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Dist. 43, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 43

Textus Latinus
p. 994

Articulus III. De speciebus et differentiis huius peccati.

Quaestio II. De speciebus huius peccati quoad rationes proprias.

Secundo quaeritur de speciebus huius peccati quantum ad rationes proprias, et ostenditur, quod nulla istarum sit species peccati in Spiritum sanctum.

1. Et primo de desperatione: quia peccatum in Spiritum sanctum est ex certa malitia; sed desperatio potius est ex infirmitate quam ex malitia: ergo videtur, quod desperatio non sit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Si tu dicas, quod saltem potest esse species, in quantum est ex malitia; obiicitur contra hoc: quia qui desperat cogitat in corde suo, quod maior est iniquitas sua quam Dei misericordia1; et omnis talis errat et decipitur: ergo omnis desperatio ortum habet ex ignorantia: ergo non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum.

2. Secundo ostenditur hoc ipsum de praesumtione: quia frequenter praesumit quis potius ex confidentia vel audacia quam ex malitia: ergo non videtur esse species peccati in Spiritum sanctum. Si tu dicas, quod non est species, nisi in quantum procedit ex malitia; obiicitur contra hoc: quia praesumtio, undecumque procedat, species superbiae est, quae est capitale peccatum2: ergo non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum.

3. Tertio ostenditur hoc ipsum de obstinatione: quia « obstinatio est induratae mentis in malitia pertinacia, per quam fit homo impoenitens3 »: si ergo induratio mentis venit ex permansione in peccato, et permansio in peccato non sit species peccati, sed potius circumstantia; videtur, quod obstinatio non sit species peccati in Spiritum sanctum. Si tu dicas, quod obstinatio, secundum quod est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, non tantum dicit permansionem, sed etiam dicit novum actum et motum; obiicitur contra hoc, quia actus ille non est aliud quam voluntas manendi in peccato: ergo non est aliud quam impoenitentia: ergo videtur, quod obstinatio non sit species peccati in Spiritum sanctum ab impoenitentia distincta.

4. Quarto ostenditur hoc ipsum de impugnatione veritatis agnitae: quia frequenter veritas agnita impugnatur ex verecundia, quia homo timet confundi, quando dicit4 falsum: ergo videtur, quod non sit species peccati in Spiritum sanctum. Si tu dicas, quod non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, nisi quando est ex malitia; obiicitur contra hoc: quia tam veritas quam veritatis agnitio Filio appropriatur: ergo potius debet dici impugnatio veritatis agnitae peccatum in Filium quam peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.

5. Quinto loco ostenditur hoc ipsum de invidentia fraternae gratiae: quia aliquis invidet alii ex corruptione naturae: ergo si omne peccatum in Spiritum sanctum est ex malitia, videtur, quod ista non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum. Si tu dicas, quod hoc modo est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quo modo procedit ex malitia; obiicitur contra hoc: quia invidentia fraternae gratiae semper continetur sub invidia, quod est peccatum capitale: ergo videtur, quod invidentia fraternae gratiae reducatur ad peccatum capitale et non sit5 peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.

6. Sexto et ultimo ostenditur illud idem de impoenitentia: quia aliquis non poenitet, quia nescit se peccasse: ergo videtur, quod aliqua impoenitentia sit ex ignorantia: ergo non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, quod universaliter est ex malitia6. Si tu dicas, quod tunc est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quando est ex certa scientia; obiicitur contra hoc: quia scientia non variat genus peccati, cum sit circumstantia: si ergo impoenitentia procedens ex ignorantia non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, videtur, quod nec impoenitentia procedens ex certa scientia.

Conclusio.

