Dist. 33, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 33
Quaestio II. Utrum repudiare uxorem debuerit permitti.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum repudiare uxorem debuerit permitti. Et quod non, videtur:
1. Quia qui non prohibet malum, cum possit, habetur pro consentiente1; sed legislator potuit prohibere et non prohibuit repudium: ergo consensit. Sed consentiens malo peccat: ergo etc.
2. Item, non sunt facienda mala, ut veniant bona2: ergo nec permittenda mala, ne veniant maiora mala: ergo non debuit repudium permittere propter vitandum homicidium.
3. Item, vir et uxor pares sunt quantum ad legem tori3; sed sicut vir potest occidere uxorem, ita uxor odiens virum potest machinari etiam mortem eius: ergo idem periculum et idem ius est ex utraque parte. Sed non permittebatur in Lege, ut uxor repudiaret virum: ergo etc.
4. Item, tempore legis naturae non legimus fuisse permissum repudium, tempore gratiae similiter legimus fuisse prohibitum; quare ergo tempore legis scriptae fuit permissum? — Si dicas, sicut Dominus dicit4, ad duritiam cordis eorum; contra: quia duri erant, ideo ad eorum duritiam confringendam imposuit legislator onera gravia: ergo si grave est habitare cum uxore exosa, congruebat ergo, non permitti repudium.
Contra: 1. In Lege non debuit prohiberi aliquid, quod non debuit puniri, nec puniri debuit, nisi ex quo deberent effici meliores, saltem in opere, quamvis non in caritate; sed si repudium non permitteretur, homines illi, qui proni5 erant ad homicidium, laberentur in peius: ergo etc.
2. Item, nulla Sacramenta ita perfecte fuerunt in veteri testamento, sicut in novo: ergo nec Sacramentum coniugii: ergo si perfectio in Sacramento coniugii6 consistit in indivisibilitate, non ergo debuit perfecte in lege veteri indivisibilitas imperari.
3. Item, si tanta esset arctitudo inter virum et uxorem, quod nullo modo separari possent; cum fornicatio tunc non puniretur, omnes efficerentur fornicarii, et pauci aut nulli ducerent uxores: ergo si praeceptum fuit tunc, semen legitimum multiplicari, repudium non debuit prohiberi.
Conclusio.
Ad mala maiora evitanda repudium uxoris a Moyse debuit permitti, id est non puniri.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod permissio est quadruplex: uno modo per privationem praeceptionis, et sic Apostolus7 permittit minus bonum, quia non praecipit maius bonum, sicut virginibus nubere permittit; secundo modo per privationem prohibitionis, et sic venialia dicuntur permissa, quia non sunt prohibita; tertio modo per privationem punitionis, et sic repudiatio uxoris est permissa, quia non punitur in Lege; quarto modo per privationem cohibitionis, et sic omnia mala dicuntur a Deo permissa, quia non cohibet. — Prima permissio est propter boni qualitatem; secunda est propter nostram infirmitatem; tertia propter vitanda maiora mala; quarta propter elicienda maiora bona. Permisit igitur Moyses, quia non poterat prohibere hoc malum, quin triplex malum inde sequeretur: primum quidem defectus Sacramenti, quia non vellent uxorem ducere; secundo, multiplicatio fornicationis; tertio, homicidium8.
1. 2. Ex hoc patent duo prima, quia Moyses non permisit nisi coactus, propter scilicet maius malum vitandum, unde fuit ibi potius pati quam agere; sed qui facit malum, ut veniat bonum, peccat faciendo: ideo non est simile quod secundo obiiciebatur.
3. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quare non permittitur mulieri, dicendum, quod tempore Legis non iudicabantur ad paria vir cum muliere, tum ratione conditionis, quia vir est principium mulieris9, tum ratione praevaricationis, quia mulier est initium peccati; ideo dictum est ei Genesis tertio: Sub viri potestate eris.
4. Ad illud quod quaeritur: quare potius tempore illius Legis fuit permissum? dicendum, quod ad hoc triplex fuit ratio: una, quia non fuit eis omnino revelandum matrimonii mysterium, quia erat tempus umbrae; secunda, quia ipsi erant imperfecti,
unde tantum onus nollent recipere; tertia, quia duri, et hoc onus nollent portare et occulte possent abiicere: et ideo non fuit imponendum.
