Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 14
Quaestio II. Utrum anima Christi actu cognoscat in Verbo omnia quae habitu cognoscit.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Christi cognoscat in Verbo actu omnia quae cognoscit in habitu. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia, secundum quod vult Augustinus in libro decimo quinto de Trinitatep310-1, « in Beatis non erunt volubiles cogitationes »: si ergo anima Christi inter ceteras animas beatas beatissima est, non ergo habet cogitationes volubiles : ergo si aliquid semel in actu cogitat vel cognoscit, semper illud cogitat vel cognoscit : ergo quidquid cogitat in habitu, cognoscit in actu.
2. Item, gloria est habitus in actu — impossibile enim est, hominem esse beatum et aliquando cessare ab actu visionis divinaep310-2 — si ergo cognitio, qua cognoscit anima Christi res in Verbo, est cognitio gloriosa; videtur, quod cognitio illa semper habeat habitum coniunctum actui : ergo quidquid cognoscit in habitu, cognoscit in actu.
3. Item, perfectior est habitus coniunctus actui quam separatus, pro eo quod actus est complementum habitusp310-3; sed anima Christi cognoscit res in Verbo cognitione perfectissima : ergo quidquid cognoscit ibi in habitu, cognoscit in actu.
4. Item, una et eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit anima Christi ipsum Verbum, cognoscit alia a Verbop310-4; sed nihil de ipso Verbo cognoscit in habitu, quod non cognoscat in actu : ergo nihil de aliis rebus cognoscit in habitu, quod non cognoscat in actu.
Sed contra:
1. Sicut vult Philosophusp310-5: « Scimus plura, sed intelligimus unum solum »; hoc autem ob aliud non est, nisi quia scire nominat cognitionem in habitu, sed intelligere in actu : ergo ad plura se extendit habitus quam actus per naturam ; et si hoc, non est necesse, quod in Christo habitus parificetur actui : igitur non est necesse, quod quidquid anima Christi habitu cognoscit in Verbo, quod cognoscat in actu.
2. Item, sicut perfecta est cognitio animae Christi, ita perfectum est eius gaudium; sed anima Christi non gaudet de omni eo in actu, de quo gaudet in habitu — gaudet enim super uno peccatore poenitentiam agentep310-6, licet non actualiter in eo laetaretur, quando peccabat — ergo pari ratione non est opportunum, quod omne quod cognoscit in habitu, cognoscat in actu.
3. Item, actualis consideratio rerum cognitarum in Verbo in Christo subiacet voluntati : ergo potest modo considerare aliquidp310-7 creatum, quod non sit de essentia gloriae, modo etiam non considerare : ergo si habet illius rei habitum, non necesse est, quod habitus semper sit coniunctus actui respectu cuiuscumque cognoscibilis.
4. Item, aut anima Christi actu considerat omne quod Verbum aeternum natum est ei repraesentare, aut non. Si actu considerat omne quod Verbum aeternum natum est ei repraesentare; cum illa sint infinita, videtur, quod anima Christi in considerando actu pertransit infinita, quod est impossibile virtuti finitaep310-8. Si non actu considerat omne quod Verbum sibi unitum natum est ei repraesentare; ergo aliquam habet aptitudinem anima Christi ad aliquid, respectu cuius non semper est in actu ; sed omnis eius aptitudo est completa per habitum gloriosum : igitur aliquid cognoscit in habitu, quod non cognoscit in actu.
5. Item, quando aliquid se extendit ad infinita, impossibile est, quod ipsum totaliter sit in actu, si differat in eo actus a potentia ; sed habitus cognitionis in Christo se extendit ad infinita : ergo impossibile est, ut omne quod cognoscit in habitu, cognoscat in actu. Maior manifesta est, quia, cum continuum sit divisibile in infinitum, impossibile est, ipsum totaliter divisum esse in actup310-9. Minor probatur per hoc, quod Christus in Verbo aeterno scit, omnes species numeri paris divisibiles esse in duo aequalia, et hoc novit in habitu de qualibet eius specie : si ergo species numeri sunt infinitae, ergo novit habitu infinita.
