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Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum idem motus dilectionis possit esse in Deum et in proximum.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum idem motus dilectionis possit esse in Deum et in proximum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Idem est motus in finem et in id quod est ad finem, quia motus non numeratur propter differentiam medii, sed extremi1; sed motus caritatis est in Deum tanquam in finem, in proximum solummodo tanquam in viam: ergo unus et idem motus potest esse in utrumque obiectum.

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2. Item, ubi est unum dilectum, ibi est unus motus dilectionis; sed cum diligitur Deus et proximus, unum est dilectum — nam, sicut dicit Augustinus2, « in proximo non diligitur nisi Deus »: — ergo respectu utriusque unus est caritatis actus et motus.

3. Item, unus et idem est honor, quo honoratur imago beati Petri et ipse beatus Petrus, quia « honor imaginis refertur ad prototypum », sicut dicit Damascenus3; sed dilectio proximi refertur ad Deum: ergo unus est motus dilectionis, quo amatur Deus et proximus.

4. Item, « ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum », sicut vult Philosophus4; unde qui tenet equum per frenum una tentione tenet utrumque: ergo pari ratione, cum homo diligat proximum propter Deum, una dilectione potest diligere utrumque.

5. Item, quamvis plures sint divinae personae, tamen una dilectione diliguntur a nobis, quia in eis est una ratio diligendi, scilicet Bonitas summa5; sed similiter una est ratio diligendi Deum et proximum, videlicet ipsa summa Bonitas: ergo videtur, quod uno dilectionis motu simul amari possit Deus et proximus.

Sed contra: 1. Sicut vult Philosophus6, « motus numeratur tripliciter, scilicet subiecto, tempore et termino sive obiecto »; sed alius est terminus sive obiectum dilectionis, cum amatur Deus, et cum amatur proximus: ergo motus dilectionis est hinc inde alius et alius.

2. Item, nullus diligit aliquid deliberative nisi praecogitans; sed nullus simul et semel potest Deum et proximum intelligere, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus7, « intelligimus unum solum »: ergo pari ratione simul et semel non potest utrumque diligere: ergo alio motu dilectionis amatur Deus, alio proximus.

3. Item, unus et idem motus non potest esse intensior et remissior; sed motus dilectionis in Deum est intensior quam motus in proximum8: ergo motus iste et ille est alius et alius.

4. Item, magis conformatur in ratione diligendi Petrus et Paulus, quam Deus et proximus; sed non potest unus motus dilectionis esse in Petrum et Paulum, immo secundum proprias rationes diversis motibus diliguntur: ergo alius et alius motus dilectionis est in Deum et in proximum.

5. Item, praeceptum respicit virtutis actum et usum; sed duo sunt praecepta caritatis, secundum quod dicitur Matthaei vigesimo secundo9: unum respectu Dei, et aliud respectu proximi: ergo videtur, quod motus et actus dilectionis respectu illorum duorum habeant distingui et numerari.

Conclusio. Motus caritatis in Deum non potest idem esse, nisi quando in Deum est ut finem ultimum, in proximum vero ut obiectum; vel quando utrumque obiectum respicit sub diversa ratione, scilicet Deum ut bonum, quod optat, proximum vero, cui optat.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod motus dilectionis in Deum et in proximum potest esse dupliciter: aut ita, quod in utrumque sit tanquam in obiectum et terminum; aut ita, quod in unum sit tanquam in obiectum et in alterum tanquam in finem ultimum. Si est in unum tanquam in obiectum et in alterum tanquam in finem ultimum; sic potest esse unus et idem motus in proximum et in Deum, ut patet, quia uno actu dilectionis diligitur10 proximus propter Deum, et est ille motus quasi collativus. — Si autem sit in utrumque sicut in obiectum, hoc potest esse dupliciter, quia, cum actus caritatis sit diligere, et diligere sit « velle bonum alicui11 », dupliciter secundum hoc habet obiectum caritatis assignari, videlicet ut illud bonum dicatur obiectum, quod optatur, et ille etiam, cui optatur. Potest ergo motus caritatis ad Deum et proximum comparari in ratione obiecti dupliciter: vel sub eadem ratione et uniformi, ita quod utrumque diligat sicut illud, cui optat bonum; vel difformiter, ita quod unum respiciat sicut illud bonum, quod optat; et aliud sicut illud, cui optat. — Si respiciat difformiter, sic adhuc idem potest esse motus12 dilectionis in Deum et in proximum. Caritas enim in illo motu, quo diligit proximum, optat proximo Deum. — Si autem respiciat uniformiter, sic necesse est, motum dilectionis esse alium et alium in Deum et

