Dist. 45, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 45
## Articulus III. De voluntate divina quantum ad rationem significandi.
Consequenter quaeritur de voluntate divina quantum ad rationem significandi, et circa hoc duo principaliter quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de convenientia illius divisionis divinae voluntatis in voluntatem beneplaciti et voluntatem signi. Secundo quaeritur de numero et sufficientia signorum divinae voluntatis.
Quaestio I. Utrum voluntas divina convenienter dividatur in voluntatem signi et beneplaciti.
Et quod prima divisio non sit conveniens, videtur:
1. Quia sicut voluntas est respectu rerum, ita et potentia et scientia; sed scientia non distinguitur per scientiam veritatis et scientiam signi, similiter nec potentia: ergo nec voluntas. Si tu dicas, quod illa non habent signa; contra: sicut creaturae sunt signa voluntatis, ita etiam innuunt ex suo ordine scientiam, et ex sua magnitudine monstrant potentiam: ergo si signum perducit in aliud1, patet etc.
2. Item, si contingit divinam voluntatem significari, aut per signa naturalia, aut per signa voluntaria2: non per naturalia, quia praeceptio et prohibitio non sunt a natura, sed a voluntate; non per voluntaria, quia signum voluntarium est quod significat ex institutione; sed praeceptio et prohibitio significant non ex institutione voluntatem, sed ipsum quod praecipitur: ergo etc.
3. Item, res significata non communicat nomen suum signo — unde quamvis circulus sit signum vini, non tamen est vinum — ergo quamvis praeceptio et prohibitio etc. sint signa divinae voluntatis, non tamen debent dici voluntates: ergo non debet dividi voluntas in voluntatem signi et voluntatem beneplaciti.
4. Item, praeceptio et prohibitio et huiusmodi, aut sunt signa ratione actus, aut ratione obiecti sive connotati. Si ratione actus; sed idem est actus quod divina voluntas et Deus — quia cum dico: Deus praecipit, dicitur de Deo, et ita praedicat divinam essentiam — ergo secundum hoc idem esset signum sui ipsius. Aut ratione effectus, et tunc, cum praeceptio et prohibitio nullum connotent effectum, nec consilium, nullum omnino erit signum; et ita nullo modo videntur signa.
Sed contra:
1. Scriptura dicit, plures esse voluntates Dei3; sed constat, unam esse voluntatem beneplaciti: ergo si plures sunt, oportet, quod stet pro alia voluntate quam beneplaciti. Sed nulla voluntas Dei est nisi beneplacitum, vel signum illius: ergo etc.
2. Item, contingit cognoscere voluntatem Dei;
sed non possumus cognoscere eam per se: necesse est ergo, quod cognoscamus per signa. Sed sic nominamus, secundum quod cognoscimus: ergo non tantum debemus dicere voluntatem beneplaciti esse voluntatem, sed etiam signum eius.
3. Item, praeceptio alicuius recte dicitur voluntas illius, ergo et praeceptio Dei; sed non est voluntas causans4, quia praeceptio est, etiamsi nihil fiat: ergo est voluntas ut significans.
Conclusio.
Conclusio. Auctoritate et ratione probatur, distinguendam esse voluntatem beneplaciti et signi.
Respondeo: Ad hoc intelligendum est, quod et ratio et auctoritas compellit nos distinguere voluntatem Dei in voluntatem signi et voluntatem beneplaciti. Auctoritas quidem: quia dicit Apostolus primae ad Thessalonicenses quarto5: Haec est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra; sed illud non est dictum per essentiam, ergo vel per causam, vel per significationem; non autem per causam, ergo per significationem. — Item, ratio dictat, quia communi usu loquendi consuevimus praeceptum nostrum voluntatem appellare.
Propter hoc intelligendum, quod sicut non absurde intellectus dicitur vis intellectiva et ipsum intellectum, ita voluntas dicitur ipsa vis volendi et ipsum volitum. Et quia voluntas Dei innotescit nobis per volitum tanquam per visibile signum, et « signum est quod facit in aliud venire, dum offert se sensui »6: inde est, quod voluntatem Dei dividimus in voluntatem beneplaciti et in voluntatem signi.
