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Dist. 43, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 43

Textus Latinus
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Est peccatum ad mortem, non pro eo dico, ut quis oret. Videtur enim ex hoc, quod non habeat1 orari pro eo qui peccat in Spiritum sanctum. Sed contra hoc est: quia tales sunt diligendi ex caritate: ergo videtur, quod pro eis orandum sit. — Praeterea, tales magis indigent aliis et proniores sunt ad malum: ergo videtur, quod maior sit beneficentia misericordiae pro his orare quam pro aliis, qui non indigent.

Est igitur quaestio: quare dixit beatus Ioannes2, quod pro talibus orandum non sit, cum de nemine sit desperandum?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod peccatum ad mortem dicitur dupliciter: aut quia perducit ad mortem, aut quia disponit ad mortem. Et primo modo accipiendo, peccatum ad mortem omnino est irremissibile. Secundo modo accipiendo, peccatum ad mortem cum difficultate est remissibile. — Quolibet dictorum modorum intelligi habet praedictus sermo secundum differentem sui expositionem. Nam primo modo sensus est: non dico, ut pro eo oret quis, hoc est aliquis, nec parvus nec magnus. Secundo vero modo sensus est: non dico, ut pro eo oret quis, id est quaevis persona; quasi dicat: difficile est pro tali peccatore exaudiri, quia talis iam est inter incorrigibiles deputandus; de quo dicit Dominus Matthaei decimo octavo3: Quodsi Ecclesiam audire noluerit, sit tibi sicut ethnicus et publicanus. Et ita in uno sensu generaliter innuit, quod pro peccante ad mortem non est orandum; in alio vero sensu innuit, quod non est cuiuslibet impetrare tantum donum4. — In nullo tamen dictorum sensuum prohibet orare; sed in hoc verbo ostendit, quod mandatum suum sive monitio, qua dixerat, orandum esse pro proximo, non se extendit generaliter respectu omnium, sed respectu eorum, de quibus probabiliter sperare possumus, quod nostris orationibus concedentur5. — Et sic patet responsio ad illud.

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DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Qui blasphemaverit in Spiritum sanctum, non remittetur ei. Contra: Glossa dicit ibidem6: « Blasphemia remittetur, spiritus autem blasphemiae non remittetur »: ergo si blasphemia remittitur, sive blasphemet Patrem, sive Spiritum, remittetur.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quae differentia sit inter blasphemiam et spiritum blasphemiae. Videtur, quod gravius peccatum sit blasphemia quam spiritus blasphemiae, quia spiritus blasphemiae dicit voluntatem, blasphemia dicit opus, malum autem opus addit supra voluntatem7. — Contrarium huius est quod dicit Glossa, quae dicit, quod spiritus blasphemiae non remittitur, sed blasphemia remittitur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Hugo8, « blasphemia, quantum est de se, indifferens est quantum ad hoc, quod sit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, et non in Spiritum sanctum. Alii enim blasphemant ex infirmitate et coactione, et hi peccant in Patrem; alii ex deceptione, et hi peccant in Filium; alii ex certa malitia, et hi peccant in Spiritum sanctum, et hoc est sceleratissimum genus peccati, in vituperiis Dei delectari ». Et post subiungit: « Quid est spiritus blasphemiae, nisi affectus et desiderium vituperationis divinae? Spiritus enim blasphemiae sic spirat ad odium Dei, sicut Spiritus sanctus ad amorem Dei. Quando ergo dicitur: qui blasphemaverit in Spiritum sanctum etc., non intelligitur de quacumque blasphemia, sed de spiritu blasphemiae; unde non dicit: qui blasphemaverit Spiritum sanctum, sed qui blasphemaverit in Spiritum sanctum, id est peccando in Spiritum sanctum ». Et hoc declarat ipsa Glossa, quae dicit, quod blasphemia remittetur, spiritus autem blasphemiae non remittetur.