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in proximum. Alius enim motus dilectionis est, quo volo bonum Deo, alius, quo volo bonum proximo, quia alius et alius est dilectionis terminus; et unus est intensior, et alius remissior. Et secundum hoc circa actum dilectionis consistunt duo praecepta13. — Et secundum hanc viam rationes ad istam partem adductae procedunt, et ideo concedi possunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, patet responsio: quia procedit, secundum quod actus dilectionis est in proximum sicut in obiectum, et in Deum sicut in finem; et sic non recipit14 numerationem, sed quandam relationem et rectam ordinationem.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod est idem utrobique dilectum; similiter patet responsio: quia procedit secundum alteram viam, videlicet secundum quod Deus dicitur diligi, cum optatur proximo; sed si intelligamus de dilecto, ut illud dicatur dilectum, cui bonum optatur, non est idem dilectum, cum diligitur Deus, et cum diligitur proximus.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem est adoratio, qua adoratur imago Petri et Petrus; dicendum, quod non est simile hinc inde, quia aliter refertur dilectio proximi ad Deum, aliter honor imaginis refertur ad prototypum. Honor enim imaginis refertur ad prototypum non solum sicut ad finem, sed etiam sicut ad obiectum. Unde totaliter refertur honor in illum qui per imaginem signatur; non enim adoratur signum, secundum quod res, sed solum ipsum signatum15. Non sic autem est in dilectione, quia, cum diligitur proximus propter Deum, vere afficitur homo circa proximum, et aliter quam circa Deum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum; dicendum, quod illud verum est in his quae non possunt invicem separari16; sic autem non est in proposito. Nam sic potest homo affici circa Deum, quod nihil cogitet de proximo; sic etiam potest affici circa proximum, quod tunc non afficiatur circa Deum; et ideo consideratio illa non habet hic locum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod eadem est ratio diligendi utrobique, sicut in divinis personis; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia in divinis personis est una ratio diligendi et eodem modo comparatur ad illas tres personas dilectas; non sic autem est in dilectione Dei et proximi, quia, quamvis utrobique sit una ratio diligendi, differenti tamen modo habet ad Deum et ad proximum comparari. Et quia ex diversitate comparationum consurgit pluralitas actuum, ex unitate rationis principaliter moventis consurgit unitas habitus; hinc est, quod habitus, quo amatur Deus et proximus, est unus, licet motus eius in Deum et in proximum sit alius et alius17.

Scholion

I. Ad hanc quaestionem respondet Guliel. Antissiodorensis (Sum. III. tr. 6. c. 1. q. 3.): « Dicimus, quod impossibile est, quod eodem motu numero diligatur Deus et proximus ». Sed rectius solvit S. Bonav., duplici adhibita distinctione. Similiter docent B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a 7. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

II. Sequentis (4.) quaestionis solutio fluit ex principiis communiter receptis, quibus probatur, quod idem habitus caritatis se extendat ad dilectionem Dei ut obiectum principale, et ad dilectionem proximi ut obiectum secundarium (cfr. S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 23. a. 5, q. 25. a. 1.). Hoc loco non invenimus explicite de hac quaestione tractantes praeter Guliel. Antissiodorensem (Sum. III. tr. 6. c. 1. q. 5.), nec non Petrum a Tar. (hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.), qui ad mentem nostri auctoris hic adhibet notissimum principium: quod est primum in intentione posterius est in exsecutione, et e converso. Sed alibi, ubi agitur de ordine caritatis (infra d. 29.), idem docent alii commentatores Magistri (cfr. S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 26. a. 1. 2.).

