Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 14, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus

p. 295

Articulus I. De scientia, quam anima Christi habuit de Verbo.

Quaestio I. Utrum anima Christi cognoscat Verbum alia cognitione, quam illa quae est ipsum Verbum.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum anima Christi cognoscat Verbum cognitione alia, quam illa quae est ipsum Verbum^p295-t. Et quod cognoscatur Verbum ab illa anima sine alia sapientia media, videtur:

1. Quia Verbum increatum non tantum est sapientia, sed etiam fons sapientiae, sicut dicitur primo^p295-5 Ecclesiastici; sed sapientia unita animae non cognoscitur mediante alia, quia sic esset abire in infinitum: cum ergo Verbum, quod est sapientia, sit animae Christi unitum; videtur, quod se ipso cognoscatur et non per aliquem habitum medium.

2. Item, ad cognitionem naturae nihil plus requiritur nisi cognoscens et cognoscibile et unio unius ad alterum^p295-6; sed Verbum increatum unitur ipsi

p. 296 animae Christi omnino immediate: ergo videtur, quod sicut se ipso unitur, ita se ipso absque medio ab anima Christi cognoscatur.

3. Item, aeque intimum vel magis est Verbum unitum ipsi animae, sicut anima sibi, vel sicut aliquis habitus, qui sit in anima; sed anima Christi cognoscit se ipsam per sui essentiam, cognoscit etiam habitus, qui sunt in ipsa se ipsis, non per medium^p296-1: ergo pari ratione et Verbum sibi unitum.

4. Item, natura humana in Christo unita est Verbo in unitatem personae et hypostasis: ergo cum talis unio faciat communicationem proprietatum^p296-2, eodem modo cognoscit Christus homo ipsum Verbum increatum, quo Verbum cognoscit se ipsum; sed Verbum cognoscit se ipsum non per aliquem habitum medium: ergo et Christus homo. Sed nihil scit Christus nisi quantum ad animam secundum humanam naturam: ergo anima Christi cognoscit ipsum Verbum per sapientiam, quae est Verbum.

Sed contra: 1. Sapientia sive cognitio est perfectio intellectus et illud quo intellectus cognoscit formaliter^p296-3; sed Verbum increatum non potest uniri animae, sicut perfectio perfectibili: ergo necesse est, quod praeter sapientiam, quae est ipsum Verbum, anima Christi habeat habitum creatum sive ad cognoscendum Verbum, sive aliud.

2. Item, Deus est intimus omni animae et praesentissimus, non tamen ab omnibus videtur, sed solum a Beatis; hoc autem non est propter diversitatem a parte cogniti: ergo propter diversitatem a parte cognoscentium^p296-4. Ergo si hoc est per aliquid eis datum, videtur ergo, quod ad hoc, quod anima cognoscat Deum, necesse sit, aliquod lumen creatum ei infundi, quod sit in una, et non in alia: ergo videtur, quod anima Christi Verbum sibi unitum cognoscat per alicuius creati luminis adminiculum.

3. Item, quamvis Verbum increatum sit unitum oculo Christi et omnibus partibus corporis, non tamen cognoscitur ab oculo, et hoc, quia non est in eo dispositio ad cognoscendum rem spiritualem^p296-5: ergo pari ratione, quantumcumque Verbum increatum uniatur animae Christi, nisi anima sit disposita

p. 297 ad videndum Deum per lumen, quod ipsam faciat deiformem, nunquam ipsum intuebitur: ergo videtur, quod Verbum increatum cognoscat per habitum medium.

4. Item, quanto Deus clarius videtur, tanto necesse est oculum esse magis dispositum; sed anima Christi clarissime super omnes creaturas videt Verbum sibi unitum: ergo necesse est, intellectum eius esse maxime dispositum ad hoc. Sed non potest ad hoc disponi nisi per aliquem habitum medium^p296-6: ergo etc.

Conclusio. Cognitio, qua mediante Christi anima cognoscit Verbum sibi unitum, non est ipsum Verbum, sed effectus Verbi et quid creatum.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum cognitio, qua anima Christi cognoscit Verbum sibi unitum, sit ipsum Verbum, an aliquid creatum; si intelligatur de cognitione actu, absque dubio certum est, quod est alia, quia haec coepit esse et est actus animae et ab anima; Verbum autem est aeternum et non est ab anima, sed a Deo. — Si autem cognitio dicatur, quo mediante cognoscimus^p296-7, sic fuit diversitas opinantium.