Istae sex species non nominant peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, nisi quatenus sunt ex malitia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quemadmodum in operibus7 meritoriis caritas dat formam, ita quod nihil est meritorium, nisi ex caritate procedat; sic intelligendum est in peccato in Spiritum sanctum, quod malitia dat formam huic peccato; unde nihil dicendum est esse peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, nisi quod ex certa malitia procedit. Et quoniam fere omnes actus animae, qui procedunt ex certa malitia, possunt procedere ex infirmitate et ignorantia; et nomina peccatorum imponuntur ab actibus8: hinc est, quod nullum nomen praedictarum specierum est impositum alicui earum, secundum quod est p. 995 praecise peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Et propterea in omnibus opus est hac generali et communi distinctione, ut dicamus, quod ista sex nominent peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, secundum quod sunt ex malitia. Si autem sint praeter malitiam, utpote ex ignorantia et infirmitate, tunc non sunt peccata in Spiritum sanctum. Hoc autem melius patet, si ad singula descendamus.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de desperatione, quod potest esse ex infirmitate; dicendum, quod aliquando desperat aliquis ex pusillanimitate, ita quod in ipsa desperatione non invenit complacentiam, sed dolet et renititur contra ipsam; et tunc non est dicendum esse peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quia ex tali desperatione non proiicitur homo in profundum9. — Est et alia desperatio, qua quis desperat definitive, abscondens se quasi a facie divinae misericordiae, secundum quod fecit Cain10, qui dixit: Ecce, a facie tua eiicis me hodie; et haec semper est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quia est in contumeliam divinae misericordiae, cui suam praefert iniquitatem, sicut dixit Cain: Maior est iniquitas mea etc. Ex hoc tamen non iudicatur infidelis, aut quia talis bene sentit de aliis, sed male de se; aut certe quia non aestimat, Deum misereri non posse, sed potius misereri nolle; et tale peccatum semper habet coniunctam malitiam, pro eo quod qui sic desperat in tali culpa vult vitam suam finire; unde tales desperatissimi frequentissime sibi ipsis inferunt mortem11.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de praesumtione, dicendum, quod est praesumtio de meritis et praesumtio de impunitate. Prima praesumtio, qua quis praesumit de meritis suis sive de aliquo, quod habet in se, est peccatum superbiae12. Secunda vero praesumtio, qua quis praesumit de impunitate, dans totum divinae misericordiae et auferens ei omnino rigorem iustitiae, hoc est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quia claudit viam ad gratiam et viam ampliat ad peccatum; et sic patet, quod aliter pertinet ad peccatum capitale, aliter ad peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de obstinatione, quod obstinatio dicit permansionem in malo; dicendum, quod obstinatio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur obstinatio continua permansio in culpa. Alio modo dicitur obstinatio voluntas complacens sibi in culpa perpetrata et priorem culpam non detestans, sed approbans; et hoc modo dicit actum, actum, inquam, procedentem ex malitia; ideo est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Differt autem ab impoenitentia, secundum quod hic accipitur proprie; nam unum est respectu praeteriti, et reliquum respectu futuri. Et quamvis una sit virtus, cuius est « praeterita plangere et plangenda non committere13 », tamen circa istos duos actus possunt esse diversa vitia; sicut largitas, cum sit una virtus, tamen secundum duos actus, qui ad ipsam concurrunt, videlicet dare et tenere, habet duo vitia opposita, videlicet prodigalitatem et avaritiam.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de impugnatione veritatis agnitae; dicendum, quod veritas agnita tripliciter potest intelligi impugnari: aut propter ipsam veritatem, aut propter ipsum dicentem, aut propter effectum consequentem. Primo modo nullus impugnat, cum « omnes homines natura scire desiderent14 ». Secundo modo et tertio potest impugnari ex infirmitate et etiam ex malitia; et cum quis impugnat eam pertinaciter, sive in confusionem dicentis, sive propter excusationem sui, quasi semper habet adiunctam malitiam, maxime cum est veritas ad salutem pertinens, ut est veritas christianae religionis; et sic est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Tunc autem dico, aliquem veritatem pertinaciter impugnare, quando ex sua impugnatione propter odium dicentis vel effectus consequentis aut facit vel vult facere praeiudicium veritati, ita quod, quamvis non odiat veritatem, secundum quod veritas est, tamen ratione adiuncti omnino eam abhorret; sicut aliquis odit Deum ratione iustitiae; et ratione illius odii contingit, quod homo delectatur in contumeliis Dei et in confutatione veritatis; et tunc recte dicitur moveri ex malitia et pertinacia. Si autem quis resistat non pertinaciter, tunc bene potest procedere talis impugnatio ex quadam infirmitate; nec talis impugnatio peccatum est in Spiritum sanctum. — Nec valet illud quod obiicit, quod veritas et agnitio veritatis appropriatur Filio; quia talis impugnatio non procedit ex ipsa agnitione, sed potius procedit ex malitiosa voluntate. Unde Magister supra dixit in Prologo15: « Dissentientibus voluntatibus, dissentiens fit animorum sensus, et dum aliud complacet, p. 996 pietatis error obnititur et voluntatis invidia resultat »; et illud est quod movet ad veritatem impugnandam.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de invidia fraternae gratiae, dicendum, quod dupliciter potest quis invidere gratiae alienae: aut quia ex hoc minuitur bonum proprium, cuius promotionem appetit singulariter, et sic est peccatum capitale; aut quia gustus16 animae sic est depravatus, ut, sicut non videt bonum in se, sic etiam nolit videre bonum in alio; et tunc est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Hoc autem est in illis maxime, qui vix possunt in aliquo homine videre bonum. Et ita alio modo est capitale peccatum, alio modo est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum; et isto ultimo modo non procedit nisi ex magna corruptione et malitia voluntatis, quae adeo gustum eius pervertit, ut bonum faciat apparere malum, et malum faciat apparere bonum.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de impoenitentia, dicendum, quod impoenitentia dicitur dupliciter, videlicet privative et contrarie. Si dicatur privative, sic non est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quia non ponit novum peccatum, sed conditionem dicit sive circumstantiam peccati praecedentis. Alio modo potest dici contrarie, et tunc dicitur impoenitentia voluntas non poenitendi17; et talis ex malitia procedit et peccatum est in Spiritum sanctum. — Nec valet illud quod obiicit, quod scientia non variat genus. Dico enim, quod hoc non est ratione scientiae, sed ratione malitiae. Haec autem impoenitentia sic est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, quod tamen aliae species ad ipsam ordinantur, ut18 ipsa quodam modo omnibus aliis est annexa. Nec hoc impedit, quin sit diversa species ab aliis, quia, sicut in virtutibus una disponit ad alteram, sic etiam et in vitiis, quamvis non sit tanta connexio in habitibus vitiorum, sicut est in habitibus virtutum, sicut, dante Deo, in tertio libro19 manifestabitur.

