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Dist. 15, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 15

Textus Latinus
p. 338

Quaestio II. Utrum in Christo fuerit passio tristitiae.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in Christo fuerit passio tristitiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

Fundamenta. 1. Matthaei vigesimo sextop338-1: Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem: si ergo veritas falsitatem dicere non poterat, videtur, quod veraciter tristis erat.

2. Item, Christus flevit super Ierusalem, secundum quod dicitur Lucae decimo nonop338-2; sed fletus signum est interioris moeroris: ergo si Christus nihil fecit per duplicitatem, veraciter habuit in se affectum tristitiae.

3. Item, Christus amabat et desiderabat nostram salutem; sed qui amat aliquid tristatur de eius amissionep338-3: ergo cum Christus videret multos salutem suam negligere, videtur, quod pro eis verum senserit in se affectum tristitiae.

4. Item, quanto sunt in aliquo maiora viscera pietatis, tanto magis compatitur afflictis; et quanto magis compatitur interius, tanto magis moerore afficitur; sed Christus habuit in se abundantissima viscera pietatis: ergo videtur, quod in aliorum necessitatibus et infirmitatibus veraciter et intense habuit passionem tristitiaep338-4.

Ad oppositum: Sed contra: 1. Isaiae quadragesimo secundop338-5: Non erit tristis neque turbulentus, dicitur de Christo: ergo Christus neque turbationem neque tristitiam habuit in se.

2. Item, Proverbiorum duodecimop338-6: Non contristabit iustum, quidquid ei acciderit; sed Christus fuit iustissimus: ergo videtur, quod Christus de nullo sibi accidente fuerit contristatus.

3. Item, Senecap338-7 probat multiplici ratione, quod « tristitia non cadit in sapientem », et fundamentum suae rationis est, quia « virtutem nihil potest laedere, sicut nihil eam potest auferre »: ergo si Christus vere sapiens fuit et virtutem inconcussam habuit, videtur, quod passionem tristitiae in se non habuerit.

4. Item, nullus tristatur, nisi de eo quod fit contra voluntatem suamp338-8; sed contra voluntatem Christi nihil fieri potuit, quia in omnibus impleta fuit: ergo non videtur, quod in se veraciter tristitiam habuerit.

Conclusio.

In Christo fuit vera tristitia, non tamen omni modo, quo in nobis est, sed tantum, secundum quod dictabat ei ratio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut dicit Magister in litterap338-9, et textus etiam evangelicus confirmat, in Christo fuit vera tristitia, non tamen omni modo, quo in nobis est. Conclusio 1. Est enim quaedam tristitia, quae est praeter rationis imperium; et est tristitia, quae est contra rationis iudicium rectum; et est tristitia, quae est subiecta rationis imperio et iudicio. Triplex tristitia. Et illa tristitia est praeter rationis imperiump338-10, quae consurgit ex quadam necessitate et surreptione, sicut motus primi; et haec quidem communis est sapientibus et insipientibus, et bonis et malis. — Illa vero tristitia est contra rationis iudicium rectum, in qua ratio subiicitur sensualitati nec tantum turbatur, sed etiam perturbatur. — Illa autem est secundum rationis imperium et iudicium, quando quis tristatur, ratione dictante et suadente, ipsum tantum et taliter super aliquo debere tristari.

Conclusio 2. Dico ergo, quod in Christo fuit tristitia tantum isto tertio modo, quia de nullo tristatus fuit, nisi secundum quod dictabat ei ratio. Et hoc idem in­

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nuitur Ioannis undecimop339-1, ubi dicitur: Iesus autem infremuit spiritu et turbavit semetipsum; in quo ostenditur, quod turbatio et tristitia rationi non praesidebat, sed subiacebat. Primis autem duobus modis non fuit in Christo tristitia. — Per hoc patet responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem adductas. Ad argumenta. Nam rationes ad primam partem procedunt de tristitia secundum tertium modum; rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt secundum primum modum et secundum: et hoc patet discurrenti per singulas.

Solutio oppositorum. 1. 2. 3. Quod enim dicitur in Isaia: Non erit tristis etc.; hoc non excludit quamcumque tristitiam, sed tristitiam perturbantem. — Similiter illud quod dicitur in Proverbiis: Non contristabit iustum etc.; intelligitur de illa tristitia, quae statum mentis evertit, non de illa tristitia, qua quis tristatur compatiendo aliip339-2, vel etiam refugiendo aliquod malum illatum sibi. — Similiter illud quod dicit Seneca, intelligendum est. Seneca enim non vult probare, quod tristitia turbans non sit in sapiente, sed quod non est in sapiente tristitia perturbans. Quid perturbatio. Perturbatio autem dicit deflexionem rationis ab aequitatep339-3; et hoc modo sapiens nec tristatur nec perturbatur. Non vult autem ostendere Seneca, quod sapiens nullo modo turbetur; hoc enim est quasi impossibile in aliquo reperiri; et praeterea, nec turbari, vel non tristari, de quibus homo debet, id non est sapientiae, sed potius duritiae, Notandum. cum dicat Apostolus ad Romanos duodecimop339-4: Gaudere cum gaudentibus, et flere cum flentibus.

