Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 8
QUAESTIO II.
Utrum daemones animabus illabi possint.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum daemones illabi possint animabus. Et quod sic, videtur.
Fundamenta. 1. Lucae quarto1: Ecce homo habens daemonium, ibi Glossa: «Intraverat diabolus, unde exierat Christus»; sed Christus non exierat de corpore, sed de spiritu: ergo diabolus subintrat spiritum.
2. Item, si impartibile adiungatur impartibili, secundum totum applicatur ei2, et quod applicatur alicui secundum totum applicatur ei secundum suum intimum; sed illabi non est aliud quam secundum intimum profundari: ergo cum daemon sit impartibilis et obsidendo hominem animae applicetur, videtur, quod eidem necessario illabatur.
3. Item, sicut est ordo in corporibus, ita est ordo in spiritibus; sed in corporibus videmus, quod agens influit virtutem suam passo usque ad intimum, aliter enim non alteraret totum3: ergo pari ratione et in spiritibus: ergo daemon potest influere virtutem suam usque ad intima animae. Sed virtus daemonis non est spiritualior quam substantia: ergo videtur, quod daemon usque ad intima animae illabi possit.
4. Item, sicut homo efficitur templum Dei per gratiam, ita efficitur templum diaboli per peccatum; sed omnino ibidem, ubi prius erat gratia, incipit esse culpa: ergo ubi prius habitabat Deus, potest habitare diabolus.
Contra: 1. Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum4: «Inest singulis spiritibus naturalis terminus, quo a se invicem distinguuntur, et unus in altero non est»; sed anima humana spiritus est: ergo non potest esse in daemone nec daemon in ea: ergo nec illabi: ergo etc.
2. Item, si unus spiritus illabitur, aut alter potest illabi, aut non. Si sic; pari ratione et tertius et quartus, et sic de aliis, et ita omnes spiritus mali possent illabi uni animae, quod plane falsum est. Si non potest; ergo unus spiritus implet totam animam. Sed hoc est falsum, quia imaginem Dei nihil minus Deo implere potest, sicut dicit Augustinus et Beda5.
3. Item, si daemon illaberetur animae, esset intimus animae: ergo per totum dominaretur ei, ergo posset pertrahere ad mala, quaecumque vellet, et ita anima liberum arbitrium non haberet. Quodsi anima liberum arbitrium non potest amittere: ergo nec daemon ei illabi potest.
4. Item, si illaberetur animae, nihil esset ita intimum in anima, in quo non esset et super quod non posset daemon; sed sicut Deus illabendo animam rectificat et conservat, sic daemon, quod potest, deordinat et depravat: ergo si daemon illaberetur animae, daemon posset synderesim vel voluntatem naturalem depravare et ad malum inclinare; quod est impossibile6.
CONCLUSIO.
Daemones animabus humanis illabi nequeunt.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illabi aliquid alicui importat, quod illud intimum sit ei et quod intime operetur in illo; nihil autem tale est respectu animae nisi solus Deus: ideo solus divinus spiritus animae potest illabi7. — In anima namque humana idem est intimum et supremum; et hoc patet, quia secundum sui supremum maxime approximat Deo,
similiter secundum sui intimum; unde quanto magis redit ad interiora, tanto magis ascendit et unitur aeternis. Et quia «solus Deus superior est mente humana»8 secundum sui supremum, solus Deus potest menti esse intimus; et ideo illabi spiritui rationali est divinae substantiae proprium. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod animabus humanis illabi non potest malignus spiritus.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Glossa, quod intravit diabolus etc.; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur de ingressu secundum substantiam, sed secundum effectum sive conformitatis malitiam; unde non vult Glossa plus dicere, quam quod, ubi fuit9 gratia, ibi incipit esse malitia.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impartibile impartibili applicatur secundum totum; dicendum, quod aut intelligitur de iunctura situali, aut de iunctura virtuali. Si de situali, sic potest habere veritatem; sic autem non est intelligere applicationem substantiarum spiritualium, quia non sunt situales. Si autem intelligatur de applicatione virtuali, sic sermo non habet veritatem; quoniam in simplici substantia reperitur magnitudo virtutis, et secundum illam considerari potest in anima maior et minor ratio dignitatis secundum accessum ad originem illius virtutis10.