem habent adhaerentiam et maiorem improbitatem, quam etiam aliqua delectatio peccati carnalis. Peccata vero carnalia nunquam tantum delectant, quando sunt in sola voluntate, quantum quando sunt in voluntate et opere, nec etiam tantum damnificant. Ideo non sequitur, quod in talibus opus non addat ad malitiam voluntatis1.
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Question II. Whether the sin of deed adds anything beyond the sin of will.
Secondly it is asked whether the sin of deed adds beyond the sin of will. And that it does seems so.
1. Upon that of the Psalm2: Add iniquity upon iniquity; the Gloss: "He who adds the deed to the will adds iniquity to iniquity"; but he who does this either commits a new sin, or a greater one; but not a new one: therefore a greater one.
2. Likewise, Augustine3: "Each one is made wretched by an evil will, but more wretched by power, when the desire of the evil will is fulfilled"; but a man is not made more wretched by a sin unless the sin be aggravated: therefore the sin of will is aggravated by the addition of the deed.
3. Likewise, it seems so by reason. In human justice he is more gravely punished who sins in deed than he who sins by will alone, or by will and word than by will only: therefore if human justice is derived from eternal justice and is conformed to it and is praiseworthy in its working4; it seems that he is worthy of a greater punishment who sins by will and deed than he who sins by will only. But no one is worthy of a greater punishment except on account of a greater fault: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, he sins more gravely who sins against God and against neighbor than he who sins against God only; but he who sins by interior will alone sins only against God; whereas he who sins outwardly in deed often sins against his neighbor, as is plain in adultery and homicide: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, the more a man glorifies himself and is in delights, so much the more is he worthy of punishment5; but he who sins by will and deed has glorified himself more and has taken more delight than he who sinned by will alone: therefore he is worthy of a greater punishment; and if this, he perpetrates a greater fault.
On the contrary: 1. Upon that of the Psalm6: For in your heart you work iniquities; the Gloss: "If you will and cannot, God reckons it as done"; therefore if the will is reckoned for the deed, it seems that the deed adds nothing beyond the will as regards the formal character of sin.
2. Likewise, Augustine7: "If it should happen that someone does not lie with another's wife, but it is plain that he desires her, and that, were the power given, he would do it; he is no less guilty than if he were caught in the very act": therefore if he is no less guilty, he does not sin more when he consummates it in deed than when he wills it fully in the will.
3. Likewise, the gravity and magnitude of a sin consists in the quantity of contempt; but when the will consents entirely, then the aversion and contempt are full: therefore the sin is equal, whether the deed be present or absent.
4. Likewise, the outward deed is not culpable except on account of the interior will: therefore if the whole ground of culpability takes its origin from the will itself, it seems that, with the sin existing in will alone, a man is as culpable as if he sinned in deed.
5. Likewise, spiritual sins, which are consummated by the will alone, are graver than carnal sins, whose consummation takes place in the flesh. If, then, the former, which consist in the will alone, are graver than the latter, which consist in will and deed; it seems that the deed adds nothing to the malice of the will.
Conclusion
If on both sides the will is full, the sin of deed adds—not by reason of a greater contempt of God, but by reason of delight, or of harm done.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, when it is asked whether the deed adds anything to the malice of the will, this can be understood in two ways: in one way with respect to a will that can proceed into deed, but nevertheless does not proceed, because it does not will fully and entirely; and with respect to such a will the malice of the deed without doubt adds. For when the sin is consummated in deed, then the consent is fuller8, and not only is the woman said to eat, but also the man; and therefore the sin is then greater and graver by reason of the greater turning-toward and also the turning-away. — In another way it can be understood with respect to a will that indeed does not proceed into deed, not because it does not will, but because it cannot. And then this question is raised, when on both sides there is a full will, whether he sins more gravely who wills and cannot, or he who wills and does, granted that each is moved by an equal love.
This question therefore being understood in this way, it must be answered that one sin is said to be greater than another in three ways: either by reason of a greater contempt of God, or by reason of a greater lust or delight, or by reason of a greater harm done. Speaking in the first way, the deed does not add to the iniquity of the will, because the full will9 is turned away from God of itself, just as when it is joined to the deed. But as regards delight or lust it adds and aggravates, especially as regards the kind of carnal sin by which a man sins against himself; likewise as regards harm done it adds, and this especially as regards the kind of sin by which one sins against neighbor. For however much anyone may will to fornicate, he is never delighted as when the will is joined to the act10. Likewise, however much anyone may will to kill another, he does not do as much harm as if he actually killed. And since God, the just judge, in punishing considers in a sin not only the magnitude of contempt, but also the magnitude of delight and the magnitude of harm done; hence it is that in some way the deed adds to the wickedness of the will. — Whence also the reasons that show this are to be conceded, although not all of them are conclusive, especially the one that is drawn from the likeness of divine and human justice. For it is not alike, because men consider what is outwardly evident and public justice; but God beholds the heart11 and considers not only public justice, but also private.
To the arguments for the contrary part: To 1 and 2. As to what is objected on the contrary from that Gloss and from the authority of Augustine—of which the one says that the will is reckoned for the deed, and the other says that he is no less guilty who wills and does not do than he who wills and does; it must be said that both12 proceed according to the quantity of sin, which is measured according to the fullness of consent and according to the magnitude of contempt; and so it is rightly conceded that the deed does not add to such a will.
