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Dist. 20, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 20

Textus Latinus
p. 519

Quaestio II. Utrum poena purgatorii sit maxima poenarum temporalium.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum poena purgatoria sit maxima poenarum temporalium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus, in quodam sermone1: «Ille ignis durior erit, quam quidquid in hoc saeculo poena[m] aut videre, aut sentire, aut cogitare quis potest.»

2. Item, in littera2 dicit, quod «excellit omnem poenam, quam unquam passus sit aliquis in hac vita.»

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia quanto quis est debilior, tanto iudex puniens minori poena debet esse contentus: ergo quanto est fortior, tanto exigitur ab eo poena gravior; sed spiritus separatus improportionaliter est fortior, quam sit totum coniunctum sive homo totus; sed post hanc vitam est spiritus separatus: ergo videtur, quod gravius puniatur.

4. Item, spiritus separatus a carne semper gravius peccat quam spiritus carni unitus; sed malum poenae proportionatur malo culpae, et malum culpae semper gravius est in spiritu separato: ergo pari ratione et malum poenae.

5. Item, maior et gravior est poena passionis quam poena compassionis; sed anima exuta punitur poena passionis, coniuncta vero poena compassionis: ergo etc.

6. Item, quanto poena est universalior, tanto gravior; sed anima exuta, cum punitur, tota punitur et secundum totum — cum enim sit simplex, ignis totam attingit — sed in praesenti vix aut nunquam aliqua poena totum hominem cruciat: ergo generaliter gravior est illa, quam sit aliqua temporalis poena.

Contra: 1. Deus retribuit unicuique secundum meritum suum, unde proportionaliter respondet poena reatui; sed cum quis moritur, reatus non intenditur: ergo nec poena debet intendi: ergo nec debet esse maior in futuro quam in praesenti.

2. Item, quanto aliquid magis est passibile, adiunctum punienti magis patitur et gravius punitur3; sed coniunctum magis est passibile quam anima secundum se: ergo adiunctum affligenti magis patitur. Ergo si punitur coniunctum in praesenti, et in futuro anima separata: patet etc.

3. Item, maior est passio, in qua agens est transmutans et abiiciens, quam ubi alterum horum deficit; sed in purgatorio anima punitur, ita quod non transmutatur, nec aliquid abiicitur, in praesenti autem a corpore fit abiectio4: ergo videtur quod ista poena sit gravior.

4. Item, beatior erit anima, quando glorificabitur, corpore resumto, et similiter miserior, quando punietur, corpore resumto: ergo unio animae ad corpus potius facit ad poenae augmentum quam ad diminutionem: ergo ab oppositis, separatio facit potius ad diminutionem quam ad augmentum: ergo videtur, quod minus graviter puniatur in purgatorio anima separata quam nunc, cum sit coniuncta.

p. 520
Conclusio. Poena purgatorii in suo genere gravior est omni temporali poena, quam modo sustinet anima carni coniuncta.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera5 et Sancti etiam multi dicunt, oportet nos concedere, etiamsi non appareat nobis ratio, quod poena purgatoria gravior est omni temporali poena, quam modo sustinet anima carni coniuncta. In huiusmodi autem magis adhaerendum est auctoritati quam rationi, pro eo quod illud est magis supra naturam et rationem quam secundum naturam et rationem. — Sane tamen hoc intelligendum, ut generaliter poena illa sit maior ista, secundum illam regulam Philosophi6: «Si optimum in uno genere est melius optimo in alio genere, et hoc simpliciter illo melius.» Similiter intelligendum est hic, quod illa sit maior, non quia minima sit maior maxima in hoc genere, sed quia maxima in illo genere maior sit maxima in hoc genere. Sicut enim dicit beatus Gregorius7, quibusdam revelatum est, quasdam animas in umbra punitas esse.

Ad hoc autem, quod tenemus, intelligendum aliqui voluerunt assignare rationem naturalem, ostendentes, quod ex natura animae veniret, quod cum anima exuta patitur, per se ipsam patitur secundum se totam, et ideo poena modica est ei gravissima. — Sed hunc modum dicendi non approbat ratio catholica, quae in inferno credit animas gravius puniendas post corpora iam resumta; unde credendum est, quod iusti, qui igne conflagrationis in corpore purgabuntur in die iudicii, gravius punientur — quia brevius, et ideo intensius — quam qui nunc purgantur.

