Dist. 40, Art. 4, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 40
Articulus IV.
De reprobatione et specialiter de obduratione.
Consequenter est quaestio de tertio articulo, scilicet de reprobatione. Et cum ea quae dicta sunt de praedestinatione aeterna, sint dicenda vel aptari possint reprobationi, quaeritur specialiter de obduratione, quae est eius connotatum, de qua duo quaeruntur.
Primum est, utrum sit poena, an culpa.
Secundum, utrum obduratio sit a Deo.
Quaestio I.
Utrum obduratio sit poena, an culpa.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Quod autem obduratio sit poena, ostenditur sic:
1. Super illud ad Romanos nono1: Cuius vult miseretur etc., Glossa Augustini: «Obduratio est nolle misereri»: sed nolle misereri non est culpa, sed poena: ergo etc.
2. Item, ibidem2: «Miseretur secundum gratiam, quae gratis datur; obdurat autem secundum iudicium, quod meritis redditur»; sed constat quod non redditur bonis meritis, ergo malis; sed quod malis meritis redditur est poena: ergo obduratio est poena.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia in hoc differt culpa et poena, quia culpa est affectio voluntaria, poena autem est affectio involuntaria; sed obduratio cordis est involuntaria, quia nullus vult dehabilitari sive obdurari: ergo etc.
4. Item, sicut se habet excaecatio ad intellectum, sic obduratio ad affectum; sed excaecatio dicit poenam, non culpam: ergo et obduratio.
Contra:
1. Super illud ad Romanos secundo3: Secundum duritiam etc., Glossa: «Induratio est induratae mentis in malitia pertinacia, per quam fit homo impoenitens»; sed hoc dicit culpam: ergo etc.
2. Item, Augustinus de Praedestinatione Sanctorum4: «Obduratio nihil aliud est quam Dei obviare mandatis»; sed obviare mandatis dicit inobedientiam: sed «peccatum, ut dicit Ambrosius, nihil aliud est quam praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum»: ergo obduratio dicit peccatum.
3. Item, ratione videtur, quia nulla poena temporalis, secundum quod huiusmodi, opponitur gratiae gratificanti; sed obduratio opponitur gratiae gratificanti et maxime gratiae finali: ergo obduratio non est poena, sed culpa.
4. Item, in hoc est differentia inter poenam et culpam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus5, «poena est malum, quod patimur, culpa vero est malum, quod agimus»; sed obdurationem unusquisque facit sibi sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Gratia et libero arbitrio6: «Induravit Dominus Pharaonem iusto iudicio, sed ipse se libero arbitrio». Et quod obduratio sit a nobis, patet: quia in Psalmo dissuadetur: Nolite, inquit, obdurare corda vestra: ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Obduratio, ut dicit cor inhabile ad impressionem gratiae, est poena peccati; ut significat cor in peccato stabilitum, est dispositio praecedentis peccati; ut vero dicit cor rebelle, est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod obduratio in spiritibus est translative dicta ab obduratione in corporibus. In corporibus autem duritiam consequitur triplex proprietas, quamvis insit corpori per eandem naturam, non sic spiritui7. Durum enim est inhabile ad suscipiendum, est stabile ad permanendum, est iterum forte ad rebellandum sive resistendum. Secundum hunc triplicem modum cor obdurari dicitur tripliciter. Primo modo dicitur cor obduratum ex hoc, quod est inhabile ad impressionem gratiae suscipiendam; et hoc modo sonat in passionem et est poena consequens culpam. Secundo modo dicitur cor obduratum, quod est in peccato stabilitum, quod scilicet est multum compactum ad amorem peccati; et hoc modo obduratio est peccatum cum dispositione sive dispositio peccati praecedentis. Tertio modo dicitur cor obduratum cor rebelle quod vult Deum et eius mandata et gratiam impugnare; et hoc modo est speciale peccati genus, scilicet peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. 2. Et secundum istum modum triplicem diversae auctoritates procedunt de obduratione, quae bene videntur sibi obviare: sed diversis viis procedunt secundum membra distinctionis praedictae. Concedendum est ergo, quod obduratio uno modo est poena; concedendum est nihilominus, quod aliis modis est culpa sive dispositio culpae.
Ad 3. 4. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod poena gratiae non repugnat et etiam sonat in passionem; dicendum, quod triplex est poena. Est enim quaedam poena inflicta, quaedam contracta, quaedam acta. Poena inflicta simpliciter est passio et non repugnans8 gratiae, ut fames, sitis et aegritudo. Poena contracta est fomes et concupiscentia, et haec quidem passio est, et ideo poena, sed tamen inclinat ad actionem malam; et ideo gratiae repugnat non quantum ad substantiam, sed quantum ad inclinationem. Poena acta est sicut obduratio et gratiae expulsio, et haec quidem poena est, quia passio est; sed quia ex mala actione sive ex peccato est, et illud concomitatur inseparabiliter, ideo opponitur gratiae. Et ita patet, quod nihilominus est poena et passio; quamvis enim contingat per propriam actionem, nihilominus poena est, sicut patet in scabioso, qui in scalpendo se delectatur, sed postea sentit in carne ardorem.
