Dist. 45, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 45
Quaestio II. De numero et sufficientia signorum divinae voluntatis.
Secundo quaeritur de numero et sufficientia signorum divinae voluntatis. Et ponit Magister quinque signa1, quae continentur in hoc versu:
Praecipit et prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet.
Et videtur, quod debeat ponere pauciora.
1. Quoniam signum et signatum dicuntur correlative, et si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum; sed si unum non dicitur multipliciter, nec reliquum, per artem Topicorum2; sed voluntas Dei est una et uno modo se habens: ergo unum solum debet habere signum.
2. Item, aut signa haec distinguuntur ratione modi significandi, aut ratione rei. Si ratione rei significantis3, ergo tot debent esse signa, quot res, quia omnis res signum est divinae voluntatis tanquam causae. Si ratione modi significandi; sed eodem modo significant divinam voluntatem praeceptio et prohibitio: ergo sunt unum signum.
3. Item, voluntas Dei, sicut infra4 patebit, non est respectu mali: ergo nullum signum eius debet accipi per comparationem ad malum: cum ergo permissio et prohibitio sint respectu mali, non sunt signa voluntatis divinae.
Quod sint plura, videtur:
4. Quia cuilibet bono respondet malum ex opposito, immo uni bono plura mala5: ergo tot vel plura signa debent accipi a parte mali, sicut ex parte boni. Cum ergo ex parte boni sint tria, patet etc.
5. Item, sicut impletioni respondet permissio, ita et cohibitio6, immo multo fortius et magis ex opposito: ergo videtur, quod plura sint signa.
6. Item, sicut praeceptioni opponitur prohibitio, ita consilio dissuasio: ergo videtur, quod sint plura.
Conclusio. Numerus et sufficientia quinque signorum voluntatis divinae explicantur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod numerus signorum uno modo consuevit accipi sic. Voluntas enim divina, proprie loquendo, est praesentium et futurorum; praeteritorum autem aut non est, aut non alio modo quam praesentium7. Secundum hoc notandum, quod si est respectu praesentis, aut illud est bonum, et sic impletio; aut malum, et sic permissio. Si respectu futuri, hoc tripliciter: aut est malum, et sic prohibitio; aut bonum necessarium, et sic praeceptio; aut bonum supererogationis, et sic consilium. Bonum autem supererogationis non habet malum oppositum, ideo nec consilium habet signum oppositum.
Alio modo possunt distingui sic: voluntas divina, sicut infra8 patebit, aliquid vult simpliciter, aliquid vult conditionaliter sive quantum in se; et utroque modo contingit eam significari. Voluntas ergo absoluta potest ad aliquid comparari aut per modum complacentiae, aut per modum displicentiae. Si per modum displicentiae, illud nullo modo fit: et ita hanc non contingit significari nec sciri aliquo signo exteriori. Si per modum complacentiae, aut quia placet illud quod fit, et sic impletio; aut quia placet aliquid9 ex illo, et sic permissio; et sic habemus duo signa. Potest iterum significari divina voluntas ut antecedens sive conditionalis, et hoc dupliciter: aut per modum complacentiae, ita quod oppositum displicet, et sic praeceptio; aut per modum displicentiae, et sic prohibitio; aut per modum complacentiae, ita tamen quod oppositum non displicet, et sic consilium. Per modum vero10 displicentiae, ita quod oppositum non placet,
non est possibile reperiri. — Et secundum hoc patet numerus et sufficientia et solutio obiectorum.
1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod voluntas beneplaciti non est multiplex; dicendum, quod hoc verum est quantum ad substantiam; tamen quantum ad connotata multiplex est, ut visum est. Voluntas enim absoluta connotat effectum, voluntas conditionata connotat naturalem ordinationem rei ad eventum, sicut omnium ad salutem.
