Dist. 11, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 5
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 11
Quaestio V. Utrum haec conversio sit subita, vel successiva.
Quinto quaeritur, utrum haec conversio sit subita, an successiva. Et quod sit subita, videtur:
1. Quia successio est per resistentiam suscipientis, ut patet in diffusione lucis in aëra, quia nihil resistens1; sed ex parte panis nulla est resistentia: ergo nec successio aliqua.
2. Item, « quantum operatio est a virtute potentiori, tanto velocior », ut patet in sexto Physicorum2; sed haec est a virtute infinita: ergo est in instanti.
3. Item, non ob aliud est successio in operatione nisi propter praeparationem et inductionem proprietatum3; sed hic nulla est praeparatio: ergo nulla successio.
4. Item, si successio, aut haec est, quia panis successive abiicitur, aut quia corpus successive introducitur.
Non quia panis; quia non est ponere, quare citius convertatur una pars quam alia, nec materia quam forma. Nec quia Christi corpus; quia illud non potest habere nisi esse perfectum et integrum.
Contra:
1. Etsi divina virtus ibi immediate operetur, operatur tamen ad verbi prolationem4; sed verbi prolatio est successiva: ergo et conversio.
2. Item, si dicas, quod non operatur per sermonem; tamen simul operatur cum sermone, quia nec ante nec post; sed5 sermonis prolatio est successiva: ergo cum successivum non sit simul cum instantaneo, patet etc.
3. Item, si conversio est in instanti, quaero, in illo instanti, in quo est mutatio, quid sit; aut panis, aut corpus6. Non panis, quia panis est terminus a quo; non corpus, quia est terminus, ad quem est mutatio; nec aliquid aliud: ergo nihil; sed hoc est impossibile: ergo mutatio non fit in instanti.
4. Item, panis in illa conversione habet esse ultimum, similiter corpus Christi primum; aut in eodem instanti, aut in alio. Si in eodem: ergo simul est panis et corpus. Si in alio et alio; sed inter quaelibet duo instantia cadit tempus medium7, et in illo medio est conversio: ergo etc.
CONCLUSIO. Conversio panis in verum Christi corpus fit in instanti, non successive.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod haec conversio est subito et in instanti. Quamvis enim fiat ad verbi prolationem, non tamen per verbum sicut per effectivum principium, sed per Verbum increatum8, quod operatur in instanti.
2. Quod ergo obiicit, quod non sunt simul, dicendum, quod successivum non est simul cum instantaneo secundum totum nec secundum partem, sed tamen secundum aliquid sui, ut puta factum vel dictum esse, quod est vel in ratione medii, vel principii, vel finis. Unde certum est, quod quando totum dictum est, totum factum est; sed quando Dominus facit, ipse novit9.
3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de illo instanti, utrum sit panis; dicendum, quod in mutatione subita simul est fieri et factum esse, et simul desinere et desiisse; quia ergo in instanti desinit esse panis, non est panis. Rursus, quia incipit esse corpus vel convertitur in corpus, est corpus Christi.
4. Ad illud vero quod quaeritur de ultimo esse panis, multiplex est positio.
Quidam enim dicunt, quod quia panis habet esse temporale, sed corpus Christi esse aeternum, quod ultimum esse panis non est nisi in tempore, primum esse corporis in instanti. Unde sicut instans copulatur ad tempus, ita quod nihil est medium; sic et in proposito habere se dicunt. — Sed hoc est non probabilis fuga: primum, quia, si panis nunquam haberet esse in instanti, maneret obiectio, et non est hic solutio. Secundo, quia quod corpus Christi sit in altari vel sub speciebus, hoc est temporale. Tertio vero, quia utrumque habet esse permanens, et ideo esse utriusque est in instanti.