Quidam enim voluerunt dicere, quod non solum in Christo, verum etiam in omnibus aliis Beatis sapientia, qua cognoscunt Deum, est sapientia aeterna; et isti etiam ponunt, quod dilectio illa, qua Deum diligunt Sancti et Beati, sit ipse Spiritus sanctus. Pro inconvenienti enim habent, quod illa sapientia, vel dilectio sit accidens et non substantia, cum sit nobilior anima. Item pro inconvenienti habent, quod illa sapientia et dilectio faciat animam cognoscere et amare, et ipsa non cognoscat et amet, cum nobilior sit res cognoscens non cognoscente. Pro inconvenienti etiam habent, quod beatitudo nostra, quae est bonum supremum, consistat in accidentibus. — Sed ad haec omnia supra responsum est libro primo, distinctione decima septima^p297-1, et secundo, distinctione vigesima sexta. Haec etiam positio improbata est; unde et communis opinio tenet contrarium. Ponimus enim sapientiam creatam, quae est habitus, et dilectionem creatam, et gratiam creatam et etiam ceteras virtutes. Valde enim absurdum esset dicere, quod fides esset Deus et spes, et sic de aliis virtutibus, nisi hoc causaliter diceretur^p297-2. Et ideo haec positio inter positiones extraneas numeranda est, pro eo quod nimium recedit a via communi.

Et ideo alii voluerunt dicere, quod quamvis alii homines cognoscant Verbum increatum mediante habitu cognitionis creatae, et Christus etiam^p297-3 quantum ad scientiam comprehensionis, in qua communicat cum aliis hominibus; tamen quantum ad scientiam unionis, cum habeat ipsum Verbum sibi intime unitum, cognoscit absque omni alio habitu medio. Cum enim habeat sapientiam increatam sibi unitam, non per medium, sed per se ipsam, cognoscere potest se ipsa^p297-4; et hoc est solius illius animae proprium, quae a Verbo est assumta. Sola enim hunc modum cognitionis habet, sicut in ea sola reperitur excellentia talis unionis. — Sed licet illud videatur magis probabile quam praedictum; tamen hoc a veritate deviat, si quis intueatur. Verbum enim non unitur animae Christi in illa beata unione, sicut cognoscibile cognoscenti, vel sicut habitus potentiae, vel perfectio perfectibili; sed est unio in unitate personae, quae potest esse absque cognitione; sicut patet in carne Christi, quae unita est Verbo, et tamen ipsum non cognoscit.

Alium igitur modum unionis necesse est esse ad hoc, quod anima cognoscat Verbum sibi unitum in unitatem personae; hic autem est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum, et ita per aliquam influentiam^p297-5, quae ipsam animam cognoscentem faciat Deo similem ac deiformem, et ita per aliquem habitum ipsam animam informantem, qui quidem habitus non potest esse nisi aliquid creatum. Nam quid increatum non potest esse ut forma ipsius ani-

p. 298 mae. — Et propterea dicere oportet tertio modo, quod anima Christi, sicut et animae aliorum Sanctorum, Verbum increatum cognoscit per sapientiam creatam, quae disponit ipsarum animarum potentias cognitivas et conformes reddit, ut illud lumen aeternum cognoscant.

