Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially 1 through 21 across the four printed pages bearing apparatus (812, 813, 814, 815). Page 811 itself carries no d.45-dubia footer — its footnotes belong to the preceding scholion of a.3 q.2.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod voluntas nunquam dicitur relative. Videtur enim falsum, quia sicut creator dicitur ad creaturam, et praescientia ad praescitum, ita velle dicitur ad volitum; sed supra habitum est distinctione trigesima quinta, quod illa dicuntur relative: ergo et velle.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister accipit hic dici relative, prout relativus modus dicendi distinguitur a modo dicendi secundum substantiam, et hic est personalis, et ita accipitur hic. Ipse autem obiicit de relatione respectu creaturae, quae est quantum ad modum intelligendi, nec distinguitur a modo dicendi secundum substantiam. — Vel etiam potest dici, quod Magister loquitur secundum generalem nominis intellectum, quia velle non est tantum respectu creati, ut praescire et creare, sed etiam respectu Dei.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Deus scit omnia, id est, Deus est, cuius scientiae, quae est ipsius essentia, subiecta sunt omnia. Videtur enim male dicere, quia similiter divinae voluntati subiecta sunt omnia, quia voluntati eius nullus resistit¹: ergo Deus vult omnia; quod non conceditur.

Item ego quaero: cum omnia scibilia sint subiecta divinae scientiae et essentiae, et similiter volita; quare non dicimus, quod Deus volendo se velit alia, sicut sciendo se scit alia? Quod si tu concedas, tunc cetera essent aeterna. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile; quaeritur: Quare non? et videtur quod sit simile, quia, sicut divinae scientiae actus non deflectitur extra Deum, et ita sciendo se scit omnia, ita et de voluntate videtur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod subiecta divinae scientiae non dicuntur, quia sunt inferiora, sed subiecta dicuntur, respectu quorum est actus divinae cognitionis; et haec quidem sunt omnia cognoscibilia; et ideo novit omnia. Similiter subiecta voluntati sunt², et haec non sunt omnia volibilia, ideo patet illud.

Quod quaeritur, utrum volendo se velit omnia; dicendum, quod velle uno modo dicit complacentiam, alio modo dicit causam. Et prout dicit complacentiam, credo quod bene potest dici, quod volendo se velit omnia, quia omnia placent ei, quae ab ipso et ad ipsum sunt. Prout tamen dicit progressum effectus ab ipso, quamvis actus non egrediatur extra, tamen res egrediuntur, et ideo dicit respectum ad extra³. Unde sicut non conceditur: possendo se potest omnia, sic et in proposito.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quare Deus fecit caelum et terram? Respondendum est: quia voluit. Videtur enim mala responsio, quia tunc videtur facile omnia determinare; videtur etiam, quod voluntas Dei non habeat rationem. Sed contra: super illud ad Ephesios primo⁴: Secundum consilium voluntatis suae, Glossa: « Voluntas Dei est ex ratione »: ergo est quaerere rationem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod voluntas nostra, cum excitetur a volito, et causam et rationem habet et quantum ad se et quantum ad volitum, maxime cum vult aliquid, quod est propter finem; sed voluntas Dei, cuius actus est ipse⁵, quia non excitatur aliqua ratione alia a se, causam quantum ad se habere non potest. Volitum autem aliquando habet aliam causam quam voluntatem⁶, aliquando solam voluntatem, ut in mundi creatione. Voluntas habet rationem, sed non causam, quia non est irrationalis. Unde non habet rationem tanquam diversam a se, sed idem⁷ re; et ideo voluntas Dei non potest esse irrationalis; et propter hoc in actibus, qui totaliter sunt ab ipsa, sufficit ipsam scire, nec oportet ulterius aliam rationem quaerere. Et sic patet illud⁸.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium specierum et motionum. Videtur enim male dicere, quia tunc, cum voluntas Dei sit agens per intentionem, videtur quod nihil fiat casu et fortuna.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Deus, quamvis sit causa omnium, non tamen est tota causa, sed ipse cum causis creatis. Propter hoc notandum, quod effectus habet comparari ad causam supremam, quae Deus est, et sic nihil evenit casu et fortuna; habet etiam comparari ad voluntatem sive causam creatam, quae est natura vel intelligentia, et sic, cum multa eveniant praeter intentionem, multa fiunt casu et fortuna.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod nihil fit, quod non egrediatur de interiori aula summi Imperatoris. Videtur enim falsum, quia peccata fiunt, et non egrediuntur ab ipso.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister non assu-

mit hanc auctoritatem, sicut habetur in originali⁹. Nam ibi dicitur, quod non iubeatur, aut permittatur; et ita non habet locum obiectio. Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod Magister restringit distributionem suam ad res, quae sunt aliqua natura. — Vel dicendum, quod ampliat verbum egrediendi ad facere et permittere.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod monstruosi animantium partus et terrae motus et his similia fiunt voluntate Dei. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia monstrum dicit deordinationem aliquam in natura: ergo non est a causa suprema.