Propterea est alia positio, quod in eodem instanti est ultimo esse panem et primo esse corpus, eodem, inquam, secundum substantiam, differente secundum rationem; quia secundum quod est mensura ultimi esse panis, est terminus praeteriti, secundum quod primi esse corporis, est principium futuri. — Sed haec positio non potest stare, quia quaecumque sit diversitas in ratione in uno instanti, nunquam contradictoria sunt simul vera in eodem: ergo nec disparata de eodem. Et praeterea, si praeteritum in sui termino esset, et futurum esset in sui initio; nunquam continuarentur per unum instans, immo essent simul.
Propterea est tertia positio, quod est in uno instanti secundum rem, sed plura secundum virtutem. Sicut enim unus punctus fit duo puncta divisione lineae et commensuratione, ut puta si duarum linearum fiat contiguatio super lineam continuam substratam; ille unus punctus, ad quem contiguantur, aequivalet duobus: sic in instanti, quamvis non multiplicetur, quia tempus non dividitur, tamen duobus aequivalet propter commensurationem duorum ultimorum, durationis scilicet panis et corporis. — Sed illud non potest stare, quia in contiguis ultima simul sunt; sed in durationibus, quae se habent secundum prius et posterius,
impossibile est, quod ultima sint simul; unde in illa contiguatione punctus substratus non fit duo, sed duo puncta uniuntur in uno, nec tamen cedunt in unum propter distinctionem corporum, in quibus sunt. Et iterum, quantumcumque illud verum sit, quod duo indivisibilia sint simul, nunquam tamen verum est, quod duo contradictorie opposita simul insint eidem, quia sunt incompossibilia; nec etiam ea quae necessario requirunt ordinem, non tantum causaliter sive secundum naturam, sed etiam secundum esse in actu et durationem actualem.
Propterea est quarta positio, quod est in alio et alio instanti secundum rem, eo modo, quo in tempore est ponere instantia multa; quia unum est secundum suam essentiam, cuius fluxus est continuus; unde non10 est ponere plura instantia, ut consequenter se habentia secundum se; sed tamen, secundum quod mensurat duas actiones discontinuas est in eo duo signare; sicut si linea secet aliam, signat duo puncta. — Sed illud non potest stare, quia in nullo continuo nec esse nec intelligi nec signari possunt vere duo indivisibilia, ipso manente continuo, quae se habeant consequenter, alioquin intelligitur de necessitate ut multiplicatum. Si ergo tempus manet non intercisum, patet etc.
Et ideo dicendum est ultimo, quod tempus sive instans mensura ultimi esse panis et primi esse corporis, potest dupliciter accipi: vel in duratione propria uniuscuiusque, sicut dicit Philosophus, quod « unumquodque propria periodo mensuratur », quae illa quidem cum re incipit et desinit; et sic sunt diversae mensurae discontinuae et diversa instantia consequenter se habentia, sicut sunt duo esse, esse scilicet panis et corporis. Si autem accipiatur instans secundum communem mensuram, quae est tempus continuum, non intercisum, ut est mensura motus primi mobilis, vel etiam ut tempus consideratur secundum essentiam, non secundum esse; tunc accipit determinatum instans secundum nostram signationem. Signetur ergo unum instans in tempore, in quo ultimo est panis; signetur et aliud instans, in quo primo est corpus? Ego dico, non signetur, quia11 non est signare duo instantia consequenter se habentia in continuo, manente continuo; unde quodlibet horum per se signari potest, sed duo simul impossibile est signare. Et sic patet, quod in alio et alio instanti habet esse panis et corpus secundum rem, et secundum quod est, mensura realis et propria; licet secundum mensuram communem duo instantia immediate signare non contingat.
— Hic autem modus solvendi rationabilior et certior videtur omnibus praedictis, quoniam supra tria principia certa fundatur. Primum est, quod in eodem instanti simplici impossibile est contradictoria esse, quantumcumque instans habeat diversitatem secundum considerationem. Secundum est, quod in continuo, manente continuo, impossibile est instantia esse consequenter nec vere signari. Tertium est, quod inter esse panem et corpus Christi, vel inter duo contradictoria nihil est medium12.