Nec aliter potest intelligi. Quomodo^p297-6 enim potest anima lumen aeternum cognoscere et claritatem summam intueri, quin ipsa efficiatur clara et luminosa? Anima autem Christi, quia a Verbo est assumta, maiorem habet deiformitatem, ac per hoc perfectiorem et eminentiorem cognitionem, quam aliqua anima beata per gloriam. — Unde non est intelligendum, quod scientia unionis distinguatur a scientia comprehensionis, quasi non sit per aliquem habitum medium, sed quia excellentior et amplior deiformitas et claritas collata est animae Christi ex hoc, quod Verbo unita est, quam ex hoc, quod simpliciter est beata^p297-7. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes probantes, quod anima Christi cognoscat Verbum cognitione aliqua formaliter, quae, inquam, non est ipsum Verbum, sed effectus Verbi, quam, inquam, Verbum facit in anima Christi beatissima.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ipsum Verbum est sapientia, et sapientia cognoscitur se ipsa; dicendum, quod ipsum Verbum est sapientia^p297-8, qua cetera cognoscuntur, tam ipsum Verbum quam ea quae sunt ab ipso. Sed attendendum est, quod ille ablativus potest construi formaliter, vel causaliter. Si formaliter; sic sapientia aeterna est sibi ipsi ratio cognoscendi. Si causaliter; sic omnia cognoscuntur ipsa, quia facit cetera cognosci; formaliter autem non potest intelligi, quia non potest esse forma cognoscentis creati, nisi dicatur forma exemplaris. Et quoniam omnis actus cognoscendi perfectus est a sapientia non tantum effective, sed sicut a forma perficiente ipsam substantiam cognoscentem; hinc est, quod ad cognoscendum fontem sapientiae requiritur sapientia, quae de illo fonte derivatur. Nec est procedere in infinitum, quia ibi est status, scilicet in sapientia vel scientia, quae est forma et habitus animae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ibi est cognoscens et cognoscibile et unio; dicendum, quod non quaecumque unio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile sufficit ad cognitionem, immo requiritur, quod uniantur per modum cognoscentis. Sicut enim in opponendo monstratum est, Deus est in omnibus essentialiter et intimus omnibus, et tamen a paucis cognoscitur^p298-1; et ideo, quamvis Verbum increatum sit animae unitum, non tamen cognoscitur per hoc, quod unitur in unitatem personae, sed per hoc, quod intellectus animae sibi unitae efficitur ei conformis per influentiam luminis. Necesse enim est, intellectum aliquo modo formari et informari ab ipso intelligibili, ad hoc quod ipsum cognoscat.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de anima et scientia, quod se ipsis cognoscuntur, et illa quae essentialiter sunt in anima; dicendum, quod anima non dicitur cognosci se ipsa, quia ipsa sit scientia, qua cognoscit se; sed scientia^p298-2 se ipsa cognoscitur, quoniam ipsa est unita potentiae cognoscenti, in quantum est cognoscens. De sapientia autem increata secus est, tum quia ipsa est supra animam cognoscentem — et ideo oportet elevari per gratiam — tum etiam, quia talis unio non sufficit, nisi alius modus unionis concurrat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de communicatione idiomatum, dicendum, quod verum est, quod ille homo cognoscit Verbum sapientia increata; sed quamvis idiomata communicentur illi homini^p298-3, non tamen communicantur animae Christi. Nos autem non quaerimus nunc de cognitione, quae detur illi homini per idiomatum communicationem, sed quae competit secundum naturam animae a Verbo assumtae.

Scholion

I. Agitur in hac distinctione non de divina Verbi cognitione, sed de cognitione et scientia animae Christi, cui theologi communiter triplicem tribuunt scientiam, scilicet beatam, infusam et acquisitam. Scientia beata est ipsa visio beatifica, qua Deus immediate et clare cognoscitur; infusa est scientia inferioris ordinis, tamen «de sursum descendens» (Iac. 3, 15.) et sine propria industria per supernaturalem Dei influxum communicata; acquisita vero a rebus propria actione comparatur. De infusa et acquisita breviter agitur in 3. articulo. Cum autem una scientia beata duplex habeat obiectum, scilicet primarium, quod est ipse Deus, et secundarium, scilicet alias res in divino exemplari cognitas; auctor in 1. art. q. 2. 3. inquirit de primario scientiae beatae obiecto, et in 2. art. de secundario.

II. In hac 1. quaestione agitur de ipsa visione beatifica ex parte animae cognoscentis, utrum scilicet importet scientiam sive habitum creatum. Supponitur autem, in Christo homine ab instanti suae conceptionis fuisse visionem beatificam (cfr. supra d. 13. a. I. q. 3.). In hac quaestione considerari potest vel potentia cognoscendi (intellectus), vel actus, vel habitus. Fide constat contra Apollinaristas, Monothelitas aliosque, quod in Christo fuerit tum potentia intellectus humana et creata; tum actus intelligendi humanus, cum Synodus oecumenica VI. profiteatur in Christo «duas naturales operationes indivise, inconvertibiliter, inseparabiliter, inconfuse» etc. (cfr. Concil. Lateran., an. 649 sub Martino I, can. 9-16, nec non hic initium responsionis et infra d. 17. a. I. q. 1. 2.). Restat igitur quaestio de habitu creato, «quo mediante cognoscimus».

Opinio prima hic relata tribuitur Ioanni a Ripa et communiter censetur erronea, sicut et secunda. Conveniunt igitur nunc theologi in hoc, quod in Christo fuit scientia creata non tantum quoad potentiam et actum, sed etiam quoad habitum sive lumen gloriae, quo per modum formae infuso intellectus assimilatur obiecto increato et intellectus possibilis ad cognoscendum perficitur. Scotus quoad factum consentit doctrinae communi, sed Deo possibile esse vult, immediate, absque aliqua forma creata, in intellectu visionem efficere, pro qua assertione provocat etiam ad verba Magistri hic in lit. Insuper notamus, quod variae sunt opiniones theologorum circa munera et effectus luminis gloriae. — Distinctionem inter scientiam unionis et comprehensionis habet etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 13. m. 2. 3.), cuius verba, quae differentiam specificam inter utramque scientiam statuere videntur, a S. Bonav. (in fine corp.) sane explicantur. — Hanc et sequentem quaestionem diffusius probatim invenies in quibusdam auctoris nostri quaestionibus disputatis, a nobis, Deo favente, in volumine V. huius editionis primum publicandis.

III. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. I. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. I. quaestiunc. 1-3; S. III. q. 9. a. I. 2; de Verit. q. 20. a. I. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 3. quaestiunc. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article I. On the knowledge which the soul of Christ had of the Word.

Question I. Whether the soul of Christ knows the Word by a knowledge other than that which is the Word itself.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether the soul of Christ knows the Word by a knowledge other than that which is the Word itself^p295-t. And that the Word is known by that soul without any other intervening wisdom seems to be the case:

1. Because the uncreated Word is not only wisdom, but also the fount of wisdom, as is said in the first chapter^p295-5 of Ecclesiasticus; but wisdom united to the soul is not known by the mediation of another, for thus it would be to go off into infinity: since therefore the Word, which is wisdom, is united to the soul of Christ, it seems that it is known by itself and not through any intervening habit.

2. Likewise, for the knowledge of a nature nothing more is required except a knower and a knowable and a union of the one with the other^p295-6; but the uncreated Word is united to the

p. 296 soul of Christ wholly immediately: therefore it seems that, just as it is united by itself, so by itself, without any medium, it is known by the soul of Christ.

3. Likewise, the Word united to the soul itself is as intimate, or more so, as the soul is to itself, or as some habit which is in the soul; but the soul of Christ knows itself through its own essence, it knows also the habits which are in it by themselves, not through a medium^p296-1: therefore by parity of reasoning also the Word united to it.

4. Likewise, the human nature in Christ is united to the Word in the unity of person and hypostasis: therefore, since such a union brings about a communication of properties^p296-2, in the same way Christ the man knows the uncreated Word itself by that by which the Word knows itself; but the Word knows itself not through any intervening habit: therefore also Christ the man. But Christ knows nothing except as to the soul according to the human nature: therefore the soul of Christ knows the Word itself through the wisdom which is the Word.

On the contrary: 1. Wisdom or knowledge is the perfection of the intellect and that by which the intellect knows formally^p296-3; but the uncreated Word cannot be united to the soul as a perfection to the perfectible: therefore it is necessary that, besides the wisdom which is the Word itself, the soul of Christ have a created habit either for knowing the Word, or something else.

2. Likewise, God is most intimate and most present to every soul, yet he is not seen by all, but only by the Blessed; but this is not on account of a diversity on the part of the known: therefore on account of a diversity on the part of the knowers^p296-4. Therefore, if this is by something given to them, it seems then that, for the soul to know God, it is necessary that some created light be infused into it, which is in one and not in another: therefore it seems that the soul of Christ knows the Word united to it through the support of some created light.

3. Likewise, although the uncreated Word is united to the eye of Christ and to all the parts of the body, it is nevertheless not known by the eye, and this because there is not in it a disposition for knowing a spiritual thing^p296-5: therefore by parity of reasoning, however much the uncreated Word be united to the soul of Christ, unless the soul be disposed

p. 297 to see God through a light that makes it deiform, it will never behold it: therefore it seems that it knows the uncreated Word through an intervening habit.

4. Likewise, the more clearly God is seen, the more necessary it is that the eye be more disposed; but the soul of Christ most clearly, above all creatures, sees the Word united to it: therefore it is necessary that its intellect be most disposed for this. But it cannot be disposed for this except through some intervening habit^p296-6: therefore etc.

Conclusion. The knowledge by the mediation of which the soul of Christ knows the Word united to it is not the Word itself, but an effect of the Word and something created.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, when it is asked whether the knowledge by which the soul of Christ knows the Word united to it is the Word itself, or something created; if it is understood of knowledge in act, it is without doubt certain that it is other, because this began to be and is an act of the soul and from the soul; but the Word is eternal and is not from the soul, but from God. — But if knowledge be taken as that by the mediation of which we know^p296-7, then there has been a diversity of opinions.

For some have wished to say that not only in Christ, but also in all the other Blessed, the wisdom by which they know God is the eternal wisdom; and these also hold that the love by which the Saints and Blessed love God is the Holy Spirit himself. For they regard it as unfitting that that wisdom, or love, should be an accident and not a substance, since it is more noble than the soul. Likewise they regard it as unfitting that that wisdom and love should make the soul to know and to love, while it itself does not know and love, since a knowing thing is more noble than a non-knowing one. They regard it also as unfitting that our beatitude, which is the supreme good, should consist in accidents. — But to all these things a reply was given above, in the first book, distinction seventeen^p297-1, and in the second, distinction twenty-six. This position too has been disproved; whence the common opinion holds the contrary. For we posit created wisdom, which is a habit, and created love, and created grace and also the other virtues. For it would be utterly absurd to say that faith were God, and hope, and so of the other virtues, unless this were said causally^p297-2. And therefore this position is to be numbered among the extraneous positions, for the reason that it departs too far from the common way.