2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum ratione modi significandi etc.; dicendum, quod ratione modi significandi. Est enim aliquis modus significandi voluntatem ut detestantem, quod facit prohibitio; alius modus ut approbantem, quod facit praeceptio.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas non est respectu mali; dicendum, quod per modum approbantis non est respectu mali, sed ex malo eliciti; per modum vero detestantis est respectu mali in se.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cuilibet bono respondet malum ex opposito; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen bono supererogationis potest opponi malum et non-malum. In quantum enim supererogationis, opponitur minus bonum; in quantum autem bonum, opponitur malum, sed non aliud, et illud quidem opponitur bono praecepti; et ideo cadit sub prohibitione.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de cohibitione, dicendum, quod illa impedit effectum, et propter hoc privat rationem significandi, ut visum est.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consilio opponitur dissuasio; dicendum, quod, sicut opinio est una contrariorum, quia est acceptio unius partis cum formidine alterius, sic consilium, quia non accipit alteram partem determinate, comprehendit suasionem et dissuasionem. Nam qui suadet consulit, et qui dissuadet similiter consulit aliquid.
In assignandis quinque signis divinae voluntatis antiqui magistri conveniunt, non autem eandem viam tenent, ut sufficientiam et congruentiam horum signorum manifestent. De opinionibus diffusius agit Alex. Hal., loc. in q. 1. cit.; et de ipsis signis ibid. in qq. 37. 38. 39.
Praeter iam in quaestione I. citatos: Scot., I. Sent. d. 47. q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 19. a. 12. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 12.
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Question II. On the number and sufficiency of the signs of the divine will.
Secondly, it is asked about the number and sufficiency of the signs of the divine will. And the Master sets down five signs1, which are contained in this verse:
He commands and forbids, permits, counsels, fulfils.
And it appears that he ought to set down fewer.
1. Because sign and signified are said correlatively, and if one of opposites is said in many ways, so also is the other; but if one is not said in many ways, neither is the other, by the art of the Topics2; but the will of God is one and is disposed in one manner: therefore it ought to have only one sign.
2. Likewise, either these signs are distinguished by reason of the mode of signifying, or by reason of the thing. If by reason of the signifying thing3, then there must be as many signs as there are things, because every thing is a sign of the divine will as of [its] cause. If by reason of the mode of signifying; but precept and prohibition signify the divine will in the same mode: therefore they are one sign.
3. Likewise, the will of God, as will appear below4, is not with respect to evil: therefore no sign of it ought to be taken by comparison to evil; since, then, permission and prohibition are with respect to evil, they are not signs of the divine will.
That there are more, appears thus:
4. Because to every good there corresponds an evil from the opposite, indeed to one good there correspond many evils5: therefore as many or more signs ought to be taken on the side of evil as on the side of good. Since, then, on the side of good there are three, [the conclusion] is plain, etc.
5. Likewise, just as to fulfilment corresponds permission, so also restraint (cohibitio)6 — indeed much more strongly and rather, from the opposite: therefore it seems that there are more signs.
6. Likewise, just as to precept is opposed prohibition, so to counsel [is opposed] dissuasion: therefore it appears that there are more.
Conclusion. The number and sufficiency of the five signs of the divine will are explained.
I respond: It must be said that the number of signs has been customarily taken in one way thus. For the divine will, properly speaking, is of present and future things; but of past things it either is not, or [is] in no other mode than [it is] of present things7. According to this it must be noted that, if it is with respect to a present thing, that thing is either good, and so [we have] fulfilment (impletio); or evil, and so permission. If with respect to a future thing, this is in three ways: either it is evil, and so prohibition; or a necessary good, and so precept; or a supererogatory good, and so counsel. But a supererogatory good has no opposed evil; therefore neither does counsel have an opposed sign.
In another way they can be distinguished thus: the divine will, as will appear below8, wills some things absolutely, and some things conditionally or so far as in itself; and in either mode it happens that it is signified. The absolute will, therefore, can be related to something either by way of complacency (complacentia) or by way of displeasure (displicentia). If by way of displeasure, that thing in no way comes to be: and so this [absolute will of displeasure] cannot be signified or known by any exterior sign. If by way of complacency, [it is so] either because that which comes to be pleases, and so [we have] fulfilment; or because something9 [arising] out of it pleases, and so permission; and thus we have two signs. The divine will can again be signified as antecedent or conditional, and this in two ways: either by way of complacency, in such a way that the opposite displeases, and so [we have] precept; or by way of displeasure, and so prohibition; or by way of complacency, yet so that the opposite does not displease, and so counsel. But by way10 of displeasure such that the opposite does not please,
it is not possible to be found. — And according to this the number and sufficiency [of the signs] and the solution of the objections are clear.
