Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially across the apparatus block covering printed pages 860–861, which is the closing matter of Liber I.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus: Multum interest, quid velle Deo, quid homini congruat. Ergo ex hoc¹ videtur, quod aliquid licite possit homo velle sciendo, quod Deus velit contrarium. Ponatur ergo per impossibile, quod alicui reveletur sua damnatio; constans est, quod Deus vult istum damnari voluntate absoluta. Aut ergo iste tenetur velle, aut non; vel — quidquid sit de tentione — quid est perfectius velle, utrum velle damnari, vel non? Si vult damnari: ergo vult a Deo separari; hoc² voluntas recta nunquam potest appetere. Si non vult damnari: ergo perfecte se non conformat: ergo perfectior est voluntas opposita.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud est impossibile, quod alicui reveletur sua damnatio; et impossibili posito, non est mirum, si sequatur impossibile³. — Tamen, si tu quaeras, quid est perfectius? respondeo, quod in aeterna damnatione sunt duo, scilicet poenae inflictio et aeterna a Deo separatio. Separationem aeternam a Deo nullo modo credo quod aliqua anima recte debeat velle, immo semper velle contrarium; sed poenam velle, si revelatum est sibi, debet. Et hoc patet, quia quilibet iustus de se et de alio debet velle, quod omnis peccans finaliter aeternaliter puniatur: ergo si ponitur praeexistens⁴ cognitio certitudinaliter circa se⁵, credo, quod quamdiu durat ei bona voluntas, quod hoc volet.

Si autem quaeras de eo, qui peccat, utrum velle debeat gratiam sibi subtrahi; quia⁶ videtur quod sic, cum Deus velit, et ipse sciat hoc esse iustum; dicendum ad hoc, quod gratiam subtrahi alicui sub triplici conditione potest respici, aut simpliciter, aut ad tempus. Et ad tempus adhuc dupliciter: vel in se, vel prout habet rationem poenae. Hoc modo⁷ vult Deus subtrahere, et hoc modo debet peccans velle, ut eum Deus puniat. — Unde regula generalis est, quod in omnibus, quae scimus Deum velle absolute, tenemur voluntate absoluta velle; tamen licet nobis velle contrarium voluntate conditionata, sive quantum in nobis est, quia hoc decet nos; et propter hoc dicit Augustinus⁸: Multum interest etc.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod actio Iudaeorum fuit mala. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia actio Iudaeorum fuit causa passionis; sed si causa immediata mala, et effectus: ergo si actio fuit mala, et passio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod istud est verum de actione et passione in eodem genere bonitatis, secundum quod unum est causa alterius. Dicendum ergo, quod actio Iudaeorum fuit causa passionis in genere naturae, et in illo genere, sicut actio fuit mala, ita et passio; sed non fuit causa in eodem genere moris, immo Christi bona intentio⁹, quae passionem voluntariam dirigebat in bonum finem; econtra in actione Iudaeorum non habente rectum

