Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`La.`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`En.`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., Cod. X, Vat., ed. 1).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc verbo, quod ponitur, scilicet praedestinatio est de bonis salutaribus. Quaeritur ergo, quid intelligatur per bona salutaria. Si tu dicas, quod gratia et gloria: ergo, sicut homo dicitur praedestinatus, ita gratia debet dici praedestinata.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedestinatio est praeordinatio. In ordinatione autem tria concurrunt, quid ordinatur, et per quid, et ad quid. Primum est homo, secundum est gratia, tertium est gloria. Et quoniam ille solus dicendus est praedestinatus, qui praedestinatione ordinatur, ideo patet, quod gratia et gloria non debet¹ dici praedestinata, sed homo solum, qui praedestinatur ad salutem.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Et de hominibus salvandis. Videtur enim insufficienter dicere: quia cum praedestinatio sit praeparatio gratiae et gloriae², ergo non tantum est hominum, sed etiam Angelorum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedestinatio uno modo dicit praeparationem boni³, et sic convenit hominibus et Angelis et etiam Christo: alio modo dicit praeparationem boni et liberationem a malo, et sic dicitur praedestinatio propositum miserendi, et sic proprie est hominum, et sic accipit Magister hic⁴.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod praedestinatio sine praescientia esse non potest. Videtur enim male dicere, quia praescientia est malorum, unde praesciti dicuntur mali; sed praedestinatio bonorum: ergo potest esse praedestinatio sine praescientia, sicut e converso⁵. Si dicas mihi, quod praedestinatio est speciale, sed praescientia est commune et speciale: tunc quaero, quare magis praescientia approprietur reprobationi quam praedestinationi.

Ad hoc est unus modus respondendi, quod quia praedestinatio addit, ideo habuit nomen proprium; reprobatio vero non, ideo retinuit nomen commune. — Sed quomodo habet illud veritatem, cum reprobatio sit praescientia poenae, cuius Deus est causa⁶?

Et propterea est dicendum, quod non tantum addit, quod ita distrahat⁷. Nam praedestinatio dat intelligere beneplacitum, quod trahit ipsam in genus scientiae practicae simpliciter, eo quod beneplacitum est simpliciter et absolute respectu totius connotati. Sed non sic est de reprobatione, quia voluntas non est respectu mali culpae, et respectu poenae est consequens, non antecedens, et quasi tracta⁸. Et propter hoc, quia minus distrahit a ratione scientiae, retinuit sibi nomen praescientiae.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de ista responsione Magistri: Quibus respondemus, ex ea ratione dictum esse etc.

Videtur enim, quod non solvat propter suam distinctionem ad quaestionem de augmento, quoniam demonstrato aliquo damnando, verum est dicere: istum posse salvari, ergo potest esse praedestinatus: ergo plures possunt esse praedestinati, quam sunt: ergo potest numerus praedestinatorum augeri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister in hac prima responsione principaliter respondet ad quaestionem primam, utrum praedestinatum sit possibile damnari; et bene, scilicet per compositionem et divisionem⁹. Et per istam solutionem patet aliquo modo responsio ad illud de augmento, sed non plene; ideo annectit solutionem sequentem, quae est explicatio huius, in qua dicitur, quod aliquis non potest incipere esse praedestinatus, quamvis possit esse praedestinatus, quia hoc est dicere, quod ab aeterno potuit. Et quoniam augmentum dicit maiorem numerum quam prius cum praesuppositione prioris et nova additione, ideo patet, quod ex sui ratione distinctionem et successionem dicit in partibus. Unde si aliquis, statim cum est, esset ita magnus, quantus futurus est, non diceretur augeri, sed tamen potuisset esse maior; ita in proposito intelligendum. — Vel aliter solvi potest per compositionem et divisionem, sicut Magister solvit; possunt enim plures esse, quam sint: ergo potest numerus augeri.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod intelligentia conditionis implicitae veritatem facit in dicto et impossibilitatem in vero¹⁰, quomodo sit illud intelligibile. Si enim idem non est causa oppositorum, et conditio implicita facit veritatem, quomodo facit impossibilitatem?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister vult dicere, quod illud est falsum, demonstrato aliquo: istum damnari vel salvari, est impossibile; sed si addatur et implicetur conditio praedestinationis, facit veritatem in dicto et impossibilitatem in vero, id est, facit illud dictum cum modo impossibilitatis esse verum, utpote si dicatur: istum damnari et esse praedestinatum simul, est impossibile, sive: istum salvari et non esse praedestinatum, est impossibile. — Vel aliter potest dici, quod dictum falsum alicuius conditionis implicatione fit verum¹¹: ut demonstrato reprobo, istum salvari est falsum; adde conditionem praedestinationis, et fiet verum: istum salvari, si est praedestinatus, est verum. Item, eodem demonstrato, istum damnari est verum; adde conditionem praedestinationis, et fiet impossibile: istum damnari, si est praedestinatus, est impossibile, coniunctim intelligendo¹².