1. For to what is objected, that the will of good pleasure is not manifold; it must be said that this is true as to substance; yet as to its connotates it is manifold, as has been seen. For the absolute will connotes the effect, the conditional will connotes a natural ordering of the thing to the event, as of all things to salvation.
2. To what is asked, whether [the signs are distinguished] by reason of the mode of signifying etc.; it must be said that [it is] by reason of the mode of signifying. For there is one mode of signifying the will as detesting, which prohibition performs; another mode [of signifying it] as approving, which precept performs.
3. To what is objected, that the will is not with respect to evil; it must be said that, by way of approving, it is not with respect to evil, but to that which is elicited out of evil; but by way of detesting it is with respect to evil in itself.
4. To what is objected, that to every good there corresponds an evil from the opposite; it must be said that [this is] true; yet to a supererogatory good there can be opposed an evil and a non-evil. For insofar as [the good is] supererogatory, [there] is opposed a lesser good; but insofar as [it is] a good, [there] is opposed an evil, but not another [evil] — and that [evil] indeed is opposed to the good of precept; and therefore it falls under prohibition.
5. To what is objected concerning restraint (cohibitio), it must be said that it [merely] hinders the effect, and on this account is deprived of the character of signifying, as has been seen.
6. To what is objected, that to counsel is opposed dissuasion; it must be said that, just as opinion is one of contraries, because it is the acceptance of one part with fear of the other, so counsel, since it does not take the other part determinately, comprehends [both] persuasion and dissuasion. For he who persuades counsels, and he who dissuades likewise counsels something.
In assigning the five signs of the divine will the ancient masters agree, but they do not hold the same way in showing the sufficiency and congruence of these signs. Concerning these opinions Alex. of Hales treats more diffusely in the place cited above in q. 1; and concerning the signs themselves [he treats] in the same place in qq. 37, 38, 39.
Besides those already cited in question I: Scotus, I Sent. d. 47, q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; Summa I, q. 19, a. 12. — B. Albert, here a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3, a. 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 12.
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- Hic c. 6.Here [Lombard, Sentences, Book I, dist. 45,] c. 6.
- Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13.Aristotle, Topics I, c. 13.
- Vat. cum cod. cc adiungit significatae, quam vocem et proxime post substituit pro significantis, sed falso, quia res significata hic est ipsa voluntas Dei.The Vatican edition with codex cc adds significatae ("of the thing signified"), which word it also substitutes shortly afterwards for significantis — but mistakenly, because the thing signified here is the will of God itself.
- Dist. 46. q. 2.Distinction 46, q. 2.
- Similiter Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6: « Peccare multis modis possumus; malum enim est infiniti, ut Pythagorici coniectabant, bonum autem finiti ». Et Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 31: Optimorum (τῶν ἀγαθῶν) causa una, optimo malum contrarium, mali causae multae.Similarly Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 6: "We can err in many ways; for evil belongs to the infinite, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, but good to the finite." And Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4, § 31: Of the best things (τῶν ἀγαθῶν) there is one cause; to the best [there is] one contrary evil; of evil the causes are many.
- Vat. cum cod. cc prohibitio, at in solutione obiectionis etiam Vat. legit cohibitio.The Vatican edition, with codex cc, [reads] prohibitio; but in the solution of the objection even the Vatican reads cohibitio.
- Vat., suppressis verbis aut non est, aut non, sic: praeteritorum autem alio modo non est quam etc. Pro aut non alio modo plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 aut alio modo, omissa particula non, quam ex cod. T restituimus.The Vatican edition, having suppressed the words aut non est, aut non, [reads] thus: but of past things [the will] is in no other mode than etc. For aut non alio modo very many codices, with ed. 1, [read] aut alio modo, having omitted the particle non, which we have restored from codex T.
- Dist. 46. q. 1. — Immediate post pro aliquid vult simpliciter, aliquid vult Vat. aut vult simpliciter, aut vult.Distinction 46, q. 1. — Immediately after, for aliquid vult simpliciter, aliquid vult the Vatican [reads] aut vult simpliciter, aut vult.
- Vat. cum cod. cc aliud.The Vatican edition, with codex cc, [reads] aliud.
- Ed. 1: Per modum vero nec placentiae nec displicentiae.Edition 1: But by way neither of pleasure nor of displeasure.