finem; et ideo in genere moris actio fuit mala et Deo displicens, et passio bona et Deo placens. Et sic patet totum¹⁰.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod voluit Christum pati et mori etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia occidere Christum erat malum facere: ergo Christum occidi, fuit malum fieri: si ergo Deus voluit Christum pati, Deus voluit malum fieri; quod supra¹¹ negatum est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod occidere Christum fuit malum per comparationem ad subiectum. Quando ergo accipitur passio, aut¹² simpliciter accipitur in comparatione ad patientem sive ad sustinentem poenam, et sic simpliciter est bonum; aut in comparatione ad inferentem, et sic ex illo respectu iudicatur malum, quia malitia moris potius intentionem respicit quam actum. Et primo modo est sensus: Christum pati a Iudaeis est bonum, id est Christum sustinere poenam, quam Iudaei intulerunt, est bonum. Secundo modo est sensus: Christum pati a Iudaeis est bonum, id est passionem inferri Christo a Iudaeis est bonum; et sic falsum, quia illatio passionis non fuit nisi mala, sed sufferentia non fuit nisi bona; et sic distinguit Magister¹³.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Hoc bonum tantum fuit, ut Apostolus Petrus, qui id fieri nolebat, ab ipso qui occisus est, satan diceretur. Secundum hoc videtur, quod quicumque dolet et tristatur circa passionem Christi, est redarguendus: ergo peccavit beatissima Virgo, dum doluit, secundum quod dicitur Lucae secundo¹⁴: Tuam ipsius animam pertransibit gladius. Peccaverunt similiter Apostoli. Falsum etiam dicit Apostolus secundae ad Timotheum secundo¹⁵: Si compatimur, et conregnabimus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dolere de aliquo est dupliciter¹⁶: aut ita quod dolens voluntate rationis absoluta velit contrarium eius, de quo dolet; et sic nulli licuit dolere de passione Christi, et Petrus, quia voluntate rationis contrarium volebat, est redargutus¹⁷. Alio modo dolere de aliquo est ferri ad contrarium voluntate pietatis, tamen nihilominus hoc¹⁸ velle voluntate absoluta; sic bonum est condolere Christo et pie affici circa eum, et sic afficiuntur viri sancti, qui magnas gratias agunt Deo de passione Christi; sed tamen moventur pie in consideratione dolorum. Sic etiam piissima anima beatae Virginis dilectissimo Filio suo patienti, quantum sustinere poterat, compatiebatur¹⁹. Nullo tamen modo est dubitandum, quin virilis eius animus et ratio constantissima vellet etiam Unigenitum tradere²⁰ pro salute generis humani, ut Mater per omnia conformis esset Patri. Et in hoc miro modo debet laudari et amari, quod placuit ei, ut Unigenitus suus pro salute generis humani offerretur. Et tantum etiam compassa est, ut, si fieri posset, omnia tormenta quae Filius pertulit, ipsa multo libentius sustineret²¹. Vere igitur fuit fortis et pia, dulcis pariter et severa, sibi parca, sed nobis largissima. Haec ergo praecipue est amanda et veneranda post Trinitatem summam et eius prolem beatissimam, Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, a cuius divinitatis mysterio enarrando ceterae linguae deficiunt, quia consummatio sermonum ipse est. Ei igitur, qui potest omnia facere superabundanter, quam petimus aut intelligimus, secundum virtutem, quae operatur in nobis, ipsi gloria in Ecclesia et in Christo Iesu in omnes generationes saeculi saeculorum. Amen²².

EXPLICIT LIBER PRIMUS.

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DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the letter, and first concerning that which Augustine says: There is a great difference between what it befits God to will and what befits a man to will. Therefore from this¹ it seems that a man may licitly will something knowing that God wills the contrary. Suppose then per impossibile that to someone his own damnation be revealed; it is established that God wills him to be damned with an absolute will. Either, therefore, that man is bound to will [it], or not; or — whatever may be said about being held [to it] — what is more perfect to will: to will to be damned, or not? If he wills to be damned: therefore he wills to be separated from God; this² an upright will can never desire. If he does not will to be damned: therefore he does not perfectly conform himself: therefore the opposite will is more perfect.

I respond: It must be said that this is impossible — that to someone his own damnation be revealed; and when an impossible thing is supposed, it is no wonder if an impossible thing follows³. — Nevertheless, if you ask, what is more perfect? I reply that in eternal damnation there are two things, namely the infliction of punishment and eternal separation from God. As for eternal separation from God, in no way do I believe that any soul ought rightly to will it; indeed it should always will the contrary. But to will the punishment, if it has been revealed to it, it ought. And this is clear, because every just person ought to will, both concerning himself and concerning another, that every sinner finally and eternally be punished: therefore if there is supposed a pre-existing⁴ certain cognition concerning himself⁵, I believe that, as long as a good will endures in him, he will will this.

But if you ask concerning him who sins, whether he ought to will that grace be withdrawn from him; for⁶ it seems that yes, since God wills it, and he himself knows this to be just: it must be said to this that grace's being withdrawn from someone can be regarded under a threefold condition, either absolutely, or for a time. And for a time still in a twofold way: either in itself, or as it has the character of a penalty. In this way⁷ God wills to withdraw [it], and in this way the sinner ought to will that God punish him. — Hence the general rule is that in all things which we know God wills absolutely, we are bound to will [them] with an absolute will; nevertheless it is permitted to us to will the contrary with a conditioned will, that is, so far as in us lies, because this befits us; and on account of this Augustine says⁸: There is a great difference etc.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that the action of the Jews was evil. For this seems false to say, because the action of the Jews was the cause of the passion; but if the immediate cause is evil, [so also is] the effect: therefore if the action was evil, [so too] the passion.

