Bonaventure

Quaestio II.

Utrum electio sit idem quod praedestinatio.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur, quid sit electio, et quod sit idem quod praedestinatio, videtur.

1. Magister dicit in littera¹: «Cum autem praedestinatio sit electio, qua Deus elegit quos voluit, ante mundi constitutionem»: ergo etc.

2. Item, ratione videtur, quia omnis praedestinatus est electus, et omnis electus praedestinatus, ergo praedestinatio est electio, cum per se praedicentur ad invicem².

3. Item, quorum opposita sunt eadem, ipsa sunt eadem³; sed oppositum electionis est reprobatio, et haec est oppositum praedestinationis: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Quaecumque sunt diversorum, ipsa sunt diversa; sed praedestinatio est solum bonorum, electio vero omnium salvandorum et aliquorum damnandorum: ergo etc. Probatio minoris habetur Ioannis sexto⁴: Nonne duodecim vos elegi, et unus ex vobis diabolus est? Si tu dicas, quod illud intelligitur de electione temporali; contra: electio temporalis signum est aeternae: aut ergo concordant, aut est signum falsum.

2. Item, si nunquam esset aliquis malus, esset praedestinatio, sed non esset electio; secundum hoc ergo aliud obiectum respicit electio, aliud praedestinatio: ergo non sunt omnino idem.

3. Item, agens secundum propositum dicitur agens per electionem⁵, et non dicitur agere secundum praedestinationem: ergo differt praedestinatio et electio.

Quaeritur ergo, quae sit differentia, et quod sit prius secundum rationem intelligendi.

Conclusio.

Electio secundum affectionem dilectionis idem est quod praedestinatio, electio vero secundum effectum finalis gratificationis est signum praedestinationis infallibile.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod electio tripliciter dicitur. Est enim electio secundum affectum dilectionis, et secundum effectum finalis gratificationis, et secundum statum praelationis. Prima est aeterna et est idem quod praedestinatio; secunda est temporalis et signum primae infallibile; tertia similiter temporalis, nec est effectus nec signum aeternae electionis. Multi enim praeficiuntur mali et reprobi; et utinam non sint plures mali quam boni!

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de verbo Domini, Ioannis sexto, dicendum, quod intelligitur de electione praelationis, et haec non est tantum bonorum nec omnium bonorum; et ideo vere patet, quod non est idem quod praedestinatio. — Et quod obiicitur, quod est signum; dicendum, quod non est signum certum, nec Dominus dat pro signo, et stultus est, qui huic signo credit. Sed electio secundum effectum finalis gratificationis, haec est signum certum simpliciter, sed non est certum nobis. Et haec differt a vocatione, quia multis datur gratia, qui non perseverant; ideo dicuntur vocati, sed non electi; et de his dicitur Matthaei vigesimo secundo⁶: Multi sunt vocati, pauci vero electi.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod electio respicit malum, et convenit omni agenti a proposito, non sic praedestinatio; notandum, quod in Deo idem sunt propositum, praedestinatio et electio secundum rem, tamen differunt secundum rationem intelligendi. Nam propositum simpliciter dicit voluntatem faciendi aliquid. Ille enim dicitur proponere, qui firmiter vult facere aliquid. Electio vero et praedestinatio addunt supra conceptionem⁷, sed differenter, quia praedestinatio addit ordinem et directionem in finem, sed electio discretionem sive separationem a suo opposito. Unde propositum dicit firmam voluntatis⁸ conceptionem, praedestinatio cum conceptione dicit praeordinationem, et electio quandam discretionem. Secundum hoc igitur patet, quod propositum est prius secundum rationem intelligendi, et deinde electio, quia prius est intelligendum aliquid separari a malo sive a massa⁹, quam dirigi in finem; et sic patet diversitas et ordo.