Ad argumenta:
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de scientia et potentia, dicendum, quod ipsa voluntas se habet immediatius ad res, et cum non sit determinata in futuris indifferentibus, ideo indiget certis signis7. Et propterea, cum debeamus nos illi conformare, oportet nos ipsam cognoscere. Sed divina scientia est respectu omnium, similiter et potentia, et praeterea, neutri oportet nos conformare; ideo non sic dicitur scientia signi vel potentia, sicut voluntas dicitur.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum sint signa naturalia, vel voluntaria; dicendum, quod signum est ens et est signum; potest ergo dici naturale in quantum ens, vel in quantum signum. Signa igitur voluntatis in quantum entia voluntaria sunt, quia a voluntate, sed naturalia sunt in quantum signa8, quia naturaliter significant, sicut effectus naturaliter significant causam.
3. Ex hoc patet sequens, quia res non communicat signo dato nomen, communicat tamen signo naturali9, ut patet: nam urina dicitur sana, quia est signum sanitatis; est enim signum quod causatur naturaliter. Hoc tamen non est generaliter verum, nec secundum sermonis proprietatem, sed secundum tropum loquendi, sicut tangit Magister in littera10. Et ratio transferendi est similitudo comperta inter signum, quod naturaliter significat, et significatum.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: ratione cuius sunt signa? dicendum, quod ratione actus causati11 per comparationem ad obiectum. Obiectum enim innotescere facit voluntatem, ut est sub actu praeceptionis et prohibitionis et huiusmodi. Unde hoc quod praecipitur, signum est voluntatis, in quantum praecipitur.
Distinctio voluntatis in voluntatem beneplaciti et signi est fundata in s. Scriptura et ab omnibus doctoribus recepta; licet a paucis posterioribus Scholasticis, ut Franc. Mayronis, voluntas signi reducatur ad actum beneplaciti, sed inefficacem, quod communissime improbatur.
Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. q. 36. m. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 19. a. 11. — B. Albert., hic a. 9; de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 80. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 3. princ. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. 1. Sent. d. 46. q. 1.
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## Article III. On the divine will according to its mode of signifying.
Consequently the divine will is inquired into according to its mode of signifying, and concerning this two things are principally asked. First it is asked about the fittingness of that division of the divine will into the will of good pleasure and the will of sign. Second it is asked about the number and sufficiency of the signs of the divine will.
Question I. Whether the divine will is conveniently divided into the will of sign and of good pleasure.
And that the first division is not fitting appears thus:
1. Because just as the will is with respect to things, so also is power and knowledge; but knowledge is not distinguished into knowledge of truth and knowledge of sign, and likewise neither is power: therefore neither will. If you say that these [knowledge and power] do not have signs, to the contrary: just as creatures are signs of the will, so also do they intimate, from their order, knowledge, and from their magnitude show power: therefore if a sign leads on to another thing1, the [conclusion] is plain, etc.
2. Likewise, if it happens that the divine will is signified, [this is] either by natural signs or by voluntary signs2: not by natural, because precept and prohibition are not from nature, but from the will; not by voluntary, because a voluntary sign is what signifies by [conventional] institution, but precept and prohibition signify not by institution the will, but the very thing which is commanded: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the thing signified does not communicate its name to the sign — whence although a hoop is a sign of wine, yet it is not wine — therefore although precept and prohibition etc. are signs of the divine will, yet they should not be called wills: therefore the will ought not to be divided into the will of sign and the will of good pleasure.
4. Likewise, precept and prohibition and the like are signs either by reason of the act, or by reason of the object or connoted thing. If by reason of the act: but the act is the same as the divine will and as God — because when I say: God commands, it is said of God, and so it predicates the divine essence — therefore on this account it would be a sign of itself. Or by reason of the effect; and then, since precept and prohibition connote no effect, nor does counsel, there will be no sign at all; and so in no way do they appear to be signs.