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Ex quo aliquid factum est vel dictum, non concedunt, quod illud possit non esse etc. Videtur enim falsum: quia Christus dixit, Petrum peccaturum¹³: ergo postquam dixit, fuit necessarium dixisse, et necessario sequitur: si Christus dixit, hoc erit, quia da oppositum, et tunc sequetur, Christum esse mentitum, quod est impossibile: ergo videtur, cum antecedens sit necessarium, quod necessarium fuit, Petrum negare.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in dictione Christi duo sunt, scilicet verbi prolatio et assertio. Et verbi prolatio simpliciter est praeterita et necessaria, et ex illa non sequitur consequens. Non enim sequitur: Christus hoc dixit, ergo erit; protulit enim hoc verbum: Ero similis vobis mendax¹⁴. Est iterum assertio, et illa sequitur illustrationem divinae praescientiae. Sicut ergo divina praescientia est certa et infallibilis, cui non potest subesse falsum, et tamen aspicit futurum et connotat circa ipsum veritatem¹⁵, et ideo non est necessarium, Deum praescisse quod praescivit, quamvis sit certum et infallibile: ita intelligendum de Christi assertione, quod certitudinem habet et infallibilitatem a divina praescientia; sed tamen non est necessarium, Christum hoc asseruisse; et ideo, si ponatur, hoc non contingere, ponitur, et Christum non asseruisse. Et sic patet illud et consimilia. In assertione enim Christi duo sunt, scilicet actus mentis¹⁶, et relatio ad futurum contingens sive ordinatio. Et quamvis unum sit necessarium, reliquum est contingens.

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sicut praedestinationis effectus illa gratia est, qua in praesenti iustificamur etc. Ex hoc ostenditur, quod praedestinatio sit causa gratiae. Quaeritur ergo: in quo genere causae? Cum enim sit scientia, videtur dicere causam exemplarem. Et iterum, hoc non videtur sufficere, quia exemplar non necessario infert exemplatum, sed praescientia ponit. Et iterum, si est causa, aut universalis, aut particularis¹⁷: non universalis, quia tunc indigeret alia particulari adiuvante; non particularis, quia tunc determinata esset ad unum effectum tantum. Et iterum, aut necessaria, aut contingens: non necessaria, quoniam per voluntatem operatur; non contingens, quoniam haec est fallibilis et incerta.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedestinatio est causa gratiae, sicut dicit¹⁸, et tota causa, sed non causa salutis, ut excludatur cooperans et disponens. Adiutores enim Christi sumus¹⁹, et nullus salvatur invitus. — Quod ergo quaeritur, in quo genere causae sit; dicendum, quod praedestinatio claudit in se scientiam et beneplacitum voluntatis et dispositionem voluntatis, per quam placuit Deo nos salvare, quae est summa bonitas manifestanda. Ratione primi dicit causam in genere formae²⁰, ratione secundi in genere efficientis, ratione tertii in genere finis.

Quod quaeritur, utrum necessaria, vel contingens; universalis, vel particularis; dicendum, quod de omnibus istis modis causandi habet quod est perfectionis, non quod est imperfectionis. Nam de proprietate²¹ universalis habet extensionem ad multa; de proprietate particularis sufficientiam ad singula; de proprietate causae necessariae immutabilitatem; de proprietate contingentis habet arbitrii libertatem, quia potest facere et non facere. Conditiones autem imperfectionis non habet, quia nec habet insufficientiam, sicut causa universalis; nec limitationem, sicut causa particularis; nec inevitabilitatem, sicut causa necessaria; nec vertibilitatem, sicut causa contingens²².

DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod praedestinationis effectus est gratiae appositio. Videtur enim male dicere, quia causa et effectus sunt correlativa; cum ergo relativa simul sint natura²³, quandocumque est praedestinatio, est gratiae appositio: ergo nullus est praedestinatus, nisi qui habet gratiam. Sed contra hoc est, quia praedestinatio est non entium, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Fide ad Petrum²⁴.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedestinatio non semper est causa in actu, sed in habitu; et ideo non oportet, quod respondeat effectus in actu, sed in habitu.