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English Translation

Article III. On the species and differences of this sin.

Question II. On the species of this sin with respect to their proper accounts.

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the species of this sin with respect to their proper accounts, and it is shown that none of these is a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

1. And first concerning despair: because the sin against the Holy Spirit is from settled malice; but despair is rather from weakness than from malice: therefore it seems that despair is not a sin against the Holy Spirit. If you say that it can at least be a species insofar as it is from malice; it is objected against this: because he who despairs thinks in his heart that his iniquity is greater than God's mercy1; and every such man errs and is deceived: therefore all despair takes its origin from ignorance: therefore it is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

2. Secondly, the same is shown concerning presumption: because frequently one presumes rather from confidence or boldness than from malice: therefore it does not seem to be a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit. If you say that it is not a species except insofar as it proceeds from malice; it is objected against this: because presumption, from whatever source it proceeds, is a species of pride, which is a capital sin2: therefore it is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

3. Thirdly, the same is shown concerning obstinacy: because « obstinacy is the stubbornness of a mind hardened in malice, by which a man becomes impenitent3 »: if therefore the hardening of the mind comes from persistence in sin, and persistence in sin is not a species of sin but rather a circumstance; it seems that obstinacy is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit. If you say that obstinacy, insofar as it is a sin against the Holy Spirit, does not only signify persistence, but also signifies a new act and motion; it is objected against this, because that act is nothing other than the will of remaining in sin: therefore it is nothing other than impenitence: therefore it seems that obstinacy is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit distinct from impenitence.

4. Fourthly, the same is shown concerning the impugning of acknowledged truth: because frequently acknowledged truth is impugned out of shame, because a man fears to be confounded when he speaks4 falsely: therefore it seems that it is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit. If you say that it is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit except when it is from malice; it is objected against this: because both truth and the acknowledgment of truth are appropriated to the Son: therefore the impugning of acknowledged truth ought rather to be called a sin against the Son than a sin against the Holy Spirit.

5. In the fifth place, the same is shown concerning envy of a brother's grace: because one envies another out of the corruption of nature: therefore if every sin against the Holy Spirit is from malice, it seems that this is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit. If you say that it is a sin against the Holy Spirit in the way in which it proceeds from malice; it is objected against this: because envy of a brother's grace is always contained under envy, which is a capital sin: therefore it seems that envy of a brother's grace is reduced to a capital sin and is not5 a sin against the Holy Spirit.