Scholion.
1. Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 29. m. 3. 4. 5.) enumerat et bene explicat tres effectus reprobationis, qui sunt substractio gratiae, excaecatio, obduratio. In solut. ad 3. tangitur a S. Doctore primum membrum huius divisionis, et bene distinguitur triplex poena; excaecationis autem mentio fit in 1. fundam. De poena eiusque ordine ad culpam cfr. II. Sent. d. 36. per totam. — Doctores in hac doctrina conveniunt, et Petr. a Tar. fere ad verbum sequitur nostrum Doctorem.
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Article IV.
On reprobation, and especially on obduration.
Next comes the question on the third article, namely on reprobation. And since the things which have been said about eternal predestination must be said, or can be applied, to reprobation, the inquiry is made specifically about obduration, which is its connoted attribute, and concerning which two things are asked.
The first is, whether it is punishment or fault.
The second, whether obduration is from God.
Question I.
Whether obduration is punishment or fault.
That obduration is punishment is shown thus:
1. Upon that passage in Romans nine1: He has mercy on whom he wills etc., the Gloss of Augustine: «Obduration is to be unwilling to have mercy»: but to be unwilling to have mercy is not fault, but punishment: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, in the same place2: «He shows mercy according to grace, which is given gratuitously; but he hardens according to judgment, which is rendered to merits»; but it is established that it is not rendered to good merits, therefore to bad ones; but that which is rendered to bad merits is punishment: therefore obduration is punishment.
3. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason, because in this fault and punishment differ, that fault is a voluntary affection, but punishment is an involuntary affection; but obduration of the heart is involuntary, because no one wills to be disabled or hardened: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, as blinding stands to the intellect, so obduration to the affection; but blinding signifies punishment, not fault: therefore obduration also.
On the contrary:
1. Upon that passage in Romans two3: According to your hardness etc., the Gloss: «Induration is the obstinacy of a hardened mind in malice, by which a man becomes impenitent»; but this signifies fault: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, Augustine On the Predestination of the Saints4: «Obduration is nothing else than God's standing in the way of the commandments»; but to stand in the way of the commandments signifies disobedience: but «sin, as Ambrose says, is nothing else than the transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly commandments»: therefore obduration signifies sin.
3. Likewise, by reason it appears, because no temporal punishment, insofar as such, is opposed to gratifying grace; but obduration is opposed to gratifying grace, and most of all to final grace: therefore obduration is not punishment, but fault.
4. Likewise, in this is the difference between punishment and fault, that, as Augustine says5, «punishment is the evil which we suffer, but fault is the evil which we do»; but each one brings obduration upon himself, as Augustine says in the book On Grace and Free Will6: «The Lord hardened Pharaoh by a just judgment, but he himself by his own free will». And that obduration is from us, is plain: because in the Psalm it is dissuaded: Do not, he says, harden your hearts: therefore etc.
Conclusion.
Obduration, insofar as it signifies a heart unfit to receive the impress of grace, is the punishment of sin; insofar as it signifies a heart established in sin, it is the disposition of preceding sin; but insofar as it signifies a rebellious heart, it is sin against the Holy Spirit.
I respond: It must be said that obduration in spirits is spoken of by transference from obduration in bodies. In bodies, however, hardness is followed by a threefold property, although it is in the body through the same nature, which is not the case in spirit7. For the hard is unfit for receiving, is stable for remaining, and again is strong for rebelling or resisting. According to this threefold mode the heart is said to be hardened in three ways. In the first way the heart is called hardened from this, that it is unfit for receiving the impress of grace; and in this way it sounds as a passion and is punishment following fault. In the second way the heart is called hardened, when it is established in sin, namely when it is much compacted in love of sin; and in this way obduration is sin together with disposition, or the disposition of preceding sin. In the third way the heart is called hardened as a rebellious heart which wills to assail God and his commandments and grace; and in this way it is a special kind of sin, namely sin against the Holy Spirit.
To the arguments:
To 1, 2. And according to this threefold mode the various authorities proceed concerning obduration, and they seem well to oppose one another: but they proceed by different ways according to the members of the aforesaid distinction. It must therefore be conceded that obduration in one mode is punishment; it must nevertheless be conceded that in other modes it is fault, or the disposition of fault.
