Bonaventure

Quaestio IV. Utrum in poena purgatorii sit minor certitudo de gloria quam in via.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum in illa poena sit minor certitudo de gloria quam in via. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia quanto status similior est statui, quem homo omnino respuit, tanto maiorem timorem incutit ei¹ qui in eodem existit; sed status purgatorii magis similis est statui infernali quam status vitae praesentis: ergo augetur in eo timor: ergo per oppositum minuitur certitudo.

2. Item, anima peccatrix punitur timore et dolore, sicut econtra anima iusta reficitur gaudio et spe; sed in purgatorio augetur poena doloris²: ergo pari ratione poena timoris: ergo minuitur certitudo futurae beatitudinis.

3. Item, si augeretur certitudo, augeretur consolatio, et si augeretur consolatio, minueretur flagellatio: ergo si esset ibi maior certitudo, esset ibi minor afflictio quam in praesenti; sed non est minor, sed maior afflictio quam in praesenti: ergo est minor certitudo.

4. Item, si maior esset certitudo, ibi non ambulet anima per speciem, sed per fidem³, quae non evacuatur, quousque veniat lux gloriae; esset ibi maior fides, et si maior fides, maior gratia: ergo a destructione consequentis, si gratia non est maior in purgatorio, nec maior videtur, quod sit certitudo: ergo saltem ita dubitat anima ibi, sicut hic. Sed hic nescit, utrum odio, an amore digna sit: ergo et ibi nescit, utrum sit in inferno, vel extra.

Contra: 1. Magis est certus per spem qui sperat et non potest desperare, quam qui sperat et desperare potest; sed animae, quae sunt in purgatorio, ita sperant, quod desperare non possunt, in via autem desperare possunt: ergo etc.

2. Item, maior est certitudo in eo, in quo nulla est dubitatio, quam in eo, in quo cadit dubitatio, — haec est per se vera — sed in eo qui est in purgatorio, non cadit dubitatio de gloria habenda: ergo est ibi maior certitudo. Probatio minoris: si potest dubitare, se perventurum; et qui potest dubitare, potest consequenter opinari; et qui potest opinari, potest credere et errare circa utramque partem⁴: ergo cum anima talis non possit errare, non videtur, quod possit dubitare.

3. Item, si venit ex hoc titubatio, aut ex subreptione, aut ex scientia certa: non ex subreptione, quia hoc competit animae ratione coniunctionis suae cum carne, a qua opprimitur et non omnino est domina actuum suorum. Non ex certa scientia; probatio: anima, quae est in purgatorio, certa fide cognoscit, quod in inferno vermis non moritur⁵; certa fide cognoscit, quod anima in inferno non melioratur; certa fide cognoscit, quod in inferno desperatione cruciatur; sed constat, quod opposita videt in se: ergo ex deliberatione non potest de his dubitare, quin cadat a vera fide. Sed non potest fieri infidelis: ergo non potest ex certa scientia dubitare; nec ex subreptione dubitat: ergo nullo modo: ergo etc.

4. Item, cum anima a carne separatur, se ipsam nudam intuetur: ergo videt quod habet in se, ergo novit, utrum habeat culpam mortalem, an gratiam; et certa est, quod si habet gratiam, non potest ad infernum descendere: ergo videtur, quod nullo iudicio dubitet: ergo multo maior certitudo est de gloria in purgatorio quam in praesenti saeculo.

Conclusio

In purgatorio est maior certitudo de gloria quam in via, minor quam in patria.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum secundum quosdam, quod pro acerbitate poenarum⁶ ita absorbetur spiritus, ut ubi sit ignoret et ex hoc dubitet, utrum sit in inferno, an extra. Sicut enim anima ex dulcedine extra se rapitur, ut nesciat, utrum in corpore, an extra corpus⁷ hoc videat; sic suo modo dicunt in poenis se habere. Et pro statu illo dicunt minorem certitudinem secundum actum esse, licet non sit minor secundum habitum, immo quodam modo maior.

Sed certe non videtur hoc rationabiliter sustineri: primum, quia, etsi spiritus carni coniunctus possit ab huiusmodi poenis adeo absorberi, ut usum rationis amittat, spiritus tamen separatus, qui immortalis est, non videtur adeo absorberi, cum fortior sit ad sustinendam magnam poenam in se quam in corpore parvam. — Et quod illud verum sit, patet per verba Gregorii in quarto Dialogorum⁸, ubi dicit, quod quidam in purgatorio existentes in gravibus poenis petierunt adiutorium pro liberatione: ergo sciebant se aliquando liberandos. — Patet etiam per illud quod dicitur in homilia de divite et Lazaro⁹, ubi dicit, quod « damnati supra se electos considerant usque in diem iudicii ». Si ergo poena illa infernalis improportionaliter gravior est quam purgatoria; et illa non absorbet usum rationis in damnatis, qui sunt oppressi verme et desperatione et culpa: quanto magis nec ista poena absorbebit spiritus iustorum,

qui fortificati sunt bona conscientia et spe et divina gratia? Certe non videtur.

