Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 8
QUAESTIO III.
Utrum daemones possint illudere sensus.
Tertio loco quaeritur, utrum daemon possit sensus illudere. Et quod sic, videtur.
Fundamenta. 1. Super illud Exodi septimo1: Fecerunt magi per incantationes et arcana quaedam similiter, dicit Glossa Rabani: «Diabolicis figmentis spectantium oculos illudebant, ut res in sua specie remanentes aliae viderentur».
2. Item, in Itinerario Clementis2 dixit Niceta
ad Petrum, narrans praestigia Simonis: «Vidimus canes cantare et imagines ambulare»; constat, quod hoc non fiebat nisi virtute daemonum. Si igitur daemones haec et his similia plura faciunt, quae nullo modo nisi miraculose fieri possunt: ergo oculos spectantium illudunt, maxime cum illa facere videntur, ad quae per auxilium naturae iuvari non possunt.
3. Item, in Vitis Patrum3 legitur, quod quidam adduxerunt quandam puellam ad sanctum patrem, quae videbatur eis esse equa; sed sanctus pater deprehendit, quod esset puella: ergo si hoc fiebat arte diabolica, apparet etc.
4. Item, plus est decipere intellectum quam sensum; sed daemones multos decipiunt et seducunt quantum ad intellectum: ergo multo fortius seducere vel illudere possunt quantum ad sensum.
Contra: 1. «Sensus particularis non errat, ut dicit Philosophus4, circa proprium obiectum», ergo non percipit nisi quod verum est; sed delusio sensuum non potest esse sine errore et deceptione: ergo etc.
2. Item, cum diabolus facit aliquem videre asinum, vel aliquod aliud animal, ubi non est secundum veritatem, necesse est, quod faciat similitudinem illius animalis in oculo; sed illa similitudo non potest generari nisi ab illo animali, cum non possit educi de nihilo: ergo vel oportet, quod afferat5 asinum, vel nunquam faciat eum videri. Sed si asinum affert, non est ludificatio; si non affert, non immutat: ergo nunquam potest deludendo immutare vel immutando illudere.
3. Item, cum hominem facit videri capram, aut similitudo hominis pervenit usque ad oculum, aut non. Si sic: ergo cum iudicet secundum similitudinem receptam, iudicabit illum6 esse hominem: ergo non decipietur. Si non pervenit; quaero, quid impedit? et videtur, quod nihil possit. Existente enim medio illuminato, necesse est, obiectum multiplicari per medium, si non adsit corporeum obstaculum: ergo videtur, quod nullo modo possit ibi esse ludificatio sensus.
4. Item, cum facit videri quod non est, aut hoc facit immutando virtutem, aut immutando oculum, aut obiectum. Si immutando obiectum, ergo est verum miraculum, non ergo praestigium. Si immutando organum vel virtutem, cum haec sint digniora, tunc erit maius miraculum: ergo falsa miracula erunt maiora veris; quod si hoc est falsum, redit idem quod prius.
CONCLUSIO.
Daemon sensus nostros illudere potest, sive ostendendo praesens esse quod non est, sive aliter ostendendo quam est, sive abscondendo quod praesens est.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam attendendum est, quod absque dubio daemones sensus possunt deludere, sicut multiplex experientia docet. Modum autem assignare est valde difficile, et ad hoc plures doctores conati sunt diversimode.
