Bonaventure

Quaestio II.

Utrum obduratio sit a Deo.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum obduratio sit a Deo sive sit effectus Dei reprobantis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Ad Romanos nono¹: Cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat; sed idem est aliquid fieri Deo auctore et Deo volente: si ergo obduratio est Deo volente, ergo et Deo auctore.

2. Item, ibidem in Glossa²: «Obduratio est nolle misereri»: aut ergo hic est praedicatio per causam, aut per inhaerentiam, aut per essentiam. Non per inhaerentiam vel per essentiam — in Deo enim est voluntas miserendi, nec tamen obduratio — ergo est dictum per causam; sed Deus non vult misereri aliquorum ut praescitorum, ut dicit Augustinus: ergo ab ipso est eorum obduratio.

3. Item, super illud Exodi³: Ego indurabo cor eius, dicit Augustinus: «Induravit Deus Pharaonem iusto iudicio», ergo secundum hoc fuit iustum Pharaonem indurari; sed omne iustum a summa iustitia procedit, quae Deus est: ergo etc.

4. Item, ratione videtur, quia omne quod est aliquid, est a Deo: obduratio est aliquid: ergo secundum id quod est, est a Deo. Quod sit aliquid, patet, quia durum dicit naturalem potentiam⁴; sed molle dicit impotentiam. Ergo si mollities et in corporibus et spiritibus est aliquid, quod habet Deum causam, patet etc.

5. Item, quicumque habet curam alicuius, si permittit eum malefacere, cum possit prohibere, vel perire, cum possit adiuvare, non inconvenienter dicitur causa sui maleficii vel peccati sive mali. Unde praelatus, qui subditos non corrigit, causa dicitur malorum in subditis; similiter, qui habet unde pascat fame morientem, et non pascit, causa est mortis eius. Si ergo Deus potest prohibere, ut affectus noster non⁵ durescat, et potest pascere, ut non deficiat, et non facit; videtur, quod sibi sit ratio et causa indurationis attribuenda.

6. Item, Philosophus dat maximam⁶: «Si aliquid est causa alicuius, et oppositum est causa oppositi», ut, si habere pulmonem est causa respirandi, et non habere est causa non respirandi. Sed velle misereri est causa gratificationis: ergo nolle misereri est causa obdurationis.

7. Item, «si aliquid per sui praesentiam causa est alicuius, per sui absentiam est causa oppositi», haec est alia maxima Philosophi⁷; sed Deus per sui praesentiam est causa mollificationis cordis: ergo per sui absentiam est causa obdurationis.

8. Item, si aliqua duo sunt omnino similia, aut p. 720proprietas aliqua non inest uni, quae non insit alii, aut si inest, aliunde inest. Ponantur ergo hic duo parvuli, sicut Iacob et Esau⁸: Deus unum obdurat, ut Esau, alterum non obdurat, ut Iacob: ergo cum sint similes omnino quantum ad naturam et quantum ad merita, aliunde venit obduratio. Sed non est dare nisi a Deo, ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod a diabolo; contra: esto quod diabolus nullo modo se intromittat, nihilominus iste obduraretur.

9. Item, omnis effectus, sive positivus sive defectivus, habet causam proximam et immediatam: quaero ergo, quae sit causa obdurationis proxima: aut enim culpa originalis, aut actualis, aut usus liberi arbitrii, aut aliquid aliud. Non culpa originalis, quia tunc omnes obdurarentur; similiter nec culpa actualis, quia tunc omnis actualiter peccans obduraretur; nec usus liberi arbitrii, quia obduratio, ut est connotatum reprobationis⁹, est in parvulis, in quibus non est usus liberi arbitrii. Restat ergo, quod voluntas Dei sit causa, et hoc videtur, quia ea posita ponitur effectus. Si enim Deus non vult istius misereri, necesse est, eum obdurari.

Contra: 1. Iesum acuto¹⁰, Omnia qui erat odit ad me, ego victum facio; ergo paratus est immuno omnes simpliciter; ergo defectus illustrationis non venit ex parte Dei, sed ex parte nostra.

2. Item, Apocalypsis tertio¹¹: Ecce ego ad ostium et pulso, si quis mihi aperuerit, intrabo ad illum etc. Sed si perceperat, voluerunt hospitari, nec recumdunt in domo, non est causa ex parte sui, sed nostra suscipi: ergo similiter et obdurationis non est causa, nisi qui non recipit Deum pulsantem.

3. Item, Augustinus super illud Ioannis¹² Ecce in tenebris lucet, dicit: «Sicut enim positis in sole praesente est lux, et ipse aborto est luci, et omni impietas, qui mens est ouli; pravorum est nubeculae», si ipse est absoulus. Si ergo bonum est nimulae, quae caecitas siue privatio actus videtur non sit a sole, patet quod nec obduratio est a Deo.

