Dist. 20, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 20
Quaestio III. Utrum poena purgatorii sit voluntaria.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum poena illa sit voluntaria. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia omnis sapiens vult illud, sine quo non potest adipisci desideratum — unde desiderans sanitatem vult secari et uri — sed animae in purgatorio non sunt insipientes et desiderant gloriam et sciunt, se non posse ad eam pervenire nisi per poenae tolerantiam: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod hoc non est velle simpliciter, sed sub conditione; ostenditur, quod simpliciter velint. Cor rectum habet qui voluntatem suam voluntati divinae conformat, ut dicit Ambrosius et Glossa super Psalmum1, sicut habitum est in primo; sed iusti in purgatorio habent rectum cor, et Deus vult, ibi esse ipsos: ergo et ipsi volunt, se ibi esse et pati.
2. Item, omnis vere poenitens vult facere emendam sive agendo, sive sustinendo; sed anima, quae moritur vere poenitens, poenitentiam non amittit: ergo vult emendam facere. Sed non potest agendo, ergo patiendo: ergo vult illam poenam pati.
3. Item, omnis qui patitur aliquam poenam et non vult illam pati, iudicatur impatiens et illi est, qui infert, inobediens: ergo cum viri iusti in purgatorio poenam patiantur, si nolunt illam pati, sunt impatientes et inobedientes.
Contra: 1. «Voluntarium est illud quod est in ipso cognoscente singularia2»: ergo quod non est a principio intrinseco, sed extrinseco et de necessitate, non de libertate, non habet rationem voluntarii; sed talis est poena purgatoria: ergo etc.
2. Item, nihil, a quo quis desiderat et petit liberari, est voluntarium; si enim esset voluntarium, in eo vellet persistere; sed iusti, qui sunt in purgatorio, petunt et desiderant inde liberari: ergo etc. Minor multis revelationibus nota est, sicut etiam potest probari per quartum Dialogorum3.
3. Item, quanto poena acerbior est, si voluntaria est, tanto gloriosius est martyrium; sed poena purgatorii est acerbissima, ut supra4 monstratum est: ergo si est voluntaria, videtur, quod omnes qui transeunt purgatorium, martyres iudicandi sunt.
Conclusio
Conclusio. Poena purgatorii minimam habet rationem voluntarii, quia est a voluntate tolerante quidem, sed oppositum desiderante.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqua poena dicitur tripliciter voluntaria: uno modo, quia assumitur a voluntate imperante, sicut est poena poenitentialis; alio modo, quia sustinetur a voluntate acceptante, sicut est poena Martyrum, quia5 adeo eis placet, quod ab ea liberari non vellent; tertio modo est quaedam poena, quae sustinetur a voluntate tolerante, ut puta poena, quae est in patientia, ita quod eius oppositum est in desiderio, sicut cum amans et desiderans sanitatem infirmatur, sustinet quidem infirmitatem tanquam poenam divinitus inflictam, attamen ab ea liberari procurat; et illud minime habet rationem voluntarii. — Hoc modo voluntaria est poena purgatoria in viris iustis, qui voluntarie eam sustinent et desiderant vehementer ad patriam pervenire, et alios sibi auxilium praebere.
Secundum hoc patet responsio ad utramque partem, quoniam rationes ad primam partem probant, illam poenam voluntariam esse hoc modo tertio. Rationes vero ad oppositum probant, quod non est voluntaria primo modo, vel secundo; quod patet discurrendo per singulas. Primae enim omnes rationes currunt secundum voluntatem tolerantem, quae Deo se conformat, cum etiam liceat aliquid sibi desiderare, quod et Deus vellet ipsam habere, quantum in se est. Sequentes rationes currunt secundum voluntatem imperantem, quae est ab intrinseco; vel secundum desiderantem, quae nollet separari a volito6, et quae tanto magis delectat, quanto voluntarium, quod obtinet, magis desiderat.
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Question III. Whether the pain of purgatory is voluntary.
Thirdly it is asked whether that pain is voluntary. And that it is, it seems:
1. Because every wise person wills that without which he cannot attain what is desired — whence one desiring health wills to be cut and burned — but the souls in purgatory are not unwise, and they desire glory and know that they cannot attain it except through the endurance of the pain: therefore etc. If you should say that this is not to will it absolutely, but under a condition; it is shown that they will it absolutely. He has an upright heart who conforms his will to the divine will, as Ambrose and the Gloss on the Psalm1 say, as was held in the first [book]; but the just in purgatory have an upright heart, and God wills them to be there: therefore they too will themselves to be there and to suffer.