6. Sixthly and lastly, the same is shown concerning impenitence: because someone does not repent because he does not know that he has sinned: therefore it seems that some impenitence is from ignorance: therefore it is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit, which is universally from malice6. If you say that it is then a sin against the Holy Spirit when it is from settled knowledge; it is objected against this: because knowledge does not vary the genus of a sin, since it is a circumstance: if therefore impenitence proceeding from ignorance is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit, it seems that neither is impenitence proceeding from settled knowledge.

Conclusion.

These six species do not name a sin against the Holy Spirit, except insofar as they are from malice.

I respond: It must be said that, just as in meritorious works7 charity gives the form, in such a way that nothing is meritorious unless it proceeds from charity; so it is to be understood in the sin against the Holy Spirit that malice gives the form to this sin; whence nothing is to be said to be a sin against the Holy Spirit except what proceeds from settled malice. And since almost all acts of the soul which proceed from settled malice can proceed from weakness and ignorance; and the names of sins are imposed from their acts8: hence it is that no name of the aforesaid species is imposed on any of them insofar as it is p. 995 precisely a sin against the Holy Spirit. And therefore in all of them there is need of this general and common distinction, that we may say that these six name a sin against the Holy Spirit insofar as they are from malice. But if they are apart from malice, namely from ignorance and weakness, then they are not sins against the Holy Spirit. This, moreover, appears better if we descend to the particulars.

To the arguments:

To 1. To that which is first objected concerning despair, that it can be from weakness; it must be said that sometimes someone despairs from faint-heartedness, in such a way that in the despair itself he finds no complacency, but grieves and resists against it; and then it is not to be said to be a sin against the Holy Spirit, because by such despair a man is not cast into the depths9. — And there is another despair, by which one despairs definitively, hiding himself as it were from the face of divine mercy, as Cain did10, who said: Behold, thou dost cast me out this day from thy face; and this is always a sin against the Holy Spirit, because it is to the contempt of the divine mercy, to which he prefers his own iniquity, as Cain said: Greater is my iniquity etc. Yet by this he is not judged unfaithful, either because such a one thinks well of others but ill of himself; or certainly because he does not reckon that God cannot have mercy, but rather will not have mercy; and such a sin always has malice joined to it, because he who thus despairs in such guilt wishes to end his life; whence such utterly despairing men very frequently inflict death upon themselves11.

To 2. To that which is objected concerning presumption, it must be said that there is a presumption of merits and a presumption of impunity. The first presumption, by which one presumes upon his own merits or upon something which he has in himself, is the sin of pride12. But the second presumption, by which one presumes upon impunity, giving everything to the divine mercy and taking away from it altogether the rigor of justice, this is a sin against the Holy Spirit, because it closes the way to grace and widens the way to sin; and thus it is clear that in one way it pertains to a capital sin, in another way to a sin against the Holy Spirit.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning obstinacy, that obstinacy signifies persistence in evil; it must be said that obstinacy is said in two ways. In one way obstinacy is said to be continual persistence in guilt. In another way obstinacy is said to be a will that takes complacency in a guilt committed and does not detest the prior guilt, but approves it; and in this way it signifies an act, an act, I say, proceeding from malice; therefore it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. It differs, however, from impenitence, insofar as the latter is here taken properly; for the one is with respect to the past, and the other with respect to the future. And although there is one virtue, whose office is « to bewail past things and not to commit things to be bewailed13 », nevertheless concerning these two acts there can be diverse vices; just as liberality, although it is one virtue, nevertheless according to the two acts which concur in it, namely giving and keeping, has two opposed vices, namely prodigality and avarice.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning the impugning of acknowledged truth; it must be said that acknowledged truth can be understood to be impugned in a threefold way: either on account of the truth itself, or on account of the one speaking it, or on account of the consequent effect. In the first way no one impugns it, since « all men by nature desire to know14 ». In the second and third way it can be impugned from weakness and also from malice; and when one impugns it pertinaciously, whether to the confusion of the speaker, or for the excuse of himself, it almost always has malice joined to it, especially when it is a truth pertaining to salvation, as is the truth of the Christian religion; and so it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. But then I say that someone impugns truth pertinaciously when, out of his impugning on account of hatred of the speaker or of the consequent effect, he either does or wishes to do prejudice to the truth, in such a way that, although he does not hate the truth insofar as it is truth, nevertheless by reason of what is adjoined he wholly abhors it; just as someone hates God by reason of His justice; and by reason of that hatred it happens that a man takes delight in contempts of God and in the refutation of truth; and then he is rightly said to be moved by malice and pertinacity. But if one resists not pertinaciously, then such impugning can well proceed from a certain weakness; nor is such impugning a sin against the Holy Spirit. — Nor is that valid which he objects, that truth and the acknowledgment of truth are appropriated to the Son; because such impugning does not proceed from the acknowledgment itself, but rather proceeds from a malicious will. Whence the Master said above in the Prologue15: « When wills disagree, the perception of minds becomes discordant, and while one thing pleases, p. 996 error opposes piety and the envy of the will arises »; and that is what moves one to impugn the truth.

