Pars 1, Cap. 9
Breviloquium · Pars I: De Trinitate Dei
Capitulum IX. De voluntate Dei et providentia.
De voluntate autem Dei haec tenenda sunt, quod ipsa sic est recta, ut nullo modo possit obliquari; sic est efficax, ut nullo modo possit impediri; sic est una, ut tamen multiformiter habeat significari.
Significatur enim divina voluntas, quae est voluntas beneplaciti, per voluntatem signi secundum quinque differentias signorum, quae sunt praeceptio, prohibitio, consilium, impletio et permissio; secundum quae disponuntur a voluntate beneplaciti quaecumque in universo fiunt. « Est enim voluntas Dei prima et summa causa omnium specierum ac motionum. Nihil enim fit visibiliter et sensibiliter in ista totius creaturae amplissima quadam immensaque republica, quod non de interiore invisibili atque intelligibili aula summi Imperatoris aut iubeatur, aut permittatur, secundum ineffabilem iustitiam praemiorum atque poenarum, gratiarum et retributionum7 ».
Et quia ista voluntas, ratione regulata, dicitur providentia; hinc est, quod omnia, quae in universo fiunt, aguntur et reguntur divina providentia, quae per omnia est irreprehensibilis, quia nihil nisi iuste praecipit, prohibet, vel consulit; nihil agit nisi bene, nihil permittit iniuste.
Intelligentia autem et ratio praedictorum haec est. Primum principium, cum sit summe nobile, et voluntatem habet et nobili modo habet. Cum igitur voluntas de se dicat illud, secundum quod in agentibus a proposito1 attenditur regula rectitudinis et efficacia operationis; necesse est, quod voluntas in Deo sit rectissima et efficacissima: ideo rectissima, quia idem est in Deo voluntas et veritas; ideo efficacissima, quia idem prorsus in Deo est voluntas et virtus sive potestas. — Et quia non potest divina voluntas carere veritate, ideo non tantum est recta, verum etiam regula rectitudinis. Quia vero nullo modo potest carere virtute, ideo non tantum est efficax, verum etiam fons et origo totius efficaciae; ita ut nihil sine illa possit effici, nihil contra illam possit fieri, nihil etiam sit, a quo valeat impediri.
Et quia rectissima est, nullus potest esse rectus, nisi conformetur ei2; nullus autem potest ei conformari, nisi voluntas illa innotescat sibi: oportuit ergo, voluntatem divinam ut regulam rectitudinis notificari nobis. Rectitudo autem quaedam est necessitatis, et haec est in faciendo bonum necessarium et declinando malum3; quaedam est perfectionis, et haec est in supererogando ultra debitum; et secundum hoc innotescit nobis per triplex signum, scilicet praeceptionem, prohibitionem et consilium; quod quidem significat divinum beneplacitum acceptare tanquam iustum; quod fit secundum divinum praeceptum, quod declinatur secundum divinam prohibitionem et adimpletur secundum divinum consilium. Signa vero haec infallibilia signa sunt divinae voluntatis, ut est regula rectitudinis.
Rursus, quia efficacissima est, nullo modo potest aliquis aliquid efficere, nisi ipsa operante et coefficiente; nullus deficere vel peccare potest, nisi ipsa iuste deserente4. Et secundum hoc duo sunt eius signa, scilicet impletio, quod est signum voluntatis ut efficientis; et permissio, quod est signum voluntatis iuste deserentis. Iuste autem deserit, quia iustum est, ut sic administret res, quas condidit, ut non infringat leges, quas indidit; et sic cooperetur « rebus, quas creavit, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat5 »: et ideo, si liberum arbitrium ad utrumque vertibile de lege naturae in malum dimittat cadere, hoc non permittit nisi iuste.
