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Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 39

Textus Latinus
p. 911

Quaestio II. Utrum synderesis per peccatum exstingui possit.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum synderesis possit per peccatum exstingui. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud Psalmi1: Corrupti sunt et abominabiles facti sunt; Glossa: « Omni vi rationali privati »; sed synderesis est potentia rationalis: ergo per magnitudinem peccati potest synderesis privari saltem quantum ad actum.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi2: Ab altitudine diei p. 912 timebo; Glossa: « Stupor est, qui non sentit »; et post subiungitur: « Stulta arrogantia similis est stupori, quando quis, de se praesumens, nec timet nec cavet »: ergo sicut per stuporem contingit corpus fieri insensibile respectu morbi corporalis, ita et animam contingit fieri insensibilem respectu morbi spiritualis. Si ergo synderesis remurmurat morbo spirituali, videtur, quod synderesim contingat aliquando exstingui.

3. Item, haeretici pro errore suo sustinent mortem sine aliquo remorsu conscientiae: si ergo synderesis est remurmurare malo, et in eis non remurmurat aliquo modo; videtur, quod in eis sit exstincta omnino.

4. Item, fomes se habet per oppositum ad synderesim3; sed fomitem contingit totaliter exstingui, sicut patet in beata Virgine: ergo videtur, quod similiter synderesim contingat exstingui per peccatorum multitudinem.

Sed contra: 1. In Glossa praehabita super primum Ezechielis4: Facies aquilae etc.; Glossa: « Scintilla conscientiae in Cain non exstinguitur »: si ergo Cain fuit magnus peccator, videtur, quod per peccatum exstingui non habeat.

2. Item, Augustinus in secundo de Civitate Dei5: « Tanta est vis probitatis et castitatis, ut omnis vel pene omnis eius laude moveatur humana natura, nec usque adeo sit turpitudine vitiosa, ut totum amittat sensum honestatis »: ergo si iste sensus honestatis est synderesis, videtur, quod non possit per peccatum exstingui.

3. Item, quae naturaliter insunt sunt inseparabilia; sed synderesis inest nobis naturaliter: ergo videtur, quod actum eius non possumus omnino per peccatum amittere, cum « vitium, sicut dicit Augustinus6, non deleat extrema naturae vestigia ».

4. Item, si in aliquibus deberet exstingui, maxime esset exstincta in damnatis; sed in damnatis synderesis non exstinguitur, quia remorsus conscientiae est ex actu synderesis; et hic remorsus maxime in eis viget, quia nec ignis eorum exstinguetur, nec vermis morietur7: ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Synderesis quoad actum ad tempus impediri potest, sed exstingui non potest, scilicet quoad omnem actum et omne tempus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod synderesis quantum ad actum impediri potest, sed exstingui non potest. Ideo autem non potest exstingui, quia, cum dicat quid naturale, non potest a nobis omnino auferri. Unde et Glossa dicit super illud Lucae decimo8: Abierunt, semivivo relicto: « Immortalitatem exuere, sed rationis sensum omnino abolere non possunt, quin homo possit sapere et Deum cognoscere », « nec unquam vitium delet extrema naturae vestigia ».

Quamvis autem actus eius omnino auferri vel exstingui non possit, potest tamen ad tempus impediri, sive propter tenebram obcaecationis, sive propter lasciviam delectationis, sive propter duritiam obstinationis. — Propter tenebram obcaecationis impeditur synderesis, ne malo remurmuret, pro eo quod malum creditur esse bonum: sicut est in haereticis, qui morientes pro impietate erroris, credunt se mori pro pietate fidei; et ideo remorsum non sentiunt, sed magis quoddam gaudium fictum9 et vanum. — Propter lasciviam delectationis similiter impeditur; aliquando enim in peccatis carnalibus ita absorbetur homo ab actu carnis, ut remorsus locum non habeat, quia carnales homines tanto impetu delectationis feruntur, ut ratio tunc non habeat locum10. — Propter duritiam obstinationis impeditur etiam synderesis, ne ad bonum stimulet, sicut in damnatis, qui adeo sunt in malo confirmati, ut nunquam possint ad bonum inclinari. Et ideo synderesis, quantum ad instigationem ad bonum, sempiternum habet impedimentum; et propterea, quantum ad istum actum, potest dici exstincta; non tamen est11 exstincta simpliciter, quia habet alium usum, videlicet remurmurationis. Secundum enim illum usum, secundum quem synderesis habet pungere et remurmurare contra malum, maxime vigebit in damnatis; et hoc dico, prout remurmuratio contra malum tenet rationem poenae, non prout tenet rationem iustitiae, quia illa remurmuratio erit ad commendandam divinam iustitiam, sed non erit ad eliciendam fructuosam poenitentiam. Unde remurmurabit synderesis in damnatis contra culpam, in relatione tamen ad poenam.

