Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 10, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 10

Textus Latinus

p. 231

Quaestio III. Utrum virtus transsubstantiandi sit data verbo prolato, an solum sit virtus Verbi increati.

Tertio quaeritur de virtute transsubstantiationis per comparationem ad verbum; et quaeritur, utrum virtus transsubstantiandi sit data verbo prolato, an solum sit virtus Verbi increati. Et quod verbo prolato, videtur.

1. Ambrosius¹: «Sermo Christi creaturam mutat»; sed omnis actio, quae est ab aliquo, est mediante virtute, sed haec mediante verbo prolato: ergo etc.

2. Item, Eusebius²: «Invisibilis sacerdos visibiles creaturas in substantiam corporis et sanguinis sui verbi sui secreta potestate commutat».

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia omne adveniens alicui, quod est in sola potestate ad aliquid, et faciens ipsum esse in actu, habet virtutem aliquam³; sed verbo adveniente ad elementum, statim transit in corpus Christi: ergo in verbo est aliqua virtus ad hoc.

4. Item, cum non sit virtus in speciebus; si non est virtus in verbo, tunc ergo non est Sacramentum novae legis, cuius est «efficere quod figurat⁴».

5. Item, in omni naturali opere, ubi Deus operatur mediante creatura, data est virtus creaturae, per quam operatur⁵: ergo simili ratione in opere miraculi: ergo si illud operatur per verbum, patet, quod verbo collata est virtus.

Contra: 1. Augustinus de Verbis Domini⁶: «Sicut de Virgine per Spiritum sanctum Christi caro sine coitu creatur, ita per eundem ex substantia panis et vini idem corpus Christi mystice consecratur»; sed illud fit solum virtute increata: ergo et istud.

2. Item, Ambrosius⁷: «Sermo Christi creaturam mutat»; «quis Sermo? Hic, per quem omnia facta sunt»; sed illud Verbum est increatum, non creatum: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia corpus Christi est nobilissimum inter creata; sed potentia transsubstantiandi potest in illud, quia convertit aliud in ipsum; sed nihil potest supra aliud, nisi quod est nobilius⁸; et nihil creatum est ipso nobilius: ergo nulla virtute creata fit: ergo nec virtute verbi prolati.

4. Item, si virtus est data verbo a Christo, aut verbo in mente, aut in scripto, aut in prolatione. Non in mente nec in scripto: ergo in prolatione; sed verbum, quod Christus protulit, nunquam potest resumi⁹: ergo dicitur aliud. Sed illud nunquam fuit nisi nunc: ergo nec data est ei potestas sive virtus.

5. Item, si datur in prolatione; aut subito, aut successive. Si successive, ergo successive operatur, quod stultum est dicere, ut manifestum est. Non enim dare est, quod una pars panis primo transsubstantietur quam alia, cum verbum respiciat aequaliter totum; nec quod una pars Christi prius sit quam alia, quia tunc partes corporis Christi glorificati essent separabiles; quod stultum est dicere¹⁰. Si subito, aut in principio, aut in medio, aut in fine. Si in principio, et statim cum est, operatur: ergo in principio fit transsubstantiatio: ergo si non compleret verba, factum esset. Similiter de medio. Si in fine; sed verbum in fine non est: ergo datur non-enti. Item, si in fine; constat, quod desinente verbo, desinit et virtus: ergo in eodem instanti virtus incipit et desinit, et est et non est.

6. Item, si datur virtus, aut toti, aut alicui parti. Si toti: ergo aut quaelibet pars habet totam virtutem, aut partem. Si totam: ergo quaelibet pars facit; si partem virtutis; cum partes non sint simul, nec erit virtus simul nec operatio simul. Si alicui parti, quaero, cui?

7. Item, si Deus dat virtutem verbo in prolatione; tunc, cum verbum prolatum deficiat, videtur similiter, quod illa nobilis virtus statim desinat esse; et inconveniens esset, quod Deus sic tam nobilem virtutem daret, quae statim desinat esse.

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8. Item, si corrumpitur, quaero: in quid cedit? aut in aliquid, aut in nihil. In aliquid non, quia non ex aliquo; si in nihil, tunc videtur contra communem sententiam et Sanctorum et philosophorum, quae est, quod nihil quod corrumpitur, cedat omnino in non-ens.

Conclusio.

Intelligibilior est opinio, quod non sit data verbo aliqua qualitas, quae operetur transsubstantiationem, sed tantum efficax ordinatio ad hoc.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dicendum, quod hic est duplex opinio, sicut tactum est supra distinctione prima.

