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Dist. 48, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 48

Textus Latinus

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Articulus II. De conformitate voluntatis nostrae ad divinam.

Quaestio II. Utrum teneamur voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae conformare in volito.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum teneamur conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae in volito. Et quod sic, videtur.

Argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

1. Matthaei duodecimo¹: Qui non est mecum, contra me est: ergo si non consonat Deo in volito, est contra Deum: ergo si tenemur Deo non esse contrarii, tenemur velle quod Deus vult.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi²: Non adhaesit mihi cor pravum, Glossa: « Pravum cor atque distortum habet qui non vult hoc quod Deus vult »; sed tenemur vitare cordis pravitatem: ergo tenemur velle quod Deus vult.

3. Item, Tullius³ definiens amicitiam dicit, quod amicitia est idem velle et idem nolle in rebus honestis; sed tenemur Deo servare amicitiam: ergo et idem velle in honestis. Sed Deus non vult nisi iustum et honestum: ergo debemus nostram voluntatem suae conformare in omnibus.

4. Item, omnis intellectus, qui discordat a prima veritate sive cognitione⁴, est falsus: ergo omnis affectus est iniquus, qui non concordat cum divina voluntate in volito: ergo etc.

5. Item, tenemur velle quod Deus praecipit, aut ergo quia praecipit, aut quia vult. Non quia praecipit, quia illi qui fuerunt mundati, quibus datum est praeceptum a Domino de tacendo⁵, non peccaverunt in revelando, quia divina inspiratione cognoverunt, Deum non velle illud quod praecipiebat: ergo tenemur ad praeceptum, quia tenemur ad voluntatem: ergo tenemur velle quod Deus vult.

6. Item, tenemur credere non tantum quod praecipit Deus credere, sed etiam omne quod dicit esse verum: ergo a simili tenemur velle non tantum quod praecipit Deus velle, sed⁶ omne quod Deus indicat se velle tanquam bonum: ergo tenemur velle omne quod scimus Deum velle.

Contra:

1. Augustinus in Enchiridio⁷: Aliquando homo bona voluntate vult quod non vult Deus.

2. Item, viri sancti frequenter volunt opposita, sicut Apostolus volebat alligari in Ierusalem, et discipuli nolebant, Actuum vigesimo primo⁸; sed constat, quod Deus aliquid illorum volebat: ergo licet contrarium divinae voluntati velle meritorie: ergo etc.

3. Item, si tenemur in volito conformare; ergo cum in indifferentibus non sit nobis voluntas divina determinata, quicumque vult aliquod indifferens determinate, committit se discrimini: ergo peccat mortaliter, quod absurdum est. Si dicas, quod tenetur, quando scit Domini voluntatem; contra: scientia non inducit novum peccatum neque tentionem, sed solum aggravat peccatum: ergo propter scientiam nemo tenetur, sicut nec ignorans.

4. Item, Ieremias dolebat super destructionem Ierusalem, in Threnis; Christus flebat super Ierusalem, Lucae decimo nono⁹; Beata Virgo et Apostoli super passionem Christi. Si flebant et dolebant, et dolor est de rebus, quae nobis nolentibus accidunt, ergo nolebant. Et constat, quod omnes hi merebantur, et sciebant, Deum velle contrarium: ergo licite et meritorie possumus velle contrarium divinae voluntati, etiam ubi scitur.

5. Item, quantumcumque praelatus meus velit aliquid, non teneor illud velle, nisi mihi praecipiat, etiamsi sciam ipsum velle: ergo pari ratione, quantumcumque velit Deus aliquid, non teneor illud velle, quantumcumque mihi innotescat, nisi Deus mihi praecipiat.

6. Item, quod Deus consulit¹⁰ vult, et nos scimus eum velle, tamen non tenemur velle, quamvis multum sibi placeat, etiam plus quam praeceptum: ergo non tenemur velle omne quod scimus Deum velle.

Conclusio.