Rursus, si per gratiam praeveniat et sustentet, nulli iniuriam facit; ideo non agit iniuste nec omnino iuste secundum exigentiam meritorum, quia merita ad hoc non sufficiunt; sed gratis et misericorditer et quodam modo iuste, quantum est ex condecentia bonitatis suae. Cum ergo damnat et reprobat, operatur secundum iustitiam; quando vero praedestinat, secundum gratiam et misericordiam, quae non excludit iustitiam6. Quia ergo omnes, secundum quod de massa perditionis erant, debebant damnari; ideo plures reprobantur quam eligantur, ut ostendatur, quod salvatio est secundum gratiam specialem, sed damnatio secundum iustitiam communem. Nullus ergo potest conqueri de divina voluntate, quia omnia agit rectissime, immo in omnibus debemus gratias agere et honorificare regimen divinae providentiae. — Si quis autem quaerat, quare magis uni peccatori munus gratiae largiatur quam alteri, hic oportet silentium imponere humanae loquacitati et exclamare cum Apostolo7: O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei, quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius, et investigabiles viae eius. Quis enim cognovit sensum Domini, aut quis eius consiliarius fuit, aut quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. Ipsi gloria in saecula saeculorum. Amen.
---
Chapter IX. On the will of God and providence.
Concerning the will of God these things are to be held: that it is so right that it can in no way be bent aside; so efficacious that it can in no way be impeded; so one that it nevertheless has to be signified in many ways.
For the divine will, which is the will of good pleasure, is signified through the will of the sign according to five differences of signs, which are precept, prohibition, counsel, fulfilment, and permission; and according to these, whatever comes to be in the universe is disposed by the will of good pleasure. « For the will of God is the first and highest cause of all species and motions. For nothing comes to be visibly and sensibly in this vast and immense commonwealth of the whole creation which is not either commanded or permitted from the interior, invisible, and intelligible hall of the highest Emperor, according to the ineffable justice of rewards and punishments, of graces and retributions7 ».
And because this will, regulated by reason, is called providence, hence it is that all things which come to be in the universe are done and governed by divine providence, which is in all things beyond reproach, because it commands, prohibits, and counsels nothing except justly; it does nothing except well; it permits nothing unjustly.
Now the understanding and the reason for the aforesaid is this. The first principle, since it is supremely noble, both has will and has it in a noble manner. Since, therefore, the will of itself says that in which — as is observed in agents acting from purpose1 — there is a rule of rightness and an efficacy of operation; it must be that the will in God is most right and most efficacious: most right, because in God will and truth are the same; most efficacious, because in God will and power or might are altogether the same. — And because the divine will cannot lack truth, therefore it is not only right, but also the rule of rightness. But because it can in no way lack power, therefore it is not only efficacious, but also the font and origin of all efficacy; so that nothing can be effected without it, nothing can be done against it, nor is there anything by which it can be impeded.
And because it is most right, no one can be right unless he be conformed to it2; but no one can be conformed to it unless that will become known to him: it was therefore fitting that the divine will, as the rule of rightness, be made known to us. Now one kind of rightness is that of necessity, and this lies in doing the necessary good and turning away from evil3; another is that of perfection, and this lies in going beyond what is owed; and according to this it becomes known to us through a threefold sign, namely precept, prohibition, and counsel — which indeed signifies that the divine good pleasure accepts as just what is done according to the divine precept, what is turned away from according to the divine prohibition, and what is fulfilled according to the divine counsel. And these signs are infallible signs of the divine will as it is the rule of rightness.
Again, because it is most efficacious, no one can in any way effect anything except by its operating and co-effecting; no one can fail or sin except by its justly deserting4. And according to this there are two signs of it: namely fulfilment, which is the sign of the will as effecting; and permission, which is the sign of the will justly deserting. And it deserts justly, because it is just that it should so administer the things which it founded as not to infringe the laws which it implanted in them; and thus that it should cooperate « with the things which it created, so as to let them exercise their own motions5 »: and therefore, if it lets free choice, changeable to either side by the law of nature, fall into evil, it does not permit this except justly.