Per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod quaerit, quae differentia sit inter blasphemiam et spiritum blasphemiae, et quod gravius sit peccatum spiritus blasphemiae quam blasphemia. Non enim differunt, sicut voluntas et actus, sed sicut generale et speciale9.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod desperatio est, qua quis diffidit penitus de bonitate Dei, aestimans, malitiam suam Dei bonitatem excedere. Videtur enim ex hoc, quod omnis desperans sit infidelis. Omnis enim, qui sic aestimat, credit, bonitatem Dei esse finitam, et omnis talis errat contra id quod fidei est. — Item, qui credit contrarium eius quod dicit Scriptura, haereticus et infidelis iudicatur; sed Scriptura10 dicit: Quacumque hora ingemuerit peccator, omnium iniquitatum eius non recordabor; desperans credit eius oppositum: ergo etc. — Praeterea, articulus specialis est de remissione peccatorum, et contra istum errat ille qui desperat. — Similiter potest obiici de eo qui praesumit; videtur enim, quod praesumtio11 tollat fidem. — Contrarium huius est, quia fides ita praecedit spem, sicut praecedit caritatem: ergo sicut odium non tollit spem, ita etiam nec desperatio fidem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod fides differt a spe in hoc, quod fides respicit ipsum obiectum in universali, sed spes respicit in particulari, videlicet respectu sperantis; et in hoc etiam, quod fides dicit certitudinem in intellectu, et spes dicit certitudinem in affectu12. Sicut igitur contingit aliquando ignorari aliquid in particulari et sciri in universali, sicut dicit Philosophus in secundo Priorum13, sicut est de illo qui scit, omnem mulam esse sterilem, et tamen aestimat, hanc habere in utero; sic potest aliquis habens fidem carere spe; et sicut potest aliquis non habens certitudinem de aliquo in affectu habere in intellectu, sic potest aliquis non habens spem habere fidem.

Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod talis aestimat, malitiam suam Dei bonitatem excedere; dicendum, quod aestimare, malitiam bonitatem excedere, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut in se, aut in effectu; et in effectu dupliciter: aut universaliter respectu cuiuslibet, aut particulariter respectu sui. Et primo et secundo modo est infidelitatis, et tertio desperationis. Et hoc significat textus Genesis14, ubi dixit Cain desperans: Maior est iniquitas mea, quam ut veniam merear; non dixit, quod maior

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esset quam misericordia, sed quod amplior esset quam venia, ad quam pervenire posset. — Vel potest dici, quod talis aestimatio potius venit ex subversione confidentiae quam ex subversione notitiae; sicut homo aliquando bene scit aliquid, et tamen affectio adeo dominatur, ut ad aestimandum oppositum pertrahat ipsum.

Et per hanc viam respondendum est ad illa duo, quae postea obiiciuntur; non enim concludunt, quod desperatio tollat fidem, quia defectus est duplicis conditionis, sicut dictum est. Quamvis autem desperatio non tollat fidem simpliciter, nihilominus tamen plus laeditur fides per desperationem quam per odium, vel quodcumque aliud peccatum, quod non sit ei directe oppositum. In fide enim sunt tria, videlicet ipsa credulitas et habilitas tendendi in Deum et ipsa tendentia. Primum est quasi terra, et secundum quasi semen, et tertium est quasi fructus. Primum tollitur solum per infidelitatem; secundum vero tollitur per desperationem, qua efficitur homo inhabilis ad tendendum in Deum; tertium vero tollitur per omne peccatum15.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod peccatum in Patrem illud intelligitur, quod fit per infirmitatem. Si enim hoc verum est, tunc omne peccatum est peccatum in Patrem, quia, cum potentia peccandi potius sit impotentia quam potentia16, hoc ipso, quo aliquis potest peccare, potest deficere et infirmus esse. — Item, si peccatum in Filium est per ignorantiam, sicut ipse subiungit17: « cum omnis peccator sit ignorans », sicut vult Philosophus, videtur, quod omne peccatum sit in Filium: ergo nulla est illa divisio peccatorum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur peccatum esse ex infirmitate et ignorantia, non accipitur hic quaecumque infirmitas et quaecumque ignorantia, sed infirmitas, quae quidem est ex carne, et ignorantia, quae est respectu alicuius circumstantiae facientis rationem culpae. Et hoc modo talis infirmitas non est respectu omnis peccati, nec talis ignorantia; quamvis, largo modo accepta infirmitate pro quacumque impotentia, et ignorantia pro quacumque nescientia, sive cognitionis practicae, sive speculativae, in omni peccato reperiantur. Praeterea, sciendum est, quod quando dividitur peccatum per has differentias, quod illud dicitur peccatum ex infirmitate, quod procedit ex ipsa immediate, et similiter ex ignorantia et malitia; et sic istae tres differentiae non concurrunt in peccatum idem. Et sic patent obiecta. — Et haec sufficiant de ista divisione, quia supra quaesitum fuit de his, distinctione vigesima secunda18, ubi illa divisio ponitur et manifestatur.

