Bonaventure

Articulus II. De obligatione conformandi voluntatem nostram divinae.

Quaestio I. Utrum teneamur voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae conformare in ratione volendi.

Quod autem teneamur in ratione volendi, videtur.

1. Quia tenemur, quod facimus, facere iuste. Unde Deuteronomii decimo sexto¹: Iuste quod iustum est exsequeris; sed non fit iuste, nisi quod homo facit secundum conformitatem voluntatis quantum ad rationem volendi, ut velit ex caritate: ergo etc.

2. Item, tenemur diligere Deum ex toto corde, quia hoc praecipitur Deuteronomii sexto², et Dominus idem iterat Matthaei vigesimo secundo; sed hoc non potest fieri nisi ex caritate: ergo tenemur ad conformitatem in ratione sive in forma volendi.

3. Item, tenemur Deo veraciter obedire; sed veraciter non obedit Deo, nisi qui facit ea voluntate, quam acceptat Deus. Haec autem est voluntas informata caritate: ergo etc.

4. Item, « propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis³ »; sed propter conformitatem voluntatis in ratione volendi obligamur ad conformitatem voluntatis in volito, quia finis praecepti est caritas, ut dicit Apostolus primae ad Timotheum primo⁴: ergo multo fortius obligamur ad conformitatem in ratione volendi, ut quod volumus velimus ex caritate.

Contra:

1. Deus vult et praecepit parentes honorari⁵; esto quod opportunitas se offerat, et aliquis honoret patrem ex naturali pietate, non ex caritate, constat quod non peccat; et non conformat voluntatem suam nisi in volito: ergo non tenetur ad rationem volendi.

2. Item, si tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram divinae in ratione volendi, sicut in volito, ergo quotiescumque volumus aliquid non ex caritate, deficit illud ad quod tenemur: ergo peccamus in omni⁶ actu: nullus ergo actus est indifferens.

3. Item, si tenemur conformare in ratione volendi, cum ergo vir peccator habeat voluntatem a Deo continue in hoc deficientem, quia non habet caritatem: ergo continue in omni instanti peccat.

4. Item, nullus potest conformare voluntatem suam divinae in ratione volendi, nisi habeat caritatem; sed non est in nostra potestate habere caritatem⁷: ergo homo tenetur ad impossibile. Si dicas, quod potest facere, quo facto habebit caritatem, quia potest se disponere ad caritatem; obiicitur de obstinato, et de eo qui actualiter est in peccato: dum peccat et est in actu illo, non potest se conformare: ergo non tenetur. Quodsi non tenetur, et alii tenentur, reportat commodum de malitia; quodsi hoc non est conveniens, nulli ergo tenentur.

Conclusio.

Conclusio. Voluntas nostra tenetur conformari voluntati divinae in ratione volendi et quidem, quatenus est praeceptum negativum, semper et pro semper, quatenus vero est affirmativum, non pro semper, sed pro loco et tempore.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae in ratione

volendi, ut si velimus aliquid, velimus ex caritate⁹; et hoc patet, quia tenemur eum diligere ex caritate.

Attendendum autem, quod haec est obligatio per modum praecepti affirmativi. Differt enim obligatio praecepti affirmativi et negativi¹⁰; nam negativum obligat semper et ad semper; affirmativum autem tantum obligat semper, sed non ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore; et sicut non obligat ad semper, ita nec ad omnem actum voluntatis, nec ad omne praeceptum, sed tunc solum, quando tenemur exire in actum caritatis.

Unde notandum, quod sic tenemur ad hoc, quod numquam ad contrarium, sicut velle, quod Deus vult, ex libidine¹¹. Ad hoc etiam tenemur pro loco et tempore, si habemus caritatem; si autem non habemus, non ad hoc tenemur, sed ad aequivalens, quia tenemur facere quod in nobis est, ut habeamus; et ad hoc similiter¹² pro loco et tempore obligamur. Ex his patet responsio ad obiecta.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1, 2, 3. Quod enim obiicitur, quod aliquis sine peccato honorat parentes etiam ex naturali pietate; dicendum, quod verum est; et ex hoc sequitur, quod non in omni actu tenetur conformare¹³, non tamen sequitur, quod non teneatur. Et per hoc patet sequens, quod obiicit de generalitate actuum. Patet etiam aliud quod obiicit de generalitate temporis.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod non est in potestate nostra habere caritatem; dicendum, quod in potestate habentium caritatem est, et in potestate non habentium, non propinqua, sed dispositiva. Potest enim quilibet facere, quo facto habeat caritatem; et ideo, si non faciat, imputatur sibi, nec excusatur per impossibilitatem, quia non est impossibilitas, ubi succurrit aliunde potestas, et non deficit, nisi propter nostram negligentiam¹⁴.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de obstinato, dicendum, quod nullus est adeo obstinatus, qui non possit facere quod in se est, et qui non possit redire ad cor¹⁵; et ideo tenetur sicut et alii, licet non pro quolibet instanti, sed pro loco et tempore.

