Dist. 48, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 48
Quaestio II. Utrum conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam faciat eam iustam.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam faciat eam iustam. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia super illud Psalmi1: Rectos decet collaudatio, Glossa: « Recti sunt qui dirigunt cor suum secundum voluntatem Dei, quae recta est ».
2. Item, secundae ad Corinthios sexto2: Quae participatio iustitiae cum iniquitate? aut quae societas lucis ad tenebras? quasi dicat: nulla. Si ergo divina voluntas iustitia est et lux, si humana voluntas sit iniqua, non potest esse conformis: ergo si est conformis, necesse est esse iustam.
3. Item, conformari regulae iustitiae nihil aliud est quam iustificari3; sed voluntas divina est regula iustitiae, quia non potest obliquari ad aliquod iniquum: ergo conformari voluntati divinae est iustificari.
4. Item, intellectus noster non potest conformari divino, quin efficiatur verus: ergo nec affectus noster potest conformari divino, quin efficiatur iustus; sicut enim veritas est rectitudo intellectus, sic iustitia est rectitudo affectus4.
Contra:
1. Magister5 dicit, et est verbum Augustini, quod « voluntas Dei bona per hominum malas voluntates impletur »; sed unus effectus non procedit ab una causa per aliam, nisi illae causae ad invicem conformentur: ergo contingit malam voluntatem divinae conformari.
2. Item, conformitas voluntatum consistit in volendo et nolendo idem; sed impius potest velle et nolle quod Deus vult et non vult, ut ponit exemplum Augustinus6 de pravo filio, qui vult patrem mori, quod et Deus vult: ergo conformitas non facit voluntatem iustam.
3. Item, quamvis voluntas Dei sit beata, tamen voluntas illi conformis non propter hoc est beata: ergo pari ratione, quamvis sit iusta, non propter hoc voluntas conformis est iusta.
4. Item, si conformitas facit voluntatem iustam, cum velit hominem, qui patitur iniuriam, vindicare, si ille qui patitur iniuriam, vult se vindicare, iuste vult: ergo iustum est exigere vindictam. Si tu dicas, quod Deus vult hominem vindicare, sed non vult, quod homo vindicet se; hoc non solvit, quia saltem tunc liceret homini appetere, quod Deus ipsum vindicaret.
Conclusio.
Conclusio. Conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam et secundum actum et secundum volitum facit eam iustam; non autem sola conformitas in volito.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam attenditur secundum proportionem, sicut dictum est7. Duplex est autem proportio voluntatis, scilicet ad actum et ad volitum. Similis proportio ad actum consistit in hoc quod, sicut Deus quod vult vult ex caritate et liberaliter sive iuste et recto fine, sic et homo velit. Similis proportio ad obiectum8 est, ut quod vult Deus, etiam homo velit.
Potest igitur conformitas attendi secundum hanc duplicem similitudinem9 et comparationem; et sic est sufficiens et facit voluntatem iustam. Potest iterum attendi solum secundum alteram, ut puta secundum volitum; et sic est deficiens, cum careat simili habitudine, et hoc non sufficit ad iustitiam.
De prima conformitate procedunt primae rationes, de secunda secundae.
3. Ad illud tamen quod tertio obiicitur, quod conformitas non facit beatam animam, ergo nec iustam; dicendum, quod beatitudo dicit iustitiam consummatam. Unde plus requiritur ad hoc, ut voluntas fiat beata, quam ut fiat iusta; et ideo non sequitur, quod si non facit beatam, quod non faciat iustam. Tamen, sicut conformitas sufficiens, quae est in volito et ratione volendi, facit voluntatem iustam, sic conformitas superexcellens facit eam beatam. Illa autem est superexcellens, quando in omnibus divinae conformatur et ex nulla parte est difformis, nec in aliquo, saltem in modico10.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, iam patet responsio; quia appetens vindictam non conformat se Deo in modo sive in ratione volendi. Deus enim tanquam iustus iudex vult hoc zelo iustitiae; qui autem appetit ultionem sui sive suae iniuriae ut plurimum vult libidine vindictae. Si autem aliquis appetat solum zelo iustitiae, sicut Deus, et ex caritate, tunc dicerem, eum habere voluntatem iustam.