English Translation
p. 607

Question III. Whether one and the same motion of love can be toward God and toward neighbor.

Thirdly it is asked whether one and the same motion of love can be toward God and toward neighbor. And that it is so, seems [the case].

1. The motion to the end and to that which is to the end is the same, because a motion is not numbered on account of a difference of the means, but of the extreme1; but the motion of charity is toward God as toward the end, toward neighbor only as toward the way: therefore one and the same motion can be toward each object.

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2. Likewise, where there is one thing loved, there is one motion of love; but when God and neighbor are loved, there is one thing loved — for, as Augustine says2, « in the neighbor nothing is loved but God »: — therefore with respect to each there is one act and motion of charity.

3. Likewise, one and the same is the honor by which the image of blessed Peter is honored and blessed Peter himself, because « the honor of the image is referred to the prototype », as Damascene says3; but the love of neighbor is referred to God: therefore there is one motion of love by which God and neighbor are loved.

4. Likewise, « where one [is] for the sake of another, in both [cases] there is only one », as the Philosopher holds4; whence he who holds a horse by the bridle holds both by one holding: therefore by parity of reasoning, since a man loves his neighbor for the sake of God, he can by one love love both.

5. Likewise, although the divine persons are several, nevertheless they are loved by us with one love, because in them there is one ground of loving, namely the highest Goodness5; but similarly there is one ground of loving God and neighbor, namely that highest Goodness itself: therefore it seems that by one motion of love God and neighbor can be loved at once.

On the contrary: 1. As the Philosopher holds6, « a motion is numbered in a threefold manner, namely by subject, by time, and by term or object »; but the term or object of love is other when God is loved and when neighbor is loved: therefore the motion of love is on this side and that one and another.

2. Likewise, no one loves anything deliberately without forethought; but no one can understand God and neighbor at one and the same time, because, as the Philosopher says7, « we understand one thing only »: therefore by parity of reasoning he cannot love both at one and the same time: therefore by one motion of love God is loved, by another the neighbor.

3. Likewise, one and the same motion cannot be more intense and more remiss; but the motion of love toward God is more intense than the motion toward neighbor8: therefore this motion and that one are one and another.

4. Likewise, Peter and Paul are more conformed in the ground of loving than God and neighbor; but there cannot be one motion of love toward Peter and Paul, nay according to their proper grounds they are loved by diverse motions: therefore the motion of love toward God and toward neighbor is one and another.

5. Likewise, a precept regards the act and use of a virtue; but the precepts of charity are two, according as it is said in Matthew twenty-two9: one with respect to God, and another with respect to neighbor: therefore it seems that the motion and act of love with respect to those two must be distinguished and numbered.

Conclusion. The motion of charity toward God cannot be the same [as that toward neighbor], except when it is toward God as toward the ultimate end and toward neighbor as toward the object; or when it regards each object under a different ground, namely God as the good which it wishes, but neighbor as that for whom it wishes [it].

I respond: It must be said that the motion of love toward God and toward neighbor can be twofold: either in such a way that it is toward each as toward object and term; or in such a way that it is toward the one as toward object and toward the other as toward the ultimate end. If it is toward the one as toward object and toward the other as toward the ultimate end; thus there can be one and the same motion toward neighbor and toward God, as is plain, because by one act of love10 the neighbor is loved for the sake of God, and that motion is as it were collative. — But if it is toward each as toward object, this can be in two ways, because, since the act of charity is to love, and to love is « to will good to someone11 », accordingly the object of charity can be assigned in two ways, namely that that good which is wished be called the object, and also that one for whom it is wished. The motion of charity, then, can be compared to God and neighbor in the character of object in two ways: either under the same and uniform ground, in such a way that it loves each as that for whom it wishes good; or in a different manner, in such a way that it regards the one as that good which it wishes, and the other as that for whom it wishes [it]. — If it regards [them] in a different manner, thus the motion12 of love toward God and toward neighbor can still be the same. For charity, in that motion by which it loves the neighbor, wishes God for the neighbor. — But if it regards [them] uniformly, thus it is necessary that the motion of love be one and another toward God and