4. Item, Anselmus¹³: «Non ideo non habet bonus gratiam, quia Deus non dat, sed quia homo non accipit»; ergo non debet dici obduratio esse a Deo.

5. Item, ratione videtur, quia «quinta est ultima ablactio»¹⁴; sed obduratio est proximum inter omnia mala: ergo ipsum non efficit Deus, qui est optimus.

6. Item, obduratio anima reddit animam impotentem ad bonum, ergo est defectus; sed defectus est non habet causam, aut si habet, habet causam deficientem¹⁵. Deus autem nullam est causa deficiens: ergo obduratio nullo modo est a Deo.

Conclusio.

Obduratio, prout est defectus, non est a Deo; sed prout ordinatur a retribuente divina iustitia in poenam culpae, est a Deo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod obduratio, in quantum poena, dicit animae ineptitudinem, et ita dicit defectum poenalem; et poena omnis, in quantum talis, est iusta et ordinata: ideo dicit defectum ordinatum. In quantum ergo defectus est, non habet causam nisi deficientem; haec autem non est Deus, quia Deus non est causa deficiens, sed liberum arbitrium destitutum. In quantum vero ordinatum, habet causam merentem, scilicet ipsam culpam, et causam ordinantem, scilicet retribuentem divinam iustitiam.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. 2. 3. Illae igitur tres auctoritates Apostoli scilicet, Augustini et Glossae, et consimiles, quae dicunt, Deum obdurasse aliquem, intelliguntur quantum ad rationem ordinis, non quantum ad rationem defectus, quia per comparationem ad defectum solum comparatur in ratione permittentis, non efficientis. Et est exemplum: si aliquis esset dignus perire fame, et alius posset eum pascere, et iusto indicio nollet eum pascere: si quaereretur, quae fuit in isto causa mortis, responderetur, quod defectus cibi; ille vero non diceretur occidisse, sed permisisse. Si rursus quaereretur, utrum iste iuste fecerit, diceretur, quod sic; cum tamen nihil fecerit, quia ipsum non facere

ordinatus est in poena sibi debita. Per hunc modum est intelligendum in proposito.

4. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod obduratio dicit positionem; dicendum, quod in corporibus dicit positionem, quia per naturam suam nata sunt sibi¹⁸ resistere; sed in spiritibus dicit defectum, quia de naturali aptitudine spiritus debet esse habilis ad susceptionem influentiae divinae. Unde habilitas talis est potentiae et habitus¹⁶; sed econtra obduratio et ineptitudo est per modum privationis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui permittit, subditum perire, est causa etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, si tenetur et debet facere; sed si non tenetur nec debet hoc facere, immo magis contrarium, nullatenus potest illi imputari periculum, sed iustitia¹⁷; et ita est in Deo.

6. 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si aliquid est causa alicuius, quod oppositum est causa oppositi; dicendum, quod illud tenet in naturalibus et necessariis, sicut in habere pulmonem et non habere, et respirare et non respirare; non autem habet locum in voluntariis, sicut dicit Anselmus²¹. Causa autem, quare iste habet gratiam, est quia Deus dat; causa, quare non habet, est quia non accipit. — Sed ista solutio non videtur competens, quoniam si maxima Philosophi bona est, necesse est, quod teneat in omni materia.

Et propterea est dicendum, quod ipse loquitur de causa proxima et immediata, et quae est tota causa, non exigens aliam²²; et in omni tali tenet. Sed quamvis voluntas Dei sit causa efficiens gratificationis, tamen ad salutem concurrit liberum arbitrium ut consentiens. Quia ergo ista duo concurrunt, quodlibet horum potest causare defectum; et non causat divina voluntas, quae est liberalissima, sed causat liberum arbitrium, quod, quamvis non possit neque sufficiat efficere, potest tamen esse deficiens causa, quae sufficiens est ad defectum effectus. In bonis enim «facilius est destruere quam construere»²³.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur de absentia, dicendum, quod cum absentia alicuius est malum, aut ille est causa suae absentiae, aut non. Si ille est causa suae absentiae, dicitur per consequens esse causa eius quod incurritur ex absentia; si autem ipse non est causa, immo, quantum est de se, semper paratus est praesens esse; tunc revera nullo modo dicendus est esse causa, sed illud, ratione cuius iuste se absentat, ideo nostrum peccatum, et non Deus. Peccata enim nostra diviserunt inter nos et Deum nostrum²⁴, et sunt quasi nubes densissimae, auferentes nobis illustrationem gratiae.

9. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quae sit causa efficiens, ratione cuius insit; dicendum, quod causa²⁵ est liberum arbitrium, meritorium est peccatum sive originale sive actuale. Causa vero deficiens, quae ponit defectum, est liberum arbitrium deficiens et in defectu suo permanens, sive quia ipsum negligit, sive quia, peccatis exigentibus, alius non succurrit. Quia vero, duobus existentibus similibus, potest alter habere manum sublevantem²⁶, alter non; ideo unus obduratur ex se, alter vero sublevatur ab alio. Et per hunc modum intelligendum est in Iacob et Esau; Esau enim iacuit propria infirmitate, sed Iacob relevatus est aliena virtute.

Question II.

Whether obduration is from God.

Secondly it is asked whether obduration is from God or whether it is an effect of God reprobating. And that it is so seems thus:

1. To the Romans, ninth¹: Of whom he wills he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens; but it is the same thing for something to come to be with God as author and with God as willing it: if therefore obduration is by God's willing, therefore also by God as author.

2. Likewise, on the same place in the Gloss²: «Obduration is to be unwilling to have mercy»: either, then, this is predication by cause, or by inherence, or by essence. Not by inherence or by essence — for in God there is the will to have mercy, and yet not obduration — therefore it is said by way of cause; but God does not will to have mercy on certain ones as foreknown, as Augustine says: therefore from him is their obduration.

3. Likewise, on that text of Exodus³, I will harden his heart, Augustine says: «God hardened Pharaoh by a just judgment», therefore according to this it was just that Pharaoh be hardened; but every just thing proceeds from the supreme justice, which is God: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, by reason it seems so, because everything that is something is from God: obduration is something: therefore according to that which it is, it is from God. That it is something is clear, because hard names a natural potency⁴; but soft names an impotency. Therefore if softness, both in bodies and in spirits, is something which has God for its cause, this is clear etc.

5. Likewise, whoever has charge of someone, if he permits him to do evil when he could prevent it, or to perish when he could help, is not unfittingly said to be the cause of his evildoing or sin or evil. Hence a prelate who does not correct his subjects is called the cause of evils in the subjects; likewise, he who has wherewith to feed one dying of hunger and does not feed him is the cause of his death. If therefore God can prevent our affection from⁵ hardening, and can feed it that it not fail, and does not do so; it seems that the ground and cause of the hardening is to be attributed to him.

6. Likewise, the Philosopher gives the maxim⁶: «If something is the cause of something, then the opposite is the cause of the opposite», so that, if to have a lung is the cause of breathing, then not to have is the cause of not breathing. But to will to have mercy is the cause of glorification: therefore not to will to have mercy is the cause of obduration.

7. Likewise, «if something by its presence is the cause of something, by its absence it is the cause of the opposite», this is another maxim of the Philosopher⁷; but God by his presence is the cause of softening of the heart: therefore by his absence he is the cause of obduration.

8. Likewise, if any two are wholly alike, either p. 720some property is in one which is not in the other, or, if it is in it, it is in it from elsewhere. Let there be set, then, two infants, like Iacob and Esau⁸: God hardens one, as Esau, but not the other, as Iacob: therefore since they are wholly alike as to nature and as to merits, the obduration comes from elsewhere. But there is nothing to assign as cause except God, therefore etc. If you say, from the devil; on the contrary: granted that the devil in no way intervenes, nevertheless this one would be hardened.

9. Likewise, every effect, whether positive or defective, has a proximate and immediate cause: I ask therefore what is the proximate cause of obduration: either original fault, or actual, or the use of free choice, or something else. Not original fault, because then all would be hardened; likewise not actual fault, because then everyone actually sinning would be hardened; nor the use of free choice, because obduration, insofar as it is the connoted [term] of reprobation⁹, is in infants, in whom there is no use of free choice. There remains therefore that the will of God is the cause, and this seems [to follow] because, given it, the effect is given. For if God does not will to have mercy on this man, it is necessary that he be hardened.

[Note: see ambiguities log — the closing sentence of fundamentum 9 is OCR-bled in raw lines 29991–29995; the gist from PDF: therefore from these four exhausted possibilities it follows that obduration is something which God in some way wills to bring about.]

On the contrary:

1. [Cited from] Isaiah¹⁰: He invites all who come to him; therefore he is ready to enlighten all simply; therefore the defect of illumination does not come from God's side, but from ours.

2. Likewise, in Apocalypse third¹¹: Behold I stand at the door and knock; if any man hear my voice and open to me, I will come in to him etc. But if [men] perceive [his knock] and refuse him hospitality, and do not lodge him in the house, the cause is not on his side but on ours that he is not received: therefore likewise of obduration there is no cause, except him who does not receive God knocking.

3. Likewise, Augustine on that text of John¹²: Behold the light shineth in darkness, says: «For just as for those placed in the sun, when it is present, there is light, and the sun itself shines on the light, and on every impiety; the [defect] of perverse minds is the [defect] of the little cloud», if it is itself absent. If therefore the little cloud, which is a blindness or privation of vision, is not from the sun, it is plain that neither is obduration from God.