I respond: It must be said that this is true of action and passion in the same genus of goodness, according as the one is the cause of the other. It must therefore be said that the action of the Jews was the cause of the passion in the genus of nature, and in that genus, as the action was evil, so also the passion; but it was not the cause in the same genus of morality, but rather Christ's good intention⁹, which was directing the voluntary passion to a good end; whereas, on the contrary, in the action of the Jews, which had no right

end; and therefore in the genus of morality the action was evil and displeasing to God, and the passion good and pleasing to God. And so the whole is plain¹⁰.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that he willed Christ to suffer and die etc. For this seems ill said, because to kill Christ was to do evil: therefore for Christ to be killed was for an evil to come about: therefore if God willed Christ to suffer, God willed an evil to come about; which has been denied above¹¹.

I respond: It must be said that to kill Christ was evil by comparison to the subject. When therefore the passion is considered, either¹² it is considered simply in comparison to the one suffering or to the one undergoing the penalty, and so it is simply good; or in comparison to the one inflicting [it], and from this regard it is judged evil, because the malice of morality regards rather the intention than the act. And in the first mode the sense is: For Christ to suffer at the hands of the Jews is good, that is, for Christ to undergo the penalty which the Jews inflicted is good. In the second mode the sense is: For Christ to suffer at the hands of the Jews is good, that is, for the passion to be inflicted on Christ by the Jews is good; and so [it is] false, because the inflicting of the passion was nothing but evil, while the enduring [of it] was nothing but good; and so the Master distinguishes¹³.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: This good was so great that the Apostle Peter, who did not will it to come about, was called Satan by that very One who was killed. According to this it seems that whoever grieves and is saddened concerning the passion of Christ is to be rebuked: therefore the most blessed Virgin sinned when she grieved, according to what is said in Luke chapter two¹⁴: A sword shall pierce through thy own soul. Likewise the Apostles sinned. The Apostle too speaks falsely in second Timothy chapter two¹⁵: If we suffer together, we shall also reign together.

I respond: It must be said that to grieve concerning something is in a twofold way¹⁶: either so that the one grieving, by an absolute will of reason, wills the contrary of that of which he grieves; and so it was permitted to no one to grieve concerning the passion of Christ, and Peter, because by a will of reason he was willing the contrary, was rebuked¹⁷. In another mode, to grieve concerning something is to be carried toward the contrary by a will of piety, while nevertheless willing this¹⁸ by an absolute will; in this way it is good to feel co-suffering with Christ and to be piously affected concerning him, and in this way holy men are affected, who give great thanks to God for the passion of Christ, but nevertheless are piously moved in the consideration of the sufferings. So likewise the most pious soul of the blessed Virgin co-suffered, so far as she could bear it, with her most beloved Son suffering¹⁹. Yet in no way must it be doubted that her manly spirit and most steadfast reason willed even to hand over the Only-begotten²⁰ for the salvation of the human race, that the Mother might be in all things conformed to the Father. And in this she must be praised and loved in a wondrous way, because it pleased her that her Only-begotten should be offered for the salvation of the human race. And she suffered together [with him] so greatly that, if it could come to pass, she would much more gladly bear all the torments which the Son endured²¹. Truly therefore she was strong and pious, equally sweet and severe, sparing toward herself but most generous toward us. She therefore is especially to be loved and venerated after the highest Trinity and its most blessed offspring, Jesus Christ our Lord, in declaring the mystery of whose divinity all other tongues fall short, because he himself is the consummation of discourses. To him therefore, who is able to do all things superabundantly beyond what we ask or understand, according to the power that worketh in us, to him be glory in the Church and in Christ Jesus throughout all generations of the world of worlds. Amen²².

HERE ENDS THE FIRST BOOK.

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