Respondeo: Aliquibus dicendum videtur, quod monstrum dicit deordinationem aliquam in natura, et dicit etiam substantiam aliquam¹⁰. Substantia illa causam habet positivam, quae Deus est, sed inordinatio illa non habet causam positivam, sed privationem; et haec est ut plurimum improportio virtutis agentis ad materiam: aut enim materia superabundat, aut deficit secundum proportionem caloris operantis et virtutis. Et Augustinus loquitur de monstris quantum ad id, quod habent substratum.

Tamen aliter posset dici, quod monstra etiam sunt a Deo puniente, quoniam¹¹ poenae sunt; et sic habent rationem ordinis. Quamvis enim Deus non faciat contra ordinem in finem, facit tamen contra solitum cursum naturae frequenter, vel ad vindictam, vel ad misericordiam¹².

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Placuit vanitati philosophorum causis aliis attribuere. Videtur enim, quod non bene dicat, quia philosophi causis aliis vere attribuerunt: ergo in hoc vani non fuerunt, ut puta luna eclipsatur, eo quod terra interponitur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non ideo dicuntur vani, quia aliis tribuerunt; sed quia sic aliis tribuerunt, ut tamen ad causam praecipuam non referrent. Et ideo evanuerunt¹³, quia ad causam primam et praecipuam non venerunt, quae sola est causa simpliciter prima et simpliciter generalissima.

DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Divina voluntas non recipit in se multiplicitatem. Videtur enim falsum, quia plures sunt ideae, eo quod plurium ideatorum: ergo similiter plures voluntates, quia plurium volitorum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non est simile sicut patet in quaestione de ideis¹⁴; quia voluntas dicit, quod plus se tenet ex parte volentis et secundum esse et secundum rationem dicendi, et ideo re et ratione una est voluntas beneplaciti: sed idea secundum rationem dicendi plus se tenet ex parte ideati, quia similitudinem eius dicit. Et cognitio secundum rationem intelligendi et dicendi motum dicit in nobis a rebus ad animam secundum rem, sed in Deo secundum rationem intelligendi; voluntas autem non. Ideo hac duplici ratione conceditur de ideis, non de voluntate¹⁵.

DUB. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod voluntas non recipit mutabilitatem. Videtur enim falsum, quia Deus nunc vult aliquid esse, quod postea non volet¹⁶ esse: ergo videtur, quod desinat velle et similiter incipiat: ergo videtur divina voluntas mutari.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in huiusmodi locutionibus est solum respectu connotati mutatio, quod comparatur ad divinam voluntatem, ratione cuius ponitur inceptio et desitio in actibus illis, qui connotant aliquid de praesenti. Si enim dicatur: Deus vult, hoc esse futurum, ab aeterno voluit, sed tamen causa in actu sive actualiter causans non fuit, nisi quando facere voluit, id est pro illo instanti, in quo actus voluntatis¹⁷ copulatur operi, non autem ipsi subiecto volenti. Et sic patet, quomodo sit causa actualis in tempore, nulla facta in ea mutatione; quia continue voluit, et ita actu fuit; sed causans in actu non fuit nisi pro tempore, pro quo voluit, ita quod nulla circa Deum voluntas incepit, sed solus effectus incepit¹⁸.

DUB. X.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: Et Deus iratus dicitur; sed non est ira in eo. Videtur enim

male dicere, quia in Deo est vis rationalis et concupiscibilis: ergo pari ratione ponenda est in Deo irascibilis: ergo sicut vere in eo est actus cognitivae et amoris, ita proprie actus furoris.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod irascibilis aliquo modo sonat in imperfectionem de ratione sui nominis; et ideo dicunt aliqui, quod nullo modo recipiatur in Deo nec transsumtive. — Tamen cum actus huiusmodi vis in nobis sint gloriari et dominari, et hi sunt in Deo; quare non similiter et haec vis?

Et est propterea dicendum, quod in Deo vere est haec vis gloriandi et dominandi, quae est ipsa divina substantia. Tamen quia ira¹⁹ habet passionem coniunctam de ratione sui nominis, ideo non recipitur in Deo nec irascibilis, nec ira, nisi transsumtive et sermone tropico. Et notandum, quod Deus habet signa irae, non quae significent iram in ipso, sed quae significant iram in nobis et vere, quando in nobis sunt.