Opinio prima. Quidam namque voluerunt modum huius delusionis assignare dicentes, hoc supra naturam esse; tripliciter autem hoc fieri posse. Potest enim hoc facere daemon a superiori influendo, ab intrinseco phantasmata movendo, ab extrinseco species obiiciendo. — A superiori influendo, dicunt hoc modo fieri posse: quia daemon per naturam superior est sensu corporeo; et quia superiora nata sunt influere in inferiora, daemon potest species, quas habet in se, sensui imprimere, tam interiori quam exteriori; quae tamen minus sunt spirituales in suscipiente quam in dante, quia «quod recipitur in aliquo est per modum recipientis, non per modum recepti»7. — Similiter ab interiori phantasmata movendo, dicunt sic posse accidere: sicut accidit in somnis, ex motu phantasmatum et defluxu ab organo excitari virtutem sensitivam interius et fieri somnium, in quo videtur homini, quod videat vel audiat veritatem, cum phantasma rei pervenit ad organum visus vel auditus: sic et in proposito daemon potest phantasmata existentia in organo interiori facere defluere ad organa sensuum; et sic videtur homini, quod videat vel sentiat ipsam rem; dum ex rei phantasmate formatur organum, et intentio sensus super illud convertitur, iudicat de similitudine, ac si esset veritas. — Ab exteriori vero species obiiciendo, potest hoc modo sensum ludificare. Unaquaeque enim res nata est speciem suam susceptibili dare. Et si esset aliquid, quod non tantum susciperet speciem, sed etiam tenere posset; posset circumferri et alicui pro veritate offerri; sicut ostenditur luna in puteo. Quia ergo non latet daemonem natura specularis, non solum susceptiva specierum, sed etiam retentiva; mediante illa potest, quamcumque vult et cuiuscumque rei vult, speciem pro veritate sensibus nostris offerre; quam cum pro veritate accipiunt, ludificantur. — Hunc igitur triplicem modum dicunt daemoni esse possibilem; et eum modo uti hoc8, modo
altero, et modo tertio. — Sed quilibet horum modorum interius consideranti habet aliquid improbabilitatis. Non enim videtur possibile, quod substantia spiritualis, quae habet in se species omnino immateriales, possit eas sensibus imprimere, cum omnino sit virtus improportionabilis9. Nec etiam videtur, quod species ab organo interiori regrediatur, cum iste sit ordo retrogradus. Praeterea mirum valde est, si daemon invenit ita magnum speculum, in quo in sua magnitudine et latitudine possit ostendere unum castrum, sicut pluribus aliquando est ostensum. Mirum etiam est, si videt quis ita rem, quod non potest videre speculum. Mirabilis est etiam natura talis rei corporalis, quae speciem potest suscipere et tenere, cum videamus, speciem ab obiecto10 sensibiliter separari non posse.
Opinio auctoris (Conclusio 2). Ideo alius est modus dicendi, qui magis est consonus naturae et intelligentiae, quod daemon potest ludificare sensus, sive ostendendo praesens esse quod non est, sive aliter ostendendo quam est, sive abscondendo quod praesens est. Primum quidem facit species offerendo, secundum facit sensum vel obiectum divariando, tertium vero facit impedimentum praestando.
Primus modus. Primum intelligi potest sic. Quando phantasmata existentia interius offeruntur forti oblatione ipsi virtuti interiori, vel virtus interior fortiter illis intendit11; similitudo rei videtur esse veritas. Hoc manifestum est per naturam. Nam phrenetico propter ascensum fumositatum ad cerebrum ex modica occasione exteriori videtur ei, quod videat multa, quae non sunt sibi praesentia, vel quod audiat. Similiter per fortem conversionem intentionis phantasma videtur veritas, sicut Augustinus exemplificat in libro de Trinitate12, quod quidam tanta conversione recogitabat cuiusdam mulieris imaginem, quod ei carnaliter commisceri videbatur, etiam vigilando.
Applicatur. Per hunc modum daemon potest sive intentionem ad imaginem convertere, sive fumos aliquos immittendo spiritum animalem immutare et phantasmata diversimode variare et intentioni offerre, et sic diversa homini facere apparere; et hoc modo utitur frequentissime. Et huius signum est, quia nunquam facit hominem aliquid sentire13, cuius imaginem non habeat in interiori organo virtutis imaginariae. Nunquam enim caecos naturaliter facit somniare de coloribus, nec surdos de sonis, nec eis talia repraesentat in vigilia vel in somnis.