4. Likewise, Anselm¹³: «The good man does not lack grace because God does not give it, but because the man does not receive it»; therefore obduration ought not to be said to be from God.

5. Likewise, by reason it seems so, because «the fifth [is the ultimate] privation»¹⁴; but obduration is the worst of all evils: therefore the supremely good God does not bring it about.

6. Likewise, obduration renders the soul powerless for the good, therefore it is a defect; but a defect either has no cause, or, if it does, has a deficient cause¹⁵. But God is in no way a deficient cause: therefore obduration is in no way from God.

Conclusion.

Obduration, insofar as it is a defect, is not from God; but insofar as it is ordained by divine justice as one repaying as a punishment for sin, it is from God.

I respond: It must be said that obduration, insofar as [it is] punishment, signifies the soul's ineptitude, and so it signifies a penal defect; and every punishment, insofar as such, is just and ordained: therefore it signifies an ordained defect. Insofar therefore as it is a defect, it has no cause but a deficient one; and this is not God, since God is not a deficient cause, but [rather] a destitute free will. But insofar as it is ordained, it has a meriting cause, namely the fault itself, and an ordaining cause, namely the divine justice repaying.

To the arguments:

Ad 1. 2. 3. Those three authorities therefore — namely of the Apostle, of Augustine, and of the Gloss, and the like, which say that God has hardened someone — are to be understood as regards the ratio of order, not as regards the ratio of defect; since by comparison to the defect [God] is compared only in the ratio of one permitting, not of one effecting. And there is an example: if someone were worthy to perish of hunger, and another could feed him, and by just judgment refused to feed him: if it were asked what was the cause of his death in this case, it would be answered that the lack of food [was]; but the other would not be said to have killed [him], but to have permitted [it]. If again it were asked whether this man acted justly, it would be answered that yes; even though indeed he did nothing, since this very not-doing was ordained by his authority to the merits of [the other] — and consequently he

[that one] is ordered into the punishment due to himself. In this manner is it to be understood in the matter at hand.

To 4. To that which is objected, that obduration speaks a positing; it must be said that in bodies it speaks a positing, because by their nature they are made to resist themselves¹⁸; but in spirits it speaks a defect, because by the natural aptitude the spirit ought to be apt for the reception of divine influence. Hence such aptitude belongs to potency and habit¹⁶; but on the contrary obduration and ineptitude is by way of privation.

To 5. To that which is objected, that one who permits a subject to perish is a cause etc.; it must be said that this is true if he is bound and ought to act; but if he is not bound nor ought to do this, indeed rather the contrary, in no way can the danger be imputed to him, but [it is rather] justice¹⁷; and so it is in God.

To 6, 7. To that which is objected, that if something is the cause of something, then the opposite is cause of the opposite; it must be said that this holds in things natural and necessary, as in having a lung and not having one, and breathing and not breathing; but it does not have place in voluntary matters, as Anselm says²¹. Now the cause why this man has grace is because God gives; the cause why he does not have it is because he does not receive. — But this solution does not seem fitting, since if the Philosopher's maxim is sound, it is necessary that it hold in every matter.

And therefore it must be said that he speaks of the proximate and immediate cause, and the cause which is the whole cause, requiring no other²²; and in every such case it holds. But although the will of God is the efficient cause of glorification, nevertheless to salvation free choice concurs as consenting. Because therefore these two concur, any of them can cause a defect; and the divine will, which is most liberal, does not cause [it]; rather the free choice causes [it], which, although it cannot and does not suffice to effect [the good], nevertheless can be a deficient cause, which is sufficient for the defect of the effect. For in good things «it is easier to destroy than to build up»²³.

To 8. To that which is objected concerning absence, it must be said that when the absence of something is an evil, either he is the cause of his own absence, or not. If he is the cause of his own absence, he is consequently called the cause of what is incurred from the absence; if however he is not the cause, but rather, so far as in him lies, is always ready to be present; then in truth he is in no way to be called the cause, but rather that on account of which he justly absents himself, that is our sin, and not God. For our sins have divided between us and our God²⁴, and they are like very dense clouds taking from us the illumination of grace.

To 9. To that which is asked, what is the efficient cause by reason of which it is in [the soul]; it must be said that the cause²⁵ is free choice; the meritorious cause is sin, whether original or actual. But the deficient cause, which posits the defect, is the free choice, deficient and remaining in its defect, either because it itself neglects, or because, sins requiring it, no other comes to its aid. Because indeed, when two stand alike, one can have a hand lifting him up²⁶, the other not; therefore one is hardened of himself, the other is lifted up by another. And in this manner is it to be understood in Iacob and Esau; for Esau lay [fallen] by his own infirmity, but Iacob was raised up by another's strength.