DUB. XI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod praecepit Abrahae immolare filium, nec tamen voluit; ergo secundum hoc videtur, quod praeceptum falsum signum fuit.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod voluntas Dei volebat fidem et devotionem Abrahae manifestari²⁰ in praeparatione obediendi; et hoc Deus volebat, et hoc signum importabat et vere; sed tamen secundum aestimationem Abrahae plus importabat, et per illud plus, quod Abraham intelligebat, Dominus fidem eius probabat, ita quod nec in signo falsitas, nec in Abraham deceptio fuit, sed probatio²¹.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says, that will is never said relatively. For this seems false, because just as creator is said with reference to creature, and foreknowledge to what is foreknown, so willing is said with reference to what is willed; but it was held above in the thirty-fifth distinction that those things are said relatively: therefore willing also [is said relatively].

I respond: It must be said that the Master takes to be said relatively here according as the relative mode of speaking is distinguished from the mode of speaking according to substance, and this is personal, and so it is taken here. But he himself objects from the relation with respect to a creature, which is in regard to the mode of understanding, and is not distinguished from the mode of speaking according to substance. — Or alternatively it can be said that the Master speaks according to the general understanding of the name, since to will is not only with respect to a created thing, as to foreknow and to create, but also with respect to God.

Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: God knows all things, that is, God is, of whose knowledge, which is his very essence, all things are subjects. For it seems to speak ill, because likewise all things are subjects of the divine will, since to his will no one resists¹: therefore God wills all things; which is not conceded.

Likewise I ask: since all knowables are subjects of the divine knowledge and essence, and likewise the things willed; why do we not say that God in willing himself wills other things, just as in knowing himself he knows other things? If you concede this, then the others would be eternal. If you say that the case is not similar, it is asked: Why not? and it seems that the case is similar, since just as the act of the divine knowledge is not turned aside outside God, and so in knowing himself he knows all things, so it seems also concerning the will.

I respond: It must be said that things are not called subjects of the divine knowledge because they are inferior, but they are called subjects with respect to which the act of the divine cognition takes place; and these indeed are all knowables; and therefore he knows all things. Similarly subjects of the will are², and these are not all volibles, therefore the point is plain.

As to what is asked, whether in willing himself he wills all things; it must be said that to will in one mode bespeaks complacency, in another mode bespeaks causality. And in so far as it bespeaks complacency, I believe it can rightly be said that in willing himself he wills all things, since all things which are from him and toward him please him. But in so far as it bespeaks the procession of the effect from him, although the act does not go outside, the things nevertheless go forth, and therefore it bespeaks a respect to what is outside³. Whence just as it is not conceded: by being able [to do] himself, he is able for all things, so also in the matter at hand.

Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: Why did God make heaven and earth? It must be answered: because he willed [it]. For this seems an ill response, because then it seems that everything can easily be determined; it also seems that God's will has no reason. But on the contrary: upon that text to the Ephesians, chapter one⁴: According to the counsel of his will, the Gloss: « God's will is from reason »: therefore a reason is to be sought.

I respond: It must be said that our will, when it is moved by what is willed, has both a cause and a reason both as to itself and as to what is willed, especially when it wills something which is for the sake of an end; but the will of God, whose act is himself⁵, because it is not moved by any reason other than itself, can have no cause as to itself. But the thing willed sometimes has a cause other than the will⁶, sometimes the will alone, as in the creation of the world. The will has a reason, but not a cause, because it is not irrational. Whence it does not have a reason as something diverse from itself, but [a reason] the same⁷ in thing; and therefore the will of God cannot be irrational; and on account of this, in those acts which are wholly from it, it suffices to know it itself, nor is it necessary to seek further any other reason. And so the point is plain⁸.

Doubt IV.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that God's will is the cause of all species and motions. For it seems to speak ill, because then, since God's will is an agent acting through intention, it seems that nothing happens by chance or by fortune.

I respond: It must be said that God, although he is the cause of all things, yet is not the whole cause, but he together with created causes. On account of this it must be noted that the effect is to be compared to the supreme cause, which is God, and so nothing happens by chance and fortune; it has also to be compared to the will or created cause, which is nature or intelligence, and so, since many things come about beside the intention, many things happen by chance and fortune.

Doubt V.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that nothing happens which does not go forth from the inner court of the supreme Emperor. For this seems false, since sins happen, and they do not go forth from him.