6. Item, nihil novit anima Christi in actu, super quod non convertat se actualiter ; sed intellectus eius et aspectus simplex est et finitus ; sed simplex et finitum ad quod se convertit totaliter se convertitp311-1: ergo si actu se convertit ad unum, impossibile est, quod simul et semel actu se convertat ad illud quod sit ab illo disparatum : igitur anima Christi non omnia cognoscit in actu, quae cognoscit in habitu.
Conclusio.
Anima Christi quoad ea quae sunt essentialia gloriae, omnia quae cognoscit in habitu, cognoscit in actu, quod non est necesse quoad ea quae non sunt essentialia gloriae.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod anima Christi beata habet cognitionem aliquorum, quae sunt essentialia gloriae, et aliquorum, quae non sunt de essentia gloriae. — Si ergo loquamur de cognitione eorum quae sunt essentialia gloriae, dico, quod anima Christi omnia quae cognoscit in habitu, cognoscit in actu, quia gloria est habitus in actu. Unde sicut non potest anima eius non esse gloriosa, sic impossibile est, actualem considerationem eorum quae sunt de essentia gloriae, in ipso interrumpi. — Si autem loquamur de cognitione eorum quae non sunt essentialia gloriae, sic non est necesse, quod omnia quae cognoscit in habitu, cognoscat in actu. — Et huius signum est, quod Deus Beatis existentibus in gloria, hoc est sanctis Angelis, aliquid de novo revelat et ostendit in se, quod prius tamen non ostendebatp311-2. Et ideo statui gloriae non repugnat considerare aliquid nunc, quod prius non considerabatur. — Nec repugnat etiam perfectioni creaturae, quoniam creaturam perfici hoc est eius capacitatem impleri ; creatura autem plurium est capax secundum cognitionem habitualem quam secundum considerationem actualem, sicut in opponendop311-3 monstratum est. Et ideo non solum in Angelis, verum etiam in anima Christi hoc verum est, quod plura cognoscit in habitu, quam consideret in actu; et ideo concedendum est, quod non omnia considerat in actu, quae habet in habitu, quantum ad ea quae non sunt de substantia gloriae. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.
Ad ultimam tamen rationem potest responderi, ne det occasionem deviandi. Quod enim dicitur, quod intellectus simplex et finitus ad quod se convertit totaliter se convertit, non cogit, quia intellectus animae beatae et maxime animae Christi dilatatur per gratiamp311-4; et quod plus est, in Verbo per unum et idem cognoscit distincte multa, et ideo intellectus glorificatus cognoscendo multa in Verbo non dividitur, sed unitur, quia non applicatur ad hoc, vel ad illud primo et immediate, sed mediante Verbo aeterno, quod, cum sit unum, ducit in multa cognoscenda. Aliae vero rationes, quae ad hanc partem inductae sunt, concedi possunt.