And therefore others have wished to say that, although other men know the uncreated Word by the mediation of a habit of created knowledge, and Christ also^p297-3 as to the knowledge of comprehension, in which he shares with other men; nevertheless as to the knowledge of union, since he has the Word itself intimately united to him, he knows without any other intervening habit. For since he has the uncreated wisdom united to him, not through a medium but through itself, he can know by it^p297-4; and this is proper to that soul alone which was assumed by the Word. For it alone has this mode of knowledge, just as in it alone is found the excellence of such a union. — But although that seems more probable than the foregoing, nevertheless it deviates from the truth, if one looks closely. For the Word is not united to the soul of Christ in that blessed union as a knowable to a knower, or as a habit to a potency, or as a perfection to the perfectible; but it is a union in unity of person, which can be without knowledge; as is plain in the flesh of Christ, which is united to the Word and yet does not know it.

Therefore another mode of union must needs be present in order that the soul may know the Word united to it in unity of person; but this is by an assimilation of the knower to the known, and thus by a certain influence^p297-5, which makes the knowing soul itself like to God and deiform, and thus by a certain habit informing the soul itself, which habit indeed cannot be anything but something created. For something uncreated cannot be as the form of the soul

p. 298 itself. — And therefore it must be said in a third way, that the soul of Christ, like the souls of the other Saints also, knows the uncreated Word through created wisdom, which disposes the cognitive potencies of those souls and renders them conformed, so that they may know that eternal light.

Nor can it be understood otherwise. For how^p297-6 can the soul know the eternal light and behold the highest brightness, without itself being made bright and luminous? But the soul of Christ, because it was assumed by the Word, has a greater deiformity, and through this a more perfect and more eminent knowledge, than any soul blessed through glory. — Whence it is not to be understood that the knowledge of union is distinguished from the knowledge of comprehension as though it were not through some intervening habit, but because a more excellent and ampler deiformity and brightness has been conferred on the soul of Christ from this, that it is united to the Word, than from this, that it is simply blessed^p297-7. — The reasons proving that the soul of Christ knows the Word by some knowledge formally are therefore to be granted — which, I say, is not the Word itself, but an effect of the Word, which, I say, the Word produces in the most blessed soul of Christ.

1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary, that the Word itself is wisdom, and wisdom is known by itself; it must be said that the Word itself is the wisdom^p297-8 by which the rest are known, both the Word itself and the things that are from it. But it must be attended to that that ablative can be construed formally or causally. If formally; thus the eternal wisdom is to itself the ground of knowing. If causally; thus all things are known by it, because it makes the rest to be known; but it cannot be understood formally, because it cannot be the form of a created knower, unless it be called an exemplar form. And since every perfect act of knowing is from wisdom not only effectively, but as from a form perfecting the very knowing substance; hence it is that for knowing the fount of wisdom there is required a wisdom which is derived from that fount. Nor is it to proceed to infinity, because there is there a terminus, namely in the wisdom or knowledge which is the form and habit of the soul.

2. To that which is objected, that there is there a knower and a knowable and a union; it must be said that not every union of knower to knowable suffices for knowledge, but rather it is required that they be united after the mode of a knower. For just as was shown in the objecting, God is in all things essentially and is intimate to all, and yet is known by few^p298-1; and therefore, although the uncreated Word is united to the soul, it is nevertheless not known by this, that it is united in unity of person, but by this, that the intellect of the soul united to it is made conformed to it through the influence of light. For it is necessary that the intellect be in some way formed and informed by the intelligible itself, in order that it may know it.

3. To that which is objected concerning the soul and knowledge, that they are known by themselves, and those things which are essentially in the soul; it must be said that the soul is not said to be known by itself because it is the knowledge by which it knows itself; but knowledge^p298-2 is known by itself, since it is united to the knowing potency, inasmuch as it is a knower. But concerning uncreated wisdom it is otherwise, both because it is above the knowing soul — and therefore it is necessary to be elevated through grace — and also because such a union does not suffice, unless another mode of union concur.

4. To that which is objected concerning the communication of properties, it must be said that it is true that that man knows the Word by uncreated wisdom; but although the properties are communicated to that man^p298-3, they are nevertheless not communicated to the soul of Christ. But we are not now inquiring about the knowledge which is given to that man through the communication of properties, but about that which belongs to him according to the nature of the soul assumed by the Word.