Conclusio. Non tenetur voluntas nostra conformari voluntati divinae in quocumque volito, sed tantum in omni eo quod nobis innotescit Deum velle voluntate absoluta, vel in eo in quo consistit substantialiter ordo salutis.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod non tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae in omni quod vult Deus — sed hoc est perfectionis et supererogationis, et hoc erit in patria — sed ad hoc solum tenemur, quod ipse nos vult velle. Dicunt autem, quod Deus nos vult velle solum quod praecipit, et nolle quod prohibet. Haec enim sunt signa, per quae sufficienter indicat nobis suam voluntatem, qua vult nos velle aliquid. In aliis volitis, sive innotescant sive non, licet velle contrarium sine peccato. Et per hoc solvunt ad utramque partem. Unde dicunt, quod licet nobis aliqua velle proprie, quia non decet velle opposita, ut est de destructione gentis nostrae, et de calamitatibus iustorum, et consimilium. Etiam si Deus pluat vel disponat pluere, oppositum possum petere et velle.

Sed haec licet sit facilior, tamen quia Augustinus¹¹ dicit, quod impius est, cui non placet divina providentia, non tantum videtur, quod homo teneatur velle Dei mandata, sed etiam, quod teneatur velle Dei opera. Et iterum, quomodo non recalcitrat voluntas nostra voluntati divinae, quando Deus vult aliquid, et nos omnino volumus contrarium? Omnino videtur ei repugnare. Et iterum, Glossa praedicta videtur dicere, quod homo, qui non vult quod Deus vult, habet cor pravum; non dicit, quod Deus vult ipsum velle, vel quod Deus praecipit.

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Propterea aliter dicendum, quod revera non tenemur velle omne quod Deus vult, sed solum quod vult et innotescit, nec adhuc illud omne. Ideo notandum, quod aliquid ostendit se Deus velle absolute et quantum in se est, ut bona, quae facit. Et haec tenemur velle simpliciter et absoluta voluntate quantum in nobis est.

Aliquid ostendit se velle voluntate absoluta, sed oppositum velle, quantum in se est, ut mala, quae infligit. Et haec tenemur velle voluntate absoluta et deliberativa: tamen oppositum possumus velle voluntate pietatis, ut dicit Hugo¹². Unde sicut Deus non delectatur in nostris poenis, sed magis dicit: Heu, heu, consolabor super hostibus meis, Isaiae primo¹³; sic et nos. Unde Hugo distinguit in nobis triplicem voluntatem, scilicet rationis, pietatis et carnis, et in Christo quadruplicem, extendens nomen voluntatis. Unde dicit in libro de Voluntatibus Christi, loquens de Christo: « Voluntas Deitatis per iustitiam sententiam dictabat; voluntas rationis per obedientiam veritatem approbabat; voluntas pietatis per compassionem in malo¹⁴ suspirabat; voluntas carnis per passionem in malo proprio murmurabat ». Et ideo voluntate rationis debemus etiam velle malum poenae, quod scimus Deum velle; sed voluntate pietatis possumus conditionaliter, sive quantum est in nobis, si Deo placet, non velle. Nam et ipse Deus, quantum in se est, non vult, sicut praedictum est.

Aliquid ostendit Deus se velle, quantum in se est, circa quod consistit substantialiter ordo salutis, ut sunt ea quae praecipit fieri, et praecipit non fieri; et haec tenemur velle¹⁵.

Aliquid ostendit Deus se velle, quantum in se est, circa quod consistit expeditio salutis, ut sunt ea quae consulit. Et ad talia non obligat nec vult obligare: vult enim aliquos salvare sic, aliquos latiori via ire.

Ex his igitur patet, quod tenemur generaliter velle conformare voluntatem nostram¹⁶, non in omni volito, sed in omni eo quod innotescit tribus modis praedictis, alioquin frangeretur amicitia; et de tali volito currunt rationes et auctoritates. Ideo enim praecepto tenemur nos conformare, quia vult, nos velle quod praecipit; et hoc scimus. Et praelato meo teneor conformari in hoc, quod expresse scio ipsum velle me velle; sed in praelato nescio nisi per mandatum, sed in Deo scio per alia signa, sicut praedictum est.

Ad argumenta pro parte contraria:

Ad 4. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod in nullo potest discordare intellectus, quin sit falsus etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile de bono et vero. Nam verum dicitur absolute, bonum vero in relatione ad finem. Et quia duo opposita non sunt simul, ideo non possunt intellectus discordantes esse veri. Sed bonum dicitur in relatione ad finem. Et quoniam opposita volita possunt ad eundem finem ordinari, ideo simul possunt esse bona, et affectus respectu eorum esse recti. Ideo non necesse est in omni volito conformari, quia oppositum possumus sancte velle, quia ordinate in finem; sed oppositum eius, quod Deus vult nos velle, non possumus ordinare in finem, quia Deus non acceptat illud.