Ad argumenta in oppositum:
Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod in Beatis non sunt cogitationesp311-5 volubiles nec considerationes; dicendum, quod verbum illud intelligitur de his quae sunt de essentia gloriae, quia illa semper erunt in actuali cognitione atque consideratione; de his autem, quorum cognitio non est de essentia gloriae, non oportet habere veritatem. — Potest etiam aliter dici, quod volubilitas cogitationis duplex est: quaedam per inquisitionem et intimationem sive decursump311-6, quo quis venit in cognitionem rei incognitae; et talis volubilitas non erit in Beatis. Est etiam alia volubilitas per transitum considerationis unius rei in considerationem alterius; et talis volubilitas non auferetur a Beatis. Augustini igitur auctoritas intelligitur de prima volubilitate, non de secunda ; et ideo tali auctoritate non potest concludi, quod anima beata quidquid cognoscit in habitu, cognoscat in actu.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gloria est habitus in actu; dicendum, quodp311-7 verum est; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod omnis cognitio, quae est in gloria, sit in actu continuo, sed de illa solum, quae est de essentia gloriae; et quoniam multa cognoscit anima Christi in Verbo, et aliae animae, quae non sunt de essentia gloriae: hinc est, quod non oportet, ipsam omnia considerare in actu, quae novit in habitu.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habitus in actu est perfectior quam habitus praeter actum; dicendum, quod verum est, quando est in actu nobilissimo, qui debetur ipsi habitui; actus autem nobilissimus, qui debetur ipsi gloriae, est actualis consideratio summi veri, non autem actualis consideratio cuiuscumque veri creabilis vel creatip311-8. Ideo ad hoc, quod anima Christi habeat habitum cognitionis perfectum, non oportet, quod actualiter consideret omne verum, sed sufficit, quod actu consideret verum summum.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit Verbum, cognoscit alia a Verbo etc. ; dicendum, quod illud verum est de cognitione quantum ad habitum, sed non est opportunum de cognitione quantum ad actum. Actualis enim cognitio et consideratio Verbi aeterni est ipsi gloriae essentialis, non sic autem actualis cognitio aliorum a Verbo; et ideo non oportet, quod sic alia consideret actualiter, secundum quod actualiter consideret ipsum Verbum, sed habitualiter. Habitus enim ille essentialiorem habet comparationem respectu Verbi, quod est cognitum principale, quam respectu aliorum cognitorum in Verbo, quae sunt cognita quasi ex consequenti et secundario.
I. In hac quaestione S. Bonav. nihil intendit nisi fundamentum iacere pro solvenda difficillima quaestione sequenti, et concludit, quod anima Christi (sicut omnes Beati) plura cognoscit in habitu, quam consideret in actu. Haec conclusio nititur principio philosophico in rebus naturalibus evidenti, quod « ad plura se extendit habitus quam actus », et quod intellectus creatus « plurium est capax secundum cognitionem habitualem quam secundum considerationem actualem ». Quoad statum gloriae tamen hoc principium valde restringendum est et minime valet quoad habitualem cognitionem primarii obiecti visionis beatificae, de qua communiter tenetur, quod « gloria est habitus in actu » (hic ad 2.) ; quoad secundarium vero obiectum S. Bonav. et Scotus conclusionem praedictam defendunt. Sed Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 13. m. 5.), S. Thom. (cfr. tamen pag. 311, nota 2.) cum plurimis aliis ne hoc quidem admittunt (cfr. q. seq.). — Tria tantum hoc loco observamus.
1. Vocabulum habitus vel habitualiter a S. Bonav. hic non sumitur pro qualitate vel habitu praedicamentali, ut videtur sensisse Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 5. q. 14.), qui refellitur a Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 13. seqq.), sed sicut explicant ipse Bonav. et Scot. (ibi n. 20.), scilicet in hoc sensu, quod adest animae aliquid, quo informata constituitur in actu primo ad facile cognoscendum omnia quae Verbum cognoscit, dummodo illud ut speculum voluntarium revelare velit (cfr. infra q. 3. in corp. circa finem ; Mastrius in III. Sent. disp. 5. a. 2.). Unde plures Scotistae solent pro habitualiter dicere quasi habitualiter.
2. S. Bonav. ideo praefert hanc positionem, ut explicet, quomodo cognitio se extendere possit successive ad infinita, ita ut non ponatur infinitas nec in potentia cognoscente nec in habitu seu lumine gloriae, sed solum in ratione cognoscendi visa ut obiecto primario, quod in se habet infinitas comparationes ad creaturas et res possibiles. Ab hoc obiecto primario specificatur talis visio, simulque et ex consequenti recipit aptitudinem extendendi se ad infinitos illos respectus sive obiecta, quae relucent in obiecto primario (cfr. hic solut. ad 4. et q. seq., praesertim ad 7. 8. 9.).
