Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 42
Articulus unicus.
De potentia in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest.
Quaestio I.
Utrum Deus possit aliquid aliud a se.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).
Quod autem non possit Deus aliud a se, ostenditur sic.
1. Omnis potentia, quae agit in aliud a substantia, in qua est vel cuius est, egreditur ab illa substantia1; potentia enim non operatur, nisi ubi est. Si ergo divina substantia operatur per suam potentiam in aliquid aliud a se, potentia eius incipit esse vel fieri in alio: ergo egreditur a substantia. Sed omnis potentia, quae egreditur, elongatur a substantia, et omnis talis distat a substantia; et omnis potentia distans a substantia repugnat simplicitati: cum ergo hoc sit impossibile in Deo, videtur, quod Deus non agat in aliud a se.
2. Item, omnis potentia, cuius opus est in aliud2, habet dependentiam ab illo. Probatio: opus enim, quod transit in materiam subiectam, aliquo modo pendet ex illa; sed potentia pendet ex eodem, ex quo pendet actus, quia perficitur per actum: ergo si potentia divina est in aliud, habet dependentiam.
3. Item, omnis potentia, quae est in aliquid, quod non semper est coniunctum suo actui3, habet indigentiam — non enim est perfecta, nisi quando agit, et non agit, nisi cum obiectum est praesens — ergo quando non est semper praesens, est incompleta; hoc autem repugnat potentiae divinae: ergo etc.
4. Item, in Deo idem est posse et esse4; sed Deus non est aliud a se: ergo non potest in aliud a se. Si tu dicas, quod potentia connotat, sed non essentia; contra: Deus potest aliquid facere, quod nec est nec fuit nec erit: ergo nihil connotat. Si tu dicas, quod connotat, quod est in potentia; sed potentia Dei non est aliud quam Deus et quod est in Deo: ergo et nihil aliud connotat.
Sed contra:
1. Bonum est diffusivum sui5; sed diffusio, secundum quod huiusmodi, est in aliud: ergo bonum, secundum quod bonum, potest in aliud: aut ergo secundum potentiam suam, aut alienam. Si secundum alienam: ergo non est perfecte bonum, cum non habeat actum bonum per se; si per potentiam suam: ergo bonum, secundum quod bonum, potest in aliud; sed Deus est summe bonus: ergo etc.
2. Item, omnis perfectio creaturae est in hoc, quod possit aliud a se producere6; si ergo omne quod perfectionis est, Deo est attribuendum, potentia producendi aliud est Deo attribuenda.
3. Item, si nihil aliud a se potest, ergo nulli alii a se praeest, ergo nec aliquid Deo subest: ergo a nullo est colendus, a nullo est adorandus, et nihil ab ipso omnino est quaerendum; quod est summum inconveniens, secundum omnes.
4. Item, si nihil potest aliud, ergo nihil est ad ipsum neque propter ipsum; sed bonitas est in p. 747rebus et ordo per relationem ipsorum7 ad summum bonum, a quo est omne bonum: ergo secundum hoc nulla res est bona nec ordinata in universo; hoc autem est summum inconveniens: ergo necesse est ponere, quod possit in aliud a se. Prima consequentia est manifesta; ad illud enim solum stat ultima resolutio in redeundo, in quo est prima origo in exeundo, ut manifestum est.
Conclusio.
Deus potest aliud sive in aliud a se, sed sine ulla imperfectione distantiae, dependentiae et indigentiae.
Respondeo: Ad hoc intelligendum notandum est, quod posse aliud sive in aliud a se, hoc est dupliciter: aut in aliud sicut in distinctum secundum essentiam et remotum secundum distantiam, sicut unum contrarium agit in aliud, quia impossibile est, duo contraria esse in eodem subiecto8; et hoc modo posse in aliud est per egressum potentiae a substantia, et ideo est ibi elongatio et distantia. Et quia elongatur a sua substantia, ideo pendet a substantia, in quam agit, et ideo est ibi dependentia; et quia distantia et dependentia, ideo imperfectio et indigentia. — Hoc modo posse in aliud Deo non competit propter tres conditiones praedictas, sicut ostensum est9, quia repugnant divinae potentiae, quae sunt distantia, dependentia et indigentia.