Secundus modus. Secundum modum possumus intelligere sic. Quod res alio modo vel sub alia dispositione appareat sensui, quam sit naturaliter, potest contingere propter variationem aliquam ex parte organi; sicut quando humor sanguineus vel vapor igneus descendit ad oculos, videtur homini, quod ea quae exterius sunt, sint rubea; vel propter variationem aliquam ex parte obiecti, sicut contingit aliquando, quod ex positione candelae14 et dispositione palearum videntur paleae serpentes esse operatione naturali. Simile est in aliquibus virtutibus quarundam rerum mineralium.
Applicatur. Et quia iste modus non latet daemones, et sunt ministri veloces, potentes quae necessaria sunt ad haec statim afferre; ideo sensus nostros frequenter deludunt, ostendentes rem aliter, quam sit, dum eam faciunt aliter, quam se habeat, apparere. Quod quidem fit variationem modicam inducendo circa organum vel obiectum; quae quidem variatio non mutat formam, sed solum est ex quadam accidentali adhaerentia, et est ut passio, non ut passibilis qualitas15.
Tertius modus. Tertium modum sic possumus intelligere. Res siquidem, quae praesto est, sensum nostrum sine visibili obstaculo dupliciter potest latere: aut quia impeditur virtus sensus, ne perveniat ad sensibile; aut quia impeditur species sensibilis, ne perveniat ad sensum; et utroque modo impeditur sensus, ne percipiat quod sibi est praesto.
Applicatur. Utrumque autem horum satis credendum est esse possibile virtuti daemonis. Et ideo dicitur posse facere per hanc viam, ut hominem reddat invisibilem, quod tamen certum non est; Notandum. si tamen est, hac via posse fieri16, non est multum incredibile.
His visis patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, quoniam terminanda est in partem affirmativam; patet etiam in parte responsio ad obiecta.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod sensus non errat circa proprium obiectum; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur, quantum est de sui natura, salva scilicet media dispositione organi, et medii, et obiecti. Intelligitur etiam de sensu particulari per se. In hac autem deceptione sensus communis sive phantasia, quae dicitur collativa, admiscetur sensui particulari et iudicat, esse alterius quod est suum17.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla res potest videri nisi per suam speciem; dicendum, quod speciem nec de novo dat nec de novo affert; sed illam quae erat in phantasia, tam18 vivaciter virtuti illi interiori obiicit, ut credat, se rem exteriorem sensibilem intueri.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod facit hominem videri capram, utrum illa species hominis deferatur ad visum; dicendum, quod fortassis impedit, ne perveniat ad visum, vel visus ad eam, vel saltem impedit, ne perveniat ad iudicium, dum loco illius offert speciem caprae, quam habet in phantasia; et sic, dum aspicit ad corpus humanum, aestimat se videre capram.
4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, ubi faciat immutationem, vel circa organum, vel obiectum, vel virtutem; dicendum, quod potest facere et facit circa omnia haec pro loco et tempore, sicut sibi videtur expedire. Nec tamen sequitur, quod sit verum miraculum, quia non est ibi vera formarum transmutatio aut inductio, sed solum quaedam transitoria et quasi momentanea immutatio, quae, cum ostendat circa rem veram transmutationem esse, non est verum miraculum, sed vanum et falsum praestigium.
I. Ex principio communiter concesso, quod substantia spiritualis quandam potestatem habeat super corpora, sequitur, eandem etiam organum corporale et potentiam sensitivam ei coniunctam ita immutare posse, ut inde resultent sensuum allucinationes; quod hic subtiliter explicatur.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 43. m. 3, q. 39. m. 1. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 8. q. unica, n. 6. seqq.; Report. ibid. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 5; S. I. q. 114. a. 4; de Malo, q. 16. a. 11. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 1. et tr. 8. q. 30. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 5. dub. lat. 1. — Durand., hic q. 4.
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QUESTION III.
Whether the demons can delude the senses.
In the third place it is asked whether a demon can delude the senses. And that it can, it seems.
Foundations. 1. Upon that [text] of Exodus 71: The magicians did the like by enchantments and certain secret arts, the Gloss of Rabanus [says]: «By diabolic figments they deluded the eyes of the spectators, so that things remaining in their own species seemed to be others».