Ad 3. Et ex hoc patet illud quod ultimo quaeritur, quare agens a proposito non semper dicitur agens p. 716secundum praedestinationem, sicut secundum electionem; quia omnis agens a proposito deliberans alteram partem contradictionis praeaccipit, ideo omnis talis dicitur eligere; sed non omnis agens sic ordinat effectum in finem, sed ut plurimum se ipsum. Praedestinare autem est praeordinare alterum in finem, et hoc quidem competit Deo proprie; et ideo patet illud. Praedestinatio enim tria connotat, scilicet praeordinatum, et hic est homo; et rationem praeordinandi, et haec est gratia; et rationem finis, et haec est gloria: et sic sunt tria, scilicet quod, et per quod, et ad quod.

Question II.

Whether election is the same as predestination.

Secondly it is asked what election is, and that it is the same as predestination is shown.

1. The Master says in the text¹: «Since predestination is the election by which God chose those whom he willed, before the foundation of the world»: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems by reason, because every predestined person is elect, and every elect person predestined; therefore predestination is election, since they are predicated of one another per se².

3. Likewise, those whose opposites are the same are themselves the same³; but the opposite of election is reprobation, and this is the opposite of predestination: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Whatever things belong to different subjects are themselves different; but predestination is only of the good, whereas election is of all those to be saved and of some to be damned: therefore etc. The proof of the minor is had in John six⁴: Have I not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? If you say that this is to be understood of temporal election; on the contrary: temporal election is a sign of the eternal: either then they agree, or it is a false sign.

2. Likewise, if there were never anyone evil, there would still be predestination, but there would not be election; according to this, then, election regards one object, and predestination another: therefore they are not entirely the same.

3. Likewise, an agent acting from purpose is called an agent through election⁵, and is not said to act according to predestination: therefore predestination and election differ.

It is asked therefore what is the difference, and what is prior according to the order of understanding.

Conclusion.

Election according to the affection of love is the same as predestination; election according to the effect of final glorification is an infallible sign of predestination.

I respond: It must be said that election is spoken of in three ways. For there is election according to the affect of love, and according to the effect of final glorification, and according to the state of pre-eminence. The first is eternal and is the same as predestination; the second is temporal and an infallible sign of the first; the third likewise is temporal, and is neither an effect nor a sign of eternal election. For many evil and reprobate are set in pre-eminence; and would that there were not more evil than good!

To the arguments:

To 1. To that which is objected concerning the word of the Lord in John six, it must be said that it is to be understood of election to pre-eminence, and this is not only of the good, nor of all the good; and so it clearly appears that it is not the same as predestination. — And to that which is objected, that it is a sign; it must be said that it is not a certain sign, nor does the Lord give it as a sign, and foolish is he who trusts in this sign. But election according to the effect of final glorification — this is a sign certain absolutely speaking, but it is not certain to us. And this differs from vocation, because grace is given to many who do not persevere; therefore they are called vocati (called) but not electi (elect); and of these it is said in Matthew twenty-two⁶: Many are called, but few are chosen.

To 2. To that which is objected, that election regards evil and is fitting to every agent acting from purpose, but predestination does not; it is to be noted that in God purpose, predestination, and election are the same in reality, yet they differ according to the order of understanding. For purpose simply expresses the will of doing something. For he is said to purpose who firmly wills to do something. But election and predestination add upon the [will's] conception⁷, yet differently, because predestination adds order and direction toward an end, while election adds discretion or separation from its opposite. Hence purpose expresses a firm conception of the will⁸, predestination together with conception expresses pre-ordination, and election expresses a certain discretion. According to this, then, it is clear that purpose is prior in the order of understanding, and election follows, since it must first be understood that something is separated from evil or from the mass⁹, and then directed toward an end; and so the diversity and order are clear.

To 3. And from this is clear what is asked last, namely why an agent from purpose is not always called acting p. 716according to predestination as he is according to election; because every agent who deliberates from purpose seizes upon one part of the contradiction beforehand, and therefore every such agent is said to elect; but not every such agent thus orders the effect toward an end, but for the most part toward himself. To predestine, however, is to pre-ordain another toward an end, and this properly belongs to God; and so the matter is clear. For predestination connotes three things, namely the one pre-ordained, and this is a human being; the ground of pre-ordaining, and this is grace; and the ground of the end, and this is glory: and so there are three, namely that which, through which, and toward which.