Alio modo posse in aliud dicitur sicut in divisum secundum formam et essentiam, non tamen in remotum secundum aliquam distantiam, quia divina essentia, dum operatur, intime est in illo. Et hoc modo nec ponit distantiam nec dependentiam nec indigentiam. Cum enim divina essentia sit omni perfectione perfecta, et potentia eius sit omnimoda indivisione indivisa, a nullo alio dependet, nullo alio indiget: hoc igitur modo ponendum, quod Deus potest in aliud a se sive aliud a se.
Ad argumenta in oppositum:
Ad 1. Ex his patet primo obiectum. Quod enim primo obiicit: potentia, quae est in aliud, egreditur ab agente in passum; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, ubi agens in aliud non est in illo secundum veritatem; ubi autem est, omnino nulla necessitas est egrediendi.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia, quae est in aliud, pendet ex illo; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de illo, cuius actio est in aliud tanquam in sustentans10; divina autem potentia non indiget alio sustentante, quod patet, quia non indiget subiecta materia, sed facit ex nihilo. Et ratio huius est, quia cum potentia sit omnino indifferens et ab essentia et actu, sicut essentia non indiget sustentante, sic nec potentia.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia, quae est in aliud, habet perfectionis indigentiam; dicendum, quod potentia agens in aliud est duplex: quaedam, quae est suus actus; et talis nihil plus habet, quando agit in aliud, quam quando non agit, et haec nullo modo indiget; et talis est potentia divina propter summam simplicitatem. Alia est potentia agens in aliud per actum a se differentem; et talis plus habet, quando agit, quam quando non agit, et talis est, quae habet indigentiam aliquo modo, ut potentia creata. Non sic est de potentia divina; et ideo, quamvis sit in aliud, quod non semper est praesens, propter hoc tamen nec indigens est nec incompleta.
Ad 4. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod potentia connotat possibile, et possibile ampliatur ad ens et ad non-ens11; et sicut possibile ampliatur, ita et diversitas connotati. Et ideo non tantum dicitur posse in aliud, quia potest in aliud quod est, sed quia potest in aliud, quod potest esse; Deus autem a se non potest esse aliud. Ideo patet illud.
I. Quaestio intelligenda est de potentia activa sive exsecutiva in ordine ad actum transeuntem; hanc in Deo esse, fide certum est. Disputatur tantum inter theologos, utrum et quomodo secundum nostrum modum intelligendi potentia distinguenda sit ab intellectu et voluntate, et ab ipsa natura divina. Scotus docet, potentiam divinam ex natura rei non distingui a voluntate, cum haec sit causa immediata et effectiva operum divinorum extra Deum, praelucente intellectu ut principio directivo. S. Thomas, licet non eodem modo a suis discipulis exponatur, secundum Gotti (I. tr. 4. q. 4. dub. 4.) tenet, attributum omnipotentiae virtualiter distinguendum esse a natura divina, sed non a linea intellectiva et volitiva, et formaliter consistere in intellectu practico, quatenus applicatur a voluntate. Aureolus quem sequitur Suarez putat, ipsam divinam naturam ut praeintelligitur ad divina attributa, esse formaliter et immediate potentiam operativam. Alii virtualiter distinguunt potentiam divinam et a natura et a linea intellectiva et volitiva, quibus favet S. Bonav., infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 1, praesertim ad 2, et a. 1. q. 2.
Notandum est in solut. ad 3, quod potentia divina non tantum est semper in actu, sed etiam est suus actus, quatenus est immanens. Hinc respectu Dei non potest applicari axioma Aristotelis, quod qualibet potentia melior est suo actu.
II. Breviter et eleganter totam de divina potentia doctrinam comprehendit S. Bonav. in Breviloq. I. c. 7. Ipsae conclusiones fide et ratione constant. — De hac quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1, de hac et seq. q. — Scot., de Rerum principio, q. 2. a. 2. n. seqq. — Thom., S. hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 25. a. 1. 2. 3; S. c. Gent. II. c. 7. 8. 9. 22. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. 1. tr. 19. q. 77. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
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Article unique.
On power (potentia) in comparison to the possibles, [those things] which it can [do].
Question I.
Whether God can [do/produce] anything other than himself.
That God cannot [produce] anything other than himself is shown thus.