Again, if it goes before and sustains by grace, it does injury to no one; therefore it acts neither unjustly nor altogether justly according to the exigency of merits, since merits do not suffice for this; but freely and mercifully and in a certain way justly, so far as befits its own goodness. When, therefore, it condemns and reprobates, it works according to justice; but when it predestines, according to grace and mercy, which does not exclude justice6. Since therefore all, according as they were of the mass of perdition, deserved to be condemned, therefore more are reprobated than are chosen, so that it may be shown that salvation is according to special grace, but damnation according to common justice. No one, therefore, can complain of the divine will, since it does all things most rightly; rather, in all things we ought to give thanks and honor the governance of divine providence. — But if anyone should ask why the gift of grace is bestowed on one sinner rather than on another, here silence must be imposed upon human garrulity, and we must cry out with the Apostle7: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been his counsellor? Or who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? For of him, and by him, and in him, are all things. To him be glory for ever and ever. Amen.
---
- 7August., III. de Trin. c. 4. n. 9. Textus originalis et B vocibus omnium specierum interserunt corporalium, I temporalium. Vat., quam sequuntur 1, 3: Est enim... fit visibile aut intelligibile in ista... quadam universaque republica, quod non de illa imperiali aula etc. Post sensibiliter A H addunt vel intelligibiliter. — De voluntate Dei cfr. I. Sent. d. 45-48, ubi etiam quaedam de providentia divina tanguntur; plenius autem de ipsa agit Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 26. per totam. — Post pauca verbis ratione regulata E H R interserunt gubernata vel.Augustine, On the Trinity III, c. 4, n. 9. The original text and B insert corporalium among the words omnium specierum, I temporalium. The Vatican edition, which editions 1 and 3 follow: Est enim… fit visibile aut intelligibile in ista… quadam universaque republica, quod non de illa imperiali aula, etc. After sensibiliter A H add vel intelligibiliter. — On the will of God cf. Book I of the Sentences, dd. 45–48, where certain matters concerning divine providence are also touched on; but Alexander of Hales treats of it more fully, Summa p. I, q. 26, throughout. — Shortly after, E H R insert gubernata vel into the words ratione regulata.
- 1De hac dictione cfr. tom. I. pag. 714, nota 3.On this expression cf. vol. I, p. 714, note 3.
- 2Cfr. I. Sent. d. 48. — Superius voci efficaciae B H praemittunt efficientiae vel [H et], ubi M omittit totius.Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 48. — Above, B H prefix efficientiae vel [H et] to the word efficaciae, where M omits totius.
- 3Respicitur Ps. 36, 27: Declina a malo et fac bonum.Reference is made to Psalm 36:27: Turn away from evil and do good.
- 4Vide II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Pro operante edd. et pauci codd. cooperante.See Book II of the Sentences, d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — For operante the editions and a few codices have cooperante.
- 5August., VII. de Civ. Dei, c. 30: Sic itaque administrat omnia, quae creavit, ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat. — Pro creavit, quod plures codd. omittunt, plures alii (inter quos B L M S) creat.Augustine, City of God VII, c. 30: And so he administers all the things which he created in such a way that he also lets them exercise and carry out their own motions. — For creavit, which very many codices omit, very many others (among them B L M S) have creat.
- 6Cfr. Anselm., Proslog. c. 9-11, ex quo quaedam attulimus tom. IV. pag. 964, nota 3. — August., Enchirid. c. 99. n. 25: Sola enim gratia redemptos discernit a perditis, quos in unam perditionis concreverat massam ab origine ducta causa communis. — Ante secundum gratiam B L H repetunt operatur. Aliquanto inferius pro in omnibus B de omnibus (I. Petr. 4, 11: Ut in omnibus honorificetur Deus).Cf. Anselm, Proslogion c. 9–11, from which we adduced certain passages in vol. IV, p. 964, note 3. — Augustine, Enchiridion c. 99, n. 25: For grace alone distinguishes the redeemed from the lost, whom a cause common to them from their origin had welded into one mass of perdition. — Before secundum gratiam B L H repeat operatur. Somewhat below, for in omnibus B has de omnibus (1 Peter 4:11: That in all things God may be honored).
- 7Rom. 11, 33-36. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro munus gratiae plures codd. et 2 minus gratia, Vat. et 1, 3 gratiam.Romans 11:33–36. Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 41, a. 1, q. 2. — A little above, for munus gratiae very many codices and edition 2 have minus gratia, the Vatican edition and 1, 3 gratiam. ---