4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod nihil contra voluntatem Christi evenit; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de voluntate rationis absoluta, non autem verum est de voluntate sensualitatis, vel de voluntate conditionata. Tristitia autem non tantum insurgit ex voluntate rationis absoluta, sed etiam secundum alias differentias, sicut melius manifestabitur infrap339-5, cum agetur de voluntate Christi.

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English Translation
p. 338

Question II. Whether there was a passion of sorrow in Christ.

Secondly it is asked, whether there was a passion of sorrow in Christ. And that there was, seems [to follow].

Foundations. 1. Matthew twenty-sixp338-1: My soul is sorrowful even unto death: if therefore the Truth could not utter a falsehood, it seems that he was truly sorrowful.

2. Likewise, Christ wept over Jerusalem, according to what is said in Luke nineteenp338-2; but weeping is a sign of inward grief: therefore, since Christ did nothing through duplicity, he truly had in himself an affect of sorrow.

3. Likewise, Christ loved and desired our salvation; but whoever loves something is saddened at its lossp338-3: therefore, since Christ saw many neglecting their own salvation, it seems that on their account he truly felt in himself an affect of sorrow.

4. Likewise, the greater the bowels of compassion are in someone, the more he has compassion for the afflicted; and the more he has compassion inwardly, the more he is affected by grief; but Christ had in himself the most abundant bowels of compassion: therefore it seems that in the necessities and infirmities of others he truly and intensely had the passion of sorrowp338-4.

To the opposite: On the contrary: 1. Isaiah forty-twop338-5: He shall not be sorrowful nor turbulent, is said of Christ: therefore Christ had in himself neither disturbance nor sorrow.

2. Likewise, Proverbs twelvep338-6: Whatever may befall him, it shall not sadden the just man; but Christ was most just: therefore it seems that Christ was saddened by nothing befalling him.

3. Likewise, Senecap338-7 proves by manifold reasoning that « sorrow does not fall upon the wise man », and the foundation of his reasoning is that « nothing can injure virtue, just as nothing can take it away »: therefore if Christ was truly wise and had unshaken virtue, it seems that he did not have the passion of sorrow in himself.

4. Likewise, no one is saddened except over that which happens against his own willp338-8; but nothing could happen against Christ's will, since in all things it was fulfilled: therefore it does not seem that he truly had sorrow in himself.

Conclusion.

In Christ there was true sorrow, yet not in every manner in which it is in us, but only according to what reason dictated to him.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt, as the Master says in the textp338-9, and the evangelical text also confirms, in Christ there was true sorrow, yet not in every manner in which it is in us. Conclusion 1. For there is a certain sorrow which is apart from the command of reason; and there is a sorrow which is against the right judgment of reason; and there is a sorrow which is subject to the command and judgment of reason. Threefold sorrow. And that sorrow is apart from the command of reasonp338-10 which arises from a certain necessity and stealth, like the first movements; and this indeed is common to the wise and the foolish, and to the good and the bad. — But that sorrow is against the right judgment of reason in which reason is subjected to sensuality and is not only disturbed but even thrown into turmoil. — But that [sorrow] is according to the command and judgment of reason, when someone is saddened, reason dictating and persuading, that he ought to be saddened only so much and in such a way over something.

Conclusion 2. I say therefore that in Christ there was sorrow only in this third manner, because he was saddened over nothing except according to what reason dictated to him. And this same thing is in­

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timated in John elevenp339-1, where it is said: But Jesus groaned in spirit and troubled himself; in which it is shown that disturbance and sorrow did not preside over reason, but lay subject to it. But in the first two manners there was no sorrow in Christ. — Through this is clear the response to the arguments adduced for either side. To the arguments. For the arguments for the first part proceed concerning sorrow in the third manner; but the arguments to the opposite proceed according to the first manner and the second: and this is clear to one running through them one by one.

Solution of the opposed [arguments]. 1, 2, 3. For what is said in Isaiah: He shall not be sorrowful etc.; this does not exclude every sorrow, but disturbing sorrow. — Similarly what is said in Proverbs: It shall not sadden the just man etc.; is understood of that sorrow which overturns the state of the mind, not of that sorrow by which someone is saddened in having compassion for anotherp339-2, or even in fleeing some evil inflicted upon himself. — Similarly what Seneca says must be understood. For Seneca does not wish to prove that disturbing sorrow is not in the wise man, but that there is not in the wise man a sorrow that throws into turmoil. What turmoil is. Now turmoil means a deflection of reason from rectitudep339-3; and in this manner the wise man is neither saddened nor thrown into turmoil. But Seneca does not wish to show that the wise man is in no way disturbed; for this is well-nigh impossible to be found in anyone; and moreover, neither to be disturbed, nor not to be saddened, over the things by which a man ought [to be], that is not [a mark] of wisdom but rather of hardness, Note. since the Apostle says to the Romans twelvep339-4: To rejoice with those who rejoice, and to weep with those who weep.