1. Every power which acts on something other than the substance in which it is or whose [power] it is, goes out from that substance1; for a power does not operate except where it is. If therefore the divine substance operates through its power upon something other than itself, its power begins to be or come-to-be in another: therefore it goes out from the substance. But every power that goes out is removed from the substance, and every such [power] stands at a distance from the substance; and every power standing at a distance from the substance is repugnant to simplicity: since therefore this is impossible in God, it appears that God does not act on anything other than himself.
2. Likewise, every power whose work is in another2 has a dependence on it. Proof: for a work which passes into an underlying matter depends in some way on it; but the power depends on the same [thing] on which the act depends, since it is perfected through the act: therefore if the divine power is [directed] into another, it has a dependence.
3. Likewise, every power which is [directed] toward something that is not always conjoined to its act3 has neediness — for it is not perfect except when it acts, and it does not act except when the object is present — therefore when [the object] is not always present, [the power] is incomplete; but this is repugnant to the divine power: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, in God to-be-able (posse) and to-be (esse) are the same4; but God is not other than himself: therefore he cannot [extend] to anything other than himself. If you say that potentia connotes [an other] but not essentia; on the contrary: God can do something which neither is nor was nor will be: therefore [the term potentia] connotes nothing. If you say that it connotes that which is in potency; but the power of God is nothing other than God and what is in God: therefore it connotes nothing other either.
On the contrary:
1. The good is diffusive of itself5; but diffusion, as such, is into another: therefore the good, as good, can [extend] into another: either therefore by its own power, or by another's. If by another's: therefore it is not perfectly good, since it does not have a good act through itself; if by its own power: therefore the good, as good, can [extend] into another; but God is supremely good: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, every perfection of a creature consists in this, that it can produce something other than itself6; if therefore everything that belongs to perfection must be attributed to God, the power of producing another is to be attributed to God.
3. Likewise, if [God] cannot [produce] anything other than himself, therefore he is preeminent over none other than himself, therefore nothing is subject to God either: therefore he is to be venerated by none, to be adored by none, and nothing at all is to be sought from him; which is the highest inconvenience, according to all.
4. Likewise, if [God] cannot [produce] anything other [than himself], then there is nothing [ordered] to him nor on account of him; but goodness is in p. 747things and [there is] an order through their relation7 to the highest good, from which is every good: therefore on this account no thing in the universe is good or ordered; but this is the highest inconvenience: therefore it is necessary to posit that he can [extend] into another than himself. The first consequence is manifest; for the ultimate resolution in returning stands solely to that [point] in which the first origin in going-out is, as is manifest.
Conclusion.
God can [produce] another, or [act] upon another than himself, but without any imperfection of distance, dependence, or neediness.
I respond: For the understanding of this it must be noted that to-be-able [to produce] another, or [to act] upon another than oneself, is twofold: either [to act] upon another as upon something distinct according to essence and remote according to distance, as one contrary acts upon another, since it is impossible that two contraries be in the same subject8; and in this mode to-be-able [to act] upon another is by the going-out of the power from the substance, and therefore there is here a removal and a distance. And because it is removed from its substance, therefore it depends upon the substance upon which it acts, and therefore there is here a dependence; and because [there is] distance and dependence, therefore [there is] imperfection and neediness. — In this mode to-be-able [to act] upon another does not belong to God on account of the three aforementioned conditions, as has been shown9, because they are repugnant to the divine power, namely distance, dependence, and neediness.
In another mode to-be-able [to act] upon another is said as upon something divided [from oneself] according to form and essence, but not however as upon something remote according to any distance, since the divine essence, while it operates, is intimately in [that other]. And in this mode it posits neither distance nor dependence nor neediness. For since the divine essence is perfect with every perfection, and its power is undivided with every kind of indivision, it depends on nothing else, it stands in need of nothing else: this then is the mode in which it must be posited that God can [act] upon another than himself, or [produce] another than himself.
To the arguments to the contrary:
To 1. From these [things] the first objection is plain. For as to what it first objects: that a power which is [directed] toward another goes out from the agent into the patient; it must be said that this is true where the agent is not in that other according to truth; but where it is, there is no necessity at all of going out.