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toward neighbor. For the motion of love by which I will good to God is one, and that by which I will good to neighbor is another, because the term of love is one and another; and the one is more intense, the other more remiss. And according to this, about the act of love there stand the two precepts13. — And according to this way the reasons adduced to that part proceed, and therefore they can be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, the answer is plain: because it proceeds insofar as the act of love is toward neighbor as toward object, and toward God as toward end; and thus it does not receive14 a numbering, but a certain relation and right ordering.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that the thing loved is the same in both [cases]; similarly the answer is plain: because it proceeds according to the other way, namely insofar as God is said to be loved when [good] is wished for the neighbor; but if we understand of the thing loved, so that that be called the thing loved for whom good is wished, the thing loved is not the same when God is loved and when neighbor is loved.

3. To that which is objected, that the adoration is the same by which the image of Peter and Peter [himself] are adored; it must be said that it is not alike on this side and that, because the love of neighbor is referred to God in one way, the honor of the image is referred to the prototype in another. For the honor of the image is referred to the prototype not only as to an end, but also as to an object. Whence the honor is referred wholly to him who is signified by the image; for the sign is not adored as a thing, but only the very thing signified15. But it is not so in love, because, when the neighbor is loved for the sake of God, the man is truly affected toward the neighbor, and otherwise than toward God.

4. To that which is objected, that where one [is] for the sake of another, there is only one; it must be said that this is true in those things which cannot be separated from one another16; but it is not so in the case at hand. For a man can be so affected toward God that he thinks nothing of the neighbor; so too he can be affected toward the neighbor in such a way that he is then not affected toward God; and therefore that consideration has no place here.

5. To that which is objected last, that the ground of loving is the same in both [cases], as in the divine persons; it must be said that it is not alike: because in the divine persons there is one ground of loving and it is compared in the same way to those three persons loved; but it is not so in the love of God and of neighbor, because, although in both [cases] there is one ground of loving, it nevertheless is compared in a different manner to God and to neighbor. And because from the diversity of comparisons there arises a plurality of acts, [while] from the unity of the ground principally moving there arises a unity of habit; hence it is that the habit by which God and neighbor are loved is one, although its motion toward God and toward neighbor is one and another17.

Scholion

I. To this question William of Auxerre replies (Summa III, tr. 6, c. 1, q. 3): « We say that it is impossible that God and neighbor be loved by one and the same motion in number ». But St. Bonaventure solves it more correctly, by applying a twofold distinction. Bl. Albert teaches similarly, here, art. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 3, art. 2, little-question 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, art. 7, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 4.

II. The solution of the following (4th) question flows from principles commonly received, by which it is proved that the same habit of charity extends itself to the love of God as the principal object, and to the love of neighbor as the secondary object (cf. St. Thomas, Summa II-II, q. 23, a. 5; q. 25, a. 1). In this place we do not find [authors] treating explicitly of this question except William of Auxerre (Summa III, tr. 6, c. 1, q. 5), and also Peter of Tarentaise (here, q. 3, art. 2, little-question 2), who, according to the mind of our author, here applies the well-known principle: that what is first in intention is later in execution, and conversely. But elsewhere, where the order of charity is treated (below, dist. 29), other commentators of the Master teach the same (cf. St. Thomas, Summa II-II, q. 26, a. 1, 2).