Quidam enim ponunt, quod datur verbis aliqua virtus spiritualis, per quam operantur transsubstantiationem, Deo nihilominus intime operante. Et haec virtus verbi habet posse et respicit panem; non enim se extendit ad corpus Christi. — Et est exemplum: si esset dator formarum, sicut aliqui posuerunt, agens particulare solum operaretur per comparationem ad terminum a quo, non ad quem. Et datur haec virtus verbo supra naturam et supra intellectum et datur subito, ut dicunt. Sed non oportet, quod operetur statim, cum datur, quia operatur secundum nutum dantis. Et est virtus simplex, operans instantanee; et tamen est in subiecto composito et successivo, quoniam est ibi supra naturam.

Sed quia difficillimum et non intelligibile videtur, quando illa virtus datur verbo, utrum tunc detur, vel ante sit data, et quomodo et qualiter datur, et quomodo operatur, si ponatur esse aliqua qualitas in verbo; propterea est alia via, quod virtus verbi extenso nomine dicitur, non quia aliqua qualitas sit data verbo, per quam operatur, sed ex divina institutione hoc firmatum est, ut, isto verbo prolato a sacerdote super panem cum intentione conficiendi, panis transsubstantietur. Unde ad prolationem illius verbi Verbum increatum facit. Illa ergo ordinatio verbi infallibilis ad talem effectum virtus dicitur, quae non est aliqua qualitas data verbo nec aliquid de novo creatum.

Et ex hoc patent rationes ad utramque partem. Ad argumenta, quia primae procedunt de virtute communiter dicta, praeter ultimum. Ad quod dicendum, quod non est simile, quia natura est agens praecipuum¹¹ et efficiens, sed hic solus Deus est influens.

Rationes ad oppositum patent, quia concedo, quod sicut rerum creatio est a sola virtute increata, sic et transsubstantiatio. Sed in hoc est hic additio, quia hoc fit ad prolationem verbi creati, illud sine aliquo ministerio.

Aliae rationes omnes patent, quia nihil absolutum est verbis datum, sed Christus unica institutione non tantum verbum, quod protulit, sed omne consimile prolatum a sacerdote supra naturam ordinavit, ut statim, ipso prolato, ipse sacerdos invisibilis assistens converteret. Unde nihil datur verbo de novo, quando sacerdos illud pronuntiat. Sed illa institutione primaria efficacem habuit ordinationem ad hoc: propter quod non immerito dicitur habere virtutem. — Per hunc etiam modum intelligo, Sacramenta novae legis esse causam et efficere, sicut supra¹² determinatum est: non quia gratiam donent, sed quia efficacem ordinationem habent ex divina pactione ad gratiam. Non sic Sacramenta veteris legis, excepta circumcisione¹³. — Habet tamen nihilominus hoc Sacramentum causalitatem ratione rei contentae, scilicet carnis Christi, quae ad gratiam disponit. — Et haec positio magnorum est et bene intelligentium¹⁴.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether the power of transubstantiating is given to the uttered word, or is the power of the uncreated Word alone.

Thirdly, inquiry is made concerning the power of transubstantiation in relation to the word; and it is asked whether the power of transubstantiating is given to the uttered word, or is the power of the uncreated Word alone. And that it is [given] to the uttered word, it seems thus.

1. Ambrose¹: "The speech of Christ changes the creature"; but every action that is from anything is by means of a power, and this [action is] by means of the uttered word: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Eusebius²: "The invisible priest changes the visible creatures into the substance of the body and blood of his Word by the secret power of his word."

3. Likewise, it seems by reason, because everything that comes to something which is in mere potency toward something, and makes it to be in act, has some power³; but when the word comes to the element, it [the element] at once passes into the body of Christ: therefore in the word there is some power for this.

4. Likewise, since there is no power in the species; if there is no power in the word, then therefore there is no Sacrament of the new law, whose property is "to effect what it figures⁴."

5. Likewise, in every natural work, where God operates by means of a creature, a power is given to the creature, by which it operates⁵: therefore by like reasoning in the work of a miracle: therefore if that [transubstantiation] is worked through the word, it is plain that a power has been conferred on the word.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine, On the Words of the Lord⁶: "Just as from the Virgin, through the Holy Spirit, the flesh of Christ is created without intercourse, so through the same [Spirit] the same body of Christ is mystically consecrated out of the substance of bread and wine"; but that comes about solely by the uncreated power: therefore this also.

2. Likewise, Ambrose⁷: "The speech of Christ changes the creature"; "which speech? This one, through which all things were made"; but that Word is uncreated, not created: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason, because the body of Christ is the most noble among created things; but the power of transubstantiating has efficacy upon it, because it converts another thing into it; but nothing has power over another thing unless it be more noble⁸; and nothing created is more noble than it [the body of Christ]: therefore it comes about by no created power: therefore not by the power of the uttered word either.