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Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non tenemur ad omne volitum; dicendum, quod verum est, quia nec ad volitum, quia volitum, nec quia scitum, sed quia scitum esse volitum a Deo¹⁷, ita quod nos velimus illud. — Aliter tamen potest dici, quod tenemur, quia absolute volitum, sed excusamur per ignorantiam, maxime ubi adhibetur debita diligentia, sicut aliquis obligatur, ne cognoscat non suam. Unde de obligatione inducente culpam falsum est quod dicit, quod scientia non inducit novam obligationem. Sicut enim ignorantia facti excusat a toto, ita scientia per oppositum cum divina voluntate¹⁸ facit aliquem esse obligatum, ut nullo modo possit in contrarium sine culpa. Et sic in proposito; et sic patet illud.

Ad 4 [de Christo et Beata Virgine]. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Christo et Beata Virgine et aliis compatientibus, dicendum, sicut dictum est, quod voluntate absoluta volebant quod Deus volebat; tamen voluntate conditionata sive voluntate pietatis debebant velle contrarium; et hac voluntate merebantur, quoniam haec¹⁹ non est naturae tantum, sed etiam rationis.

Scholion

I. Praeter duas sententias in responsione positas Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 41. m. 5.) aliam commemorat his verbis: « Alii dixerunt, quod est voluntas vel appetitus rationalis et sensualitatis; voluntate ergo rationis tenemur velle, quod scimus Deum velle, non voluntate sensualitatis. Beata ergo Virgo et Apostoli passionem Christi voluerunt voluntate rationis, non sensualitatis, sed doluerunt de ea ». Eandem opinionem refert Richardus a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.), his verbis, quod « voluntate deliberativa tenemur velle absolute, et omnibus pensatis, quidquid scimus Deum velle voluntate absoluta, omnibus pensatis, dum tamen nobis congruat illud velle ». Haec tamen sententia non approbatur a Richardo; et quid veri illa sententia habeat a S. Bonaventura explicatur hic ad ult. et praecipue in dub. I.

In iisdem locis Seraphicus piissime loquitur de voluntate B. V. Mariae in passione Domini Iesu Christi; ipse cum communi sententia asserit, quod compatiendo meruerit. Hoc dictum est contra Antissiodorensem, qui hoc saltem quoad Apostolos explicite negavit, secundum verba eius a Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.) relata, quia scil. « voluntas illa sensualitatis erat nec meritoria ».

II. Authors: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 41. m. 4. § 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. II. q. 19. a. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. § 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2, q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2.

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English Translation

Article II. On the conformity of our will to the divine.

Question II. Whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed.

Secondly it is asked, whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed. And that we are, it seems.

Arguments for the affirmative:

1. Matthew twelve¹: He who is not with me is against me: therefore if he does not consent with God in the thing willed, he is against God: therefore if we are bound not to be contrary to God, we are bound to will what God wills.

2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm²: A perverse heart hath not cleaved to me, the Gloss: « A perverse and distorted heart he has who does not will what God wills »; but we are bound to avoid perversity of heart: therefore we are bound to will what God wills.

3. Likewise, Tully³, defining friendship, says that friendship is to will the same thing and to be unwilling of the same thing in honorable matters; but we are bound to keep friendship with God: therefore also to will the same in honorable matters. But God wills only what is just and honorable: therefore we ought to conform our will to his in all things.

4. Likewise, every intellect which disagrees with the first truth or cognition⁴ is false: therefore every affection is wicked which does not agree with the divine will in the thing willed: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, we are bound to will what God commands, then either because he commands, or because he wills. Not because he commands, since those who had been cleansed, to whom the commandment was given by the Lord to keep silent⁵, did not sin by revealing it, because by divine inspiration they recognized that God did not will what he was commanding: therefore we are bound to the precept because we are bound to the will: therefore we are bound to will what God wills.

6. Likewise, we are bound to believe not only what God commands us to believe, but also everything which he says to be true: therefore by a similar reasoning we are bound to will not only what God commands us to will, but⁶ everything which God indicates that he himself wills as good: therefore we are bound to will everything which we know God to will.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine in the Enchiridion⁷: Sometimes a man with a good will wills what God does not will.