3. Quae profunda et satis difficilis doctrina ut melius intelligatur, observamus, quod actus intellectus, qui in se dicit quid absolutum, connotando importat respectum sive relationem ad obiectum, qui quidem respectus, si est ad obiectum primarium, realiter identificatur cum ipso actu intelligendi. Hinc, mutato obiecto primario, alius requiritur actus ad illud intelligendum. Hanc variationem actus essentialem experimur in omnibus intellectus nostri actibus tendentibus in obiecta disparata, quorum unumquodque habet propriam suam rationem cognoscendi. — Aliter potest esse in visione beatifica, in qua unum obiectum visum est per se ratio cognoscendi et se et omnia alia. In obiecto quidem primario videndo, quod ipsum actum specificat, non potest esse variatio nec successio. Sicut autem ipsum obiectum primarium secundario exprimit omnem veritatem participatam, ita etiam intellectui illud clare videnti praebere potest fundamentum extendendi se ad obiectum secundarium, et hoc quidem absque novo habitu et vi eiusdem actus, qui secundum aptitudinem iam continet respectus omnes ad qualescumque veritates (hic ad ult. fundam.). Nec aliud requiritur ad actu eas cognoscendas, nisi ut addantur novae relationes ad obiecta secundaria. — Hinc auctor noster (hic ad 4.) concludit, quod alia sit comparatio habitus ad obiectum primarium, alia ad secundarium, et quod actus visionis aliter dependeat ab illo, aliter ab hoc: ab illo quidem essentialiter, ab hoc quasi per accidens « et ex consequenti ». — Porro in eadem visione isti respectus ad creata vel creabilia realiter distinguuntur ab ipso actu essentiali, qui per se respectu secundarii obiecti non nisi inchoatam quandam repraesentationem habet. Hinc intelligitur, tum quod idem actus videndi essentialem gloriam absque intrinseca sua variatione possit modo plura, modo pauciora obiecta praesentare, supposito, quod speculum illud increatum repraesentat voluntarie; tum quod extensio intellectus ad varia obiecta secundaria fiat vi eiusdem actus essentialis, ita ut variatio non sit ex parte ipsius actus, sed ex parte terminationis ad obiecta accidentalia gloriae.
II. Solus Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4, similem quaestionem specialem habet, scilicet, utrum anima Christi de novo possit actu videre aliquid in Verbo, et utramque sententiam tanquam probabilem defendit, ut etiam Scot., loc. cit. Alii in seq. quaest. plerumque rem tangunt.
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Question II. Whether Christ's soul actually knows in the Word all that it knows in habit.
Secondly it is asked whether Christ's soul knows in the Word in act all that it knows in habit. And that it does, seems to be the case:
1. Because, according to what Augustine holds in the fifteenth book On the Trinityp310-1, « in the Blessed there will be no fluctuating thoughts »: if therefore Christ's soul, among the other blessed souls, is the most blessed, it does not then have fluctuating thoughts : therefore if it once thinks or knows something in act, it always thinks or knows that thing : therefore whatever it thinks in habit, it knows in act.
2. Likewise, glory is a habit in act — for it is impossible that a man be blessed and at some time cease from the act of the divine visionp310-2 — if therefore the knowledge by which Christ's soul knows things in the Word is a glorious knowledge; it seems that that knowledge always has its habit joined to act : therefore whatever it knows in habit, it knows in act.
3. Likewise, a habit joined to act is more perfect than one separated, for the reason that act is the completion of a habitp310-3; but Christ's soul knows things in the Word by a most perfect knowledge : therefore whatever it knows there in habit, it knows in act.
4. Likewise, by one and the same knowledge by which Christ's soul knows the Word itself, it knows things other than the Wordp310-4; but it knows nothing of the Word itself in habit which it does not know in act : therefore it knows nothing of other things in habit which it does not know in act.