To 5. To that which is objected concerning envy of a brother's grace, it must be said that one can envy another's grace in two ways: either because by it one's own good is diminished, whose promotion he seeks for himself singularly, and thus it is a capital sin; or because the taste16 of the soul is so depraved that, just as it does not see the good in itself, so also it is unwilling to see the good in another; and then it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. This, moreover, is most of all in those who can scarcely see the good in any man. And thus in one way it is a capital sin, in another way it is a sin against the Holy Spirit; and in this last way it proceeds only from a great corruption and malice of the will, which so perverts its taste that it makes the good appear evil, and makes the evil appear good.

To 6. To that which is objected concerning impenitence, it must be said that impenitence is said in two ways, namely privatively and contrarily. If it is said privatively, then it is not a sin against the Holy Spirit, because it does not posit a new sin, but signifies a condition or circumstance of a preceding sin. In another way it can be said contrarily, and then impenitence is said to be the will of not repenting17; and such proceeds from malice and is a sin against the Holy Spirit. — Nor is that valid which he objects, that knowledge does not vary the genus. For I say that this is not by reason of knowledge, but by reason of malice. This impenitence, moreover, is a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit in such a way that nevertheless the other species are ordered to it, so that18 it is in a certain manner annexed to all the others. Nor does this prevent it from being a species diverse from the others, because, just as among the virtues one disposes to another, so also among the vices, although there is not so great a connection in the habits of vices as there is in the habits of virtues, as, God granting, will be made manifest in the third book19.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Gen. 4, 13: Dixitque Cain ad Dominum: Maior est iniquitas mea, quam ut veniam merear.
    Gen. 4:13: And Cain said to the Lord: My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon.
  2. Cfr. supra d. XLII. lit. Magistri, c. 7.
    Cf. above, d. XLII, the text of the Master, c. 7.
  3. De hac definitione obstinationis cfr. hic lit. Magistri, circa initium, nec non August., Serm. 71. (alias 11. de Verbis Domini) c. 13. n. 21. seqq. Infra ante permansio mallemus cum pro et, quod habent codd. et edd.
    On this definition of obstinacy cf. here the text of the Master, near the beginning, as also Augustine, Sermon 71 (otherwise 11, On the Words of the Lord) c. 13, n. 21 ff. Below, before permansio, we should prefer cum for et, which the manuscripts and editions have.
  4. Codd. K T X et dixit, quae lectio planior est.
    Codices K T X also read dixit ["he said"], which reading is plainer.
  5. Pro non sit cod. T et sic.
    For non sit codex T reads et sic.
  6. Ed. 1 omittit quod universaliter est ex malitia. Vat. his verbis praemittit nisi eisque adiicit igitur etc., prius post ergo inserto si.
    Edition 1 omits quod universaliter est ex malitia ["which is universally from malice"]. The Vatican edition prefixes nisi to these words and adds to them igitur etc., having first inserted si after ergo.
  7. Cod. T rebus.
    Codex T reads rebus ["in things"].
  8. Codd. V Z actu.
    Codices V Z read actu ["from the act"].
  9. Cfr. loc. ex libro Prov. supra pag. 984, nota 3. allatus.
    Cf. the passage from the book of Proverbs cited above on p. 984, note 3.
  10. Gen. 4, 14: Ecce eiicis me hodie a facie terrae, et a facie tua abscondar. — Seq. loc. Script. est ibid. v. 13. — Paulo superius pro definitive Vat. et nonnulli codd. exhibent diffinitive.
    Gen. 4:14: Behold thou dost cast me out this day from the face of the earth, and I shall be hidden from thy face. — The following passage of Scripture is the same place, v. 13. — A little above, for definitive the Vatican edition and several codices exhibit diffinitive.