I. Pro maiori elucidatione servire possunt verba Alexandri Hal. (S. p. 1. q. 41. m. 2.): « Conformatio potest attendi secundum quatuor genera causarum, scil. quod Deus vult, in volendo ut vult, in volendo quod scimus ipsum velle, in volendo ad quid vult. Prima est conformitas materialis, secunda formalis, tertia est in ratione causae efficientis, quarta in ratione finis. Dicendum ergo, quod si ista quatuor concurrunt, est conformitas perfecta sive conformatio. Sufficiens autem conformitas attenditur in duobus, ut scil. velit homo sicut vult Deus, et propter quid vult. Imperfecta vero conformatio, cum homo vult quod vult [Deus], vel quod scit Deum velle ». — Eandem distinctionem secundum quatuor genera causarum adhibet S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 41. m. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., S. I. II, q. 19. a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2.
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Question II. Whether the conformity of our will to the divine makes it just.
Secondly it is asked whether the conformity of our will to the divine makes it just. And that it does, seems [to be the case]:
1. Because on that text of the Psalm1, Praise becomes the upright, the Gloss [says]: « The upright are those who direct their heart according to the will of God, which is upright ».
2. Likewise, in the second [letter] to the Corinthians, sixth2: What participation has justice with iniquity? or what fellowship has light with darkness? — as if to say: none. If, therefore, the divine will is justice and light, [and] if the human will be iniquitous, it cannot be conformed [to it]: therefore if it is conformed, it must necessarily be just.
3. Likewise, to be conformed to the rule of justice is nothing other than to be justified3; but the divine will is the rule of justice, because it cannot be deflected toward anything iniquitous: therefore to be conformed to the divine will is to be justified.
4. Likewise, our intellect cannot be conformed to the divine without being made true: therefore neither can our affection be conformed to the divine without being made just; for as truth is the rectitude of the intellect, so justice is the rectitude of the affection4.
On the contrary:
1. The Master5 says, and it is a saying of Augustine, that « the good will of God is fulfilled through the evil wills of men »; but one effect does not proceed from one cause through another, unless those causes are conformed to one another: therefore it happens that an evil will is conformed to the divine.
2. Likewise, conformity of wills consists in willing and not-willing the same thing; but the impious man can will and not-will what God wills and does not will, as Augustine6 sets forth in the example of the wicked son, who wishes his father to die, which God also wills: therefore conformity does not make the will just.
3. Likewise, although the will of God is blessed, nevertheless the will conformed to it is not on that account blessed: therefore, by like reasoning, although [the divine will] is just, the conformed will is not on that account just.
4. Likewise, if conformity makes the will just, since [God] wills that the man who suffers injury be avenged, [then] if the one who suffers injury wills to avenge himself, he wills justly: therefore it is just to exact vengeance. If you say that God wills the man to be avenged, but does not will that the man avenge himself; this does not solve [the difficulty], because at least it would then be permitted to the man to desire that God avenge him.
Conclusion.
Conclusion. The conformity of our will to the divine both according to act and according to the thing willed makes it just; but not the sole conformity in the thing willed.
Respondeo: It must be said that the conformity of our will to the divine is observed according to proportion, as has been said7. There is, however, a twofold proportion of the will, namely to the act and to the thing willed. The like proportion to the act consists in this: that, as God wills what he wills out of charity and liberally, or justly and with a right end, so also man wills. The like proportion to the object8 is that what God wills, man also wills.
Conformity can therefore be observed according to this twofold likeness9 and comparison; and so it is sufficient and makes the will just. It can again be observed only according to one [of these], for example, according to the thing willed; and so it is deficient, since it lacks the like relation, and this does not suffice for justice.
From the first conformity proceed the first reasons; from the second, the second.
3. As for that which is objected in the third place, that conformity does not make the soul blessed, therefore neither just; it must be said that beatitude bespeaks consummate justice. Hence more is required for the will to be made blessed than to be made just; and therefore it does not follow that if it does not make [the will] blessed, it does not make it just. Yet, just as sufficient conformity, which is in the thing willed and in the manner of willing, makes the will just, so super-excelling conformity makes it blessed. That [conformity] is super-excelling when it is conformed to the divine in all things and is from no part difform, nor in anything, even in a little10.