To 3, 4. To that, then, which is objected, that punishment is not repugnant to grace and also sounds as a passion; it must be said that punishment is threefold. For there is a certain inflicted punishment, a certain contracted, a certain acted. Inflicted punishment, simply, is passion and not repugnant8 to grace, such as hunger, thirst, and sickness. Contracted punishment is the tinder [of sin] and concupiscence, and this indeed is passion, and therefore punishment, but it nonetheless inclines to evil action; and therefore it is repugnant to grace, not as to substance, but as to inclination. Acted punishment is like obduration and the expulsion of grace, and this indeed is punishment, because it is passion; but because it is from evil action or from sin, and that accompanies it inseparably, therefore it is opposed to grace. And so it is plain that it is nonetheless punishment and passion; for although it comes about through one's own action, it is nonetheless punishment, as is plain in the man with scabies, who delights in scratching himself, but afterwards feels a burning in the flesh.
Scholion.
1. Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 29. m. 3. 4. 5.) enumerates and well explains the three effects of reprobation, which are withdrawal of grace, blinding, obduration. In the solution to 3 the first member of this division is touched on by the Holy Doctor, and the threefold punishment is well distinguished; mention of blinding is made in the first fundament. Concerning punishment and its order to fault, cf. II. Sent. d. 36. throughout. — The Doctors agree in this teaching, and Petr. a Tar. follows our Doctor almost word for word.
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- Vers. 18.Verse 18 [Rom. 9:18].
- Vide supra pag. 713, nota 4.See above page 713, note 4.
- Vers. 5. — Vat., neglecta auctoritate codd. et textus originalis, verba Glossae sic reddit: Induratio est perseveratio mentis in malitia pertinaci, per quam etc.Verse 5 [Rom. 2:5]. — The Vatican edition, neglecting the authority of the codices and of the original text, renders the words of the Gloss thus: Induration is the perseverance of the mind in pertinacious malice, through which etc.
- Melius legeretur de Praedestinatione et gratia, in quo libro, qui ceterum incerti auctoris est, c. 1. dicitur: Quid enim aliud est duritia quam Dei obviare mandatis? — Sequens textus, ex Ambrosio citatus, invenitur in eius libro de Paradiso, c. 8. n. 39.It would be better read On Predestination and Grace, in which book — which is moreover of uncertain author — c. 1, it is said: For what else is hardness than God's standing in the way of the commandments? — The following text, cited from Ambrose, is found in his book On Paradise, c. 8 n. 39.
- Contra Adimantum, Manichaei discipulum, c. 26: Malum hoc loco non peccatum, sed poena intelligenda est. Dupliciter enim appellatur malum: unum, quod homo facit, alterum, quod patitur; quod facit, peccatum est; quod patitur, poena. Cfr. et de Vera Relig. c. 20. n. 39, et I. de lib. arb. c. 1. n. 1. (c. 1.); nec non III. c. 15. et 16. n. 41. seqq. — Textus deinde allatus loc. cit. c. 23. n. 45. sic sonat: Ac per hoc et Deus induravit per iustum iudicium, et ipse Pharao per liberum arbitrium. — Psalmus, ex quo mox verba citantur, est 94, 8.Against Adimantus, the disciple of Mani, c. 26: Evil in this place is to be understood not as sin, but as punishment. For evil is called such in two ways: one, that which man does; the other, that which he suffers; what he does is sin; what he suffers is punishment. Cf. also On True Religion c. 20 n. 39, and the first book On Free Will c. 1 n. 1 (c. 1); also III, c. 15 and 16 n. 41 ff. — The text subsequently cited at the same place, c. 23 n. 45, runs thus: And by this God too hardened by a just judgment, and Pharaoh himself by his free will. — The Psalm from which the words are next cited, is 94:8.
- [The reference to Augustine's De Gratia et libero arbitrio (c. 23. n. 45) is given in the preceding note.][The reference to Augustine's On Grace and Free Will (c. 23 n. 45) is given in the preceding note.]
- Sensus est: Quamvis natura corporis sit remota causa duritiae et triplicis illius proprietatis, quae duritiae attribuitur, duritia tamen est eiusdem causa proxima. Sed in spiritu duritia et proprietates consequentes nullatenus ei insunt ratione suae naturae. — De triplici proprietate duritiae cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate; III. de Caelo et Mundo, text. 11. (c. 1.); et IV. Meteor. c. 5. (c. 4.).The sense is: Although the nature of the body is the remote cause of hardness and of the threefold property which is attributed to hardness, hardness nevertheless is its proximate cause. But in spirit, hardness and the properties following upon it are in no way present to it by reason of its nature. — On the threefold property of hardness cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. on Quality; III. On the Heaven and the World, text 11 (c. 1); and IV. Meteorology c. 5 (c. 4).
- Codd. R V repugnat.Codices R V read repugnat.