4. Likewise, if power is given to the word by Christ, [it is given] either to the word in the mind, or in writing, or in utterance. Not in the mind nor in writing: therefore in utterance; but the word that Christ uttered can never be taken up again⁹: therefore another [word] is spoken. But that [word] never existed except now: therefore neither has power or virtue been given to it.

5. Likewise, if it is given in utterance; [it is given] either suddenly, or successively. If successively, then it operates successively, which is foolish to say, as is manifest. For it does not follow that one part of the bread is transubstantiated before another, since the word regards the whole equally; nor that one part of Christ exists before another, because then the parts of the glorified body of Christ would be separable; which is foolish to say¹⁰. If suddenly, [it is given] either at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end. If at the beginning, and as soon as it exists, it operates: therefore at the beginning the transubstantiation comes about: therefore if one did not complete the words, it would [already] be done. Likewise concerning the middle. If at the end; but the word does not exist at the end: therefore it is given to a non-being. Likewise, if at the end; it is established that, when the word ceases, the power also ceases: therefore in the same instant the power begins and ceases, and both is and is not.

6. Likewise, if power is given, [it is given] either to the whole, or to some part. If to the whole: then either each part has the whole power, or a part [of it]. If the whole: then each part effects [the change]; if a part of the power; since the parts are not simultaneous, neither will the power be simultaneous nor the operation simultaneous. If to some part, I ask, to which?

7. Likewise, if God gives power to the word in utterance; then, when the uttered word fails, it seems likewise that that noble power at once ceases to be; and it would be unfitting that God should so give so noble a power, which at once ceases to be.

8. Likewise, if it is corrupted, I ask: into what does it pass? either into something, or into nothing. Into something it does not [pass], because it is not from anything; if into nothing, then it seems [to be] against the common opinion both of the Saints and of the philosophers, which is that nothing which is corrupted passes altogether into non-being.

Conclusion.

The more intelligible opinion is that there is not given to the word any quality which works transubstantiation, but only an efficacious ordination to this.

I respond: To this it must be said that here there is a twofold opinion, as was touched on above in the first distinction.

For some hold that there is given to the words a certain spiritual power, by which they work transubstantiation, God nevertheless operating intimately. And this power of the word has possibility and regards the bread; for it does not extend to the body of Christ. — And there is an example: if there were a giver of forms, as some have held, the particular agent would operate only in relation to the term from which, not [the term] to which. And this power is given to the word above nature and above understanding, and is given suddenly, as they say. But it is not necessary that it operate at once when it is given, because it operates according to the will of the giver. And it is a simple power, operating instantaneously; and yet it is in a composite and successive subject, since it is there above nature.

But because it seems most difficult and unintelligible, when that power is given to the word, whether it is given then, or has been given before, and how and in what manner it is given, and how it operates, if it is posited to be some quality in the word; therefore there is another way, namely that the power of the word is so called by an extended use of the name, not because some quality has been given to the word by which it operates, but [because] from divine institution this has been established, that, when this word is uttered by the priest over the bread with the intention of consecrating, the bread is transubstantiated. Hence at the utterance of that word the uncreated Word effects [it]. That infallible ordination, then, of the word to such an effect is called power, which is not any quality given to the word nor anything created anew.

And from this the reasons on both sides are plain. To the arguments, [it is to be said] that the first ones proceed concerning power as commonly spoken, except the last. To which it must be said that it is not alike, because nature is the principal agent¹¹ and the efficient [cause], but here God alone is the one who influences.

The reasons for the opposite are plain, because I concede that, just as the creation of things is from the uncreated power alone, so also is transubstantiation. But in this there is here an addition, namely that this comes about at the utterance of a created word, that [creation] without any ministry.