To 2. To that which is objected, that a power which is [directed] toward another depends on it; it must be said that this is true of that [power] whose action is upon another as upon something sustaining [it]10; but the divine power does not stand in need of another sustaining [it], which is plain, since it does not need an underlying matter, but makes from nothing. And the reason for this is that, since power is wholly indifferent both from essence and from act, just as essence does not need [anything] sustaining [it], so neither does power.
To 3. To that which is objected, that a power which is [directed] toward another has the neediness of perfection; it must be said that a power acting upon another is twofold: a certain [power] which is its [own] act, and such a [power] has nothing more when it acts upon another than when it does not act, and this [power] in no way stands in need; and such is the divine power on account of its supreme simplicity. Another is a power acting upon another through an act differing from itself; and such a [power] has more when it acts than when it does not act, and such is [the power] which has neediness in some mode, as the created power. It is not so with the divine power; and therefore, although it is [directed] toward another which is not always present, on account of this nevertheless it is neither needy nor incomplete.
To 4. To the last [it must be] said that potentia connotes possibile, and the possibile extends both to being and to non-being11; and just as the possibile extends, so also the diversity of the connoted. And therefore it is not said only to-be-able [to act] upon another because it can [act] upon another which is, but because it can [act] upon another which can be; but God cannot of himself be another. Hence the [point] is clear.
I. The question must be understood concerning active or executive power in order to a transient act; that this is in God is certain by faith. It is disputed only among theologians, whether and how, according to our manner of understanding, power is to be distinguished from intellect and will, and from the divine nature itself. Scotus teaches that the divine power is not distinguished from the will from the nature of the thing, since the [will] is the immediate and effective cause of the divine works outside God, with the intellect shining forth as the directive principle. St. Thomas, although he is not expounded in the same way by his disciples, according to Gotti (I, tr. 4, q. 4, dub. 4), holds that the attribute of omnipotence is to be virtually distinguished from the divine nature, but not from the intellective and volitional line, and that it consists formally in the practical intellect, insofar as it is applied by the will. Aureolus, whom Suarez follows, thinks that the divine nature itself, as it is pre-understood [as logically prior] to the divine attributes, is formally and immediately the operative power. Others virtually distinguish the divine power both from the nature and from the intellective and volitional line; St. Bonaventure favors [this view], below at d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, especially at [ad] 2, and a. 1, q. 2.
It is to be noted in the solution to [argument] 3, that the divine power is not only always in act, but is also its own act, insofar as it is immanent. Hence with respect to God the axiom of Aristotle cannot be applied, that every power is better than its act.
II. St. Bonaventure briefly and elegantly comprehends the whole doctrine on the divine power in Breviloquium I, c. 7. The conclusions themselves are established by faith and by reason. — On this question: Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 20, m. 1, on this and the following question. — Scot., de Rerum principio, q. 2, a. 2, n. seqq. — Thomas, S. here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 25, a. 1. 2. 3; S. c. Gent. II, c. 7. 8. 9. 22. — B. Albert., here a. 1; S. p. 1, tr. 19, q. 77, m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 1, princ. q. 2. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1.
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- Cfr. supra pag. 686, nota 4, ubi Aristotelicam definitionem actionis transeuntis invenies. De ratione a S. Doctore hic adiuncta vide Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 9. (c. 2.), ubi docetur, illud, unde principium motus est, simul esse debere cum eo quod movetur. — Paulo inferius ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. I supplevimus et omnis talis distat a substantia.Cf. above p. 686, note 4, where you will find the Aristotelian definition of transient action. On the ground [ratio] here added by the Holy Doctor, see Aristotle, Physics VII, text 9 (c. 2), where it is taught that that from which the principle of motion [comes] must be together with that which is moved. — A little below, from the older manuscripts and edition I, we have supplied et omnis talis distat a substantia.
- Id est, cuius operatio sive actio transit in aliquod externum. Huc respiciens Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 17, et IX. text. 2. (IV. c. 12, et VIII. c. 1.) potentiam activam sic definit: principium transmutationis in aliud, secundum quod est aliud.That is, [a power] whose operation or action passes into something external. Looking to this, Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 17, and IX, text 2 (IV, c. 12, and VIII, c. 1), so defines active power: the principle of transmutation into another, insofar as it is another.