Et sic patet, quod synderesis quantum ad actum impediri potest, nunquam tamen exstingui potest universaliter quantum ad omnem actum et quantum ad omne tempus, sicut rationes probant, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur; et ideo concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de Glossa, quod per malum contingit privari omni vi rationis; dicendum, quod ratio sumitur ibi pro potentia deliberativa p. 913 et movente per modum deliberationis, quae in aliquibus omnino est ad malum conversa. Synderesis autem, ut prius12 ostensum est, non dicit vim animae rationalis ut moventem per modum deliberationis, sed ut moventem per modum naturae; et ideo Glossa illa non facit ad propositum. Nec est intelligendum, quod Glossa illa velit dicere, quod per peccatum fiat privatio quantum ad potentiam, sed quantum ad rectitudinem potentiae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo efficitur stupidus per peccatum; dicendum, quod similitudo illa attenditur, quantum est ex parte potentiae deliberativae, secundum quam habet in nobis esse stulta arrogantia. — Posset tamen dici, quod stupor non aufert simpliciter sensum, sed aufert solummodo ad tempus; et bene potest esse, quod ad tempus anima adeo incurvatur ad peccatum, ut nullum sentiat omnino remorsum, sive propter delectationis intensionem, sive propter excaecationem, cum credit13 malum esse bonum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de haereticis, iam patet responsio. Concedo enim, quod non habet usum suum, ut remurmuret malo erroris, in quod14 ceciderunt; tamen non est exstincta, pro eo quod remurmurat contra alia mala, et contra illa quae haeretici credunt esse mala.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de fomite, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia fomes est vitiositas praeter naturam, et ideo totaliter tolli potest, etiam salva natura; non sic autem est de synderesi. Inest enim secundum primam naturae institutionem; et ideo, natura salvata, non omnino auferri potest. — Alia est etiam ratio, quia aliqua est gratia sive donum gratiae gratis datum, quod directe repugnat fomiti et quod amovet carnis corruptionem15. Vitium autem et peccatum non habet esse circa actum synderesis; et ideo, quantumcumque homo peccaverit, remansit tamen in eo tam conscientia quam synderesis16.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether synderesis can be extinguished by sin.

Secondly it is asked whether synderesis can be extinguished by sin. And that it can, it seems.

1. On that text of the Psalm1: They are corrupt and are become abominable; the Gloss: « deprived of every rational power »; but synderesis is a rational power: therefore by the magnitude of sin synderesis can be deprived, at least as to its act.

2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm2: From the height of the day I shall be afraid; the Gloss: « Stupor is that which does not feel »; and afterward it is added: « Foolish arrogance is like stupor, when someone, presuming on himself, neither fears nor takes heed »: therefore just as through stupor it comes about that the body is rendered insensible with respect to a bodily illness, so too the soul comes to be rendered insensible with respect to a spiritual illness. If, then, synderesis murmurs against a spiritual illness, it seems that synderesis can sometimes be extinguished.

3. Likewise, heretics endure death for their error without any remorse of conscience: if, then, synderesis is to murmur against evil, and in them it does not murmur in any way; it seems that in them it is wholly extinguished.

4. Likewise, the fomes stands opposed to synderesis3; but the fomes can be totally extinguished, as is clear in the Blessed Virgin: therefore it seems that synderesis can likewise be extinguished by a multitude of sins.