2. Likewise, in the Itinerary of Clement2 Niceta said
to Peter, narrating the prestidigitations of Simon: «We have seen dogs sing and statues walk»; it is settled that this did not happen except by the power of demons. If, then, demons do these things and many like them, which can in no way come about except miraculously: therefore they delude the eyes of spectators, especially when they seem to do things which by the aid of nature [these spectators] cannot be helped to [achieve].
3. Likewise, in the Lives of the Fathers3 it is read that certain people brought a girl to a holy father, who [the girl] seemed to them to be a mare; but the holy father discerned that she was a girl: therefore if this came about by the diabolical art, [it is] manifest etc.
4. Likewise, it is more [to] deceive the intellect than the sense; but demons deceive and seduce many as to the intellect: therefore much more strongly can they seduce or delude [men] as to the sense.
On the contrary: 1. «The particular sense, as the Philosopher says4, does not err about its proper object»; therefore it does not perceive except what is true; but a delusion of the senses cannot be without error and deception: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, when the devil makes someone see an ass, or some other animal, where it is not in truth, it is necessary that he make the likeness of that animal in the eye; but that likeness cannot be generated except from that animal, since it cannot be educed from nothing: therefore either he must bring5 the ass, or he never makes it be seen. But if he brings the ass, it is no illusion; if he does not bring [it], he does not alter [anything]: therefore he can never alter by deluding nor delude by altering.
3. Likewise, when he makes a man be seen as a goat, either the likeness of the man comes through up to the eye, or not. If yes: then since [the sense] judges according to the likeness received, it will judge him6 to be a man: therefore it will not be deceived. If [the likeness] does not come through: I ask what hinders [it]? and it seems that nothing can [hinder it]. For with the medium illuminated, it is necessary that the object be multiplied through the medium, if there be no bodily obstacle: therefore it seems that in no way can there be a delusion of sense there.
4. Likewise, when he makes seen what is not, either he does this by altering the power, or by altering the eye, or the object. If by altering the object, then it is a true miracle, not a prestidigitation. If by altering the organ or power, since these are more worthy, then it will be a greater miracle: therefore false miracles will be greater than true ones; and if this is false, the same returns [as before].
CONCLUSION.
A demon can delude our senses, either by showing as present what is not, or by showing otherwise than [a thing] is, or by hiding what is present.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it is to be attended to that without doubt the demons can delude the senses, as manifold experience teaches. But to assign the manner is very difficult, and to this many doctors have applied themselves in divers ways.
First opinion. For certain men have wished to assign the manner of this delusion saying that it is above nature; and that threefold can this come about. For a demon can do this by influencing from above, by moving phantasms from within, by setting forth species from without. — By influencing from above, they say it can come about in this way: because a demon is by nature superior to the bodily sense; and because higher things are born to influence lower, a demon can imprint upon the sense the species which he has in himself, both interior and exterior; which species are nevertheless less spiritual in the receiver than in the giver, because «what is received in something is according to the mode of the receiver, not according to the mode of what is received»7. — Similarly, by moving phantasms from within, they say it can happen thus: as it happens in dreams, that from a motion of phantasms and a flowing down from the [interior] organ the sensitive power is excited within and a dream comes about, in which it seems to the man that he sees or hears the truth, when the phantasm of a thing comes through to the organ of sight or hearing: so also in [the case] proposed a demon can make phantasms existing in the interior organ flow down to the organs of the senses; and thus it seems to the man that he sees or perceives the thing itself; while from the phantasm of a thing the organ is formed, and the intention of the sense is turned upon it, [the sense] judges of the likeness as if it were the truth. — But from without by setting forth species, [a demon] can in this way play with the sense. For each thing is born to give its species to one susceptible [of it]. And if there were something which not only would receive the species but could also retain [it]; it could be carried about and offered to someone in place of truth; as the moon is shown in a well. Because, then, the nature of a mirror is not hidden from the demon — [a mirror] not only receptive of species but also retentive [of them] — by means of it [the demon] can offer to our senses, in place of truth, the species of whatever thing he wishes; and when they take it for truth, they are deluded. — This threefold mode, therefore, they say is possible to a demon; and that he uses now this8, now
another, and now a third. — But each of these modes, to one inwardly considering [them], has something improbable. For it does not seem possible that a spiritual substance, which has in itself species wholly immaterial, can imprint them on the senses, since it is altogether a power incommensurable [with sense]9. Nor again does it seem that a species can regress from the interior organ, since this is a retrograde order. Moreover, it is very strange if a demon finds so great a mirror, in which in its magnitude and breadth he can show a [whole] castle, as has sometimes been shown to many. It is also strange if someone sees a thing thus, [and yet] cannot see the mirror. The nature too of such a bodily thing is marvelous, [one] which can receive and retain a species, since we see that a species cannot sensibly be separated from its object10.