Alii voluerunt assignare rationem partim naturalem, partim supernaturalem. Dixerunt enim, quod animae exutae habent potentias suas expeditas et naturale desiderium habent pertingendi8 ad bonum, propter quod sunt creatae; et ulterius, gratia est in eis, quae magis istud desiderium inclinat: et ideo, cum illud bonum sitiant et ab illo retrahantur et quasi incarcerentur, modica poena sensibilis cum hac tristitia est eis maxima. Et pro tanto dicunt, poenam purgatoriam esse maximam. Sicut enim delectationes spirituales sunt intensae multum et praecellunt corporales; ita et tristitia de absentia superexcellit omnem dolorem corporalem9. — Sed certe nec ista ratio bene manuducit, si quis aspiciat. Primum quidem, quia desiderium summi Boni est desiderium, quod habet necessario iunctam secum fruitionem et aliquam realem possessionem; et ideo parit gaudium, unde qui plus desiderat summum Bonum magis ibi delectatur. In hoc enim dissimile est desiderium temporalium et corporalium a desiderio spiritualium, ut ostendit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum10. Et illud veritatem habet maxime, cum Deus inhabitat per caritatem in anima. Sed secundum istam rationem poena limbi maxima esset et fuisset maxima in sanctis Patribus, ubi creditur fuisse requies sancta. — Ista etiam ratio nihil ad propositum facit, si quis inspiciat, pro eo quod Sancti non de carentia loquuntur, sed de poena afflictiva, sicut de igne sive de flamma purgatoria.

Ideo dicendum, quod ratio huius sumitur ex divina iustitia; et ista est ratio recta, quia quod ignis agat in animam, ut infra11 videbitur, non est naturae, sed iustitiae; et ideo, quod magis agat, divinae iustitiae est attribuendum. Quoniam ergo Deus iustus poenam non acceptat, secundum quod punitiva tantum, sed secundum quod plus est in ea ratio ordinis recti; secundum hoc intelligendum, quod est poena assumta et poena inflicta. In poena assumta non tantum placet Deo ordinatio poenae ad culpam, sed ordo et rectitudo quae est in voluntate assumente; in poena inflicta placet12 ordinatio poenae ad culpam. Quoniam igitur poena poenitentium in praesenti plus est assumta, poena morientium est inflicta in purgatorio, pro eo quod iam non est tempus agendi, sed recipiendi; ideo modica poena in praesenti plus satisfacit, et magis est de ea contenta divina iustitia quam de magna in futuro;

p. 521

et ideo quasi improportionaliter maiorem exigit, ut ei satisfaciat13. — Exemplum autem potest haberi in istis materialibus debitis. Creditor enim plus acceptat marcam auri quam decem marcas argenti; et poena praesens illi comparata multo pretiosior est in conspectu Dei, quam sit aurum argento in conspectu hominum. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, poenam illam graviorem esse.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod reatus non augetur; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed reatus poenae melius solvitur de modica poena assumta quam de multa inflicta.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto magis est passibile, magis patitur14; dicendum, quod illud est verum, ceteris paribus; sed divina virtus, cuius est ille ignis instrumentum, ordinat, ut puniat gravius. — Vel dicendum, quod poena non iudicatur maior et minor secundum laesionem sive passionem, sed secundum sensum passionis, prout sensus refugit illam poenam. Et quoniam spiritus, licet minus laedatur ab igne quam corpus, vivaciorem tamen habet vim sentiendi passionem et iram, maxime refugit, quia hoc contra naturam suam est, non sic contra naturam corporis: ideo, quamvis minus patiatur et minus laedatur, passione15 naturali magis punitur et magis dolet; et per hoc patet responsio ad duo ultima.

3. Quod enim dicitur, quod magis punit quod abiicit et transmutat; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia ignis infernalis, qui urit et non consumit, gravius punit quam iste alius ignis, qui utrumque facit.