4. As for that which is objected last, the response is now plain; because the one desiring vengeance does not conform himself to God in the manner or in the manner of willing. For God, as a just judge, wills this with zeal for justice; but he who desires the avenging of himself, or of his own injury, for the most part wills [it] with the lust of vengeance. But if anyone desires [it] only with zeal for justice, as God [does], and out of charity, then I should say that he has a just will.
I. For the greater elucidation, the words of Alexander of Hales (Summa p. 1, q. 41, m. 2) may serve: « Conformation can be observed according to the four kinds of causes, namely: what God wills, in willing as he wills, in willing what we know him to will, in willing to what end he wills. The first is material conformity, the second formal, the third [is] in the character of efficient cause, the fourth in the character of [final] end. It must therefore be said that if these four concur, there is perfect conformity or conformation. Sufficient conformity, however, is observed in two [of them], namely, that man wills as God wills, and on account of what he wills. But imperfect conformation [is] when man wills what [God] wills, or what he knows God to will ». — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, employs the same distinction according to the four kinds of causes.
II. Authors: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. 1, q. 41, m. 2. — Scotus, in both Scripta, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, Summa I-II, q. 19, a. 9. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3. — Richard de Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 princ., q. 2.
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- Psalm. 32, 1. — Glossa, quae mox affertur, deprompta est ex August., Enarrat. 2. in dictum Psalm. n. 2.Psalm 32:1. — The Gloss, which is presently brought forward, is taken from Augustine, Enarration 2 on the said Psalm, n. 2.
- Vers. 14. Vulgata: Quae enim participatio... societas luci ad tenebras? — Paulo post pro si humana Vat. et humana.Verse 14. Vulgate: For what participation... fellowship has light with darkness? — A little later, for si humana the Vatican edition [reads] et humana.
- Cfr. de hoc argumento August., Enarrat. in Psalm. 93, 15. sub n. 18. seq.Cf. on this argument Augustine, Enarration on Psalm 93:15, under n. 18 ff.
- Cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de veritate, c. 12, ubi iustitia definitur « rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata »; et Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 8, ubi S. Doctor ait: « nulla autem est iusta voluntas, nisi quae vult quod Deus vult eam velle »; nec non libr. de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 1. c. 6, ubi sic legitur: Sed quoniam iustitiam, qua iustus est aliquis, constat esse rectitudinem voluntatis, quam dixi; quae rectitudo tunc tantum est in aliquo, cum ipse vult quod Deus vult eum velle.Cf. Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, c. 12, where justice is defined as « the rectitude of will preserved for its own sake »; and Dialogue on Free Will, c. 8, where the holy Doctor says: « no will is just, except that which wills what God wills it to will »; and likewise his book On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Will, q. 1, c. 6, where the following is read: But since it is agreed that the justice by which someone is just is the rectitude of the will of which I have spoken, [and] that this rectitude is then only in someone when he himself wills what God wills him to will.
- Hic c. 2, ubi et verbum Augustini, mox citatum, invenitur. Enchirid. c. 101. n. 26. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.Here c. 2, where the saying of Augustine, presently cited, is also found. Enchiridion c. 101, n. 26. See here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 1.
- Enchirid. c. 101. n. 26. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — De propos. maiori cfr. Aristot., IX. Ethic. c. 6, ubi de concordia amicorum agitur; nec non Cicero, de Amicitia, c. 6, de quo vide infra a. 2. q. 2. arg. 3.Enchiridion c. 101, n. 26. See here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 1. — On the major proposition, cf. Aristotle, IX Ethics c. 6, where concord of friends is treated; and likewise Cicero, On Friendship, c. 6, on which see below a. 2, q. 2, arg. 3.
- Quaest. praeced.[In] the preceding question.
- Pro obiectum Vat. volitum; cod. R voci obiectum adiungit et volitum.For obiectum the Vatican edition [reads] volitum; cod. R adds volitum to the word obiectum.
- Plures codd. ut H K V X (M T in marg.) et ed. 1 habitudinem.Several codices, such as H K V X (M T in the margin) and ed. 1, [read] habitudinem.
- Cfr. August., de Beata Vita, n. 17-36, et XIII. de Trin. c. 6-9.Cf. Augustine, On the Happy Life, n. 17-36, and XIII On the Trinity, c. 6-9.