Opinion of the author (second conclusion). Therefore there is another mode of speaking, which is more consonant with nature and with intelligibility: that a demon can delude the senses either by showing as present what is not, or by showing otherwise than [a thing] is, or by hiding what is present. The first he does by setting forth species, the second by varying the sense or the object, the third by furnishing an impediment.
First mode. The first can be understood thus. When phantasms existing within are set forth by a strong setting-forth upon the interior power itself, or [when] the interior power strongly attends to them11; the likeness of a thing seems to be the truth. This is manifest by nature. For to a frenzied man, on account of the rising of fumes to the brain, from some slight external occasion it seems to him that he sees many things which are not present to him, or that he hears [them]. Similarly, through a strong turning of attention, a phantasm seems [to be] truth, as Augustine exemplifies in the book On the Trinity12, that someone with so great a conversion was recalling the image of a certain woman, that he seemed to himself to be carnally mingled with her, even while waking.
Application. Through this mode a demon can either turn the attention toward an image, or by sending in certain fumes alter the animal spirit and vary the phantasms diversely and set them forth to the attention, and so make diverse things appear to a man; and in this mode he most frequently uses [his power]. And the sign of this is that he never makes a man perceive13 something whose image he does not have in the interior organ of the imaginative power. For he never makes those naturally blind to dream of colors, nor the deaf [to dream] of sounds, nor does he represent such things to them in waking or in sleep.
Second mode. The second mode we can understand thus. That a thing should appear to the sense in another mode or under a different disposition than it is naturally, can come about on account of some variation on the side of the organ; as when a sanguine humor or a fiery vapor descends to the eyes, it seems to the man that things which are externally [present] are red; or on account of some variation on the side of the object, as it sometimes happens that from the position of a candle14 and the disposition of straws, straws are seen to be serpents by natural operation. The like [happens] in some powers of certain mineral things.
Application. And because this mode is not hidden from the demons, and they are swift ministers, capable of bringing immediately those things which are necessary for these [effects]; therefore they frequently delude our senses, showing the thing otherwise than it is, by making it appear otherwise than it is. Which indeed is brought about by inducing a slight variation around the organ or the object; which variation does not change the form, but is rather from a certain accidental adherence, and is as a passion, not as a passible quality15.
Third mode. The third mode we can understand thus. A thing which is at hand can be hidden from our sense, without any visible obstacle, in two ways: either because the power of the sense is impeded from coming through to the sensible; or because the sensible species is impeded from coming through to the sense; and in either mode the sense is impeded from perceiving what is at hand to it.
Application. Now each of these is sufficiently to be believed possible to the power of a demon. And therefore [the demon] is said to be able by this way to render a man invisible, which nevertheless is not certain; Notandum. if, however, it is [so], that by this way [the thing] can come about16, it is not very incredible.
These [points] having been seen, the response to the question proposed is plain — that it is to be terminated in the affirmative; and the response to the objections is plain in part.
Solution of the opposed [arguments]. 1. For to that which is objected, that the sense does not err about its proper object; it must be said that this is understood [to be true] as far as concerns its own nature, with the middle disposition of the organ, of the medium, and of the object preserved. It is understood also of the particular sense per se. But in this deception the common sense or phantasy, which is called collative, is admixed to the particular sense and judges that to be another's which is its own17.