4. But to that which is objected, that nothing happens against Christ's will; it must be said that this is true of the absolute will of reason, but it is not true of the will of sensuality, or of the conditioned will. Now sorrow does not only arise from the absolute will of reason, but also according to other differences, as will be better made manifest belowp339-5, when the will of Christ is treated.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 38. [Matth. 26, 38.]
    Verse 38. [Matthew 26:38.]
  2. Vers. 41. [Luc. 19, 41.]
    Verse 41. [Luke 19:41.]
  3. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2: « Amor ergo... fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est; idque si acciderit sentiens, tristitia est ». Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 12. cum Nemesio, episc. Emeseno (lib. de Natura hominis, c. 17.), docet, quod « exspectatum malum [constituat] timorem, praesens vero tristitiam » [λύπην].
    Augustine, City of God XIV, c. 7, n. 2: « Love therefore... fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and if, perceiving it, this should happen, it is sorrow ». Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 12, together with Nemesius, bishop of Emesa (in the book On the Nature of Man, c. 17), teaches that « an awaited evil [constitutes] fear, but a present one sorrow » [λύπην].
  4. Cfr. Luc. 19, 41. seqq.
    Cf. Luke 19:41 ff.
  5. Vers. 4. [Isai. 42, 4.]
    Verse 4. [Isaiah 42:4.]
  6. Vers. 21. [Prov. 12, 21.]
    Verse 21. [Proverbs 12:21.]
  7. Epist. 86. Idem II. de Clementia, c. 5. ait: Aegritudo autem in sapientem virum non cadit. Serena enim eius mens est, nec quidquam incidere potest, quod illam obducat. Nihil aeque hominem quam magnus animus decet. Non potest autem magnus esse idem, si metus et moeror contundit, si mentem obducit et contrahit etc. Et II. de Tranquillitate vitae ad Serenum, c. 7. ait: Denique validius debet esse quod laedit, eo quod laeditur. Non est autem fortior nequitia virtute. Non potest ergo laedi sapiens c. 8. etc.
    Letter 86. The same author, On Clemency II, c. 5, says: But sickness [of soul] does not fall upon a wise man. For his mind is serene, and nothing can befall it that would becloud it. Nothing so befits a man as a great soul. But one cannot be the same and great, if fear and grief crush it, if it beclouds and contracts the mind, etc. And in On the Tranquillity of Life, to Serenus II, c. 7, he says: Finally, that which injures must be stronger than that which is injured. But wickedness is not stronger than virtue. The wise man therefore cannot be injured, c. 8, etc.
  8. Cfr. August., IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. n. 1. seqq. et XIV. c. 8. n. 1. seqq.
    Cf. Augustine, City of God IX, c. 4, n. 1 ff. and XIV, c. 8, n. 1 ff.
  9. Hic c. 1. [Magister, in littera.]
    Here, c. 1. [The Master, in the text.]
  10. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2: Animae dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt. — Cod. U: Et istarum prima scilicet praeter rationis imperium etiam consurgit etc.
    Augustine, City of God XIV, c. 15, n. 2: The pain of the soul, which is called sorrow, is a dissension from those things which have happened to us against our will. — Codex U: And the first of these, namely [that which is] apart from the command of reason, also arises, etc.
  11. Ioan. 11, 33. Cod. F cum Vulgata: Infremuit spiritu et turbavit se ipsum. Cfr. q. praeced. in corp.
    John 11:33. Codex F, with the Vulgate: He groaned in spirit and troubled himself. Cf. the preceding question in the body.
  12. Edd. cum paucis codd. aliis. Edd. 1, 2 subinde omittunt vel etiam, cuius loco codd. F I K L N perperam posuerunt scilicet, et pro refugiendo edd. 1, 2 exhibent removendo, codd. G I L T aut resurgendo.
    The editions, with a few codices, [read] to others. Editions 1, 2 thereupon omit or even, in whose place codices F I K L N wrongly put namely, and for fleeing editions 1, 2 give removing, codices G I L T either rising again.
  13. Zeno apud Ciceronem, IV. Tuscul. Disput. c. 6, perturbationem sive passionem definit « aversam a recta ratione contra naturam commotionem ». — Pro Perturbatio autem cod. A Perturbatio enim.
    Zeno, in Cicero, Tusculan Disputations IV, c. 6, defines turmoil or passion as « a commotion turned away from right reason, contrary to nature ». — For But turmoil codex A [reads] For turmoil.
  14. Vers. 15. Cfr. August., IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. n. 3. et XIV. c. 8. n. 3. — Paulo ante pro tristari codd. G K Z bb contristari, et mox pro duritiae cod. Z dementiae. [Rom. 12, 15.]
    Verse 15. Cf. Augustine, City of God IX, c. 4, n. 3 and XIV, c. 8, n. 3. — A little before, for to be saddened codices G K Z bb [read] to be saddened together, and shortly after, for of hardness codex Z [reads] of madness. [Romans 12:15.]
  15. Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 3. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2. et dub. 4. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    Distinction 17, a. 1, q. 3. Cf. also I Sentences, d. 48, a. 2, q. 2, and dubium 4. — See the scholion to the preceding question.
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