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English Translation
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says: There is a sin unto death; I do not say that one should pray for it. For it seems from this that there is no [obligation] to pray1 for him who sins against the Holy Spirit. But on the contrary is this: that such are to be loved out of charity: therefore it seems that one ought to pray for them. — Moreover, such have more need of others and are more prone to evil: therefore it seems that it would be a greater beneficence of mercy to pray for these than for others, who have no need.

There is therefore a question: why did blessed John2 say that one ought not to pray for such, since one ought to despair of no one?

I respond: It must be said that "sin unto death" is said in two ways: either because it leads to death, or because it disposes to death. And taking it in the first way, sin unto death is altogether irremissible. Taking it in the second way, sin unto death is with difficulty remissible. — In either of the said ways the aforesaid saying is to be understood according to a different exposition of it. For in the first way the sense is: I do not say that anyone should pray for him, that is, no one, neither small nor great. But in the second way the sense is: I do not say that anyone should pray for him, that is, any person whatsoever; as if to say: it is difficult to be heard for such a sinner, since such a one is now to be reckoned among the incorrigible; of whom the Lord says in Matthew the eighteenth3: But if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican. And so in one sense he generally implies that one ought not to pray for one sinning unto death; but in another sense he implies that it does not belong to just anyone to obtain so great a gift4. — Yet in neither of the said senses does he forbid praying; but by this word he shows that his command, or the admonition by which he had said that one ought to pray for one's neighbor, does not extend generally with respect to all, but with respect to those concerning whom we can probably hope that they will be granted to our prayers5. — And thus the answer to that is clear.

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Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Whoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him. On the contrary: the Gloss says in the same place6: « Blasphemy shall be forgiven, but the spirit of blasphemy shall not be forgiven »: therefore if blasphemy is forgiven, whether one blaspheme the Father or the Spirit, it shall be forgiven.

In connection with this it is asked, what difference there is between blasphemy and the spirit of blasphemy. It seems that blasphemy is a graver sin than the spirit of blasphemy, because the spirit of blasphemy bespeaks the will, [whereas] blasphemy bespeaks the deed, and the evil deed adds something above the will7. — The contrary of this is what the Gloss says, which says that the spirit of blasphemy is not forgiven, but blasphemy is forgiven.

I respond: It must be said that, as Hugh says8, « blasphemy, as far as it is of itself, is indifferent as to this, whether it be a sin against the Holy Spirit or not against the Holy Spirit. For some blaspheme out of weakness and compulsion, and these sin against the Father; others out of deception, and these sin against the Son; others out of certain malice, and these sin against the Holy Spirit, and this is the most wicked kind of sin, to take delight in revilings of God ». And afterward he adds: « What is the spirit of blasphemy, except an affection and desire for reviling the divine? For the spirit of blasphemy breathes toward hatred of God, as the Holy Spirit breathes toward love of God. When therefore it is said: whoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit etc., it is not understood of just any blasphemy, but of the spirit of blasphemy; whence he does not say: whoever shall blaspheme the Holy Spirit, but whoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, that is, by sinning against the Holy Spirit ». And the Gloss itself declares this, which says that blasphemy shall be forgiven, but the spirit of blasphemy shall not be forgiven.

By this is clear the answer to what is asked, namely what difference there is between blasphemy and the spirit of blasphemy, and that the sin of the spirit of blasphemy is graver than blasphemy. For they do not differ as the will and the act, but as the general and the special9.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that despair is that by which one wholly distrusts the goodness of God, esteeming his own malice to exceed God's goodness. For it seems from this that everyone who despairs is unfaithful. For everyone who esteems thus believes that the goodness of God is finite, and everyone such errs against that which belongs to faith. — Likewise, whoever believes the contrary of what Scripture says is judged a heretic and unfaithful; but Scripture10 says: In whatever hour the sinner shall groan, I will not remember all his iniquities; the one who despairs believes the opposite of this: therefore etc. — Moreover, there is a special article concerning the remission of sins, and against this errs the one who despairs. — Similarly it can be objected concerning the one who presumes; for it seems that presumption11 takes away faith. — The contrary of this is, that faith precedes hope just as it precedes charity: therefore just as hatred does not take away hope, so also neither does despair take away faith.

I respond: It must be said that faith differs from hope in this, that faith regards the object itself in the universal, but hope regards it in the particular, namely with respect to the one hoping; and also in this, that faith bespeaks certitude in the intellect, and hope bespeaks certitude in the affection12. Just as therefore it sometimes happens that something is unknown in the particular and known in the universal, as the Philosopher says in the second [book] of the Prior [Analytics]13, as is the case of one who knows that every mule is barren, and yet esteems that this one has [a foal] in its womb; so one can, having faith, lack hope; and just as one can, not having certitude about something in the affection, have it in the intellect, so one can, not having hope, have faith.