Scholion

I. In this distinction the discussion is not of the divine knowledge of the Word, but of the knowledge and science of the soul of Christ, to which theologians commonly attribute a threefold science, namely beatific, infused, and acquired. Beatific science is the very beatific vision, by which God is known immediately and clearly; infused science is of a lower order, yet «descending from above» (James 3, 15) and communicated without proper effort through a supernatural influx of God; acquired science is procured from things by one's own action. Of the infused and acquired there is a brief treatment in the 3rd article. But since the one beatific science has a twofold object, namely a primary, which is God himself, and a secondary, namely other things known in the divine exemplar; the author in the 1st article, qq. 2, 3 inquires about the primary object of beatific science, and in the 2nd article about the secondary.

II. In this 1st question the discussion is of the beatific vision itself on the part of the knowing soul, namely whether it implies a created science or habit. It is supposed, moreover, that in Christ as man, from the instant of his conception, there was the beatific vision (cfr. above, d. 13, a. I, q. 3). In this question there can be considered either the potency of knowing (the intellect), or the act, or the habit. It is established by faith, against the Apollinarists, Monothelites, and others, that in Christ there was both the potency of intellect, human and created; and the act of understanding, human, since the Sixth Ecumenical Synod professes in Christ «two natural operations indivisibly, unconvertibly, inseparably, unconfusedly» etc. (cfr. the Lateran Council, in the year 649 under Martin I, canons 9-16, as also here the beginning of the response and below, d. 17, a. I, q. 1, 2). There remains therefore the question of the created habit, «by the mediation of which we know».

The first opinion here reported is attributed to John of Ripa and is commonly held to be erroneous, as is the second. Theologians therefore now agree in this, that in Christ there was a created science not only as to potency and act, but also as to habit or light of glory, by which, infused after the manner of a form, the intellect is assimilated to the uncreated object and the possible intellect is perfected for knowing. Scotus, as to the fact, consents to the common doctrine, but holds that it is possible for God to effect the vision in the intellect immediately, without any created form, for which assertion he appeals also to the words of the Master here in the text. We note moreover that the opinions of theologians concerning the offices and effects of the light of glory are various. — The distinction between the science of union and of comprehension is found also in Alexander of Hales (S. p. III, q. 13, m. 2, 3), whose words, which seem to establish a specific difference between the two sciences, are soundly explained by St. Bonaventure (at the end of the body). — This and the following question you will find treated more diffusely in certain disputed questions of our author, to be first published by us, God favoring, in the fifth volume of this edition.

III. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., m. 1. — Scotus, in both Writings here, q. I. — St. Thomas, here, q. I, a. I, quaestiunculae 1-3; Summa III, q. 9, a. I, 2; de Veritate, q. 20, a. I, 2. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. unica, a. 3, quaestiuncula I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. I, q. 2. — Durandus, here, q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. I. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here, q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus