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut est ordo in corporibus, ita est in spiritibus; dicendum, quod etsi sit aliqua similitudo, non tamen omnimode perfecta, nec quantum ad ordinem nec quantum ad intimitatem. Non quantum ad ordinem, quia omnes substantiae rationales immediate sunt natae ferri in Deum, nec quantum ad hoc una praeest alteri; hoc autem non contingit in corporalibus inveniri. — Non est etiam simile quantum ad intimitatem, quia quod est intus et extra in re corporali est eiusdem naturae, non differens dignitate, sed magis partium positione; in anima vero quod est intimum, hoc est maxime supremum et Deo proximum. Ideo in rebus corporalibus quod potest influere exterius, magis et magis agendo, potest pervenire ad interius et ad intimum; non sic in spiritu, ubi idem dicitur esse intimum, quod est in eo supremum et dignissimum.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ibidem est culpa, ubi fuit gratia; dicendum, quod verum est; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod ibidem sit diabolus, ubi et Deus; quia aliter est gratia a Deo, aliter culpa a diabolo. Gratia enim est a Deo ut praesente et influente et intime operante et medullas affectionis penetrante, secundum quod innuit Apostolus ad Hebraeos quarto11: Vivus est sermo Dei et efficax etc. Sed culpa dicitur esse a diabolo solum sicut a suggerente et impellente, quodam modo quasi exterius instigante; et ideo non oportet, diabolum habitare in intimo cordis peccatoris, quantumcumque medullitus adhaereat peccatum. Ulterius, peccatum non ponit aliquid, sed potius privat; ideo secundum ipsum non dicitur aliquid illabi animae, sed potius ab eo aliquid corrumpi. Et sic patet, quod non est simile de culpa et gratia, quamvis sint circa idem.
I. Constat apud omnes theologos, solum Deum essentialiter illabi posse substantiae animae humanae, quod egregie a S. Doctore explicatur (hic in corp. et ad 3. 4; I Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. in fine corp., d. 19. p. I. q. 4. ad 3.), quia scil. supremo animae non est superior nisi Deus. «Quamvis enim supremum Angeli sit superius supremo animae per naturam; tamen possibile ipsius Angeli non est superius supremo animae per naturam» etc. (Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.).
II. S. Thom. rem tantum tangit S. III. q. 8. a. 8. ad 1. et alibi. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3.
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QUESTION II.
Whether the demons can slip into souls.
Secondly it is asked whether the demons can slip into souls. And that they can, it seems.
Foundations. 1. Luke 41: Behold a man having a demon, [where] the Gloss [says]: «The devil had entered, whence Christ had gone out»; but Christ had not gone out from the body, but from the spirit: therefore the devil enters the spirit.
2. Likewise, if a partless [thing] be joined to a partless [thing], it is applied to it according to the whole2, and what is applied to anything according to the whole is applied to it according to its inmost; but to slip-in [illabi] is nothing other than to be plunged according to the inmost: therefore, since a demon is partless and, by possessing a man, is applied to the soul, it seems that it of necessity slips into [the soul].
3. Likewise, just as there is an order in bodies, so is there an order in spirits; but in bodies we see that an agent infuses its power into the patient down to the inmost — otherwise it would not alter the whole3: therefore by parity of reason also among spirits: therefore a demon can infuse its power to the inmost depths of the soul. But the power of a demon is not more spiritual than [its] substance: therefore it seems that the demon can slip down to the inmost [depths] of the soul.
4. Likewise, just as a man is made a temple of God by grace, so is he made a temple of the devil by sin; but in the very same [place] where there was grace, fault begins to be: therefore where God formerly dwelt, the devil can dwell.