Ideo dicendum, quod animae in purgatorio maiorem habent certitudinem de gloria quam etiam illae quae in via sunt, sicut habebant animae in limbo; et ista certitudo media est inter certitudinem viae et patriae. In patria enim est certitudo tentionis evacuans exspectationem et timorem; in via vero certitudo est exspectationis mixta¹⁰ timori, quia quilibet labi potest, dum est viator; in purgatorio est medio modo, scilicet certitudo exspectationis, quia nondum obtinuit, sed est evacuatio timoris propter confirmationem liberi arbitrii, qua deinceps scit se peccare non posse. — Et sic patet, quod est maior certitudo, dum evacuatur timor delapsus; et illa evacuatio non est per animae maiorem perfectionem, sed per status mutationem.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod locus ille similior est inferno; dicendum, quod duplex est similitudo vel symbolum: una, quae est via ad faciliorem transitum; per quem modum dicit Philosophus¹¹, quod « in habentibus symbolum facilior est transitus »; et de hac verum est quod obiicit. — Alia est similitudo, quae tamen ad transitum non disponit, sicut os similius est ossi, quam sit humor; et tamen non ita de facili posset converti in alimentum ossis, sicut humor. Et de isto non habet veritatem quod obiicit. Quia enim difficilior est transitus, ideo minus potest, immo si nullus est transitus, nullo modo potest timere. Quoniam ergo ab igne purgatorii in infernum descendere est impossibile, non¹² ab igne praesentis supplicii sive status praesentis; quamvis ille sit similior, non inducit maiorem timorem.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod punitur dolore et timore; dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod sufficienter puniatur, non oportet, animam puniri omni genere poenae. Afflictio enim ignis vel cruciatio doloris sufficienter punit, etiam si non adsit titillatio vel titubatio timoris.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod augmentata certitudine, augetur consolatio; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, ceteris paribus; sed quoniam illa certitudo est cum afflictione et exspectationis dilatione; ideo non tam viget ibi consolatio quam afflictio. Attamen nec in ira sua continet misericordias suas¹³

Dominus, sed cum iratus est, misericordiae suae rememoratur et vehementer afflictos aliqua spei certitudine refocillat.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ambulat per fidem, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod etsi per fidem ambulet quantum ad ea quae Divinitatis sunt, quae nondum per speciem intuetur; nihilominus tamen aliqua sunt nobis invisa, quae anima exuta novit tanquam certitudinalia, utpote divinam sententiam de se latam, quae de unoquoque homine particulariter fertur in eius exitu; hoc autem fidem non evacuat, quia credit non apparentia et adhuc indiget substantia rerum sperandarum et argumento non visarum¹⁴.

Article (Sole). On the pain of purgatory.

Question IV. Whether in the pain of purgatory there is a lesser certitude of glory than in this life.

Fourthly it is asked whether in that pain there is a lesser certitude of glory than in this life. And that there is so, it seems:

1. Because the more similar a state is to a state which a man wholly rejects, the greater the fear it strikes into him¹ who exists in that same [state]; but the state of purgatory is more similar to the infernal state than is the state of the present life: therefore fear is increased in it: therefore, by the opposite, certitude is diminished.

2. Likewise, the sinful soul is punished by fear and sorrow, just as, on the contrary, the just soul is refreshed by joy and hope; but in purgatory the pain of sorrow is increased²: therefore, by parity of reasoning, [so is] the pain of fear: therefore the certitude of future blessedness is diminished.

3. Likewise, if certitude were increased, consolation would be increased, and if consolation were increased, the scourging would be diminished: therefore if there were greater certitude there, there would be less affliction there than in the present [life]; but there is not less, but greater affliction than in the present [life]: therefore there is less certitude.

4. Likewise, if the certitude were greater, the soul there would not walk by sight, but by faith³, which is not done away until the light of glory comes; there would be greater faith there, and if greater faith, greater grace: therefore, by the destruction of the consequent, if grace is not greater in purgatory, neither does it seem that certitude is [greater]: therefore the soul there at least doubts just as it does here. But here it does not know whether it is worthy of hatred or of love: therefore there too it does not know whether it is in hell or outside.

On the contrary: 1. He who hopes and cannot despair is more certain through hope than he who hopes and can despair; but the souls which are in purgatory so hope that they cannot despair, whereas in this life they can despair: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, certitude is greater in that in which there is no doubt than in that in which doubt occurs — this is self-evidently true — but in him who is in purgatory there occurs no doubt about the glory to be had: therefore there is greater certitude there. Proof of the minor: if he can doubt that he will arrive; and he who can doubt can consequently opine; and he who can opine can believe and err concerning either side⁴: therefore, since such a soul cannot err, it does not seem that it can doubt.