2. Likewise, holy men frequently will opposite things, as the Apostle willed to be bound at Jerusalem, and the disciples were unwilling, Acts twenty-one⁸; but it is plain that God willed something of these things: therefore it is permitted meritoriously to will the contrary to the divine will: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if we are bound to conform in the thing willed; then, since in indifferent matters the divine will is not determined for us, whoever wills some indifferent thing in a determinate way commits himself to risk: therefore he sins mortally, which is absurd. If you say he is bound when he knows the Lord's will; on the contrary: knowledge does not introduce a new sin or obligation, but only aggravates the sin: therefore by reason of knowledge no one is bound, just as neither is one ignorant.

4. Likewise, Jeremiah grieved over the destruction of Jerusalem, in Lamentations; Christ wept over Jerusalem, Luke nineteen⁹; the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles over the passion of Christ. If they wept and grieved, and grief is over things which befall us against our will, therefore they were unwilling. And it is plain that all these merited, and they knew that God willed the contrary: therefore licitly and meritoriously can we will the contrary to the divine will, even where it is known.

5. Likewise, however much my superior may will something, I am not bound to will it unless he commands me, even though I know that he wills it: therefore by parity of reasoning, however much God may will something, I am not bound to will it, however much it may become known to me, unless God commands me.

6. Likewise, what God counsels¹⁰ he wills, and we know that he wills it, yet we are not bound to will it, although it may please him much, even more than what is commanded: therefore we are not bound to will everything which we know God to will.

Conclusion.

Conclusion. Our will is not bound to be conformed to the divine will in every thing willed, but only in everything which becomes known to us that God wills by absolute will, or in that in which the order of salvation substantially consists.

Respondeo: To this some say that we are not bound to conform our will to the divine will in everything which God wills — but this belongs to perfection and supererogation, and this will be in the fatherland — but we are bound only to this, that he himself wills us to will. They say, however, that God wills us to will only what he commands, and to be unwilling of what he forbids. For these are the signs through which he sufficiently indicates to us his will, by which he wills us to will something. In other things willed, whether they become known or not, it is permitted to will the contrary without sin. And by this they solve [the arguments] on either side. Whence they say that it is permitted to us to will some things properly, because it is not fitting to will opposites, as in the matter of the destruction of our nation, and the calamities of the just, and the like. Even if God rains or disposes that it rain, I can ask and will the opposite.

But although this [opinion] is easier, nevertheless, because Augustine¹¹ says that he is impious to whom divine providence is not pleasing, it seems not only that man is bound to will God's commandments, but also that he is bound to will God's works. And again, how does our will not kick against the divine will, when God wills something, and we will altogether the contrary? It seems wholly to oppose him. And again, the aforesaid Gloss seems to say that a man who does not will what God wills has a perverse heart; it does not say that God wills him to will it, or that God commands it.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that in truth we are not bound to will everything which God wills, but only what he wills and which becomes known, and not even all of that. Hence it should be noted that God shows himself to will something absolutely and as far as it lies in him, as the goods which he does. And these we are bound to will simply and with absolute will, as far as it lies in us.

Some thing he shows himself to will by absolute will, but the opposite, as far as it lies in him, as the evils which he inflicts. And these we are bound to will with absolute and deliberative will: yet the opposite we may will with the will of piety, as Hugh says¹². Whence just as God is not delighted in our punishments, but rather says: Alas, alas, I will console myself over my enemies, Isaiah one¹³; so also we. Whence Hugh distinguishes in us a threefold will, namely of reason, of piety, and of the flesh, and in Christ a fourfold, extending the name of will. Whence he says in the book On the Wills of Christ, speaking of Christ: « The will of the Deity by justice dictated the sentence; the will of reason by obedience approved the truth; the will of piety by compassion in evil¹⁴ sighed; the will of the flesh through suffering in its own evil murmured ». And therefore by the will of reason we ought also to will the evil of punishment, which we know God to will; but by the will of piety we can conditionally, that is, as far as it lies in us, if it please God, not will it. For even God himself, as far as it lies in him, does not will it, as has been said.

Something God shows himself to will, as far as it lies in him, around which the order of salvation substantially consists, as are those things which he commands to be done, and which he commands not to be done; and these we are bound to will¹⁵.

Something God shows himself to will, as far as it lies in him, around which the expediting of salvation consists, as are those things which he counsels. And to such he does not bind nor will he bind: for he wills to save some thus, and others to go by a broader way.