2. To that which is objected, that no thing can be seen except through its own species; it must be said that [the demon] neither newly gives nor newly brings a species; but that one which was in the phantasy he so18 vividly sets forth to that interior power that [the power] believes [itself] to look upon an exterior sensible thing.
3. To that which is objected, that he makes a man be seen as a goat — whether the species of the man is borne to the sight; it must be said that perhaps he hinders [the species] from coming through to the sight, or the sight [from coming through] to it, or at least hinders [it] from coming through to judgment, while in place of that [species] he sets forth the species of a goat which he has in the phantasy; and so, while [the sense] looks upon a human body, it esteems itself to see a goat.
4. To that which is asked, where he makes the alteration — whether around the organ, or the object, or the power; it must be said that he can do and does [it] around all these for the place and time, as it seems to him expedient. Nor however does it follow that it is a true miracle, because there is not there a true transmutation or induction of forms, but only a certain transitory and as it were momentary alteration, which, while it shows there to be a true transmutation around a thing, is not a true miracle, but a vain and false prestidigitation.
I. From the principle commonly conceded, that a spiritual substance has a certain power over bodies, it follows that the same [substance] can also so alter a bodily organ and the sensitive power conjoined to it that hallucinations of the senses thereupon result; which is here subtly explained.
II. Alex. Hal., Summa p. II, q. 43, m. 3, q. 39, m. 1. — Scotus, II Sent. d. 8, q. unica, n. 6 ff.; Reportatio ibid., q. 1. — S. Thomas, here, q. unica, a. 5; Summa I, q. 114, a. 4; de Malo, q. 16, a. 11. — B. Albert., Summa p. II, tr. 6, q. 27, m. 1 and tr. 8, q. 30, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here, q. unica, a. 6, quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., here, a. 2, q. 3. — Aegid. R., here, q. 2, a. 5, dub. lat. 1. — Durand., here, q. 4.
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- Vers. 11, ubi Vulgata post incantationes adiungit aegyptiacas. — In verbis Rabani textus originalis: deludebant, ut res in sua natura manentes aliud viderentur.[Exodus 7,] verse 11, where the Vulgate after incantationes adds aegyptiacas [Egyptian]. — In the words of Rabanus the original text [reads]: deludebant, ut res in sua natura manentes aliud viderentur [they deluded (the eyes), so that things, remaining in their own nature, were seen as something other].
- Libr. III. Recognitionum (Ἀναγνώσεις sive Περίοδοι τοῦ Πέτρου) n. 57. Niceta ait: Aut non est mirabile... facere statuas ingredi, canes aereos latrare? (Migne, Patrol. Graec. tom. 1.). Cfr. ibid. n. 60. et II. n. 9. et III. n. 47. et Clementina de Praedicationibus Petri, hom. 2. n. 32-34; hom. 4. n. 4. et Epitome de Gestis S. Petri, n. 33. (Patrol. Graec. tom. 2.). Libri isti sunt apocryphi.Book III of the Recognitions (Ἀναγνώσεις or Περίοδοι τοῦ Πέτρου, Itineraries of Peter), n. 57. Niceta says: Is it not wonderful... to make statues walk, [and] bronze dogs bark? (Migne, Patrologia Graeca, tom. 1.). Cf. ibid., n. 60, and II, n. 9, and III, n. 47, and the Clementine [Homilies] on the Preachings of Peter, hom. 2, n. 32–34; hom. 4, n. 4, and the Epitome on the Acts of St. Peter, n. 33 (Patrologia Graeca, tom. 2.). These books are apocryphal.
- Libr. VIII. c. 19. seq. (Migne, Patrol. Lat. tom. 73.).[Vitae Patrum,] Book VIII, c. 19 f. (Migne, Patrologia Latina, tom. 73.).
- Libr. II. de Anima, text. 63. et 161. (c. 6. et III. c. 3.).[Aristotle,] On the Soul II, text 63 and 161 (c. 6 and III, c. 3).
- Plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 afferret; dein cod. T cum ed. 3 non esset pro non est. Circa principium arg. cod. V videri pro videre.Several codices with editions 2 and 3 [read] afferret; thereafter codex T with edition 3 [has] non esset in place of non est. Near the beginning of the argument codex V [reads] videri in place of videre.
