Dist. 42
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 42
DISTINCTIO XLII.
Cap. I. De omnipotentia Dei, quare dicatur omnipotens, cum nos multa possimus, quae ipse non potest.
Nunc de omnipotentia Dei agendum est, ubi prima consideratio occurrit, quomodo vere Deus dicatur omnipotens: an quia omnia possit, an tantum, quia ea possit quae vult. Quod enim Deus omnia possit, pluribus auctoritatibus comprobatur. Ait enim Augustinus in libro Quaestionum veteris ac novae Legis1: « Omnia quidem potest Deus, sed non facit nisi quod convenit veritati eius et iustitiae ». Idem in eodem: « Potuit Deus cuncta simul facere, sed ratio prohibuit », id est voluntas. Rationem nempe ibi voluntatem appellavit, quia Dei voluntas rationabilis est et aequissima. Fatendum est ergo, Deum omnia posse.
Cap. II. Quomodo dicatur Deus omnia posse.
Sed quaeritur, quomodo omnia posse dicatur, cum nos quaedam possimus2, quae ipse non potest. Non potest enim ambulare, loqui et huiusmodi, quae a natura divinitatis penitus sunt aliena, cum horum instrumenta nullatenus habere queat incorporea et simplex substantia. — Quibus id respondendum arbitror, quod huiusmodi actiones, ambulatio scilicet et locutio et huiusmodi, a Dei potentia alienae non sunt, sed ad ipsam pertinent. Licet enim huiusmodi actiones in se Deus habere non possit; non enim potest ambulare vel loqui et huiusmodi, eas tamen in creaturis potest operari. Facit enim, ut homo ambulet et loquatur, et huiusmodi. Non ergo per istas actiones divinae potentiae detrahitur aliquid, quia et hoc potest facere Deus3 omnipotens.
Sed sunt alia quaedam, quae Deus nullatenus facere potest, ut peccata; non enim potest mentiri, non potest peccare. Sed non ideo omnipotentia4 Dei in aliquo detrahitur vel derogatur, si peccare non posse dicitur, quia non esset hoc potentiae, sed infirmitatis. Si enim hoc posset, omnipotens non esset. Non igitur impotentiae, sed potentiae imputandum est, quod ista non potest. Unde Augustinus in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate5: « Magna, inquit, Dei potentia est non posse mentiri ». Sunt enim quaedam, quae in aliis rebus potentiae deputanda sunt, in aliis vero minime; et quae in aliis laudabilia sunt, in aliis vero reprehensibilia sunt. Non ergo Deus ideo minus potens est, quia peccare non potest, cum omnipotens nullatenus sit qui hoc potest.
Sunt etiam et alia quaedam, quae Deus non potest; unde videtur non omnia posse. Non enim potest mori vel falli. Unde Augustinus in libro de Symbolo6: « Deus omnipotens non potest mori, non potest falli, non potest miser fieri, non potest vinci. Haec utique et huiusmodi absit, ut possit omnipotens. Si enim huiusmodi passionibus atque defectibus subiici posset, omnipotens minime foret ». Et inde monstratur omnipotens, quia ei haec propinquare non valent; potest tamen haec in aliis operari.
Cap. III. Quod omnipotentia Dei secundum duo consideratur.
Sic igitur7 diligenter considerantibus omnipotentia eius secundum duo apparet, scilicet quod omnia facit quae vult, et nihil omnino patitur. Secundum utrumque Deus omnipotens verissime praedicatur, quia nec aliquid est, quod ei ad patiendum corruptionem inferre valeat, nec aliquid ad faciendum impedimentum afferre. Manifestum est itaque, Deum omnino nihil posse pati et omnia facere posse praeter ea sola, quibus eius dignitas laederetur eiusque excellentiae derogaretur; in quo tamen non est minus omnipotens. Hoc8 enim posse non esset posse, sed non posse. Nemo ergo Deum impotentem in aliquo dicere praesumat, qui omnia potest, quae posse potentiae est; et inde vere dicitur omnipotens.
Ex quibusdam tamen auctoritatibus traditur, ideo vere dici omnipotens, quia quidquid vult, potest. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio9: « Non ob aliud veraciter vocatur omnipotens, nisi quoniam quidquid vult, potest, nec voluntate cuiuspiam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus ». Idem in libro de Spiritu et Littera10: « Non potest Deus facere iniusta, quia ipse summa iustitia et bonitas est. Omnipotens vero est, non quod possit omnia facere, sed quia potest efficere, quidquid vult, ita ut nihil valeat eius voluntati resistere, quin compleatur, aut aliquo modo impedire eandem ». Ioannes Chrysostomus in Homilia quadam de expositione Symboli11 ait: « Omnipotens dicitur Deus, quia posse illius non potest invenire non posse, dicente Propheta12: Omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit. Ipse est ergo omnipotens, ut totum, quod vult, possit. Unde Apostolus: Eius, inquit, voluntati quis resistit? » His auctoritatibus videtur ostendi, quod Deus ex eo tantum dicatur omnipotens, quod omnia potest, quae vult, non quia omnia possit.