On the contrary:
1. Scripture says, there are many wills of God3; but it is plain that the will of good pleasure is one: therefore if there are many, it must be that [the term] stands for some will other than the [will] of good pleasure. But no will of God is anything except good pleasure, or sign of it: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, it happens that we know the will of God;
but we cannot know it through itself: it is necessary therefore that we should know [it] through signs. But we name [things] in the way that we know [them]: therefore we ought to call not only the will of good pleasure a will, but also its sign.
3. Likewise, anyone's precept is rightly called his will, therefore also God's precept; but it is not a will causing4, because the precept exists even if nothing comes to be: therefore it is a will as signifying.
Conclusion.
Conclusion. It is proved by authority and by reason that the will of good pleasure and [the will] of sign must be distinguished.
I respond: It must be said that both reason and authority compel us to distinguish God's will into the will of sign and the will of good pleasure. Authority indeed: because the Apostle says in the first [letter] to the Thessalonians, chapter 45: This is the will of God, your sanctification; but that is not said by [way of] essence — therefore either by [way of] cause or by [way of] signification; but not by cause, therefore by signification. — Likewise, reason dictates [this], because by common usage of speech we are accustomed to call our own precept a will.
On this account it must be understood that, just as it is not absurd that intellect should be called both the intellective power and the very thing understood, so also will is called both the very power of willing and the very thing willed. And because God's will becomes known to us through the thing willed as through a visible sign, and « a sign is that which makes [the mind] arrive at another thing, when it offers itself to sense »6: hence it is that we divide the will of God into the will of good pleasure and the will of sign.
To the arguments:
1. To what is objected concerning knowledge and power, it must be said that the will itself is related more immediately to things, and since it is not determined in indifferent future things, therefore it needs certain signs7. And on this account, since we must conform ourselves to it, we must come to know it. But the divine knowledge is with respect to all things, and likewise the power; and besides, we are not required to conform ourselves to either: therefore knowledge of sign or power [of sign] is not so called as the will [of sign] is.
2. To what is objected — whether [these] be natural or voluntary signs — it must be said that a sign is [both] a being and [also] a sign; therefore it can be called natural either insofar as it is a being, or insofar as it is a sign. Therefore the signs of the will, insofar as they are beings, are voluntary, because [they come] from the will; but they are natural insofar as they are signs8, because they signify naturally, as effects naturally signify their cause.
3. From this is plain the next [point], because the thing does not communicate its name to a given (conventional) sign, but it does communicate [it] to a natural sign9, as is plain: for urine is called healthy, because it is a sign of health; for it is a sign which is caused naturally. Yet this is not generally true, nor according to the propriety of speech, but according to a trope of speaking, as the Master touches on in the [main] text10. And the reason for the transference is the likeness found between the sign which naturally signifies and the thing signified.
4. To what is objected: by reason of what are they signs? it must be said that by reason of the caused act11 by comparison to the object. For the object makes the will to be known, insofar as it is under the act of precept and prohibition and the like. Hence this which is commanded is a sign of the will, insofar as it is commanded.
The distinction of the will into the will of good pleasure and of sign is founded in sacred Scripture and received by all the doctors, although by a few later Scholastics — such as Franciscus de Mayronis — the will of sign is reduced to an act of good pleasure, but [an act that is] inefficacious, which view is most commonly disproved.
Alex. Hal., on this and the following q., Summa p. I q. 36 m. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 1 a. 4; Summa I q. 19 a. 11. — B. Albert, here a. 9; on this and the following q., Summa p. I tr. 20 q. 80. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3 a. 1. — Aegid. R., on this and the following q., here 3 princ. q. 1. — Durand., on this and the following q., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q., here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following q., I Sent. d. 46 q. 1.
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- Cfr. supra pag. 282, nota 2.Cf. above p. 282, note 2.
- De hac signorum divisione in naturalia et voluntaria cfr. supra pag. 283, nota 6.On this division of signs into natural and voluntary, cf. above p. 283, note 6.
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. seqq. — In fine argumenti pro nisi beneplacitum Vat. nisi beneplaciti.Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 5 and following. — At the end of the argument, for nisi beneplacitum ("except [the will of] good pleasure") the Vatican edition [reads] nisi beneplaciti ("except of good pleasure").