3. Likewise, if wavering comes from this, [it comes] either from a sudden assault or from certain knowledge: not from a sudden assault, because this belongs to the soul by reason of its conjunction with the flesh, by which it is oppressed and is not wholly mistress of its own acts. Not from certain knowledge; proof: the soul which is in purgatory knows by certain faith that in hell the worm does not die⁵; it knows by certain faith that the soul in hell is not bettered; it knows by certain faith that in hell it is tormented by despair; but it is established that it sees the opposite [of these] in itself: therefore from deliberation it cannot doubt about these things, without falling from true faith. But it cannot become an unbeliever: therefore it cannot doubt from certain knowledge; nor does it doubt from a sudden assault: therefore in no way: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, when the soul is separated from the flesh, it beholds itself naked: therefore it sees what it has in itself, therefore it knows whether it has mortal guilt or grace; and it is certain that, if it has grace, it cannot descend into hell: therefore it seems that it doubts by no judgment: therefore there is much greater certitude of glory in purgatory than in the present world.

Conclusion

In purgatory there is a greater certitude of glory than in this life, [but] less than in the fatherland.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted, according to certain ones, that on account of the bitterness of the pains⁶ the spirit is so absorbed that it is ignorant of where it is, and from this it doubts whether it is in hell or outside. For just as the soul is rapt outside itself by sweetness, so that it does not know whether it sees this in the body or outside the body⁷; so, in their own manner, they say it happens in the pains. And for that state they say that the certitude is lesser according to act, although it is not lesser according to habit, indeed in a certain way greater.

But certainly this does not seem to be reasonably maintained: first, because, although the spirit joined to the flesh can be so absorbed by pains of this kind that it loses the use of reason, nevertheless the separated spirit, which is immortal, does not seem to be so absorbed, since it is stronger to endure a great pain in itself than a small one in the body. — And that this is true is plain from the words of Gregory in the fourth book of the Dialogues⁸, where he says that certain ones existing in purgatory amid grave pains begged for help toward their liberation: therefore they knew that they were at some time to be liberated. — It is also plain from what is said in the homily on the rich man and Lazarus⁹, where he says that "the damned consider the elect above them right up to the day of judgment." If, then, that infernal pain is disproportionately graver than the purgatorial; and that [infernal pain] does not absorb the use of reason in the damned, who are oppressed by the worm and by despair and by guilt: how much more will this pain not absorb the spirits of the just,

who are fortified by a good conscience and by hope and by divine grace? Certainly it does not seem [so].

Therefore it must be said that the souls in purgatory have a greater certitude of glory than even those which are in this life, as did the souls in limbo; and this certitude is a mean between the certitude of this life and [that] of the fatherland. For in the fatherland there is the certitude of possession, doing away with expectation and fear; in this life, however, the certitude is one of expectation mixed¹⁰ with fear, because anyone can fall while he is a wayfarer; in purgatory it is in a middle manner, namely the certitude of expectation, because it has not yet obtained, but there is a doing-away of fear on account of the confirmation of the free will, by which thenceforth it knows it cannot sin. — And so it is plain that there is greater certitude, since the fear of falling away is done away; and that doing-away is not through a greater perfection of the soul, but through a change of state.

To the arguments:

To 1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that that place is more similar to hell; it must be said that similitude or symbol is twofold: one which is a way to an easier transition; in which manner the Philosopher says¹¹ that "in things having a symbol [common quality] the transition is easier"; and concerning this what he objects is true. — Another is a similitude which nevertheless does not dispose toward transition, just as bone is more similar to bone than is moisture is; and yet [bone] could not be converted into the nourishment of bone so easily as moisture. And concerning this [latter] what he objects does not hold true. For because the transition is more difficult, therefore [the fire] can do less, indeed if there is no transition, it can in no way cause fear. Since, then, to descend from the fire of purgatory into hell is impossible — not¹² [so] from the fire of the present punishment or of the present state — although that [present state] is more similar, it does not induce greater fear.

To 2. To that which is objected, that it is punished by sorrow and fear; it must be said that, for it to be sufficiently punished, it is not necessary that the soul be punished by every kind of pain. For the affliction of fire or the torment of sorrow punishes sufficiently, even if there is present no titillation or wavering of fear.

To 3. To that which is objected, that, certitude being augmented, consolation is augmented; it must be said that this is true, other things being equal; but since that certitude is [joined] with affliction and with a deferral of expectation, therefore consolation does not flourish there as much as affliction. Nevertheless the Lord does not, even in His anger, withhold His mercies¹³,

but when He is angered, He remembers His mercy and refreshes the vehemently afflicted with some certitude of hope.

To 4. To that which is objected, that it walks by faith, therefore etc.; it must be said that, although it walks by faith as regards those things which are of the Divinity, which it does not yet behold by sight; nevertheless there are some things invisible to us which the divested soul knows as certitudinal, such as the divine sentence passed upon it, which is borne particularly upon each man at his departure; this, however, does not do away with faith, because it believes things not apparent and still needs the substance of things to be hoped for and the argument of things not seen¹⁴.