- Vat. illam.The Vatican edition [reads] illam.
- Liber de Causis, prop. 10. 12. 20. 24. — Cfr. Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 4. — Hunc modum tangit August., XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 22. n. 48. seqq., ubi etiam multa alia habentur, quae hanc quaestionem concernunt. — Mox cod. cc et ed. 1 minus bene in somniis pro in somnis.[Liber de Causis,] propositions 10, 12, 20, 24. — Cf. Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy V, prosa 4. — Augustine touches this mode at On Genesis Literally XII, c. 22, n. 48 ff., where many other things are also had which concern this question. — Soon after, codex cc and edition 1 less well [read] in somniis in place of in somnis.
- Non pauci codd. et modo uti hoc modo pro et eum modo uti hoc. Paulo inferius post horum modorum Vat. addit ut latet.Not a few codices [read] et modo uti hoc modo in place of et eum modo uti hoc. A little below, after horum modorum the Vatican edition adds ut latet.
- Sub hoc respectu Aristot., in fine de Sensu et sens. ait: Sensibile omne magnitudo est, et non est indivisibile sensibile (sentiri).Under this respect Aristotle, at the end of On Sense and the Sensible, says: Every sensible is a magnitude, and the indivisible is not [properly] a sensible (i.e., is not [properly] to be sensed).
- In Vat. additur speculo.In the Vatican edition is added speculo [from a mirror].
- Vat. intenditur. In seq. propositione post videtur supervacanee additur ei.The Vatican edition [reads] intenditur. In the following clause, after videtur, ei is superfluously added.
- Libr. XI. c. 4. n. 7.[Augustine, On the Trinity,] Book XI, c. 4, n. 7.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 somniare; nimis arcte.Codex cc and edition 1 [read] somniare [to dream]; [a reading] too narrow.
- Ed. 4 et Vat. adiiciunt factae de serpentis pinguedine.Edition 4 and the Vatican edition add factae de serpentis pinguedine [made from the fat of a serpent].
- Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate, pro tertia qualitatis specie assignat passionem et patibilem qualitatem, quibus intelligitur qualitas alterationem sensibilem causans, vel ab alteratione sensibili causata v. g. calor, rubor et omnes colores. Quodsi huiusmodi qualitas cito transit, ut rubor ex verecundia causatus, dicitur passio; si vero permanenter inest, ut rubor ex sanguinea complexione, vocatur patibilis qualitas. — Hunc modum proponit August., XVIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 18. n. 2. — Aliquanto superius Vat. quod quidem fit per variationem modicam, inducendo eam circa organum etc.Aristotle, Categories, c. on Quality, for the third species of quality assigns passion and passible quality, by which is understood a quality causing a sensible alteration or caused by a sensible alteration — e.g., heat, redness, and all colors. And if such a quality quickly passes, like redness caused by shame, it is called passion; but if it remains permanently in [the subject], as redness from a sanguine complexion, it is called passible quality. — Augustine sets forth this mode at City of God XVIII, c. 18, n. 2. — A little earlier, the Vatican edition [reads] quod quidem fit per variationem modicam, inducendo eam circa organum etc.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 posset fieri, nec est multum etc.Codex cc and edition 1 [read] posset fieri, nec est multum etc.
- Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 161. (III. c. 3.), ubi docet, sensum per se non errare circa obiectum proprium, attamen circa obiectum commune et per accidens frequenter falli. — De sensu communi et phantasia vide ibid. text. 136. seqq. et 133. seqq. (III. c. 2. seq.). — Paulo superius cod. N verbo collativa praemittit vis.Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 161 (III, c. 3), where he teaches that the sense per se does not err about its proper object, but nevertheless frequently fails about the common object and per accidens. — On the common sense and phantasy see ibid., text 136 ff. and 133 ff. (III, c. 2 f.). — A little earlier, codex N prefixes vis to the word collativa.
- Non pauci codd. et tam.Not a few codices [read] et tam. ---