From these things, then, it is plain that we are bound generally to conform our will¹⁶, not in every thing willed, but in everything which becomes known in the three ways aforesaid, otherwise friendship would be broken; and concerning such a thing willed the reasons and authorities run. For this is why by the precept we are bound to conform ourselves, because he wills us to will what he commands; and this we know. And to my superior I am bound to be conformed in this, that I expressly know him to will me to will; but in a superior I do not know except through a command, but in God I know through other signs, as has been said.

To the arguments on the contrary side:

To 4. To that which is objected, that in nothing can the intellect disagree without being false, etc.; it must be said that the case is not similar concerning the good and the true. For the true is said absolutely, but the good in relation to an end. And because two opposites are not together, therefore disagreeing intellects cannot be true. But the good is said in relation to an end. And since opposite things willed can be ordered to the same end, therefore they can simultaneously be good, and the affections in their regard can be right. Therefore it is not necessary to be conformed in every thing willed, because we can will the opposite in a holy manner, since it is ordered to the end; but the opposite of that which God wills us to will, we cannot order to the end, because God does not accept it.

To that which is objected on the contrary, that we are not bound to every thing willed; it must be said that this is true, because [we are bound] not to the thing willed because it is willed, nor because it is known, but because it is known to be willed by God¹⁷, such that we will it. — Yet otherwise it can be said, that we are bound, because [it is] absolutely willed, but we are excused through ignorance, especially where due diligence is employed, just as someone is bound not to be ignorant of what is his own [duty]. Whence concerning the obligation inducing fault, what he says is false, that knowledge does not induce a new obligation. For just as ignorance of fact excuses from the whole, so knowledge of opposition to the divine will¹⁸ makes someone to be bound, such that in no way can he go to the contrary without fault. And so in our case; and so that is plain.

To 4 [on Christ and the Blessed Virgin]. To that which is objected concerning Christ and the Blessed Virgin and the others compassionating, it must be said, as has been said, that by absolute will they willed what God willed; yet by conditional will or by the will of piety they ought to will the contrary; and by this will they merited, since this¹⁹ [will] is not only of nature, but also of reason.

Scholion

I. Besides the two opinions set forth in the response, Alexander of Hales (Summa p. I, q. 41, m. 5) records another in these words: « Others said that there is a will or appetite of the rational and of sensuality; therefore by the will of reason we are bound to will what we know God to will, not by the will of sensuality. Therefore the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles willed the passion of Christ by the will of reason, not of sensuality, but grieved over it ». The same opinion Richard of Mediavilla reports (here a. 2, q. 1) in these words, that « by deliberative will we are bound to will absolutely, and all things considered, whatever we know God to will by absolute will, all things considered, provided that to will it befits us ». This opinion, however, is not approved by Richard; and what truth that opinion has is explained by St. Bonaventure here at the end and especially in dub. I.

In the same places the Seraphic Doctor most piously speaks of the will of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the passion of our Lord Jesus Christ; he with the common opinion asserts that by compassionating she merited. This is said against the Antissiodorensis [William of Auxerre], who at least as to the Apostles explicitly denied this, according to his words as related by Dionys. Carth. (here q. 2), namely because « that will of sensuality was not meritorious ».