To that therefore which is first objected, that such a one esteems his own malice to exceed God's goodness; it must be said that to esteem one's malice to exceed [God's] goodness can be in two ways: either in itself, or in effect; and in effect in two ways: either universally with respect to anyone, or particularly with respect to oneself. And in the first and second way it belongs to unbelief, and in the third to despair. And this the text of Genesis signifies14, where Cain in despair said: My iniquity is greater than that I should merit pardon; he did not say that it was greater

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than [God's] mercy, but that it was wider than the pardon to which he could attain. — Or it can be said that such an esteem rather comes from a subversion of confidence than from a subversion of knowledge; just as a man sometimes well knows something, and yet affection so dominates that it draws him to esteem the opposite.

And by this way one must respond to those two [objections] which are afterward raised; for they do not conclude that despair takes away faith, because the defect is of a twofold condition, as has been said. But although despair does not take away faith simply, nevertheless faith is more harmed by despair than by hatred, or any other sin which is not directly opposed to it. For in faith there are three [things], namely belief itself and the aptitude for tending toward God and the tending itself. The first is as it were the earth, and the second as the seed, and the third is as the fruit. The first is taken away only by unbelief; the second is taken away by despair, by which a man is made unfit for tending toward God; the third is taken away by every sin15.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the sin against the Father is understood to be that which is done through weakness. For if this is true, then every sin is a sin against the Father, because, since the power of sinning is rather an impotence than a power16, by this very fact, by which one can sin, he can fail and be weak. — Likewise, if the sin against the Son is through ignorance, as he himself adds17: « since every sinner is ignorant », as the Philosopher holds, it seems that every sin is against the Son: therefore that division of sins is null.