In minori pro cognoscitur codd. B C D E F G I L U Z aa bb perperam cognoscit, d In conclus. pro cognoscatur edd. cum cod. cc pariter falso cognoscat.
In the minor [premise / title] for cognoscitur (is known) the codices B C D E F G I L U Z aa bb wrongly [read] cognoscit (knows); the (d) lettering in the conclusion for cognoscatur (may be known) the editions, with codex cc, likewise falsely [read] cognoscat (may know).
Vers. 5: Fons sapientiae verbum Dei in excelsis etc. —
Verse 5: «The fount of wisdom is the Word of God in the heights» etc. — [Ecclus. 1, 5].
De iis quae ad cognitionem requiruntur, deque ipsa cognitione et eius speciebus (quae in procedentibus argg. tanguntur) vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. et d. 17. p. I. q. 4. — In minori cod. U post animae Christi perperam addit cognitione alia, quam illa quae est Verbum ipsum et quod cognoscatur.
On the things which are required for knowledge, and on knowledge itself and its species (which are touched upon in the preceding arguments), see I Sent., d. 3, p. I, q. 1, and d. 17, p. I, q. 4. — In the minor, codex U after animae Christi wrongly adds cognitione alia, quam illa quae est Verbum ipsum et quod cognoscatur.
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. I. q. 2. in corp. circa finem.
Cfr. II Sent., d. 39, a. I, q. 2, in the body, near the end.
Edd. idiomatum.
The editions [read] idiomatum (of idioms).
Vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2.).
See Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 24 (c. 2).
Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 4: Omne enim quod cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem. — Pro cognoscentium edd. cum cod. cc cognoscentis. Subinde pro per aliquid cod. U propter aliquid.
Boethius, On Consolation V, prose 4: «For everything that is known is grasped not according to its own power, but rather according to the faculty of those knowing.» — For cognoscentium (of those knowing) the editions with codex cc [read] cognoscentis (of one knowing). Then for per aliquid (by something) codex U [reads] propter aliquid (on account of something).
Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 4: Superior comprehendendi vis amplectitur inferiorem, inferior vero ad superiorem nullo modo consurgit. Neque enim sensus aliquid extra materiam valet, vel universales species imaginatio contuetur etc. — S. Bonav. in Quaest. adhuc inedita de Sapientia animae Christi hoc idem arg. sic proponit: Verbum Dei, quod est sapientia, est unitum oculo, et tamen oculus non est sapiens; ergo ad hoc, quod anima sit sapiens, non sufficit ei unio in hypostasi; ergo necesse est, quod uniatur sicut cognoscens cognoscibili. Omnis autem talis unio est per assimilationem; sed omnis assimilatio est secundum aliquam qualitatem: ergo necesse est, quod ipsi animae detur qualitas spiritualis creata, per quam sit ad cognoscendum idonea; hanc autem vocamus sapientiam creatam: ergo etc.
Boethius, On Consolation V, prose 4: «The higher power of comprehending embraces the lower, but the lower in no way rises to the higher. For neither does sense avail for anything outside matter, nor does imagination behold the universal species» etc. — St. Bonaventure, in the still-unpublished Question On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ, proposes this same argument thus: «The Word of God, which is wisdom, is united to the eye, and yet the eye is not wise; therefore for the soul to be wise, the union in the hypostasis does not suffice for it; therefore it is necessary that it be united as a knower to a knowable. But every such union is by assimilation; but every assimilation is according to some quality: therefore it is necessary that to the soul itself there be given a created spiritual quality, by which it is fit for knowing; and this we call created wisdom: therefore etc.»
De quo S. Bonav. in laudata Quaest. inedita sic loquitur: Deus, cum sit lux et sapientia, diversimode cognoscitur a diversis, et ab anima Christi excellentius quam ab aliis; aut ergo hoc est ratione ipsius Dei cogniti, aut ratione potentiae cognoscentis, aut ratione alicuius gratiae disponentis. Non ratione ipsius Dei, cum ipse in se nullam habeat varietatem; nec ratione potentiae cognoscentis solum, quia tunc qui meliora haberent naturalia sapientiores et meliores essent, quod est falsum: ergo hoc erit ratione alicuius habitus intermedii disponentis; sed talis habitus non est nisi sapientia creata: ergo etc.
On which St. Bonaventure, in the praised unpublished Question, speaks thus: «God, since he is light and wisdom, is known in diverse ways by diverse [knowers], and by the soul of Christ more excellently than by others; therefore either this is by reason of God himself as known, or by reason of the potency of the knower, or by reason of some disposing grace. Not by reason of God himself, since he has in himself no variety; nor by reason of the potency of the knower alone, because then those who had better natural endowments would be wiser and better, which is false: therefore this will be by reason of some disposing intermediate habit; but such a habit is nothing but created wisdom: therefore etc.»
Sive habitus, mediante quo cognitio elicitur a potentia. — Mox pro opinantium cod. Z opinionum.
Or a habit, by the mediation of which knowledge is elicited from the potency. — Soon for opinantium (of those opining) codex Z [reads] opinionum (of opinions).
Part. I. q. I. et II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. — Arg. ex beatitudine petitum invenitur etiam in opusculo de Sapientia animae Christi, quod scripsit Hugo a S. Vict., cuius argumentationem S. Bonav. in memorata Quaest. anecdota tuetur dicens, quod ille «non intelligit, quin per aliquod accidens ad beatitudinem disponamur, sed quod quidquid est accidens, habet potius rationem viae ductivae ad alterum quam quietativi».