I respond: It must be said that the Master does not

take up this authority as it is found in the original⁹. For there it is said that it is not commanded, or permitted; and so the objection has no place. Nevertheless it can still be said that the Master restricts his distribution to things which are something of nature. — Or it must be said that he amplifies the verb to go forth to to make and to permit.

Doubt VI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that the monstrous births of living things and earthquakes and the like happen by the will of God. For this seems false, because a monster bespeaks some disorder in nature: therefore it is not from a supreme cause.

I respond: To some it seems that it must be said that a monster bespeaks some disorder in nature, and it bespeaks also some substance¹⁰. That substance has a positive cause, which is God, but that disorder has no positive cause but a privation; and this is for the most part a disproportion of the power of the agent to the matter: for either the matter superabounds, or it falls short according to the proportion of the operative heat and power. And Augustine speaks of monsters as to that which they have as a substrate.

But it could also be said otherwise that monsters are likewise from God as punisher, since¹¹ they are penalties; and so they have the character of order. For although God does not act against order toward an end, he nevertheless frequently acts against the customary course of nature, either for vengeance, or for mercy¹².

Doubt VII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: It pleased the vanity of the philosophers to attribute [things] to other causes. For it seems that he does not speak well, because the philosophers truly attributed things to other causes: therefore in this they were not vain, for instance the moon is eclipsed because the earth is interposed.

I respond: It must be said that they are not called vain therefore, because they attributed [things] to others; but because they so attributed [things] to others, that yet they did not refer them to the principal cause. And therefore they became vain¹³, since they did not come to the first and principal cause, which alone is the cause simply first and simply most universal.

Doubt VIII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: The divine will does not receive multiplicity in itself. For this seems false, because the ideas are many, on account of the many things ideated: therefore likewise the wills are many, because of the many things willed.

I respond: It must be said that the case is not similar, as is plain in the question on ideas¹⁴; since will bespeaks [something which] holds itself more on the side of the one willing, both as to being and as to the mode of speaking, and therefore in thing and in account the will of [God's] good pleasure is one: but the idea according to the mode of speaking holds itself more on the side of the thing ideated, since it bespeaks its likeness. And cognition, according to the mode of understanding and speaking, bespeaks a motion in us from things to the mind according to thing, but in God according to the mode of understanding; will however does not. Therefore by this twofold reason it is conceded of ideas, not of will¹⁵.

Doubt IX.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that the will does not receive mutability. For this seems false, because God now wills something to be, which afterwards he will not¹⁶ will to be: therefore it seems that he ceases to will and likewise begins [to will]: therefore the divine will seems to be changed.

I respond: It must be said that in locutions of this kind there is change only with respect to the connotate, which is compared to the divine will, by reason of which a beginning and cessation are placed in those acts which connote something of the present. For if it is said: God wills this to be future, he has willed it from eternity, but yet a cause in act, that is, actually causing he was not, except when he willed to make, that is for that instant in which the act of will¹⁷ is coupled to the work — but not to the very subject willing. And so it is plain how he is an actual cause in time, with no change made in him; since he willed continuously, and so was in act; but as actually causing he was not, except for the time for which he willed, so that no will began with respect to God, but only the effect began¹⁸.

Doubt X.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what is said: And God is said to be angry; but there is no anger in him. For it seems

to speak ill, because in God there is the rational and concupiscible power: therefore by parity of reason the irascible power is to be posited in God: therefore just as in him there is truly the act of the cognitive [power] and of love, so [there is] properly the act of fury.

I respond: It must be said that irascibility in some way sounds toward imperfection by the ratio of its name; and therefore some say that it is in no way received in God, not even transsumptively. — But since the acts of this power in us are to be glorified and to dominate, and these are in God; why not also similarly this power?

And on account of this it must be said that in God there truly is this power of being glorified and of dominating, which is the divine substance itself. Yet because anger¹⁹ has a passion conjoined by the ratio of its name, therefore it is not received in God, neither irascibility, nor anger, except transsumptively and in tropic speech. And it is to be noted that God has signs of anger, not such as signify anger in him, but such as signify anger in us — and truly, when [anger] is in us.

Doubt XI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that he commanded Abraham to sacrifice [his] son, but yet did not will it; therefore according to this it seems that the precept was a false sign.

I respond: It must be said that God's will willed the faith and devotion of Abraham to be manifested²⁰ in his preparation for obeying; and this God willed, and this the sign imported, and truly; but nevertheless according to Abraham's estimation it imported more, and through that "more" — which Abraham understood — the Lord was testing his faith, so that there was neither falsity in the sign nor deception in Abraham, but a probation²¹.

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