All the other reasons are plain, because nothing absolute has been given to the words, but Christ by a single institution ordained, above nature, not only the word which he uttered, but every like [word] uttered by a priest, so that at once, when it is uttered, the priest himself, invisibly assisting, would convert [the bread]. Hence nothing is given to the word anew, when the priest pronounces it. But by that primary institution it had an efficacious ordination to this: on account of which it is not undeservedly said to have power. — In this manner also I understand the Sacraments of the new law to be a cause and to effect, as was determined above¹²: not because they bestow grace, but because they have an efficacious ordination from the divine compact unto grace. Not so the Sacraments of the old law, with the exception of circumcision¹³. — Nevertheless this Sacrament has causality by reason of the thing contained, namely the flesh of Christ, which disposes unto grace. — And this position is that of great men and of those who understand well¹⁴.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Libr. IV. de Sacram. c. 4. n. 17. Cfr. de Mysteriis, c. 9. n. 52. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
[Ambrose,] Book IV On the Sacraments, c. 4, n. 17. Cf. On the Mysteries, c. 9, n. 52. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
2
Invenitur hoc testimonium in Epist. 38. seu homilia de corpore et sanguine Christi (inter opera Hieronymi), c. 2, quae alias Eusebio Emisseno (cfr. C. Quia corpus (35.), de Consecrat. d. 2) attribuebatur, secundum Oudinum autem Fausti Rhegiensis episcopi esse dicitur. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro verbi sui textus originalis et edd. verbo suo.
This testimony is found in Epistle 38, or the homily On the body and blood of Christ (among the works of Jerome), c. 2, which was elsewhere attributed to Eusebius of Emesa (cf. the canon Quia corpus (35.), de Consecratione d. 2), but according to Oudin is said to be by Faustus, bishop of Riez. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — For of his Word the original text and the editions [read] by his word.
3
Vide Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 12. seqq. (VIII. c. 7.). — Superius pro omne multi codd. et ed. 1 esse.
See Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 12 ff. (VIII, c. 7). — Above, for everything, many codices and the first edition [read] to be.
4
Secundum August. supra in lit. Magistri, d. IV. c. 1 allegatum. Cfr. etiam d. 1. p. 1. q. 4. et 5.
According to Augustine, cited above in the text of the Master, d. IV, c. 1. Cf. also d. 1, p. 1, q. 4 and 5.
5
Cfr. tom. I. pag. 746, nota 6, et tom. II. pag. 198, nota 3.
Cf. tom. I, p. 746, note 6, and tom. II, p. 198, note 3.
6
De hac auctoritate, quae C. Utrum sub figura (72.), de Consecrat. d. 2, tribuitur Augustino, sed quae est Paschasii Radberti, vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
Concerning this authority, which in the canon Utrum sub figura (72.), de Consecratione d. 2, is attributed to Augustine, but which is by Paschasius Radbertus, see here the text of the Master, c. 2.
7
Libr. IV. de Sacram. c. 4. n. 17. et 15. Cfr. de Mysteriis, c. 9. n. 52. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
[Ambrose,] Book IV On the Sacraments, c. 4, n. 17 and 15. Cf. On the Mysteries, c. 9, n. 52. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
8
Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 19. (c. 5.): Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, et principium materia. Cfr. August., de Immortal. animae, c. 8. n. 14. et IV. de Musica, c. 5. n. 8.
Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 19 (c. 5): "For the agent is always more honorable than the patient, and the principle than the matter." Cf. Augustine, On the Immortality of the Soul, c. 8, n. 14, and On Music IV, c. 5, n. 8.
9
Cod. aa subiungit quia quod semel dictum est, amplius non potest sumi, et mox omittit dicitur. Superius post Non codd. H L supplent verbo.
Codex aa adds because what has once been said can no longer be taken up, and presently omits is spoken. Above, after Not, codices H and L supply to the word.
10
Cfr. infra d. 11. p. 1. q. 5. — De seqq. rationibus vide supra d. 1. p. 1. q. 4. circa finem, et III. Sent. d. 40. dub. 3.
Cf. below d. 11, p. 1, q. 5. — On the following reasons see above d. 1, p. 1, q. 4 near the end, and III Sent. d. 40, dub. 3.
11
Codd. praecipuus. Inferius post patent codd. B M Q (bb a secunda manu) addunt primo, cod. H ergo. Subinde post quia ex codd. B H L Q (E bb a secunda manu) interserimus concedo [codd. L Q concedunt], quod. Post pauca pro creati, quod habent codd. H L N Y (bb a secunda manu), edd. prolati.
Codices [read] praecipuus. Below, after patent, codices B M Q (bb by a second hand) add primo; codex H [adds] ergo. Presently after quia, from codices B H L Q (E bb by a second hand) we insert concedo [codices L Q concedunt], quod. A little further on, for creati, which codices H L N Y (bb by a second hand) have, the editions [read] prolati.
12
Dist. I. p. I. q. 4. in fine. Cfr. etiam d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. — Pro donent codd. E K O R S T W Z tenent, quae lectio respondet supra propositis d. 1. p. 1. q. 3.
Dist. I, p. I, q. 4, near the end. Cf. also d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2. — For donent codices E K O R S T W Z [read] tenent, which reading corresponds to what was proposed above in d. 1, p. 1, q. 3.
13
De quo vide supra d. 1. p. 1. q. 5. in fine.
On which see above d. 1, p. 1, q. 5, near the end.
14
Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.
See the scholion to the 1st question of this article. ---