- Multi codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 creans.For causans, many codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] creans ("creating").
- Vers. 3. — Paulo ante sola Vat. praetermittit voluntatem Dei in. Paulo inferius post non autem per causam cod. Q (in marg.) adiicit quia non omnes sanctificat.Verse 3. — A little before, the Vatican edition alone omits voluntatem Dei in ("the will of God in"). A little below, after non autem per causam ("but not by cause"), codex Q (in the margin) adds quia non omnes sanctificat ("because he does not sanctify all").
- Verba sunt Augustini, quae integra iam supra allata sunt pag. 282, nota 2. — Plura de his quae hic docentur invenies in Anselmi libro de Voluntate, et in eiusdem libro de Voluntate Dei, nec non hic in lit. Magistri, c. 5. seqq. — Paulo ante plurimi codd. et edd. post per visibile omittunt signum, quod Vat. cum ed. 1 bene supplevit.The words are Augustine's, which have already been adduced in full above on p. 282, note 2. — More on the things here taught will be found in Anselm's book On the Will, and in the same author's book On the Will of God, as also here in the text of the Master, c. 5 and following. — A little before, most codices and editions, after per visibile, omit signum ("sign"); the Vatican [edition], with edition 1, has rightly supplied it.
- Hoc sibi vult: cum voluntas quoad res, quae esse vel non esse, et quae sic vel aliter esse possunt, hoc vel illud determinare possit, ideoque per se a nobis certe cognosci nequeat, hinc ut cognoscamus, quid voluntas determinaverit, eam certis signis manifestari necesse est. — Pro et cum non sit determinata Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. et ed. 1 et tamen non sic determinate (ed. 1 determinata). Post pauca eadem Vat. cum ed. 1 Et praeterea pro Et propterea, et deinde cum plurimis codd. et edd. perperam oporteret pro oportet, quam lectionem ex cod. T et ed. 1 restauravimus.This is what [the text] means: since the will, with respect to things which can be or not be, and which can be thus or otherwise, can determine this or that, and on that account cannot be certainly known by us through itself — hence in order that we may know what the will has determined, it is necessary that it be manifested to us by certain signs. — For et cum non sit determinata ("and since it is not determined") the Vatican [edition], with one or two codices and edition 1, [reads] et tamen non sic determinate ("and yet not so determinately"; ed. 1 determinata). Shortly afterward, the same Vatican [edition], with edition 1, [reads] Et praeterea for Et propterea, and then, with very many codices and editions, wrongly [reads] oporteret for oportet — which reading we have restored from codex T and edition 1.
- In cod. X hic additur Exemplum de nutibus hominum, qui sunt naturales, et per ipsos cognoscimus voluntates.In codex X is here added: Example of human nods, which are natural, and through which we recognize wills.
- Id est, quia non signum arbitrarium, sed tantum signum naturale eodem nomine nominatur, quo res nominatur. — Vat. cum cod. cc omittit nomen, et bis pro communicat exhibet communicant. Cod. Q (in marg.) post signo dato addit id est instituto.That is, because not an arbitrary sign, but only a natural sign, is called by the same name by which the thing is named. — The Vatican [edition], with codex cc, omits nomen ("name"), and twice for communicat exhibits communicant. Codex Q (in the margin), after signo dato, adds id est instituto ("that is, [a sign] instituted").
- Hic c. 6. — Subinde pro Et ratio permulti codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Et ratione; vitiose.Here c. 6. — Immediately after, for Et ratio very many codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] Et ratione; corruptly.
- Ex cod. Y restituimus causati, pro quo plurimi codd. cum edd. creati. Ex contextu apparet, lectionem ex cod. Y depromptam esse veram. In fine solutionis Vat. praecipit pro praecipitur.From codex Y we have restored causati ("caused"), for which very many codices with the editions [read] creati ("created"). From the context it appears that the reading drawn from codex Y is the true one. At the end of the solution, the Vatican [edition reads] praecipit ("he commands") for praecipitur ("it is commanded").