Unde ex hoc patet quod quaeri consuevit, utrum praedestinatio aliquid ponat in praedestinato; dicendum enim, quod non necessario ponit aliquid de praesenti sive actu²⁵, quoniam multi sunt praedestinati, qui non sunt mali, et multi, qui mali sunt; sed ponit aliquid secundum habitum sive de futuro, ratione cuius homo potest gaudere, scilicet quia nomen eius scriptum est in caelo²⁶. Et cum illud positum erit, magnum bonum erit; et illud erit ratio persistendi in bono et perveniendi ad magnum et summum bonum; et ideo hoc bonum habituale praeponendum est gratiae, quae est secundum praesentem iustitiam²⁷.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning this term that is set down, namely predestination is of saving goods. It is asked therefore what is to be understood by saving goods. If you say, grace and glory: then, just as a man is called predestined, so grace ought to be called predestined.

I respond: It must be said that predestination is preordering. Now in ordering three things concur: what is ordered, and by what, and to what. The first is the man, the second is grace, the third is glory. And since only that one is to be called predestined who is ordered by predestination, it is therefore plain that grace and glory ought not¹ be called predestined, but only the man, who is predestined to salvation.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: And concerning men to be saved. For he seems to speak insufficiently: because, since predestination is the preparation of grace and of glory², it is therefore not only of men, but also of Angels.

I respond: It must be said that predestination in one mode states the preparation of a good³, and in this way it suits men and Angels and even Christ; in another mode it states the preparation of a good and the freeing from an evil, and in this way predestination is called the purpose of having mercy, and in this way it is properly of men, and in this way the Master here takes it⁴.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge. For he seems to speak ill, because foreknowledge is of evils, whence the foreknown are called evil; but predestination [is] of goods: therefore predestination can exist without foreknowledge, just as conversely [foreknowledge can exist without predestination]⁵. If you say to me, that predestination is special, but foreknowledge is both common and special: then I ask, why foreknowledge is more appropriated to reprobation than to predestination.

To this there is one mode of responding, that because predestination adds [something], it therefore had a proper name; reprobation, however, [does] not, [and] therefore it retained the common name. — But how does that hold true, since reprobation is the foreknowledge of punishment, of which God is the cause⁶?

And therefore it must be said that it does not [merely] add as much as that it [should] thus draw aside⁷. For predestination gives one to understand good-pleasure, which draws it into the genus of practical knowledge simply, in that the good-pleasure is simple and absolute with respect to the whole connoted [term]. But it is not so concerning reprobation, because the will is not [directed] to the evil of fault, and with respect to punishment is consequent, not antecedent, and as it were drawn [along]⁸. And on this account, because it draws aside less from the account of knowledge, it retained for itself the name of foreknowledge.

DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this response of the Master: To which we reply, it has been said by that account etc.

For it seems that he does not solve [it] by his distinction with respect to the question concerning increase, since once someone to be damned has been demonstrated, it is true to say: this man can be saved, therefore he can be predestined: therefore more can be predestined than there are: therefore the number of the predestined can be increased.

I respond: It must be said that the Master in this first response principally responds to the first question, whether it is possible for one predestined to be damned; and well, namely by composition and division⁹. And by this solution the response to that [question] concerning increase appears in some way, but not fully; therefore he annexes the following solution, which is an explication of this [one], in which it is said that someone cannot begin to be predestined, although he can be predestined, because this is to say, that from eternity he could [be]. And since increase states a greater number than before with the presupposition of the prior and a new addition, it is therefore plain that from its own account it states distinction and succession in [its] parts. Hence if someone, the very moment he is, were as great as he is going to be, he would not be said to be increased, although he could have been greater; so it is to be understood in the matter at hand. — Or otherwise it can be solved by composition and division, just as the Master solves [it]; for there can be more than there are: therefore the number can be increased.

DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the understanding of the implied condition makes truth in the saying and impossibility in the [thing-as-]true¹⁰, how that is intelligible. For if the same is not the cause of opposites, and the implied condition makes truth, how does it make impossibility?