2. Likewise, everyone who is truly penitent wills to make amends, whether by acting or by enduring; but a soul which dies truly penitent does not lose penitence: therefore it wills to make amends. But it cannot do so by acting, therefore by enduring: therefore it wills to suffer that pain.
3. Likewise, everyone who suffers some pain and does not will to suffer it is judged impatient, and is disobedient to the one who inflicts it: therefore, since the just men in purgatory suffer pain, if they are unwilling to suffer it, they are impatient and disobedient.
On the contrary: 1. «The voluntary is that which is in the one who knows the singulars2»: therefore what is not from an intrinsic principle, but from an extrinsic one and from necessity, not from liberty, does not have the character of the voluntary; but such is the pain of purgatory: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, nothing from which one desires and asks to be freed is voluntary; for if it were voluntary, one would will to persist in it; but the just who are in purgatory ask and desire to be freed from it: therefore etc. The minor is known from many revelations, as can also be proven from the fourth [book] of the Dialogues3.
3. Likewise, the more bitter a pain is, if it is voluntary, the more glorious the martyrdom; but the pain of purgatory is most bitter, as was shown above4: therefore if it is voluntary, it seems that all who pass through purgatory are to be judged martyrs.
Conclusion
Conclusion. The pain of purgatory has the character of the voluntary to the least degree, because it is from a will that indeed tolerates, but that desires the opposite.
I respond: It must be said that a pain is called voluntary in three ways: in one way, because it is assumed by a commanding will, as is penitential pain; in another way, because it is endured by an accepting will, as is the pain of the Martyrs, because5 it so pleases them that they would not will to be freed from it; in a third way there is a certain pain which is endured by a tolerating will, as for example the pain that is in patience, such that its opposite is in desire, as when one loving and desiring health falls sick: he indeed endures the sickness as a pain divinely inflicted, yet he procures to be freed from it; and that has the character of the voluntary to the least degree. — In this way the pain of purgatory is voluntary in the just men, who voluntarily endure it and vehemently desire to attain the homeland, and to offer help to others.
According to this the response to each side is clear, since the reasons for the first side prove that pain to be voluntary in this third way. But the reasons to the opposite prove that it is not voluntary in the first way, or in the second; which is clear by running through them individually. For all the first reasons proceed according to the tolerating will, which conforms itself to God, since it is even permitted to desire something for oneself which God too would will it to have, insofar as it is in itself. The following reasons proceed according to the commanding will, which is from within; or according to the desiring will, which would not will to be separated from what is willed6, and which delights so much the more, the more it desires the voluntary [good] which it obtains.
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- 1Psalm. 32, 1. Vide I. Sent. d. 48. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 1. (Cfr. ibid. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 2. pro parte affirmat.), ubi nota q. 1. iii adiecta diximus, Glossam depromptam esse ex August. Respectu Ambrosii cfr. l. de Vocatione Gentium (inter opera Ambros.), c. 2, ubi insinuat, voluntatem esse bonam, si diligat quae Deo placent.Psalm 32, 1. See I Sent. d. 48. a. 1. q. 2. fundamentum 1. (Cf. ibid. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 2. on the affirmative side), where in note we said that the Gloss was drawn from Augustine. With respect to Ambrose, cf. the book On the Vocation of the Gentiles (among the works of Ambrose), c. 2, where he intimates that the will is good if it loves the things that please God.
- 2Aristol., III. Ethic. c. 1. Vide tom. II. pag. 592, nota 3. — Pro quod est in ipso in cod. E secunda manus cum textu originali cuius principium est in ipso [supple cum originali qui agit].Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, c. 1. See tom. II, p. 592, note 3. — For which is in him in codex E a second hand, with the original text, has whose principle is in him [supply, with the original, who acts].
- 3Scil. Gregorii, c. 40. et 53.Namely [the fourth book] of Gregory['s Dialogues], c. 40 and 53.
- 4Quaest. praeced.The preceding question.
- 5Codd. F G I K quae.Codices F, G, I, K read quae.
- 6Codd. F G I quae vellet separari a nolito [plures alii codd. habent a nolito]. Mox post quanto cod. aa addit magis.Codices F, G, I read which would will to be separated from what is not willed [several other codices have from what is not willed]. Soon after quanto, codex aa adds magis.