- Intellige: quod non est semper praesens potentiae, sive relate ad quod potentia non semper est in actu. Cfr. de hoc argumento Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 13. seqq. (VIII. c. 8.). — Mox pro nisi cum aliqui codd. ut Z aa bb nisi quando.Understand: [something] which is not always present to the power, or in relation to which the power is not always in act. Cf. on this argument Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 13 ff. (VIII, c. 8). — Soon afterward, in place of nisi cum ("except when") some codices such as Z, aa, bb [read] nisi quando ("except whenever").
- Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 1.): Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis. — In fine argumenti post est in Deo sola Vat. addit est Deus.Aristotle, Physics III, text 32 (c. 1): "For in [things] perpetual, to-be-able differs in nothing from being itself." — At the end of the argument, after est in Deo, the Vatican [edition] alone adds est Deus ("[it] is God").
- Hoc axioma formatum videtur ex iis quae Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 4. § 1, et de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 1. seq., de bono profert. — Paulo inferius pro per potentiam, quod habent cod. V et ed. I, Vat. cum plurimis codd. minus recte propter potentiam; melius cod. Z secundum potentiam.This axiom appears to be formed from those things which Dionysius brings forward concerning the good in de Caelesti Hierarchia c. 4, § 1, and in de Divinis Nominibus c. 4, § 1 ff. — A little below, in place of per potentiam ("through power"), which codex V and edition I have, the Vatican [edition] with most codices [reads], less correctly, propter potentiam ("on account of power"); better is codex Z, secundum potentiam ("according to power").
- Cfr. supra pag. 180, nota 3. — Ex hac propositione intelligitur, S. Doctorem respuisse illud systema, quod Occasionalismus vocatur, quod creaturis actionem denegat, et de quo iam Averroes, Comment. in IX. Metaph. text. 7. (VIII. c. 3.) dicit: Ista opinio est valde extranea a natura hominis, et qui recipiunt huiusmodi, non habent cerebrum habilitatum naturaliter ad bonum. Cfr. infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.Cf. above p. 180, note 3. — From this proposition it is understood that the Holy Doctor has rejected that system which is called Occasionalism, which denies action to creatures, and concerning which already Averroes, Comment. on Metaphysics IX, text 7 (VIII, c. 3), says: "This opinion is exceedingly foreign to the nature of man, and those who accept this kind [of doctrine] have not a brain naturally fitted for the good." Cf. below d. 45, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.
- Scilicet bonitatis et ordinis. Pro ipsorum cod. V ipsarum scil. rerum. — Cfr. de hoc argumento Boeth., de Hebdomad. sive Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint etc.Namely [the relation] of goodness and of order. In place of ipsorum ("of them [masc./neut.]") codex V [reads] ipsarum, i.e. rerum ("of the things"). — Cf. on this argument Boethius, de Hebdomadibus, that is, How substances, in that they are, are good etc.
- Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.): Impossibile enim, simul contraria eidem inesse. Cfr. et de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis. Hinc si duo contraria agunt, actio eorum in eo sita est, ut unum expellat alterum de subiecto, v. g. calor prodiens ex igne expellit frigus. — Paulo ante pro unum contrarium codd. R V unum contrariorum.Aristotle, Topics II, c. 3 (c. 7): "For [it is] impossible that contraries be at the same time in the same." Cf. also Categories, the chapter On Opposites. Hence if two contraries act, their action is so placed in [the subject] that the one expels the other from the subject, e.g. heat issuing from fire expels cold. — A little before, in place of unum contrarium ("one contrary"), codices R, V [read] unum contrariorum ("one of contraries").
- Cfr. tria prima argumenta ad opposit.Cf. the first three arguments to the contrary [side].
- Hoc sibi vult: potentia omnino non differt ab essentia et actione. — Aliquanto superius pro in sustentans multi codd. sustentante vel in sustentatis; prave.This is what it means: power in no way differs from essence and from action. — Somewhat above, in place of in sustentans ("upon [something] sustaining") many codices [read] sustentante or in sustentatis; corruptly.
- Sensus est: possibile non tantum respicit ens, sed etiam non-ens. Quare et possibile ab aliquibus definitur: id quod vel est vel quod potest esse.The sense is: the possibile regards not only being, but also non-being. Hence the possibile is defined by some [as]: that which either is or which can be.