Bonaventure

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XLII.

De potentia Dei in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest.

Nunc de omnipotentia Dei agendum est.

Divisio textus.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).

Supra egit Magister de scientia divina, hic agit de potentia. Et quia potentiam tripliciter contingit considerari, scilicet quantum ad quidditatem possibilium, et quantum ad quantitatem, et quantum ad modum operandi; ideo haec pars continet tres partes sive tres distinctiones. In prima determinat Magister de potentia in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest. In secunda determinat de potentia quantum ad quantitatem, ostendens eius immensitatem, infra distinctione quadragesima tertia: Quidam tamen de suo sensu gloriantes. In tertia determinat de ipsa quantum ad modum, ibi distinctione quadragesima quarta: Nunc illud restat discutiendum, utrum melius etc.

Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, habet quatuor partes. In prima Magister ostendit, quod Dei potentia est omnipotentia, quia est respectu omnium possibilium, quae posse potentiae est¹. In secunda removet illa possibilia, quae posse non est potentiae, ibi secundo capitulo²: Sed quaeritur, quomodo omnia posse dicatur. In tertia ponit signa³, quae attestantur divinae potentiae, ibi: Sic diligenter considerantibus omnipotentia eius etc. In quarta Magister alias rationes omnipotentiae docet ad praedictam⁴ reducere, ibi: Ex quibusdam tamen auctoritatibus traditur, ideo etc. Et ibi primo ponit auctoritates, deinde docet eas exponere, et hoc ibi: Sed ad hoc potest dici, quod Augustinus etc.

Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam huius distinctionis quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus possit aliquid aliud a se.

Secundo, dato quod possit, quaeritur, utrum possit in omne, quod alii agenti est possibile.

Tertio, utrum divina potentia se extendat ad omne illud, quod alii agenti est impossibile.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum possibile dicatur aliquid simpliciter secundum causas superiores sive potentiam divinam, vel secundum inferiores sive potentiam creatam.

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## Commentary on Distinction XLII.

On the power of God in relation to the possibles which he can [effect].

"Now we must treat of the omnipotence of God."

Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the divine knowledge; here he treats of [the divine] power. And since power can be considered in three ways — namely, as to the quiddity of the possibles, as to the quantity, and as to the mode of operating — therefore this part contains three sub-parts or three distinctions. In the first the Master determines concerning the power in relation to the possibles which it can [effect]. In the second he determines concerning the power as to its quantity, showing its immensity, below in distinction forty-three: "Some, however, glorying in their own [private] judgement." In the third he determines concerning the same as to [its] mode, there in distinction forty-four: "Now it remains to be discussed whether [it would have been] better," etc.

The first part, which contains the present distinction, has four parts. In the first the Master shows that the power of God is omnipotence, because it is in respect of all possibles, which [their being able] is [a function] of the power¹. In the second he removes those possibles which to-be-able is not [a function] of the power, there in the second chapter²: "But it is asked how all things are said to be possible." In the third he sets forth signs³ which attest the divine power, there: "Thus, to those who consider diligently, his omnipotence," etc. In the fourth the Master teaches to reduce the other accounts of omnipotence to the aforesaid⁴ [one], there: "Yet from certain authorities it is handed down, therefore," etc. And there he first sets forth the authorities, then teaches to expound them, and this there: "But to this it can be said that Augustine," etc.

Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this distinction, four [matters] are asked.

First it is asked, whether God can [effect] something other than himself.

Second, granted that he can, it is asked whether he can [effect] every [thing] which is possible to any other agent.

Third, whether the divine power extends to every [thing] which is impossible to any other agent.

Fourth it is asked, whether something is said to be possible without qualification according to the higher causes — i.e., the divine power — or according to the lower [causes] — i.e., the created power.

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