Sed ad hoc potest dici, quod Augustinus, ubi dicit: Omnipotens non dicitur, quod omnia possit etc., tam ample et generaliter accepit omnia, ut etiam mala includeret, quae Deus nec vult nec potest. Non ergo negavit, eum posse omnia quae convenit ei posse. Similiter, cum dicit: Non ob aliud veraciter dicitur: omnipotens, nisi quoniam quidquid vult, potest, non negat, eum posse etiam ea quae non vult; sed adversus illos qui dicebant, Deum multa velle, quae non poterat, affirmat, eum posse quidquid vult, et ex eo vere dici omnipotentem, non ob aliud, nisi13 quia potest quidquid vult. Sed cave, quomodo intelligas potest quidquid vult, an quidquid vult se posse, an quidquid vult facere, an quidquid vult fieri. Si enim dicas, ideo omnipotentem vocari, quia potest quidquid vult se posse, ergo et Petrus14 similiter omnipotens dici potest, vel quilibet sanctorum Beatorum, quia potest quidquid vult se posse, et potest facere quidquid vult facere. Non enim vult facere, nisi quod facit, nec posse, nisi quod veraciter potest; sed non potest facere quidquid vult fieri. Vult enim, salvos fieri qui salvandi sunt; verumtamen eos salvare non valet. Deus autem quidquid vult fieri, potest facere. Si enim vult aliquid fieri per se, potest illud per se facere, et per se facit, sicut caelum et terram per se fecit, quia voluit. Si autem vult fieri per creaturam et per eam operatur — sicut per homines facit domos et huiusmodi artificialia15 et Deus — quidem ex se et per se potest; homo autem vel Angelus, quantumcumque beatus est, non est potens ex se vel per se.
Sed forte dices, nec Dei Filius potest a se, nec Spiritus sanctus, sed solus Pater. Ille enim potest a se, qui est a se; Filius autem, quia non est a se, sed a Patre, non potest a se, sed a Patre; et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque. — Ad quod dicimus, quia licet Filius non possit a se nec operetur a se, potest tamen et operatur per se; sicut Spiritus sanctus. Unde Hilarius in libro nono de Trinitate16: « Naturae, inquit, cui contradicis, haeretice, haec unitas est, ut ita per se agat Filius, ne a se agat, et ita non a se agat ut per se agat ». Per se autem dicitur agere et potens esse, quia naturalem habet potentiam eandem, quam et Pater, qua17 potens est et operatur; sed quia illam habet a Patre, non a se, ideo a Patre, non a se dicitur posse et agere. Homo autem vel Angelus gratuitam habet potentiam, qua potens est. Ideo igitur vere ac proprie Deus Trinitas omnipotens dicitur, quia per se, id est naturali potentia, potest quidquid vult fieri, et quidquid vult se posse. Nihil enim vult fieri, quod non possit facere per se vel per creaturas18; et nihil vult se posse, quod non possit; et omne quod vult fieri, vult se posse; sed non omne quod vult se posse, vult et fieri. Si enim vellet, et fieret, quia voluntati eius nihil resistere potest19.
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DISTINCTION XLII.
Chap. I. On the omnipotence of God, why he is called omnipotent, although we can do many things which he himself cannot.
Now we must treat of the omnipotence of God, where the first consideration occurs, in what way God is truly called omnipotent: whether because he can do all things, or only because he can do those things which he wills. For that God can do all things is proved by many authorities. For Augustine says in the book of Questions on the Old and New Law1: « God indeed can do all things, but he does not do [anything] except what befits his truth and his justice ». The same in the same [book]: « God could have made all things at once, but reason forbade [it] », that is, [his] will. For he there called the will reason, because God's will is reasonable and most equitable. It must therefore be admitted that God can do all things.
Chap. II. In what manner God is said to be able to do all things.
But it is asked, in what manner he is said to be able to do all things, since we can do certain things2 which he himself cannot. For he cannot walk, speak, and the like, [things] which are utterly foreign to the nature of divinity, since an incorporeal and simple substance can in no way possess the instruments of these. — To these I think it must be answered, that actions of this kind, namely walking and speech and the like, are not foreign to God's power, but pertain to it. For although God cannot have such actions in himself — for he cannot walk or speak and the like — yet he can work them in creatures. For he brings it about that a man walks and speaks, and the like. Therefore through these actions nothing is taken away from the divine power, because this too the omnipotent God3 can do.