Si autem tu quaeras, quid sit locus et tempus; melius docet unctio¹⁶ quam ars; tamen quando Dominus visitat eum interiori allocutione vel exteriori praedicatione vel aliquo tali, in quo est opportunitas redeundi ad cor, si tunc negligat, incidit in contemptum et omissionis peccatum.

Article II. On the obligation of conforming our will to the divine.

Question I. Whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the manner of willing.

That we are bound [to conform it] in the manner of willing, is shown.

1. Because we are bound to do justly what we do. Hence Deuteronomy sixteen¹: Thou shalt justly pursue what is just; but it is not done justly except as man acts according to a conformity of will as to the manner of willing, namely, that he will from charity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, we are bound to love God with our whole heart, since this is commanded in Deuteronomy six², and the Lord repeats the same in Matthew twenty-two; but this cannot be done except from charity: therefore we are bound to conformity in the manner, that is, in the form, of willing.

3. Likewise, we are bound truly to obey God; but no one truly obeys God except he who acts with the will that God accepts. But this is the will informed by charity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, "that on account of which a thing [is so], is itself more so"³; but on account of the conformity of will in the manner of willing we are obliged to conformity of will in the thing willed, since the end of the precept is charity, as the Apostle says in the first to Timothy, chapter one⁴: therefore much more strongly are we obliged to conformity in the manner of willing, so that what we will, we may will from charity.

On the contrary:

1. God wills and commands parents to be honored⁵; granted that opportunity offers itself, and someone honors his father out of natural piety, not out of charity, it is clear that he does not sin; and yet he conforms his will only in the thing willed: therefore he is not bound to the manner of willing.

2. Likewise, if we are bound to conform our will to the divine in the manner of willing as well as in the thing willed, then whenever we will anything not out of charity, that to which we are bound is lacking: therefore we sin in every⁶ act: therefore no act is indifferent.

3. Likewise, if we are bound to conform in the manner of willing, since a sinful man has a will continually deficient from God in this respect — because he does not have charity — therefore he sins continually in every instant.

4. Likewise, no one can conform his will to the divine in the manner of willing unless he have charity; but to have charity is not in our power⁷: therefore man is bound to the impossible. If you say that he can do that which, once done, he will have charity, because he can dispose himself to charity; the objection is raised concerning the obstinate man, and concerning him who is actually in sin: while he sins and is in that act, he cannot conform himself: therefore he is not bound. And if he is not bound, while others are bound, he reaps an advantage from his malice; and if this is not fitting, then no one is bound.

Conclusion.

Conclusion. Our will is bound to be conformed to the divine will in the manner of willing — and indeed, insofar as it is a negative precept, always and for always; but insofar as it is affirmative, not for always, but for [the proper] place and time.

Respondeo: It must be said that we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the manner of willing, so that, if we will anything, we will it from charity⁹; and this is plain, because we are bound to love him from charity.

But it must be observed that this is an obligation by way of an affirmative precept. For the obligation of an affirmative and of a negative precept differs¹⁰; for the negative obliges always and for always; but the affirmative only obliges always, but not for always, but rather according to place and time; and just as it does not oblige for always, so neither does it oblige to every act of the will, nor to every precept, but only when we are bound to issue forth in an act of charity.

Whence it is to be noted that we are so bound to this, that never to the contrary — as it would be to will what God wills out of lust¹¹. To this also we are bound according to place and time, if we have charity; but if we do not have it, we are not bound to this, but to the equivalent, since we are bound to do what is in us, in order that we may have it; and to this likewise¹² we are obliged according to place and time. From these things the response to the objections is plain.

To the arguments:

To 1, 2, 3. What is objected, that someone honors his parents without sin even from natural piety; it must be said that this is true; and from this it follows that he is not bound to conform¹³ in every act — yet it does not follow that he is not bound. And through this the next objection, which urges the generality of acts, is also clear. Likewise the other objection, which urges the generality of time, is clear.

To 4. To that which is objected last, that it is not in our power to have charity; it must be said that it is in the power of those who have charity, and in the power of those who do not have it — not in proximate, but in dispositive power. For anyone can do that which, once done, he will have charity; and therefore, if he does not do it, it is imputed to him, nor is he excused by impossibility, since there is no impossibility where power is supplied from elsewhere, and it does not fail except through our own negligence¹⁴.

To that which is objected concerning the obstinate man, it must be said that no one is so obstinate that he cannot do what is in himself, and who cannot return to the heart¹⁵; and therefore he is bound just as others are, although not for every instant, but for [the proper] place and time.

If, however, you ask what the place and time are; unction¹⁶ teaches this better than art does; nevertheless, when the Lord visits him by interior address, or by exterior preaching, or by some such thing in which there is opportunity for returning to the heart, if he then neglects it, he falls into contempt and into the sin of omission.