On the contrary:
1. As the Philosopher holdsp310-5: « We know many things, but we understand one only »; and this is for no other reason than that to know (scire) names knowledge in habit, but to understand (intelligere) names it in act : therefore habit extends to more things than act by nature ; and if this is so, it is not necessary that in Christ habit be made equal to act : therefore it is not necessary that whatever Christ's soul knows in the Word in habit, it know in act.
2. Likewise, as Christ's soul's knowledge is perfect, so is its joy perfect; but Christ's soul does not rejoice in act over everything in which it rejoices in habit — for it rejoices over one sinner doing penancep310-6, although it did not actually rejoice in him when he was sinning — therefore by parity of reasoning it is not fitting that everything it knows in habit, it know in act.
3. Likewise, the actual consideration of things known in the Word is, in Christ, subject to the will : therefore it can now consider somep310-7 created thing which is not of the essence of glory, and now also not consider it : therefore if it has the habit of that thing, it is not necessary that the habit always be joined to act with respect to any knowable thing whatever.
4. Likewise, either Christ's soul actually considers everything the eternal Word is fitted to represent to it, or it does not. If it actually considers everything the eternal Word is fitted to represent to it; since those things are infinite, it seems that Christ's soul in considering passes in act through infinite things, which is impossible for a finite powerp310-8. If it does not actually consider everything the Word united to it is fitted to represent to it; then Christ's soul has some aptitude toward something with respect to which it is not always in act ; but its every aptitude is completed by the glorious habit : therefore it knows something in habit which it does not know in act.
5. Likewise, when something extends to infinite things, it is impossible that it be wholly in act, if act differs in it from potency ; but the habit of knowledge in Christ extends to infinite things : therefore it is impossible that everything it knows in habit, it know in act. The major is manifest, because, since the continuum is divisible to infinity, it is impossible that it be wholly divided in actp310-9. The minor is proved by this, that Christ in the eternal Word knows that all the species of even number are divisible into two equal parts, and this he knows in habit of each of its species : if therefore the species of number are infinite, then he knows infinite things in habit.
6. Likewise, Christ's soul knows nothing in act upon which it does not actually turn itself ; but its intellect and gaze is simple and finite ; but a simple and finite thing turns itself wholly to that to which it turns itselfp311-1: therefore if it actually turns itself to one thing, it is impossible that simultaneously and at once it actually turn itself to that which is disparate from it : therefore Christ's soul does not know in act all that it knows in habit.
Conclusion.
Christ's soul, as to those things which are essential to glory, knows in act all that it knows in habit, which is not necessary as to those things which are not essential to glory.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that Christ's blessed soul has knowledge of some things which are essential to glory, and of some which are not of the essence of glory. — If therefore we speak of the knowledge of those things which are essential to glory, I say that Christ's soul knows in act all that it knows in habit, because glory is a habit in act. Hence just as its soul cannot fail to be glorious, so it is impossible that the actual consideration of those things which are of the essence of glory be interrupted in it. — But if we speak of the knowledge of those things which are not essential to glory, then it is not necessary that all that it knows in habit, it know in act. — And a sign of this is that God, to the Blessed existing in glory, that is, to the holy Angels, reveals and shows in himself something anew which nevertheless he did not show beforep311-2. And therefore it is not repugnant to the state of glory to consider now something which was not considered before. — Nor is it repugnant to the perfection of the creature, since for a creature to be perfected is for its capacity to be filled ; but a creature is capable of more according to habitual knowledge than according to actual consideration, as was shown in the objectionsp311-3. And therefore not only in the Angels, but also in Christ's soul this is true, that it knows more in habit than it considers in act; and therefore it must be conceded that it does not consider in act all that it has in habit, as to those things which are not of the substance of glory. — And the reasonings which make for this side are to be conceded.