4. Similiter de alio, quod magis punit quod magis nocet16; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia maior poena est brachium conterere quam etiam amputare, quia remanet ibi sensus et dolor continuus. Sic et in anima, quae nunquam dormit, semper est actualis sensus nocivi et dissensus; ita quod uterque viget, et neuter minuitur, quantum est ex parte spiritus; et ideo dolor est intensus et continuus, ac per hoc gravissimus. Quomodo autem corpus agat in spiritum, infra16b in suo loco dicetur, cum agetur de poenis infernalibus.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the punishment of purgatory is the greatest of temporal punishments.

Secondly it is asked whether the punishment of purgatory is the greatest of temporal punishments. And it seems that it is.

1. Augustine, in a certain sermon1: "That fire will be harder than anything one can see, or feel, or imagine as a punishment in this world."

2. Likewise, in the text2 he says that "it surpasses every punishment that anyone has ever suffered in this life."

3. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because the weaker someone is, the lesser the punishment with which the punishing judge ought to be content; therefore the stronger he is, the heavier the punishment exacted from him; but a separated spirit is disproportionately stronger than the whole conjoined being, or the whole man; but after this life the spirit is separated: therefore it seems that it is punished more heavily.

4. Likewise, a spirit separated from the flesh always sins more heavily than a spirit united to the flesh; but the evil of punishment is proportioned to the evil of fault, and the evil of fault is always heavier in the separated spirit: therefore by parity of reasoning so too is the evil of punishment.

5. Likewise, the punishment of suffering is greater and heavier than the punishment of compassion; but the stripped soul is punished by the punishment of suffering, the conjoined soul by the punishment of compassion: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the more universal a punishment is, the heavier it is; but the stripped soul, when it is punished, is punished wholly and according to its whole — for since it is simple, the fire reaches the whole of it — but in the present life scarcely or never does any punishment torment the whole man: therefore that punishment is generally heavier than any temporal punishment.

On the contrary: 1. God renders to each according to his merit, whence the punishment corresponds proportionally to the guilt; but when someone dies, the guilt is not intensified: therefore neither ought the punishment be intensified: therefore neither ought it be greater in the future than in the present.

2. Likewise, the more passible a thing is, the more, when joined to the punisher, it suffers and is punished more heavily3; but the conjoined thing is more passible than the soul taken in itself: therefore what is joined suffers more from what afflicts it. Therefore if the conjoined thing is punished in the present, in the future too the separated soul is punished: it is plain, etc.

3. Likewise, greater is the suffering in which the agent is both transmuting and casting out, than where one of these is lacking; but in purgatory the soul is punished in such a way that it is neither transmuted nor is anything cast out of it, whereas in the present life there is a casting-out from the body4: therefore it seems that that punishment is heavier.

4. Likewise, the soul will be more blessed when it is glorified with the body resumed, and likewise more wretched when it is punished with the body resumed: therefore the union of the soul to the body contributes more to the increase of punishment than to its diminution: therefore, conversely, separation contributes more to diminution than to increase: therefore it seems that the separated soul is punished less heavily in purgatory than now, when it is conjoined.

Conclusion. The punishment of purgatory is, in its own kind, heavier than any temporal punishment which the soul joined to the flesh now sustains.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says in the text5 and as many of the Saints too say, we must concede, even though no reason appears to us, that the punishment of purgatory is heavier than any temporal punishment which the soul joined to the flesh now sustains. In matters of this kind one must adhere to authority rather than to reason, for the reason that this is more above nature and reason than according to nature and reason. — Yet this is rightly to be understood so that that punishment is generally greater than this, according to that rule of the Philosopher6: "If the best in one kind is better than the best in another kind, then it is also simply better than it." Likewise it is to be understood here, that the one is greater not because the least in this kind would be greater than the greatest, but because the greatest in that kind is greater than the greatest in this kind. For as blessed Gregory7 says, it was revealed to certain persons that certain souls were punished in shadow.