On the contrary: 1. In the Gloss cited above on the first chapter of Ezekiel4: The face of an eagle, etc.; the Gloss: « The spark of conscience is not extinguished in Cain »: if, then, Cain was a great sinner, it seems that it cannot be extinguished by sin.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the second book of the City of God5: « So great is the force of probity and chastity that human nature, all or nearly all of it, is moved by praise of it, nor is it so vicious in baseness as to lose entirely the sense of honesty »: therefore if this sense of honesty is synderesis, it seems that it cannot be extinguished by sin.

3. Likewise, things that are present naturally are inseparable; but synderesis is present in us naturally: therefore it seems that we cannot lose its act entirely through sin, since « vice, as Augustine says6, does not destroy the last vestiges of nature ».

4. Likewise, if it ought to be extinguished in any, it would most of all be extinguished in the damned; but in the damned synderesis is not extinguished, because the remorse of conscience is from the act of synderesis; and this remorse is most vigorous in them, since neither their fire shall be extinguished, nor their worm die7: therefore, etc.

Conclusion.

Synderesis as to its act can be impeded for a time, but it cannot be extinguished, namely as to its every act and every time.

I respond: It must be said that synderesis as to its act can be impeded, but cannot be extinguished. It cannot be extinguished for this reason: since it bespeaks something natural, it cannot be wholly taken away from us. Hence too the Gloss says on that text of Luke, chapter ten8: They departed, leaving him half-dead: « They can strip away immortality, but they cannot wholly abolish the sense of reason, such that a man may still be wise and know God », « nor does vice ever destroy the last vestiges of nature ».

But although its act cannot be wholly taken away or extinguished, it can nonetheless be impeded for a time, whether on account of the darkness of blindness, or on account of the wantonness of delight, or on account of the hardness of obstinacy. — On account of the darkness of blindness synderesis is impeded, so that it does not murmur against evil, for the reason that the evil is believed to be good: as is the case in heretics, who, dying for the impiety of their error, believe that they are dying for the piety of faith; and therefore they do not feel remorse, but rather a certain feigned9 and empty joy. — On account of the wantonness of delight it is likewise impeded; for sometimes in carnal sins a man is so absorbed by the act of the flesh that remorse has no place, because carnal men are carried along by so great an impetus of delight that reason then has no place10. — On account of the hardness of obstinacy synderesis is also impeded, so that it does not goad toward the good, as in the damned, who are so confirmed in evil that they can never be inclined toward the good. And therefore synderesis, as to its instigation toward the good, has an everlasting impediment; and on that account, as to that act, it can be said to be extinguished; yet it is not11 extinguished simply, because it has another use, namely that of murmuring. For according to that use, according to which synderesis has to prick and to murmur against evil, it will be most vigorous in the damned; and I say this insofar as the murmuring against evil holds the character of punishment, not insofar as it holds the character of justice, because that murmuring will be for commending the divine justice, but will not be for eliciting fruitful penitence. Hence synderesis in the damned will murmur against fault, yet in relation to punishment.

And thus it is clear that synderesis as to its act can be impeded, yet can never be extinguished universally as to every act and as to every time, as the reasons prove which are adduced for the second part; and therefore they are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected from the Gloss, that through evil it comes about that one is deprived of every power of reason; it must be said that reason is taken there for the deliberative power and the power that moves by way of deliberation, which in some is wholly turned toward evil. But synderesis, as was shown before12, does not bespeak the power of the rational soul as moving by way of deliberation, but as moving by way of nature; and therefore that Gloss does not bear on the point. Nor is it to be understood that that Gloss means to say that through sin a deprivation comes about as to the power, but as to the rectitude of the power.

2. To that which is objected, that a man is made stupid through sin; it must be said that that likeness is regarded so far as it is on the part of the deliberative power, according to which there is in us a foolish arrogance. — Yet it could be said that stupor does not take away sense simply, but takes it away only for a time; and it may well be that for a time the soul is so bent down toward sin that it feels no remorse at all, whether on account of the intensity of delight, or on account of blinding, when one believes13 evil to be good.

3. To that which is objected concerning heretics, the response is already clear. For I concede that it does not have its use, so as to murmur against the evil of error into which14 they have fallen; yet it is not extinguished, for the reason that it murmurs against other evils, and against those things which heretics believe to be evils.