Vide scholion ad quaestionem IV huius articuli (the article scholion covering this and the following question is rendered with QUAESTIO IV).
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Question V. Whether this conversion is sudden or successive.
Fifth, it is asked whether this conversion is sudden or successive. And that it is sudden, it seems:
1. Because succession occurs through the resistance of the recipient, as is clear in the diffusion of light into air, since [there is succession only when] something resists1; but on the side of the bread there is no resistance: therefore there is no succession either.
2. Likewise, "the more powerful the agent from which an operation proceeds, the swifter it is," as is clear in the sixth book of the Physics2; but this [conversion] is from an infinite power: therefore it is in an instant.
3. Likewise, there is no succession in an operation except on account of the preparation and the introduction of properties3; but here there is no preparation: therefore no succession.
4. Likewise, if there were succession, either it would be because the bread is cast off successively, or because the body is introduced successively.
Not because of the bread; for there is no ground for asserting why one part should be converted sooner than another, nor the matter sooner than the form. Nor because of Christ's body; for that cannot have any but a perfect and entire being.
On the contrary:
1. Although the divine power operates there immediately, it nevertheless operates at the utterance of the word4; but the utterance of the word is successive: therefore the conversion also [is successive].
2. Likewise, if you say that it does not operate through the discourse; nevertheless it operates together with the discourse, since [it operates] neither before nor after; but5 the utterance of the discourse is successive: therefore, since what is successive is not simultaneous with what is instantaneous, it is clear, etc.
3. Likewise, if the conversion is in an instant, I ask: in that instant in which the change occurs, what is there? — either bread or body6. Not bread, since bread is the term from which; not body, since [the body] is the term to which the change is; nor anything else: therefore nothing; but this is impossible: therefore the change does not occur in an instant.
4. Likewise, the bread in that conversion has its last being, and similarly Christ's body its first; [and this is] either in the same instant or in another. If in the same: then bread and body exist simultaneously. If in one and another; but between any two instants there falls an intervening time7, and in that intervening [time] the conversion occurs: therefore etc.
CONCLUSION. The conversion of the bread into the true body of Christ occurs in an instant, not successively.
I respond: It must be said that this conversion is sudden and in an instant. For although it occurs at the utterance of the word, it does not occur through the word as through an effective principle, but through the uncreated Word8, which operates in an instant.
2. As for the objection that they are not simultaneous, it must be said that what is successive is not simultaneous with what is instantaneous as a whole nor according to a part, but nevertheless according to something of itself — for instance, its having-been-done or having-been-said, which is either in the character of a middle, or of a beginning, or of an end. Hence it is certain that when the whole has been said, the whole has been done; but when the Lord does it, He Himself knows9.
3. As for the objection concerning that instant, whether it be bread; it must be said that in a sudden change the coming-to-be and the having-been-made are simultaneous, and the ceasing and the having-ceased are simultaneous; since therefore in an instant the bread ceases to be, it is not bread. Again, since it begins to be the body, or is converted into the body, it is the body of Christ.
4. As for what is asked concerning the last being of the bread, there are several positions.
For some say that, since the bread has temporal being but Christ's body eternal being, the last being of the bread is only in time, the first being of the body in an instant. Hence, just as the instant is joined to time so that there is nothing in between, so they say it holds in the case at hand. — But this is no probable evasion: first, because if the bread never had being in an instant, the objection would remain, and there is no solution here. Secondly, because the fact that Christ's body is upon the altar or under the species, this is temporal. Thirdly, because each has permanent being, and therefore the being of each is in an instant.