I respond: It must be said that the Master wishes to say that this is false, when someone has been demonstrated: for this man to be damned or to be saved is impossible; but if the condition of predestination is added and implied, it makes truth in the saying and impossibility in the [thing-as-]true, that is, it makes that saying with a mode of impossibility be true, as if it should be said: for this man to be damned and to be predestined at once, is impossible; or: for this man to be saved and not to be predestined, is impossible. — Or otherwise it can be said that a false saying about someone, by the implication of a condition, becomes true¹¹: as, with a reprobate having been demonstrated, for this man to be saved is false; add the condition of predestination, and it will become true: for this man to be saved, if he is predestined, is true. Likewise, with the same having been demonstrated, for this man to be damned is true; add the condition of predestination, and it will become impossible: for this man to be damned, if he is predestined, is impossible, taking [it] in a conjoined sense¹².

DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Once something has been done or said, they do not concede that it can not be etc. For it seems false: because Christ said that Peter would sin¹³: therefore after he said [it], it was necessary that he had said [it], and it follows necessarily: if Christ said [it], this will be; because grant the opposite, and then it will follow that Christ has lied, which is impossible: therefore it seems, since the antecedent is necessary, that it was necessary that Peter [should] deny [him].

I respond: It must be said that in Christ's saying there are two things, namely the uttering of the word and the assertion. And the uttering of the word is simply past and necessary, and from it the consequent does not follow. For it does not follow: Christ said this, therefore it will be; for he uttered this word: I shall be like to you a liar¹⁴. There is again the assertion, and that follows the illumination of divine foreknowledge. Therefore just as divine foreknowledge is certain and infallible, beneath which falsehood cannot lie, and yet looks at the future and connotes around it truth¹⁵, and therefore it is not necessary that God foreknew what he foreknew, although it is certain and infallible: so it is to be understood concerning Christ's assertion, that it has its certitude and infallibility from divine foreknowledge; but yet it is not necessary that Christ asserted this; and therefore, if it is posited that this not happen, it is also posited that Christ did not assert [it]. And so this and similar [cases] are clear. For in Christ's assertion there are two [things], namely the act of mind¹⁶, and the relation to the contingent future, or the ordering. And although one is necessary, the other is contingent.

DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Just as the effect of predestination is that grace by which we are justified in the present etc. From this it is shown that predestination is the cause of grace. It is asked therefore: in what genus of cause? For since it is knowledge, it would seem to state an exemplary cause. And again, this does not seem to suffice, because an exemplar does not necessarily entail what is exemplified, but foreknowledge does posit [it]. And again, if it is a cause, [it is] either universal or particular¹⁷: not universal, because then it would need another particular [cause] helping; not particular, because then it would be determined to one effect only. And again, [it is] either necessary or contingent: not necessary, since it operates through the will; not contingent, since this [latter] is fallible and uncertain.

I respond: It must be said that predestination is the cause of grace, as he says¹⁸, and the whole cause; but not the cause of salvation, that the cooperating and disposing [causes] may be excluded. For we are helpers of Christ¹⁹, and no one is saved unwillingly. — As for the question, in what genus of cause it is; it must be said that predestination encloses in itself knowledge and the good-pleasure of the will and the disposition of the will, by which it pleased God to save us, which is the highest goodness to be manifested. By reason of the first it states a cause in the genus of form²⁰, by reason of the second in the genus of efficient [cause], by reason of the third in the genus of end.

As for the question, whether necessary or contingent, universal or particular; it must be said that of all these modes of causing it has what is of perfection, not what is of imperfection. For from the property²¹ of the universal it has extension to many; from the property of the particular, sufficiency for individuals; from the property of the necessary cause, immutability; from the property of the contingent it has freedom of choice, because it can act and not act. But it does not have the conditions of imperfection, because it neither has insufficiency, like a universal cause; nor limitation, like a particular cause; nor inevitability, like a necessary cause; nor vertibility, like a contingent cause²².

DOUBT VIII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the effect of predestination is the bestowal of grace. For he seems to speak ill, because cause and effect are correlative; therefore since relatives are simultaneous in nature²³, whenever there is predestination there is the bestowal of grace: therefore no one is predestined except one who has grace. But against this is [the fact] that predestination is of non-existents, as Augustine says in the book On Faith to Peter²⁴.

I respond: It must be said that predestination is not always a cause in act, but in habit; and therefore it is not necessary that the effect respond in act, but in habit.

Hence from this it is plain [as to] what was wont to be asked, whether predestination posits something in the predestined; for it must be said that it does not necessarily posit something of the present or in act²⁵, since many are predestined who are not evil, and many [are] who are evil; but it does posit something according to habit, or as to the future, by reason of which a man can rejoice, namely because his name is written in heaven²⁶. And when that has been laid down, it will be a great good; and that will be a reason for persisting in the good and arriving at the great and highest good; and therefore this habitual good is to be set before grace, which is according to present justice²⁷.

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