Now, with respect to what we hold, some have wished to assign a natural reason, showing that it would come from the nature of the soul that, when the stripped soul suffers, it suffers through its very self according to its whole self, and therefore a slight punishment is most grievous to it. — But this manner of speaking is not approved by Catholic reason, which believes that in hell souls are to be punished more heavily after the bodies are resumed; whence it must be believed that the just, who will be purged in the body by the fire of the conflagration on the day of judgment, will be punished more heavily — because more briefly, and therefore more intensely — than those who are now being purged.

Others have wished to assign a reason partly natural, partly supernatural. For they said that the stripped souls have their powers unhindered and have a natural desire of reaching8 the good for which they were created; and further, grace is in them, which inclines them the more toward that desire: and therefore, since they thirst for that good and are drawn back from it and as it were imprisoned, a slight sensible punishment together with this sorrow is the greatest for them. And to this extent they say that the punishment of purgatory is the greatest. For as spiritual delights are very intense and surpass bodily ones, so too the sorrow over the absence surpasses every bodily pain9. — But surely neither does this reason lead well, if one looks closely. First indeed, because the desire of the highest Good is a desire which has necessarily joined to itself fruition and some real possession; and therefore it begets joy, whence whoever desires the highest Good more delights the more therein. For in this the desire of temporal and bodily things is unlike the desire of spiritual things, as Augustine shows in the book On Eighty-Three Questions10. And this holds most of all when God dwells through charity in the soul. But according to that reason the punishment of limbo would be the greatest and would have been the greatest in the holy Fathers, where a holy rest is believed to have been. — Moreover, this reason contributes nothing to the matter at hand, if one examines it, for the reason that the Saints do not speak of privation, but of afflictive punishment, as of the fire or of the purgatorial flame.

Therefore it must be said that the reason for this is taken from divine justice; and this is the right reason, because that the fire acts on the soul, as will be seen below11, is not a matter of nature, but of justice; and therefore that it acts more is to be attributed to divine justice. Since therefore the just God does not accept punishment insofar as it is punitive only, but insofar as there is in it the further account of right order; according to this it is to be understood that there is punishment assumed and punishment inflicted. In assumed punishment what pleases God is not only the ordering of the punishment to the fault, but the order and rectitude which is in the assuming will; in inflicted punishment what pleases is12 the ordering of the punishment to the fault. Since therefore the punishment of the penitent in the present is more assumed, the punishment of the dying is inflicted in purgatory, for the reason that there is no longer a time of acting, but of receiving; therefore a slight punishment in the present satisfies more, and divine justice is more content with it than with a great one in the future;

and therefore as it were disproportionately it exacts a greater one, that it may satisfy it13. — An example, moreover, can be had in these material debts. For a creditor accepts a mark of gold more than ten marks of silver; and the present punishment compared to it is much more precious in the sight of God than gold is to silver in the sight of men. — Therefore the reasons proving that punishment to be heavier are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that the guilt is not increased; it must be said that this is true. But the guilt of punishment is better discharged by a slight assumed punishment than by a great inflicted one.

2. To that which is objected, that the more passible a thing is, the more it suffers14; it must be said that this is true, other things being equal; but the divine power, whose instrument that fire is, ordains that it punish more heavily. — Or it must be said that punishment is judged greater and lesser not according to injury or suffering, but according to the perception of the suffering, insofar as perception shrinks from that punishment. And since the spirit, although it is less injured by the fire than the body, nevertheless has a livelier power of perceiving suffering and wrath, it shrinks the most, because this is against its nature, not so against the nature of the body: therefore, although it suffers less and is injured less, by natural suffering15 it is punished more and grieves more; and by this is plain the response to the last two.

3. For as to what is said, that what casts out and transmutes punishes more; it must be said that it is false, because the infernal fire, which burns and does not consume, punishes more heavily than that other fire which does both.