II. Authors: Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 41, m. 4, § 6. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; Summa I-II, q. 19, a. 10. — B. Albert, here a. 2, §§ 6, 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, q. 3, a. 1. — Richard de Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 princ., q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 30. — Mox pro ergo si non ed. 1 ergo qui non.
Verse 30. — Then for ergo si non, ed. 1 [reads] ergo qui non.
Psalm. 100, 3 et 4. — Glossa apud Lyranum: Cor pravum, tortum. Quod habet qui non vult omnia quae Deus vult.
Psalm 100:3 and 4. — The Gloss in Lyra: A perverse, twisted heart. Which he has who does not will all the things which God wills.
Libr. de Amicitia, c. 6, sic ait: « Est autem amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate summa consensio »; deinde in seqq.; expositis verae amicitiae finibus ac legibus, quarum prima haec est: « ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus », c. 16. auctor sic concludit: « His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas ». Ita Tullius Cicero, cum cuius expositione de amicitia definitio a S. Doctore hic ut Tulliana proposita certe convenit, si sensum spectas. At quoad verba magis congruere videtur cum illa C. Sallustii definitione, qui in libro, cui titulus est Catilina, c. 20. amicitiam sic definit: « Nam idem velle atque nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est ». — Paulo inferius Vat., refragantibus codd. nec non ed. 1, post ergo et idem velle repetit ergo idem velle.
On Friendship, c. 6, thus says: « Friendship is nothing else than the greatest accord of all divine and human matters together with goodwill and charity »; then in what follows, after the ends and laws of true friendship are set forth, of which the first is this: « that we ask honorable things from our friends, that we do honorable things for our friends' sake », c. 16, the author thus concludes: « With these ends, therefore, I think we should make use, so that, when the morals of friends are amended, there should then be among them, in all things, counsels, wills, without any exception, a community ». Thus Tullius Cicero, with whose exposition on friendship the definition proposed by the Holy Doctor here as Tullian certainly agrees, if you regard the sense. But as to the words, it seems to agree more with that definition of C. Sallust, who in the book whose title is Catilina, c. 20, defines friendship thus: « For to will the same things and to be unwilling of the same things, that at last is a firm friendship ». — A little further down, the Vatican edition, the codd. and ed. 1 dissenting, after ergo et idem velle repeats ergo idem velle.
Vat. in cognito, cod. cc sive cognitione in cognito. Cfr. de hoc argumento supra pag. 853, nota I.
The Vatican edition [reads] in cognito, cod. cc sive cognitione in cognito. Cf. on this argument above p. 853, note I.
Marc. I, 44. — Vat. cum cod. cc in hoc argumento ter praecepit pro praecipit, et circa finem argumenti omittit ad praeceptum, quia tenemur ad voluntatem: ergo tenemur.
Mark 1:44. — The Vatican edition with cod. cc in this argument has three times praecepit for praecipit, and around the end of the argument omits ad praeceptum, quia tenemur ad voluntatem: ergo tenemur.
Cod. H subiicit etiam; deinde Vat. cum cod. cc omittit Deus.
Cod. H adds etiam; then the Vatican edition with cod. cc omits Deus.
Cap. 101, n. 26. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. I.
Ch. 101, n. 26. See here the Lombard's text, c. I.
Vers. 12-14. — Mox pro volebat plures codd. V G H S T V ee fr nolebat.
Verses 12-14. — Then for volebat several codices V G H S T V ee fr [read] nolebat.
Vers. 41. — Definitio doloris, quae mox proponitur, insinuatur ab August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15, n. 2, his verbis: « Sed dolor carnis tantummodo offensio est animae ex carne, et quaedam ab eius passione dissensio; sicut animae dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt ». Insinuatur etiam a Nemesio (episcopo Emesino, saec. IV.) in libro de Natura hominis, c. 17, his verbis: « Nam cupiditas, dum quod vult assequitur, voluptatem efficit; contra, dum non assequitur, dolorem ». — Codd. T V Z, omissa post Christi particula Si, verba flebant et dolebant coniungunt cum praecedentibus. In fine argumenti pro divinae voluntati codd. A T Z cc et ed. 1 divinae voluntatis.
Verse 41. — The definition of grief which is proposed shortly is implied by Augustine, XIV On the City of God, c. 15, n. 2, in these words: « But the grief of the flesh is only an offense of the soul from the flesh, and a certain dissension from its passion; just as the grief of the soul, which is called sadness, is a dissension from those things which have happened to us against our will ». It is implied also by Nemesius (bishop of Emesa, 4th century) in the book On the Nature of Man, c. 17, in these words: « For desire, when it attains what it wills, produces pleasure; on the contrary, when it does not attain, [produces] grief ». — Codd. T V Z, omitting after Christi the particle Si, connect the words flebant et dolebant with what precedes. At the end of the argument, for divinae voluntati, codd. A T Z cc and ed. 1 [read] divinae voluntatis.
Vat. consuluit.
The Vatican edition [reads] consuluit.