On the contrary: 1. Augustine in On Faith, to Peter4: «There is in each spirit a natural boundary by which they are distinguished from one another, and one is not in another»; but the human soul is a spirit: therefore it cannot be in a demon, nor a demon in it: therefore neither can it slip in: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, if one spirit slips in, either another can slip in, or it cannot. If yes: then by parity of reason also a third, and a fourth, and so for the rest, and so all evil spirits could slip into one soul — which is plainly false. If no: then one spirit fills the whole soul. But this is false, because nothing less than God can fill the image of God, as Augustine and Bede say5.
3. Likewise, if a demon were to slip into the soul, it would be the inmost of the soul: therefore it would dominate it throughout, therefore it could draw [the soul] to whatever evils it might wish, and so the soul would not have free will. And if the soul cannot lose free will: then neither can a demon slip into it.
4. Likewise, if it were to slip into the soul, there would be nothing so inmost in the soul that [the demon] would not be there and not have it under [its power]; but as God by slipping-in rectifies and conserves the soul, so the demon, [in] what it can [do], disorders and depraves [it]: therefore if the demon were to slip into the soul, the demon could deprave the synderesis or the natural will and incline [it] to evil — which is impossible6.
CONCLUSION.
The demons cannot slip into human souls.
I respond: It must be said that for some thing to slip into another imports that it be inmost to it and operate inmostly within it; but nothing of this sort exists with respect to the soul except God alone: therefore only the divine spirit can slip into the soul7. — For in the human soul the inmost and the supreme are the same; and this is clear, because [the soul] most approaches God according to its supreme,
likewise according to its inmost; whence the more it returns to interior [things], the more it ascends and is united to the eternal. And because «God alone is higher than the human mind»8 according to its supreme, God alone can be inmost to the mind; and therefore to slip into the rational spirit is proper to the divine substance. — The reasons showing that an evil spirit cannot slip into human souls are therefore to be conceded.
Solution of the opposed [arguments]. 1. To that, then, which is first objected from the Gloss, that the devil entered etc.; it must be said that this is not said of an entry according to substance, but according to effect or the malice of conformity; whence the Gloss does not mean to say more than that, where there was9 grace, there malice begins to be.
2. To that which is objected, that partless is applied to partless according to the whole; it must be said that this is to be understood either of positional joining or of virtual joining. If of positional [joining], it can hold; but in this way one is not to understand the application of spiritual substances, because they are not positional. But if it be understood of virtual application, then the saying does not hold; for in a simple substance there is found a magnitude of power, and according to it can be considered in the soul a greater and lesser ratio of dignity according to access to the origin of that power10.
3. To that which is objected, that just as there is an order in bodies, so there is in spirits; it must be said that, although there is some similarity, it is not nevertheless every way perfect, neither as to order nor as to intimacy. Not as to order, because all rational substances are immediately born to be borne into God, nor in this respect does one stand above another; but this is not found to occur in bodily [things]. — Nor is [the case] similar as to intimacy, because what is within and without in a bodily thing is of the same nature, not differing in dignity but rather in position of parts; in the soul, however, what is inmost, that is most supreme and proximate to God. Therefore in bodily things what can flow-in outwardly, by acting more and more, can come through to the interior and to the inmost; not so in a spirit, where the same is said to be inmost which in it is the supreme and the most worthy.
4. To that which is objected, that there is fault in the very [place] where grace was; it must be said that it is true; but from this it does not follow that the devil is in the same [place] where also God is; because grace is otherwise from God, and otherwise fault from the devil. For grace is from God as present and infusing and inmostly operating and penetrating the marrow of the affections, in accordance with what the Apostle intimates to the Hebrews 411: The word of God is living and effective etc. But fault is said to be from the devil only as from one suggesting and impelling, in a certain way as from without instigating; and so it is not necessary that the devil dwell in the inmost of the sinner's heart, however medullarily sin clings [there]. Further, sin does not posit anything, but rather privates; therefore according to it nothing is said to slip into the soul, but rather something to be corrupted by it. And thus is it clear that fault and grace are not alike, although they are concerning the same [subject].