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. Aristot., V. Phys. text. 34. seqq. et 18. (c. 1. 4.). Huic simile est illud dictum de disciplina sive scientia, II. Top. c. 2. (c. 8.): Disciplina una plurium, ut finis, aut ut eius quod ad finem. — Pro sed extremi multi codd. nec non edd. 1. 2. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 60. a. 3. et extremi.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics V, text 34 ff. and 18 (ch. 1, 4). Like this is that saying about discipline or science, Topics II, ch. 2 (ch. 8): One discipline [is] of several things, as an end, or as of that which [is ordered] to the end. — For sed extremi many codices, and also editions 1, 2, and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 60, art. 3, [read] et extremi.
  2. In Ioan. Evang. tr. 65. n. 2; vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 7. Cfr. etiam I. de Doctr. christ. c. 22. n. 21.
    On the Gospel of John, tract 65, n. 2; see here the text of the Master, ch. 7. Cf. also On Christian Doctrine I, ch. 22, n. 21.
  3. Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 16. Cfr. supra pag. 202, nota 2.
    Book IV On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 16. Cf. above, p. 202, note 2.
  4. Libr. III. Topic. c. 2. Vide supra pag. 441, nota 6.
    Book III of the Topics, ch. 2. See above, p. 441, note 6.
  5. Idem dicitur supra d. 9. dub. 2. de adoratione. — In edd. deest Sed ante similiter, et pro ipsa summa Bonitas legitur illa summa Bonitas.
    The same is said above, dist. 9, dubium 2, on adoration. — In the editions Sed is wanting before similiter, and for ipsa summa Bonitas is read illa summa Bonitas.
  6. Libr. V. Phys. text. 34. seqq. (c. 4.) et VIII. text. 64. (c. 8.). Cfr. X. Ethic. c. 4.
    Book V of the Physics, text 34 ff. (ch. 4) and VIII, text 64 (ch. 8). Cf. X of the Ethics, ch. 4.
  7. Libr. II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 10.). Vide supra pag. 114, nota 3. — Pro deliberative codd. G H W aa et edd. 1. 2. deliberatione, cod. Z deliberate, qui cod. Z et paulo inferius pro diligere substituit diligi.
    Book II of the Topics, ch. 4 (ch. 10). See above, p. 114, note 3. — For deliberative codices G H W aa and editions 1, 2 [read] deliberatione, codex Z deliberate; which codex Z also, a little below, substitutes diligi for diligere.
  8. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seq. — Edd. quam motus dilectionis in proximum.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, ch. 4 f. — The editions [read] quam motus dilectionis in proximum [than the motion of love toward neighbor].
  9. Vers. 37-40. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et 4.
    Verses 37-40. See here the text of the Master, ch. 2 and 4.
  10. Cod. F hic bene interserit Deus propter se, cod. N vero subiungit Deus et.
    Codex F here aptly inserts Deus propter se, but codex N adds Deus et.
  11. Secundum Aristot., II. Rhetor. c. 5. (c. 4.). Vide supra pag. 573, nota 5. — Subinde respicitur illud Arist., II. de Anima, text. 35. (c. 4.): Ipsum autem cuius causa [i. e. finis] duplex est, hoc quidem cuius, illud vero cui. — Pro dupliciter secundum hoc codd. A G i (K a prima manu) L N T U aa bb et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. duplex secundum hoc. Aliquanto inferius pro et uniformi Vat. et uniformiter.
    According to Aristotle, Rhetoric II, ch. 5 (ch. 4). See above, p. 573, note 5. — Thereupon there is regarded that [saying] of Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 35 (ch. 4): But that for the sake of which [a thing exists] is twofold, the one of which, the other for which. — For dupliciter secundum hoc codices A G i (K by the first hand) L N T U aa bb and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [read] duplex secundum hoc. Somewhat below, for et uniformi the Vatican edition [reads] et uniformiter.
  12. Edd. actus.
    The editions [read] actus [act].
  13. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, ch. 4.
  14. Edd. respicit. Post pauca pro rectam codd. W Y rastam.
    The editions [read] respicit. After a few [words], for rectam codices W Y [read] rastam.
  15. Vide supra d. 9. a. 1. q. 2. et 3. in solut. oppos.
    See above, dist. 9, art. 1, q. 2 and 3, in the solution of the opposing [arguments].
  16. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. — Edd. ab invicem separare. Mox pro Nam sic cod. K Nam sicut.
    Cf. Sentences II, dist. 40, art. 2, q. 1, ad 3. — The editions [read] ab invicem separare. Soon, for Nam sic codex K [reads] Nam sicut.
  17. Vide supra a. 1. q. 2.
    See above, art. 1, q. 2.
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