I respond: It must be said that when sin is said to be from weakness and ignorance, there is not taken here just any weakness and just any ignorance, but the weakness which indeed is from the flesh, and the ignorance which is with respect to some circumstance constituting the formal character of fault. And in this way such weakness is not with respect to every sin, nor such ignorance; although, when weakness is taken in a broad sense for any impotence whatsoever, and ignorance for any want of knowledge whatsoever, whether of practical or of speculative cognition, they are found in every sin. Moreover, it must be known that when sin is divided by these differences, that sin is called [a sin] from weakness which proceeds immediately from it, and likewise from ignorance and malice; and thus these three differences do not concur in the same sin. And so the objections are answered. — And let these things suffice concerning this division, since above it was inquired concerning these matters, in the twenty-second distinction18, where that division is set down and made manifest.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Codd. Y (T bb a secunda manu) debeat.
    Codices Y (T, bb by a second hand) read debeat ("ought").
  2. I. Epist. 5, 16. — Cfr. sententia Augustini, in lit. Magistri allata. — Pro quod... orandum non sit, cod. T, oratione obliqua utens, orandum non esse, omisso quod.
    1 John 5:16. — Cf. the sentence of Augustine cited in the text of the Master. — For quod... orandum non sit, codex T, using indirect discourse, reads orandum non esse, omitting quod.
  3. Vers. 17.
    Verse 17. [Matthew 18:17.]
  4. Sed, ut ait B. Albert., hic a. 2, aliquis specialis sanctitatis et perfectionis debet orare pro talibus; quia magnorum est orare pro magnis.
    But, as Blessed Albert says, here a. 2, someone of special sanctity and perfection ought to pray for such; because it belongs to the great to pray for the great.
  5. Cod. bb concedatur, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 emendentur. Paulo ante pro possumus cod. T possimus. — De hoc dub. cfr. hic lit. Magistri nec non Comment. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. et a. 2. q. 2. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 3. a. 6. § 2; B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 23. q. 140. m. 3. a. 3. partic. 2; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.
    Codex bb [reads] concedatur, the Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 emendentur. Shortly before, for possumus codex T [reads] possimus. — On this doubt cf. here the text of the Master, and also the Commentary, a. 1, q. 1, reply 1, and a. 2, q. 2. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa, pt. IV, q. 26, m. 3, a. 6, § 2; Blessed Albert, here a. 2; Summa, pt. II, tr. 23, q. 140, m. 3, a. 3, particula 2; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here on the doubt, text 1.
  6. Vide supra pag. 988, nota 5.
    See above, p. 988, note 5.
  7. Cfr. supra d. 42. a. 1. q. 2.
    Cf. above, d. 42, a. 1, q. 2.
  8. Sententia sub Hugonis nomine hic allata fere ad verbum habetur in Richardi a S. Vict. opusculo « de Spiritu blasphemiae », in quo opusculo auctor profitetur, se sequi magistrum Hugonem.
    The sentence here cited under the name of Hugh is found almost word for word in Richard of St. Victor's opusculum « On the Spirit of Blasphemy », in which opusculum the author professes that he follows master Hugh.
  9. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 132. m. 1. seqq. et q. 136. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 23. q. 140. m. 3. a. 3. partic. 1; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 5.
    Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, pt. II, q. 132, m. 1 ff. and q. 136, m. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 6; Summa, pt. II, tr. 23, q. 140, m. 3, a. 3, particula 1; St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2; Giles of Rome, here on the doubt, text 5.
  10. Ezech. 18, 21. seq. — Paulo ante cod. T post haereticus subiicit est.
    Ezekiel 18:21 f. — Shortly before, codex T after haereticus adds est.
  11. Pro praesumtio, quam vocem ex cod. O, exigente contextu, restituimus ceteri codd. et edd. desperatio; quam lectionem si quis retinere mallet, certo videtur enim mutandum esset in videtur ergo. Aliquanto inferius codd. C F K L O R S (T a prima manu) V W et alii cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt ergo sicut odium non tollit spem, et deinde (etiam edd. 3, 4) fidem, quod vocabulum tamen Vat. exhibet.
    For praesumtio (presumption), which word we have restored from codex O as the context requires, the other codices and editions [read] desperatio (despair); if anyone should prefer to retain this reading, then certainly videtur enim would have to be changed to videtur ergo. Somewhat below, codices C F K L O R S (T by a first hand) V W and others, with editions 1, 2, omit ergo sicut odium non tollit spem, and then (also editions 3, 4) fidem, which word, however, the Vatican [edition] exhibits.
  12. De fide et spe fusius agitur III. Sent. d. 24. et 26. — Aliquanto superius cod. bb creditum, edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd. falso odium pro obiectum.
    Of faith and hope there is fuller treatment in III Sent., d. 24 and 26. — Somewhat above, codex bb [reads] creditum, editions 1, 2 with several codices wrongly odium for obiectum.
  13. Cap. 21. (c. 23.), ubi et exemplum de mula habetur, quod hic affertur. — Pro in secundo Priorum Vat. posuit in primo Posteriorum, in quo libro, c. 10. (c. 13.) in fine, similis sententia occurrit.
    Chapter 21 (c. 23), where also the example of the mule is found, which is here adduced. — For in the second [book] of the Prior [Analytics] the Vatican [edition] put in the first [book] of the Posterior [Analytics], in which book, c. 10 (c. 13) at the end, a similar sentence occurs.
  14. Cap. 4, 13. — Mox pro ubi cod. bb quando, cod. H quoniam, alii codd. cum ed. 2 qui, alii quem; ed. 1, verbis transpositis, Cain, qui dixit.
    Genesis 4:13. — Presently, for ubi codex bb [reads] quando, codex H quoniam, other codices with edition 2 qui, others quem; edition 1, with the words transposed, Cain, qui dixit.
  15. Cfr. de hoc dub. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 157. m. 1. seqq.; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 23. q. 140. m. 2; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa, pt. II, q. 157, m. 1 ff.; Blessed Albert, Summa, pt. II, tr. 23, q. 140, m. 2; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
  16. Cfr. infra d. 44. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox pro infirmus esse codd. C F K L O R S Y et etc. infirmus est.
    Cf. below, d. 44, a. 1, q. 1 f. — Presently, for infirmus esse codices C F K L O R S Y and etc. [read] infirmus est.
  17. Hic in lit. circa finem. — Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1, ait: Unusquisque igitur pravus (μοχθηρός), quid agendum, a quibusque abstinendum sit, ignorat.
    Here in the text near the end. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, c. 1, says: Every wicked man (μοχθηρός) therefore is ignorant of what ought to be done and from what things one ought to abstain.
  18. Art. 2. q. 1. seqq. Cfr. etiam hic a. 1. q. 1. solut. oppos. — Hoc dubium solvit Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
    Art. 2, q. 1 ff. [of d. 22]. Cf. also here a. 1, q. 1, solution of the contrary [arguments]. — Peter of Tarentaise resolves this doubt here on the text. ---
← Dist. 43, Art. 3, Q. 2