I. It is established among all theologians that God alone can essentially slip into the substance of the human soul, which is excellently explained by the holy Doctor (here in the body and in [the replies to] 3. 4; I Sent. d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, at the end of the body; d. 19, p. I, q. 4, ad 3) — namely because nothing is higher than the supreme of the soul except God. «For although the supreme of an Angel is higher than the supreme of the soul by nature; nevertheless the possible [power] of an Angel is not higher than the supreme of the soul by nature», etc. (Richard. a Med., here, a. 2, q. 2).
II. S. Thomas touches the matter only [briefly] at Summa III, q. 8, a. 8, ad 1, and elsewhere. — B. Albert., here, a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., here, q. unica, a. 6, quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., the place cited. — Aegid. R., here, q. 2, a. 3.
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- Vers. 33. — Glossa est ex Beda, in hunc locum, ubi textus originalis: Introierat enim diabolus, unde Christus spiritualiter exierat.[Luke 4,] verse 33. — The Gloss is from Bede, on this passage, where the original text [reads]: For the devil had entered, whence Christ had gone forth spiritually.
- Aristot., de Lineis insecabilibus, circa finem: «Res, quae partibus caret, tangit rem partibus carentem, tota totam». Idem dicit VI. Phys. text. 2. (c. 1.).Aristotle, On Indivisible Lines, near the end: «A thing which lacks parts touches a thing lacking parts, whole against whole». He says the same at Physics VI, text 2 (c. 1).
- Cfr. Aristot., I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 23. seqq. et 55. seqq. (c. 4. et 7. seq.). — Paulo inferius post virtutem suam Vat. subiungit passo, videlicet animae; et dein plures codd. substituunt usque in pro usque ad.Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text 23 ff. and 55 ff. (c. 4 and 7 f.). — A little below, after virtutem suam the Vatican edition adds passo, videlicet animae; and thereafter several codices substitute usque in for usque ad.
- Cap. 3. n. 30. Textus originalis ultimam partem sic exhibet: quo a se invicem discernuntur, quia nullus eorum est in alio.[Augustine, On Faith, to Peter], c. 3, n. 30. The original text presents the last part thus: by which they are discerned from one another, because none of them is in another.
- August., XII. De Civ. Dei, c. 1. n. 3; XIV. de Trin. c. 14. n. 20; Tract. 23. in Ioan. n. 5; de Spiritu et anima, c. 27. et aliis multis locis, in quibus dicit, animam solo Deo posse beatificari. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, ubi allegatur Gennadii liber de Ecclesiast. Dogmatibus, olim Augustino tributus, et recitantur etiam verba Bedae. — Aliquanto superius nonnulli codd. cum Vat. verbis pari ratione praemittunt ergo.Augustine, City of God XII, c. 1, n. 3; On the Trinity XIV, c. 14, n. 20; Tract. 23 on John, n. 5; On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 27, and in many other places, in which he says that the soul can be made blessed by God alone. Cf. also here Lombard's text, c. 4, where the book of Gennadius On Ecclesiastical Dogmas — formerly ascribed to Augustine — is alleged, and the words of Bede also recited. — A little earlier, several codices with the Vatican edition prefix ergo to the words pari ratione.
- De quo vide infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 2.On which see below, d. 39, a. 2, q. 2.
- August., VI. Musicae, c. 13. n. 40. ait: Cum enim anima per se ipsam nihil sit (non enim aliter esset commutabilis et pateretur defectum ab essentia); cum ergo ipsa per se nihil sit, quidquid autem illi esse est, a Deo sit, in ordine suo manens ipsius Dei praesentia vegetatur in mente atque ...Augustine, On Music VI, c. 13, n. 40, says: For since the soul is nothing through itself (for otherwise it would not be mutable and suffer defect from essence); since therefore it is itself nothing through itself, but whatever its being is is from God, [the soul] remaining in its own order is vivified by the very presence of God in the mind and ...
- Ut dicit Augustinus. Cfr. supra pag. 45, nota 5.As Augustine says. Cf. above, p. 45, note 5.
- Vat. finit. Paulo ante cod. T in marg. conformitatem malitiae.The Vatican edition [reads] finit. A little earlier codex T in the margin [has] conformitatem malitiae.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 2.Cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. II, q. 2.
- Vers. 12.[Hebrews 4,] verse 12. ---