To the last reasoning, however, an answer can be given, lest it give occasion for going astray. For what is said, that a simple and finite intellect turns itself wholly to that to which it turns itself, does not compel the conclusion, because the intellect of a blessed soul, and most of all of Christ's soul, is dilated through gracep311-4; and, what is more, in the Word, through one and the same thing, it knows many things distinctly, and therefore the glorified intellect, in knowing many things in the Word, is not divided but united, because it is not applied to this or that first and immediately, but by means of the eternal Word, which, since it is one, leads to many things to be known. The other reasonings, which were brought forward for this side, can be conceded.
To the arguments on the opposite side:
To 1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that in the Blessed there are no fluctuating thoughtsp311-5 or considerations; it must be said that that statement is to be understood of those things which are of the essence of glory, because those will always be in actual knowledge and consideration; but of those whose knowledge is not of the essence of glory, it is not necessary to have the truth in act. — It can also be said otherwise, that fluctuation of thought is twofold: one through inquiry and intimation or discursive coursep311-6, by which one comes into the knowledge of an unknown thing; and such fluctuation will not be in the Blessed. There is also another fluctuation through the passage of consideration from one thing into the consideration of another; and such fluctuation will not be taken away from the Blessed. Augustine's authority therefore is understood of the first fluctuation, not of the second ; and therefore by that authority it cannot be concluded that a blessed soul knows in act whatever it knows in habit.
To 2. To that which is objected, that glory is a habit in act; it must be said thatp311-7 it is true; but from this it does not follow that all knowledge which is in glory is in continuous act, but only that which is of the essence of glory; and since Christ's soul knows many things in the Word, and other souls too, which are not of the essence of glory: hence it is that it is not necessary for it to consider in act all that it knows in habit.
To 3. To that which is objected, that a habit in act is more perfect than a habit apart from act; it must be said that it is true, when it is in the noblest act, which is owed to that very habit; but the noblest act, which is owed to glory itself, is the actual consideration of the highest truth, not the actual consideration of any creatable or created truth whateverp311-8. Therefore, for Christ's soul to have a perfect habit of knowledge, it is not necessary that it actually consider every truth, but it suffices that it actually consider the highest truth.
To 4. To that which is objected, that by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, it knows things other than the Word, etc. ; it must be said that this is true of the knowledge as to habit, but it is not fitting as to the knowledge in act. For the actual knowledge and consideration of the eternal Word is essential to glory itself, but not so the actual knowledge of things other than the Word; and therefore it is not necessary that it so consider other things actually, in the way it actually considers the Word itself, but rather habitually. For that habit has a more essential relation with respect to the Word, which is the principal thing known, than with respect to the other things known in the Word, which are known as it were consequently and secondarily.
I. In this question St. Bonaventure intends nothing but to lay a foundation for solving the most difficult following question, and concludes that Christ's soul (like all the Blessed) knows more in habit than it considers in act. This conclusion rests on a principle evident in natural things in philosophy, namely that « habit extends to more things than act », and that the created intellect « is capable of more according to habitual knowledge than according to actual consideration ». As regards the state of glory, however, this principle must be greatly restricted and is by no means valid as regards the habitual knowledge of the primary object of the beatific vision, of which it is commonly held that « glory is a habit in act » (here, in the reply to 2); but as regards the secondary object, St. Bonaventure and Scotus defend the aforesaid conclusion. But Alexander of Hales (S. p. III. q. 13. m. 5.), St. Thomas (cf. however p. 311, note 2.), together with very many others, do not admit even this (cf. the following question). — We observe only three things in this place.
1. The word habit or habitually is not taken here by St. Bonaventure for a quality or predicamental habit, as Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 5. q. 14.) seems to have understood, who is refuted by Scotus (here q. 2. n. 13. ff.), but, as Bonaventure himself and Scotus explain (there n. 20.), namely in this sense, that something is present to the soul by which, being informed, it is constituted in first act for easily knowing all that the Word knows, provided that the Word, as a voluntary mirror, wills to reveal it (cf. below q. 3. in the body, near the end ; Mastrius in III. Sent. disp. 5. a. 2.). Hence many Scotists are accustomed to say, in place of habitually, quasi habitually.