But there are certain other things which God can in no way do, such as sins; for he cannot lie, he cannot sin. But on this account nothing is taken away or derogated from the omnipotence4 of God in any respect, if he is said not to be able to sin, because this would not be [a matter] of power, but of weakness. For if he could [do] this, he would not be omnipotent. Therefore this — that he cannot [do] those things — is to be imputed not to impotence but to power. Whence Augustine in the fifteenth book On the Trinity5: « It is great power of God, he says, not to be able to lie ». For there are some things which in some matters are to be reckoned [matters] of power, but in others by no means; and which in some are praiseworthy, but in others reprehensible. Therefore God is not for this reason less powerful, because he cannot sin, since he is in no way omnipotent who can [do] this.
There are still other things which God cannot [do]; whence it seems that he cannot [do] all things. For he cannot die or be deceived. Whence Augustine in the book On the Symbol6: « God omnipotent cannot die, cannot be deceived, cannot become wretched, cannot be overcome. Far be it, surely, that the omnipotent should be able [to do] these things and the like. For if he could be subjected to passions and defects of this sort, he would by no means be omnipotent ». And from this he is shown to be omnipotent, because these things cannot approach him; yet he can work these things in others.
Chap. III. That God's omnipotence is considered according to two [aspects].
Thus therefore7 to those carefully considering, his omnipotence appears according to two [aspects], namely that he does all things which he wills, and suffers nothing at all. According to each [aspect] God is most truly proclaimed omnipotent, because there is neither anything which can bring corruption upon him to suffer, nor anything to bring an impediment to his action. It is manifest therefore that God can suffer absolutely nothing and can do all things, except those alone by which his dignity would be injured and his excellence diminished; in which [exception], nevertheless, he is no less omnipotent. For this8 being able would not be being able, but being unable. Therefore let no one presume to call God impotent in anything, who can do all things which it belongs to being able [to be able to do]; and from this he is truly called omnipotent.
From certain authorities, however, it is handed down that he is therefore truly said to be omnipotent because whatever he wills, he can [do]. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion9: « He is called omnipotent for no other reason in truth, except because whatever he wills, he can [do], nor is the effect of the omnipotent will impeded by the will of any creature ». The same in the book On the Spirit and the Letter10: « God cannot do unjust things, because he himself is the highest justice and goodness. But he is omnipotent, not because he can do all things, but because he can effect whatever he wills, in such a way that nothing can resist his will, [preventing it] from being fulfilled, or in any way impede it ». John Chrysostom in a certain Homily on the exposition of the Symbol11 says: « God is called omnipotent, because his being able cannot find not being able, the Prophet12 saying: He has done all things whatsoever he willed. He is therefore omnipotent, in such a way that he can [do] the whole of what he wills. Whence the Apostle: Who, he says, resists his will? » By these authorities it seems to be shown that God is said to be omnipotent only from this — that he can do all things which he wills, not because he can do all things.
But to this it can be said that Augustine, where he says: He is not called omnipotent because he can do all things, etc., took all things so amply and generally that he included even evils, which God neither wills nor can [do]. He therefore did not deny that he can do all things which it is fitting for him to be able [to do]. Likewise, when he says: He is called omnipotent in truth for no other reason, except because whatever he wills he can [do], he does not deny that he can [do] even those things which he does not will; but against those who said that God wills many things which he was not able [to do], he affirms that he can [do] whatever he wills, and that from this he is truly called omnipotent, for no other reason, except13 because he can [do] whatever he wills. But beware how you understand he can [do] whatever he wills, whether [it means] whatever he wills himself to be able [to do], or whatever he wills to do, or whatever he wills to come to be. For if you say that he is called omnipotent because he can [do] whatever he wills himself to be able [to do], then also Peter14 can likewise be called omnipotent, or any one of the holy Blessed, because he can [do] whatever he wills himself to be able [to do], and he can do whatever he wills to do. For he does not will to do, except what he does, nor to be able, except what he truly can; but he cannot do whatever he wills to come to be. For he wills that those who are to be saved be saved; yet he is not able to save them. But God can do whatever he wills to come to be. For if he wills something to come to be through himself, he can do it through himself, and he does [it] through himself, just as he made heaven and earth through himself, because he willed [it]. But if he wills it to come to be through a creature and works through it — just as through men he makes houses and other artificial things15 of this kind, as does God — [he] indeed can [do it] from himself and through himself; but a man or Angel, however blessed, is not able from himself or through himself.