  11. Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. ad 5.
    Cf. above, art. 2, q. 1, reply to 5.
  12. Vide supra d. XLII. lit. Magistri, c. 7. — De seqq. cfr. supra pag. 992, nota 4.
    See above, d. XLII, the text of the Master, c. 7. — On what follows cf. above, p. 992, note 4.
  13. Gregor., II. in Evang. homil. 34. n. 15: Poenitentiam quippe agere est et perpetrata mala plangere et plangenda non perpetrare. — De largitate Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 7, ait: Circa donationem acceptionemque pecuniarum mediocritas est liberalitas, excessus et defectus prodigalitas et illiberalitas seu avaritia. — Mox pro tamen circa Vat. tamen contra. Paulo superius pro nam unum cod. T nam unius.
    Gregory, On the Gospels, Book II, homily 34, n. 15: For to do penance is both to bewail evils committed and not to commit things to be bewailed. — On liberality Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 7, says: Concerning the giving and receiving of money the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect are prodigality and illiberality or avarice. — Presently, for tamen circa the Vatican edition reads tamen contra. A little above, for nam unum codex T reads nam unius.
  14. Ut dicit Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1. Cfr. I. Sent. Prolog. dub. 6, ubi duplex veritatis effectus distinguitur, scil. illuminare (in quantum veritas illuminat, nemo eam odit et valet verbum Philosophi: « Omnes homines natura scire desiderant ») et arguere (veritas enim manifestando mala redarguit mala facientem, et quantum ad hoc valet illud Ioan. 3, 20: Qui male agit odit lucem).
    As Aristotle says, Metaphysics I, c. 1. Cf. I Sent., Prologue, doubt 6, where a twofold effect of truth is distinguished, namely to illuminate (insofar as truth illuminates, no one hates it, and the word of the Philosopher holds: « All men by nature desire to know ») and to convict (for truth, by manifesting evils, convicts the evildoer, and as regards this the saying of John 3:20 holds: He who does evil hates the light).
  15. Vide I. Sent. pag. 16. — Sententia, quam Magister ibi profert et quae hic repetitur, deprompta est ex Hilar., X. de Trin. n. 1. Cuius sententiae verba a Vat. et edd. 3, 4 magis integre redduntur sic: Dissentientibus... et dum aliud alius aut videtur aut complacet, erroris vel non intellectae, vel offendenti impietatis error obnititur et voluntatis invidia (codd. et edd. 1, 2 impietatis error) resultat.
    See I Sent., p. 16. — The opinion which the Master there sets forth and which is here repeated is taken from Hilary, On the Trinity, Book X, n. 1. The words of this opinion are rendered more fully by the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 thus: When men disagree... and while another thing either seems or pleases to another, the error of impiety either of what is not understood, or of one giving offense, opposes, and the envy of the will (codices and editions 1, 2: the error of impiety) arises.
  16. Ita codd. F I (K a prima manu) T W Y, alii et edd. risus; sed vox gustus in fine solut. omnibus codd. et edd. communis est.
    Thus codices F I (K by the first hand) T W Y; the others and the editions read risus ["laughter"]; but the word gustus ["taste"] at the end of the solution is common to all codices and editions.
  17. Pro non poenitendi edd., excepta 1, cum compluribus codd. impoenitendi. Paulo inferius dictae edd. solae post sed subiiciunt etiam.
    For non poenitendi the editions, except 1, together with many codices read impoenitendi. A little below, those said editions alone insert etiam after sed.
  18. Pro et codd. F X Y unde, cod. bb nam. Proxime ante pro ordinentur cod. F ordinant.
    For et codices F X Y read unde, codex bb reads nam. Immediately before, for ordinentur codex F reads ordinant.
  19. Dist. 36. q. 1. seqq. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    Distinction 36, q. 1 ff. — See the scholion to the preceding question.
← Dist. 43, Art. 3, Q. 1Dist. 43, Dubia→