2. St. Bonaventure therefore prefers this position, in order to explain how knowledge can extend itself successively to infinite things, in such a way that infinity is posited neither in the knowing power nor in the habit or light of glory, but only in the ground of knowing seen as primary object, which has in itself infinite relations to creatures and possible things. From this primary object such a vision is specified, and at the same time and consequently it receives an aptitude for extending itself to those infinite relations or objects which shine forth in the primary object (cf. here the reply to 4 and the following question, especially the replies to 7, 8, 9).
3. That this profound and sufficiently difficult doctrine may be better understood, we observe that the act of the intellect, which in itself states something absolute, by connotation implies a respect or relation to an object, which respect, if it is to a primary object, is really identified with the act of understanding itself. Hence, when the primary object is changed, another act is required for understanding it. We experience this essential variation of act in all the acts of our intellect tending toward disparate objects, each of which has its own proper ground of knowing. — It can be otherwise in the beatific vision, in which one object seen is of itself the ground of knowing both itself and all other things. In seeing the primary object indeed, which specifies the act itself, there can be no variation nor succession. But just as the primary object itself secondarily expresses every participated truth, so also it can furnish to the intellect clearly seeing it a foundation for extending itself to a secondary object, and this indeed without a new habit and by the power of the same act, which according to its aptitude already contains all the respects to truths of whatever kind (here, the reply to the last argument). Nor is anything else required for knowing them in act, except that new relations to secondary objects be added. — Hence our author (here, in the reply to 4) concludes that the comparison of the habit to the primary object is one thing, and to the secondary another, and that the act of vision depends on the former in one way, on the latter in another: on the former essentially, on the latter as it were accidentally « and consequently ». — Further, in the same vision these respects to created or creatable things are really distinguished from the essential act itself, which of itself, with respect to the secondary object, has only a certain inchoate representation. Hence it is understood, both that the same act of seeing the essential glory, without any intrinsic variation of its own, can present now more, now fewer objects, granted that that uncreated mirror represents them voluntarily; and that the extension of the intellect to various secondary objects comes about by the power of the same essential act, so that the variation is not on the part of the act itself, but on the part of the termination to the accidental objects of glory.
II. Richard of Mediavilla alone, here a. 2. q. 4, has a similar special question, namely, whether Christ's soul can newly see something in the Word in act, and defends both opinions as probable, as also does Scotus, in the place cited. Others in the following question for the most part touch upon the matter.
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- Cap. 16. n. 26: Fortassis etiam volubiles non erunt nostrae cogitationes ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes, sed omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus. — In fine arg. pro quidquid cogitat cod. A quidquid cognoscit.Ch. 16, n. 26: Perhaps our thoughts too will not be fluctuating, going from some things to others and returning, but we shall see our whole knowledge in one simultaneous glance. — At the end of the argument, for whatever it thinks codex A reads whatever it knows.
- Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 5. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 13. et X. c. 7. docet, animae felicitatem consistere in operatione, et quidem in optima.Cf. IV Sent., d. 49, p. I, q. 5. Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 13, and X, c. 7, teaches that the soul's felicity consists in operation, and indeed in the best operation.
- Aristot., VII. Ethic. c. 12, finem habitus reponit in operatione. Cfr. IX. Metaph. text. 15. (VIII. c. 8.).Aristotle, Ethics VII, c. 12, places the end of habit in operation. Cf. Metaphysics IX, text 15 (VIII, c. 8).
- Vide quaest. praeced. — Mox pro quod non cod. Z quin.See the preceding question. — Shortly after, for which not codex Z reads but that.
- Libr. II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 10.). Cfr. supra pag. 114, nota 5. — Aliquanto inferius pro et si hoc... parificetur actui edd. perperam sed... perficiatur ab actu.Book II of the Topics, c. 4 (c. 10). Cf. above p. 114, note 5. — Somewhat further down, for and if this... be made equal to act the editions wrongly read but... be perfected by act.