Therefore there is another position: that in the same instant there is the last being of the bread and the first being of the body — the same, I say, according to substance, differing according to reason; because insofar as it is the measure of the last being of the bread, it is the term of the past, [and] insofar as [it is the measure] of the first being of the body, it is the beginning of the future. — But this position cannot stand, because whatever diversity there may be in reason within one instant, contradictories are never simultaneously true in the same [instant]: therefore neither are disparate [things true] of the same. And furthermore, if the past were in its term, and the future in its beginning, they would never be continuous through one instant; rather, they would be simultaneous.
Therefore there is a third position: that it is in one instant according to reality, but several according to virtual power. For just as one point becomes two points by the division of a line and by commensuration — as, for instance, if a juncture of two lines is made upon an underlying continuous line; that one point at which they are joined is equivalent to two: so in the instant, although it is not multiplied (since time is not divided), nevertheless it is equivalent to two on account of the commensuration of two terms, namely of the duration of the bread and of the body. — But this cannot stand, because in contiguous things the terms are simultaneous; but in durations, which are ordered according to before and after,
it is impossible that the terms be simultaneous; whence in that junction the underlying point does not become two, but two points are united in one, yet they do not merge into one, on account of the distinction of the bodies in which they are. And again, however true it may be that two indivisibles are simultaneous, it is nevertheless never true that two contradictory opposites are simultaneously present in the same [subject], since they are incompossible; nor likewise those things which necessarily require an order — not only causally or according to nature, but also according to being in act and actual duration.
Therefore there is a fourth position: that it is in one and another instant according to reality, in the manner in which in time many instants are to be posited; because [time] is one according to its essence, whose flow is continuous; hence one must not10 posit several instants as ordered consequently in themselves; but nevertheless, insofar as it measures two discontinuous actions, two [instants] are to be marked in it; just as if a line cuts another, it marks two points. — But this cannot stand, because in no continuum, while it remains continuous, can two indivisibles truly be, or be understood, or be marked off, as ordered consequently; otherwise [the continuum] is of necessity understood as multiplied. If, then, time remains uninterrupted, it is clear, etc.
And therefore it must be said, lastly, that the time or instant which is the measure of the last being of the bread and the first being of the body can be taken in two ways: either in the proper duration of each, as the Philosopher says, that "each thing is measured by its proper period," which [duration] indeed begins and ceases with the thing; and thus there are diverse discontinuous measures and diverse instants ordered consequently, just as there are two beings, namely the being of the bread and of the body. But if the instant is taken according to the common measure, which is continuous time, uninterrupted, as it is the measure of the motion of the first mobile, or also as time is considered according to its essence, not according to its being; then it takes a determinate instant according to our marking. Let one instant then be marked in time, in which the bread last is; and let another instant be marked, in which the body first is? I say: let it not be marked, because11 one cannot mark two instants ordered consequently in a continuum, the continuum remaining; whence each of these can be marked by itself, but it is impossible to mark the two simultaneously. And thus it is clear that in one and another instant the bread and the body have being according to reality, and insofar as it is, [it is] a real and proper measure; although according to the common measure it does not happen that the two instants are marked immediately.
— Now this manner of solving seems more reasonable and more certain than all the aforesaid, since it is founded upon three certain principles. The first is that in the same simple instant it is impossible for contradictories to be, however much the instant may have diversity according to consideration. The second is that in a continuum, while it remains continuous, it is impossible for instants to be consequent, nor to be truly marked off. The third is that between being bread and [being] the body of Christ, or between two contradictories, there is nothing in between12.
See the scholion to Question IV of this article (the article scholion that covers this and the following question is rendered with QUAESTIO IV).
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- 1(p. 248, nota 4) Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 71. (c. 8.), ubi maiorem et minorem velocitatem motus repetit ex maiori et minori resistentia sive impedimento, quod praebet vel medium pertranseundum, v. g. aqua et aër, vel ipsum corpus movendum, v. g. gravius et levius. — Post in aëra cod. aa subiungit quae est subita. Post nihil edd. supplent est ibi.(p. 248, note 4) Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, text 71 (ch. 8), where he derives the greater and lesser velocity of motion from the greater and lesser resistance or impediment afforded either by the medium to be traversed (e.g. water and air) or by the very body to be moved (e.g. the heavier and the lighter). — After into air codex aa adds which is sudden. After nothing the editions supply is there.