Part I, q. I, and II Sent., d. 26, q. 2. — The argument taken from beatitude is found also in the opusculum On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ, which Hugh of St. Victor wrote, whose argumentation St. Bonaventure in the mentioned unedited Question upholds, saying that he «does not understand that we are disposed to beatitude through some accident, but that whatever is an accident has rather the character of a way leading to another than of a quietative».
Cfr. infra dub. 2. — Paulo inferius pro nimium codd. A aa nimis.
Cfr. below, dub. 2. — A little further down for nimium (too much) codices A aa [read] nimis (too much).
Pro etiam cod. M similiter, plures alii codd. est; edd. omittunt etiam nec non paulo post in qua. Deinde post communicat cod. V subiicit esse.
For etiam (also) codex M [reads] similiter (likewise), several other codices est (is); the editions omit etiam and also a little after in qua. Then after communicat codex V adds esse.
Ita codd. I L Z aa bb et edd., alii codd. se ipsam; fortasse lectio vera est se ipsam se ipsa (ablativus). — Hugo in commemorato opusculo de Sapientia animae Christi, circa finem, ait: Sed in rebus dubiis, si manifesta auctoritate non valeo, ab aliis quidem sic accipi volo, ut quaerentem me adiuvent, invenientem non refutent. Quicumque autem in eo persistunt, ut hoc asserere contendant, quod alia fuerit illa sapientia, qua anima Christi sapiens exstitit, alia quae animae Christi unita fuit; ego nemini praeiudicium facere volo; videant ipsi, quo sensu hoc asserant, ne forte carnalis sit, magis sua quam vera pronuntians. Hoc unum ego indubitanter affirmo, quod aut alia sapientia praeter divinam in anima Christi non fuit, aut si alia fuit, qualis [S. Bonav. infra a. 2. q. 3. in corp. aequalis] illi non fuit etc. — Post pauca pro videatur, quod habent edd. cum pluribus codd., codd. F G I L T W (aa a prima manu) videbatur, omittentes licet. Mox post tamen cod. V interserit et.
Thus codices I L Z aa bb and the editions; other codices se ipsam (itself); perhaps the true reading is se ipsam se ipsa (ablative). — Hugh in the commemorated opusculum On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ, near the end, says: «But in doubtful matters, if I do not prevail by manifest authority, I wish to be received by others in such a way that they help me as one seeking, and do not refute me as one finding. But whoever persist in this, that they contend to assert that the wisdom by which the soul of Christ was wise was one thing, and that which was united to the soul of Christ another; I wish to do prejudice to no one; let them see in what sense they assert this, lest perhaps it be carnal, pronouncing their own rather than the true. This one thing I affirm undoubtingly, that either there was in the soul of Christ no wisdom besides the divine, or if there was another, it was not such [St. Bonaventure below, a. 2, q. 3, in the body: equal] to it» etc. — After a little, for videatur (may seem), which the editions have with several codices, codices F G I L T W (aa by a first hand) [read] videbatur (was seeming), omitting licet. Soon after tamen codex V inserts et.
Quae influentia vulgo vocatur lumen gloriae. — Paulo superius pro in unitatem personae edd. cum paucis codd. in unitate personae.
Which influence is commonly called the light of glory. — A little above, for in unitatem personae (into unity of person) the editions with a few codices [read] in unitate personae (in unity of person).
Pro Quomodo codd. V Y Non. Paulo superius pro animae aliorum cod. K anima aliorum. Aliquanto inferius pro aliqua anima beata cod. K alia anima beata, codd. S aa aliqua alia beata, cod. Y aliqua anima creata.
For Quomodo (how) codices V Y [read] Non (not). A little above, for animae aliorum (of the souls of others) codex K [reads] anima aliorum (the soul of others). Somewhat below, for aliqua anima beata (any blessed soul) codex K [reads] alia anima beata (another blessed soul), codices S aa aliqua alia beata (any other blessed [soul]), codex Y aliqua anima creata (any created soul).
Cod. K voci beata praefigit substantia, et paulo inferius edd. vocibus effectus Verbi praemittunt gratia, omisso subinde inquam, pro quo cod. Q exhibet ipsum.
Codex K prefixes substantia to the word beata, and a little below the editions prefix gratia to the words effectus Verbi, thereupon omitting inquam, in place of which codex Q exhibits ipsum.
Codd. K M O addunt et sapientia. Paulo inferius pro sibi ipsi codd. I L aa sibi ipsa, et subinde creata pro creati.
Codices K M O add et sapientia (and wisdom). A little below, for sibi ipsi (to itself) codices I L aa [read] sibi ipsa (by itself), and thereupon creata for creati.
Scil. visione beatifica (cfr. hic fundam. 2.), vel saltem ut intime praesens. — In fine solut. edd. omittunt intelligibili, pro quo cod. M (N a secunda manu) intellecto, in pluribus aliis codd. perperam intellectu, in cod. S intellectu increato.
Namely, by the beatific vision (cfr. here, fundamentum 2), or at least as intimately present. — At the end of the solution the editions omit intelligibili (intelligible), in place of which codex M (N by a second hand) [reads] intellecto (the understood), in several other codices wrongly intellectu (by the intellect), in codex S intellectu increato (by the uncreated intellect).
In edd. desideratur scientia.
In the editions scientia (knowledge) is wanting.
Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6. — Paulo superius post illi homini codd. M O addunt per idiomatum communicationem. Paulo inferius pro detur cod. H substituit debetur.
Cfr. above, d. 6, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6. — A little above, after illi homini (to that man) codices M O add per idiomatum communicationem (through the communication of properties). A little below, for detur (is given) codex H substitutes debetur (is owed).

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