4. Similarly as to the other, that what harms more punishes more16; it must be said that it is false, because it is a greater punishment to crush an arm than even to amputate it, because there sensation and continuous pain remain. So too in the soul, which never sleeps, there is always an actual perception of the harmful thing and a disagreement with it; so that both are vigorous, and neither is diminished, so far as is on the part of the spirit; and therefore the pain is intense and continuous, and thereby most grievous. But how the body acts on the spirit will be told below16b in its place, when treatment is made of the punishments of hell.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Serm. 104. in appendice (alias 41. de Sanctis), n. 5: «Ille purgatorius ignis durior erit, quam quidquid potest in hoc saeculo poenarum aut cogitari, aut videri, aut sentiri.»
    Sermon 104 in the appendix (otherwise 41, On the Saints), n. 5: "That purgatorial fire will be harder than anything of punishments that can be imagined, or seen, or felt in this world."
  2. 2
    Hic c. 1, in textu ex libro de Vera et falsa Poenitentia. Cfr. Enarrat. in Ps. 37. n. 3.
    Here c. 1, in the text from the book On True and False Penitence. Cf. Commentary on Psalm 37, n. 3.
  3. 3
    Edd. quis iudicandus.
    The editions read quis iudicandus.
  4. 4
    Cfr. infra d. 45. a. 1. q. 2. — De ipsa solut. vide August., Enchirid. c. 109. n. 29.
    Cf. below d. 45, a. 1, q. 2. — On the solution itself see Augustine, Enchiridion c. 109, n. 29.
  5. 5
    Vide verba Aristot. supra pag. 389, nota 4.
    See the words of Aristotle above p. 389, note 4.
  6. 6
    Libr. III. Topic. c. 2.
    Topics Book III, c. 2.
  7. 7
    Libr. IV. Dialog. c. 36. seq. — Inferius ante aliqui Vat. addit sciendum quod, ed. 1 et plures codd. quod.
    Dialogues Book IV, c. 36 ff. — Further on, before aliqui, the Vatican edition adds sciendum quod; edition 1 and several codices, quod.
  8. 8
    Cod. I erigendi se, cod. L tendendi.
    Codex I reads erigendi se; codex L, tendendi.
  9. 9
    Edd. cum multis codd. corporeum. Paulo inferius pro aspiciat cod. K inspiciat.
    The editions, with many codices, read corporeum. A little further on, for aspiciat codex K reads inspiciat.
  10. 10
    Quaest. 35. n. 1. seq. Cfr. Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 36. n. 1. — Inferius pro Sed secundum plures codd. vel Secundum, vel cum edd. Secundum etiam. Subinde pro sancta edd. facta.
    Question 35, n. 1 ff. Cf. Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels Book II, homily 36, n. 1. — Further on, for Sed secundum several codices read either Secundum, or with the editions Secundum etiam. Then for sancta the editions read facta.
  11. 11
    Dist. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2.
    Distinction 44, p. II, a. 3, q. 2.
  12. 12
    Cod. F tantum placet.
    Codex F reads tantum placet.
  13. 13
    Edd. cum uno alteroque cod. satisfiat.
    The editions, with one or another codex, read satisfiat.
  14. 14
    Cod. U tanto magis affligitur.
    Codex U reads tanto magis affligitur.
  15. 15
    Edd. supplent tamen. — Non pauci codd. et ed. 1 incongrue punitur.
    The editions supply tamen. — Not a few codices and edition 1 read, incongruously, punitur.
  16. 16
    Ita cod. U, cod. O plus nocet, alii minus bene tantum nocet, edd. corrupte unit.
    So codex U; codex O reads plus nocet; others less well, tantum nocet; the editions, corruptly, unit.
  17. 16b
    Dist. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Pro et ideo edd. cum uno alterove cod. et ille. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    Distinction 44, p. II, a. 3, q. 2. — For et ideo the editions, with one or another codex, read et ille. — See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
Cited by

4 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether confession necessarily follows justification
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 17
infra d. 20. p. 1. q. 2.
Whether virginity is preferred to conjugal continence
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 33
supra d. 20. p. 1. q. 2.
Whether baptism, in those who receive worthily, deletes all guilt
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 4 · 2×
infra d. 20. p. I. q. 2.
Whether through the suffrages of the Church any mitigation is granted to the damned
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 46
supra d. 20. p. I. q. 2.

2 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

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