- 2(p. 248, nota 5) Colligi potest ex text. 11. seqq. (c. 2.). Cfr. VIII. text. 79. seq. (c. 10) iam tom. I. pag. 662, nota 3. allegati. — Pro quantum codd. GHaa quanto.(p. 248, note 5) This can be gathered from text 11 ff. (ch. 2). Cf. [Physics] VIII, text 79 f. (ch. 10), already cited in vol. I, p. 662, note 3. — For quantum ("the more") codices GHaa read quanto.
- 3(p. 248, nota 6) Vide Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 23. seqq. (c. 4.).(p. 248, note 6) See Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 23 ff. (ch. 4).
- 4(p. 249, nota 1) Supple (cum Alex. Hal.): successive abiicitur. — Aliquanto inferius post Christi corpus bene addit cod. aa (bb a secunda manu) successive introducitur (Alex. Hal.).(p. 249, note 1) Supply (with Alexander of Hales): is cast off successively. — Somewhat below, after Christ's body codex aa (bb by a second hand) rightly adds is introduced successively (Alexander of Hales).
- 5(p. 249, nota 2) Cfr. supra d. 10. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, ubi etiam maior seq. arg. insinuatur. — Edd. quia.(p. 249, note 2) Cf. above, d. 10, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, where the major of the following argument is also intimated. — The editions read quia ("because").
- 6(p. 249, nota 4) Scilicet corpus Christi. — Inferius post secundum repetunt codd. HLPQaa (I a secunda manu) corpus. ‖ (nota 5) Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 2: Inter puncta autem semper est linea, et inter ipsa nunc [instantia] tempus. Finem arg. — sic exhibent codd. N aa ergo non in instanti.(p. 249, notes 4–5) Namely, the body of Christ. — Below, after insofar as codices HLPQaa (I by a second hand) repeat body. ‖ Aristotle, Physics VI, text 2: "Between points there is always a line, and between the very nows [instants] a time." The end of the argument — codices N aa give it thus: therefore not in an instant.
- 7(p. 249, nota 3) Edd. quia. (So the editions read at this point.)(p. 249, note 3) The editions read quia ("because").
- 8(p. 249, nota 6) Ut dictum est supra d. 10. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.(p. 249, note 6) As was said above, d. 10, p. II, a. 1, q. 3.
- 9(p. 249, nota 7) His ultimis verbis tangit S. Doctor difficultatem, quam movit supra d. 10. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. fundam. 5. seqq., et III. Sent. d. 40. dub. 3.(p. 249, note 7) With these last words the holy Doctor touches on the difficulty which he raised above, d. 10, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, fundamentum 5 ff., and Sentences III, d. 40, dub. 3.
- 10(p. 250, nota 1) Fere omnes codd. cum ed. I perperam omittunt non, quod iam secunda manus in cod. E supplevit, cod. A legit unde est ponere plura instantia, nec consequenter etc.(p. 250, note 1) Nearly all the codices, with edition I, wrongly omit non, which a second hand already supplied in codex E; codex A reads whence several instants are to be posited, and not consequently, etc.
- 11(p. 250, nota 4) Ita fere omnes codd., cod. H omisso non, signetur, quia; codd. FGI quod non signetur, quia; edd. brevius dico, quod non est signare.(p. 250, note 4) So nearly all the codices; codex H, omitting non, [reads] let it be marked, because; codices FGI [read] that it should not be marked, because; the editions more briefly [read] I say that it cannot be marked.
- 12(p. 250, nota 5) Vide scholion ad 4. huius articuli quaest.(p. 250, note 5) See the scholion to question 4 of this article.