Enarrat. 2 in Psalm. 31, II. sub n. 23, et I. de Ordine, c. 1, n. 1. — Paulo ante pro possum cod. A possumus.
Enarration 2 on Psalm 31, II, under n. 23, and I On Order, c. 1, n. 1. — A little before, for possum, cod. A [reads] possumus.
Libr. de Quatuor Voluntatibus in Christo: « Idcirco voluntas pietatis voluntas humanitatis vocatur, quia hominis est pietate [compassione] moveri... In hac autem vita, ubi eiusdem divinae iustitiae sententiam perfecte nec scire nec praescire possumus, quaedam etiam, quae secundum ipsam iusta non sunt, sine iniustitia velle possumus, quia hoc solum ad nos pertinet, ut ubi nescimus, quid potius Deo placeat, hoc potissimum eligamus, quod pietati concordat ».
Book On the Four Wills in Christ: « Therefore the will of piety is called the will of humanity, because it is human to be moved by piety [compassion]... But in this life, where we can neither perfectly know nor foreknow the sentence of the same divine justice, we can without injustice will certain things which according to that [justice] are not just, because this alone pertains to us, that where we do not know what is most pleasing to God, we choose most especially that which agrees with piety ».
Vers. 24. — De differentia voluntatis in nobis et in Christo, ex Hugone mox allata, in principio libri eiusdem auctoris de Quatuor Voluntatibus in Christo hoc legitur: « Humana autem voluntas tripliciter consideratur: secundum rationem, secundum pietatem, secundum carnem. Ergo in Christo voluntas fuit Divinitatis et voluntas rationis et voluntas pietatis et voluntas carnis. Voluntas Divinitatis per iustitiam sententiam dictabat... Voluntas pietatis per compassionem in malo alieno suspirabat » etc.
Verse 24. — On the difference of the will in us and in Christ, drawn shortly from Hugh, at the beginning of the book of the same author On the Four Wills in Christ, this is read: « The human will, moreover, is considered in three ways: according to reason, according to piety, according to the flesh. Therefore in Christ there was the will of Divinity and the will of reason and the will of piety and the will of the flesh. The will of Divinity by justice dictated the sentence... The will of piety by compassion in another's evil sighed » etc.
Supple: alieno, ut legitur in textu originali.
Supply: alieno [another's], as is read in the original text.
Cod. T plueret. Codd. V X, paulo ante ad verba non fieri, adiectis verbis vel prohibet fieri, addunt illud nolle. Vat. ante praecepit non fieri repetit quae.
Cod. T [reads] plueret. Codd. V X, a little before at the words non fieri, having added the words vel prohibet fieri, add illud nolle. The Vatican edition before praecepit non fieri repeats quae.
Supple cum cod. K voluntati divinae. Paulo ante codd. T X omittunt velle; Vat. post velle inserit et, ac paulo inferius post tribus addit primis.
Supply with cod. K voluntati divinae [to the divine will]. A little before, codd. T X omit velle; the Vatican edition after velle inserts et, and a little further down after tribus adds primis.
In codd. et ed. 1 deest nos ante conformare, quod certe cum Vat. supplendum est, aut substituendum conformari pro conformare. Fortasse in textu originali legebatur conformari (sine nos), quae passiva forma verbi incuria librariorum transmutata est in activam, scil. conformare. Proxime ante vocabulo praecepto Vat. adiicit divino.
In the codices and ed. 1, nos is lacking before conformare, which certainly must be supplied with the Vatican edition, or conformari must be substituted for conformare. Perhaps in the original text it read conformari (without nos), which passive form of the verb, through the carelessness of scribes, was changed into the active, namely conformare. Immediately before the word praecepto, the Vatican edition adds divino.
Vel aliis verbis: sed quia scimus, aliquid esse volitum a Deo. — Pro esse volitum cod. T est volitum.
Or, in other words: but because we know something to be willed by God. — For esse volitum, cod. T [reads] est volitum.
Vat. cum cod. cc, post per oppositum facto commate, pro voluntate exhibet voluntas. Mox pro Et sic in proposito cod. V cum ed. 1 Et sic est in proposito. Vat. hoc, quae et dein cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post rationis hanc addit propositionem: « Praecipue autem hac voluntate merebatur in Christi filii passione beatissima Mater et virgo Maria, cui patienti, quantum sexus muliebris fragilitas sustinere poterat, compatiebatur », quibus verbis tunc adnectit illa, quae infra circa finem ultimi dubii habentur: « Nullo tamen modo est dubitandum etc. »
The Vatican edition with cod. cc, after per oppositum with a comma made, for voluntate exhibits voluntas. Then for Et sic in proposito, cod. V with ed. 1 [reads] Et sic est in proposito. The Vatican [reads] hoc, which and then with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 after rationis adds this proposition: « Especially, however, by this will the most blessed Mother and virgin Mary merited in the passion of Christ her Son, with whom suffering, as far as the fragility of the female sex could bear it, she compassionated », to which words there is then attached that which is found below near the end of the last dubium: « In no way, however, must it be doubted etc. ».

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