To 3. As to what is objected, that the quantity of sin is considered according to the quantity of contempt; it must be said that it is true, yet not true precisely. For God considers not only the contempt of himself, but rather also the harm to the neighbor and the delight of the sinner; whence he also exacts vengeance for the neighbor suffering injury, and exacts a greater vengeance for one suffering a greater injury; so too he afflicts him who has taken delight, and afflicts more him who has taken more delight. And therefore that argument proceeds from an insufficient ground.
To 4. As to what is objected, that the whole ground of sin is from the will; it must be said that it is not true, because some sins are not only from the wickedness of the will of the one acting, but also from the kind of deed, because they are against the prohibition of God and against the dictate of natural law13. It is true nevertheless that nothing which is done on the part of the deed by itself suffices to make a sin, unless a voluntary motion be present; and therefore from this it does not follow that, although this cannot be a sin without that, that this adds nothing to that. And
it is alike, because iron does not burn without fire; yet fire with iron burns more and penetrates more than it would do by itself; and so it is found in many other cases.
To 5. As to what is objected concerning spiritual sins, it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that spiritual sins have a spiritual delight, which in its own kind has a greater adherence and a greater wickedness than even some delight of carnal sin does. But carnal sins never delight as much, when they are in will alone, as when they are in will and deed, nor do they likewise do as much harm. Therefore it does not follow that in such cases the deed does not add to the malice of the will1.
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- Psalm. 68, 28. — Glossa interlinearis super hunc locum apud Lyranum sic sonat: Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem, vitium vitio, vel iniquos filios iniquis patribus.Psalm 68:28. — The interlinear Gloss upon this passage, in Lyra, runs thus: Add iniquity upon iniquity, vice upon vice, or wicked sons upon wicked fathers.
- Libr. XIII. de Trin. c. 5. n. 8: Mala enim voluntate vel sola quisque miser efficitur, sed miserior potestate, qua desiderium malae etc. — In hoc August. testimonio Vat. omittit potestate, et codd. C F H I L O R S T V Y ee et ed. 2 pro desiderium substituunt desideriis. Paulo inferius cod. K verbo voluntatis adiungit malae.Bk. XIII On the Trinity, c. 5, n. 8: "For by an evil will alone is each one made wretched, but more wretched by the power whereby the desire of the evil [will] is [fulfilled]," etc. — In this testimony of Augustine the Vatican edition omits potestate, and codd. C F H I L O R S T V Y ee and ed. 2 substitute desideriis for desiderium. A little below, cod. K adds malae to the word voluntatis.
- August., l. de Lib. Arb. c. 6. n. 15: Simul etiam te videre arbitror, in illa temporali [lege] nihil esse iustum atque legitimum, quod non ex hac aeterna sibi homines derivarint... Ut igitur breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae impressa nobis est, quantum valeo, verbis explicem, ea est qua iustum est.Augustine, On Free Will, bk. [I], c. 6, n. 15: "At the same time I think you also see that in that temporal [law] there is nothing just and lawful that men have not derived for themselves from this eternal [law]... Therefore, that I may briefly express in words, as far as I can, the notion of the eternal law which is impressed upon us, it is that by which it is just," [etc.].
- Apoc. 18, 7: Quantum glorificavit se et in deliciis fuit, tantum date illi tormentum et luctum.Revelation 18:7: "As much as she has glorified herself and lived in delights, so much give her of torment and grief."
- Psalm. 57, 3. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum, sumta est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc Ps. n. 4, ubi sic legitur: Quidquid vis et non potes, factum Deus computat.Psalm 57:3. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one and is found in Strabus and in Lyra, is taken from Augustine, Enarration on this Psalm, n. 4, where it reads thus: "Whatever you will and cannot do, God reckons as done."
- Libr. I. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 8: Si cui etiam non contingat facultas concumbendi cum coniuge aliena, planum tamen aliquo modo sit, id eum cupere, et si potestas detur, facturum esse, non minus etc.Bk. I On Free Will, c. 3, n. 8: "If even the opportunity of lying with another's spouse should not befall someone, yet it should in some way be plain that he desires it, and that, were the power given, he would do it, he is no less," etc.
- Id est superior pars rationis. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 6. seqq. et ibid. Comment. p. II. a. 1. et 2. — Paulo inferius pro consentit Vat. et edd. 2. 3. 4 et plures codd. substituunt minus bene consensit.That is, the superior part of reason. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 6 ff., and there the Commentary, p. II, a. 1 and 2. — A little below, for consentit the Vatican edition and edd. 2, 3, 4 and several codices substitute, less well, consensit.
- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 plenior. — [Et infra:] Vat. plene.The Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads plenior. — [And below:] the Vatican edition reads plene.
- Supple cum Vat. exteriori. Paulo superius codd. F W X Y Z et alii verbo delectato- praemittunt tantum; paulo inferius cod. T pro non tantum substituit nunquam tantum.Supply, with the Vatican edition, exteriori [exterior]. A little above, codd. F W X Y Z and others prefix tantum to the word delectato-; a little below, cod. T substitutes nunquam tantum for non tantum.
- Libr. I. Reg. 16, 7: Homo enim videt ea quae parent, Dominus autem intuetur cor.1 Kings (1 Samuel) 16:7: "For man sees the things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart."
- Cod. T omittit ambae.Cod. T omits ambae.
- Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XL. — Paulo inferius pro et ideo Vat. habet sed ideo.Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XL. — A little below, for et ideo the Vatican edition reads sed ideo.
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.