4. To that which is objected concerning the fomes, it must be said that it is not similar, because the fomes is a viciousness beyond nature, and therefore can be totally removed, even while nature is preserved; but it is not so with synderesis. For it is present according to the first institution of nature; and therefore, nature being preserved, it cannot be wholly taken away. — There is also another reason, because there is some grace or gratuitously given gift of grace which directly opposes the fomes and which removes the corruption of the flesh15. But vice and sin do not have their being about the act of synderesis; and therefore, however much a man may have sinned, there remained nonetheless in him both conscience and synderesis16.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Psalm. 13, 2. Glossa invenitur apud Petr. Lombardum, in hunc loc.; cfr. Glossa interlin. in Ps. 52, 2.
    Psalm 13:2. The Gloss is found in Peter Lombard, on this passage; cf. the interlinear Gloss on Ps. 52:2.
  2. Psalm. 55, 4. — Glossam, quae est ordinaria et secundum August., in hunc loc. n. 6, exhibent Strabus et Lyranus. — Pro sentit Vat. sentitur.
    Psalm 55:4. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one and is according to Augustine, on this passage n. 6, is given by Strabo and Lyranus. — For sentit the Vatican edition reads sentitur.
  3. Cfr. a. 1. q. 2. arg. 1. pro 1. parte.
    Cf. art. 1, q. 2, arg. 1, for the first part.
  4. Vers. 10. — Glossa integra habetur in quaest. praeced. in fine argg. ad oppos.
    Verse 10. — The complete Gloss is found in the preceding question, at the end of the arguments to the contrary.
  5. Cap. 26. n. 1. — Pro adeo sit Vat. et edd. 3, 4 adeo fit.
    Chapter 26, n. 1. — For adeo sit the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 read adeo fit.
  6. Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 12. n. 2. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 182, nota 9. et pag. 314, nota 7.
    Book XIX of the City of God, c. 12, n. 2. — On the major premise cf. above, p. 182, note 9, and p. 314, note 7.
  7. Marc. 9, 43. 45. 47: Ubi vermis eorum non moritur, et ignis non exstinguitur.
    Mark 9:43, 45, 47: Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not extinguished.
  8. Vers. 30. — De Glossa vide supra pag. 906, nota 6.
    Verse 30. — On the Gloss see above, p. 906, note 6.
  9. Pro fictum, quod in multis codd., ut F L O X Y bb cc etc. et in ed. I legitur, alii codd. ceteraeque edd. siccum. Paulo superius Vat. pro pietate commutavit in proprietate.
    For fictum, which is read in many codices, such as F L O X Y bb cc etc. and in edition I, the other codices and the remaining editions read siccum. A little above, the Vatican edition changed pietate into proprietate.
  10. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 5. dicit, quod « iucundum et molestum non omnem existimationem corrumpat et pervertat... sed eas tantum, quae ad agendas res spectant... illi autem, qui aut voluptate aut dolore corruptus est, principium statim non apparebit, neque eius causa, atque ob id omnia eligi atque agi oportere; vitium enim eiusmodi est, ut principium corrumpat ».
    Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 5, says that « the pleasant and the painful do not corrupt and pervert every judgment... but only those that bear on things to be done... but to him who is corrupted either by pleasure or by pain the principle will not at once appear, nor its cause, nor that on account of it all things ought to be chosen and done; for vice is of such a kind that it corrupts the principle ».
  11. Edd., excepta I, omittunt est.
    The editions, except I, omit est.
  12. Vide supra pag. 767, nota 4. — In fine arg. Vat. pro multitudinem substituit multiplicationem. Edd. 2, 3 omittunt contingat exstingui per peccatorum multitudinem.
    See above, p. 767, note 4. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition substitutes multiplicationem for multitudinem. Editions 2, 3 omit that synderesis can be extinguished by a multitude of sins.
  13. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 credat.
    The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 read credat.
  14. Ed. I in quem.
    Edition I reads in quem.
  15. Cfr. supra d. 32. a. 1. q. 2. et dub. 2; d. 35. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4. — Paulo inferius pro remansit Vat. remanet.
    Cf. above d. 32, a. 1, q. 2 and dubium 2; d. 35, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4. — A little below, for remansit the Vatican edition reads remanet.
  16. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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