But perhaps you will say: neither the Son of God can [act] from himself, nor the Holy Spirit, but only the Father. For he is able [to act] from himself, who is from himself; but the Son, because he is not from himself, but from the Father, is not able [to act] from himself, but from the Father; and the Holy Spirit from both. — To which we say, that although the Son is not able [to act] from himself, nor work from himself, yet he can and does work through himself; just like the Holy Spirit. Whence Hilary in the ninth book On the Trinity16: « The unity of [that] nature, he says, which you contradict, heretic, is this — that the Son so acts through himself, that he does not act from himself, and so does not act from himself, that he acts through himself ». But he is said to act and to be powerful through himself, because he has the same natural power which the Father also has, by which17 he is powerful and works; but because he has it from the Father, not from himself, therefore from the Father, not from himself, he is said to be able and to act. But a man or Angel has a gratuitous power, by which he is powerful. Therefore truly and properly God the Trinity is called omnipotent, because through himself, that is, by natural power, he can [bring about] whatever he wills to come to be, and [can do] whatever he wills himself to be able [to do]. For he wills nothing to come to be which he cannot do through himself or through creatures18; and he wills himself to be able to do nothing which he cannot [do]; and everything which he wills to come to be, he wills himself to be able [to do]; but not everything which he wills himself to be able [to do], he also wills to come to be. For if he willed [it], it would also come to be, because nothing can resist his will19.
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- Quaest. ex novo Test. q. 97; sequens locus ibid. c. utroque mixtim q. 106.Questions from the New Testament, q. 97; the following passage [is from] the same [work], cap. mixed from both, q. 106.
- Codd. A C D E possumus. — Hoc et alia plura, quae in hac dist. sequuntur sumta sunt ex Abaelardo, Introd. ad theol. III. n. 4.Codices A C D E [read] possumus. — This and many other things which follow in this distinction are taken from Abelard, Introduction to Theology III, n. 4.
- Omittitur Deus a cod. D et edd., exceptis 1, 5.Deus is omitted by codex D and the editions, except 1, 5.
- Edd. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 omnipotentiae.Editions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] omnipotentiae.
- Cap. 14. n. 24. — Infra Vat. et aliae edd. nullatenus possit esse pro nullatenus sit, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 6 (5 in marg.).Chapter 14, n. 24. — Below, the Vatican edition and the other editions [read] nullatenus possit esse in place of nullatenus sit, against the codices and editions 1, 6 (5 in the margin).
- Ad Catech. c. 1. n. 2; secundum sensum. — Paulo inferius pro inde Vat. et edd. 2, 4, 5, 6, 9 cum cod. D ideo.To the Catechumens, c. 1, n. 2; according to the sense. — A little below, for inde, the Vatican edition and editions 2, 4, 5, 6, 9 with codex D [read] ideo.
- Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 1, et cod. B minus congrue Hic ergo.The Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, and codex B, less fittingly [read] Hic ergo.
- Codd. C D E Haec. Deinde solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 6 quia omnia pro qui omnia.Codices C D E [read] Haec. Then only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 [read] quia omnia in place of qui omnia.
- Cap. 96. n. 24.Chapter 96, n. 24.
- Cap. 3. n. 31. et ultimo, secundum sensum.Chapter 3, n. 31, and the last [chapter], according to the sense.
- Non invenitur in nova ed. Chrysost., sed in ed. antiqua (cfr. supra pag. 208, nota 8.), ubi est in hom. 2.It is not found in the new edition of Chrysostom, but in the old edition (cf. above p. 208, note 8), where it is in Homily 2.
- Psalm. 113, 11; sequens locus est ad Rom. 9, 19.Psalm 113:11; the following passage is from Romans 9:19.
- Ita codd. et ed. 1; aliae edd. vel omittunt nisi vel ponunt quam.Thus the codices and edition 1; the other editions either omit nisi or put quam.
- Codd. adiiciunt nunc, ed. 1 tunc.The codices add nunc, edition 1 [adds] tunc.
- Solummodo Vat. artificia; ed. 1 aedificia artificialia. Deinde codd. omittunt est post beatus.Only the Vatican edition [reads] artificia; edition 1 [reads] aedificia artificialia. Then the codices omit est after beatus.
- Num. 18; in quo textu Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 cum codd. a se agit, ut pro a se agat, ut.Number 18; in which text the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 with the codices [read] a se agit, ut in place of a se agat, ut.
- Vat. et ed. 8 cum cod. E qui.The Vatican edition and edition 8 with codex E [read] qui.
- Codd. et Vat. creaturam. Deinde fide codd. et ed. 1 adiunximus et ante fieri et ante fieret.The codices and the Vatican edition [read] creaturam. Then on the authority of the codices and edition 1 we have added et before fieri and before fieret.
- In hac dist. et dd. 43. 44. Magister plura ad verbum vel ad sensum sumsit ex Hugone a S. Vict., Summa Sententiarum, tr. I. c. 14; et de Sacram. I. p. II. c. 22. Ex his duobus operibus Magister etiam in aliis praecedentibus dist. interdum aliqua transcripsit.In this distinction and in dd. 43, 44, the Master took many things, either verbatim or according to the sense, from Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sententiarum, tr. I, c. 14; and On the Sacraments I, pars II, c. 22. From these two works the Master also at times transcribed some things in other preceding distinctions.