- Luc. 15, 7. 10.Luke 15:7, 10.
- Codd. A K L Z aa bb aliquod, codd. T V aliud. In fine arg. pro cuiuscumque codd. I L Z aa cuiuslibet.Codices A K L Z aa bb read some (aliquod), codices T V read another (aliud). At the end of the argument, for of whatever (cuiuscumque) codices I L Z aa read of any (cuiuslibet).
- Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro Si actu considerat non pauci codd. Si actu consideret.Cf. above a. 1, q. 2. — A little above, for If it actually considers (indicative) not a few codices read If it should actually consider (subjunctive).
- Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. ad 6. — De infinitate numeri cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 68. seqq. (c. 7.), et August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 18. — Circa finem arg. pro sunt codd. A G i L T Z aa sint.See I Sent., d. 43, q. 3, ad 6. — On the infinity of number cf. Aristotle, Physics III, text 68 ff. (c. 7), and Augustine, City of God XII, c. 18. — Near the end of the argument, for are (sunt, indicative) codices A G i L T Z aa read should be (sint, subjunctive).
- Aristot., III. de Anima. text. 36. (c. 7.) ait: Omnino autem intellectus, qui secundum actum intelligit, res ipsae est.Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 36 (c. 7), says: But in general the intellect, which understands according to act, is the things themselves.
- Vide etiam supra pag. 57, nota 7. Etiam S. Thom. (S. 1. q. 67. a. 5.) ait de Angelis: Hac visione [in Verbo] cognoscunt mysteria gratiae, non quidem omnia, nec aequaliter omnes, sed secundum quod Deus voluerit eis revelare.See also above p. 57, note 7. St. Thomas too (Summa I, q. 67, a. 5) says of the Angels: By this vision [in the Word] they know the mysteries of grace, not indeed all of them, nor all equally, but according as God has willed to reveal to them.
- Id est in fundamentis. — Mox pro quod plura, quod habent edd. cum aliquot codd., in aliis codd. quum plura; quae lectio explicari posset, si demonstrativum hoc referatur ad verba: capacitatem impleri. Nostra lectio congruentior est. Subinde pro consideret codd. I K T V z hii considerat, cod. N cognoscat.That is, in the [foregoing] arguments [in fundamentis]. — Shortly, for that more, the editions with some codices read that they have, in other codices since more; which reading could be explained if the demonstrative this be referred to the words its capacity be filled. Our reading is more fitting. Then, for it should consider codices I K T V z hii read it considers, codex N it knows.
- Cfr. supra d. 13. a. I. q. 3. ad 6. — Pro gratiam cod. gloriam. Paulo inferius pro et ideo edd. et idem; et circa finem solut. cognoscibilia pro cognoscenda.Cf. above d. 13, a. I, q. 3, ad 6. — For grace one codex reads glory. A little below, for and therefore the editions read and the same; and near the end of the solution knowable things (cognoscibilia) for things to be known (cognoscenda).
- Pro voce cogitationes codd. F H V Z et alii in hac solut. constanter exhibent vocem cognitionis, dum cod. aa ubique ponit vocem cogitationis.For the word thoughts (cogitationes) codices F H V Z and others in this solution consistently exhibit the word of knowledge (cognitionis), while codex aa everywhere puts the word of thought (cogitationis).
- Edd. sive ratiocinationem et discursum. Pro intimationem [intimare idem significat ac demonstrare, cfr. Du Cange, Glossar. etc.] cod. A ratiocinationem.The editions read or reasoning and discursive process. For intimation [intimare means the same as to demonstrate, cf. Du Cange, Glossary, etc.] codex A reads reasoning.
- Codd. F N U quod hoc.Codices F N U read that this.
- Pro creabilis vel creati edd. cum paucis codd. causabilis vel causati.For creatable or created the editions with a few codices read causable or caused.