Ad illud quod obiicitur de confractione duritiae, dicendum, quod frangenda erat per poenam, quae non esset occasio maioris mali, qualis fuisset obligatio ad talem inseparabilitatem; et ideo non sic debuit frangi.
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Question II. Whether the repudiation of a wife ought to have been permitted.
In the second place it is asked whether the repudiation of a wife ought to have been permitted. And that it ought not, seems [to follow]:
1. Because he who does not prohibit an evil, when he can, is held to be consenting1; but the legislator was able to prohibit and did not prohibit repudiation: therefore he consented. But one consenting to an evil sins: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, evils are not to be done that goods may come2: therefore neither are evils to be permitted, lest greater evils come: therefore he ought not to have permitted repudiation for the sake of avoiding homicide.
3. Likewise, husband and wife are equal as regards the law of the marriage-bed3; but just as a husband can kill his wife, so a wife hating her husband can contrive even his death: therefore there is the same danger and the same right on either side. But it was not permitted in the Law that a wife repudiate her husband: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, in the time of the law of nature we do not read that repudiation was permitted, and in the time of grace likewise we read that it was prohibited; why therefore in the time of the written law was it permitted? — If you should say, as the Lord says4, for the hardness of their heart; on the contrary: because they were hard, therefore, to break their hardness, the legislator imposed heavy burdens: therefore if it is grievous to dwell with a hated wife, it was fitting therefore that repudiation not be permitted.
On the contrary: 1. In the Law nothing ought to have been prohibited which ought not to have been punished, nor ought it to have been punished, except insofar as [men] ought to be made better, at least in deed, though not in charity; but if repudiation were not permitted, those men who were prone5 to homicide would fall into worse: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, no Sacraments were as perfect in the old testament as in the new: therefore neither [was] the Sacrament of marriage: therefore if the perfection in the Sacrament of marriage6 consists in indivisibility, then indivisibility ought not to have been perfectly commanded in the old law.
3. Likewise, if there were so great a closeness between husband and wife that they could in no way be separated; since fornication then would not be punished, all would become fornicators, and few or none would take wives: therefore if it was then commanded that legitimate seed be multiplied, repudiation ought not to have been prohibited.
Conclusion.
To avoid greater evils, the repudiation of a wife ought to have been permitted by Moses, that is, not punished.
I respond: It must be said that permission is fourfold: in one way through the privation of precept, and thus the Apostle7 permits the lesser good, because he does not command the greater good, as he permits virgins to marry; in a second way through the privation of prohibition, and thus venial [sins] are said to be permitted, because they are not prohibited; in a third way through the privation of punishment, and thus the repudiation of a wife is permitted, because it is not punished in the Law; in a fourth way through the privation of restraint, and thus all evils are said to be permitted by God, because He does not restrain [them]. — The first permission is on account of the quality of the good; the second is on account of our infirmity; the third on account of the avoiding of greater evils; the fourth on account of the eliciting of greater goods. Moses therefore permitted [it] because he could not prohibit this evil without a threefold evil following from it: first indeed a defect of the Sacrament, because they would not wish to take a wife; secondly, a multiplication of fornication; thirdly, homicide8.
1. 2. From this the first two [objections] are clear, because Moses did not permit [it] except under compulsion, namely for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, whence there was in it rather to suffer than to act; but he who does an evil that a good may come, sins in doing [it]: therefore what was objected in the second place is not similar.
3. To that therefore which is objected, why it is not permitted to the woman, it must be said that in the time of the Law man and woman were not judged as equals, both by reason of condition, because man is the principle of woman9, and by reason of transgression, because woman is the beginning of sin; therefore it was said to her in Genesis, chapter three: You shall be under the power of [your] husband.
4. To that which is asked, why rather in the time of that Law was it permitted? it must be said that for this there was a threefold reason: one, because the mystery of matrimony was not to be revealed to them entirely, because it was the time of the shadow; the second, because they themselves were imperfect,
whence they would not receive so great a burden; the third, because, [being] hard, they would not bear this burden and could secretly cast it off: and therefore it was not to be imposed.
To that which is objected concerning the breaking of hardness, it must be said that it had to be broken by a penalty which would not be the occasion of a greater evil, such as the obligation to such inseparability would have been; and therefore it ought not to have been broken in that way.
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- 1In Comment. in Rom. 1, 32. olim Ambros. tributo: Assentire autem est, si, cum possit reprehendere, taceat.In the Commentary on Romans 1, 32, formerly attributed to Ambrose: "Now to assent is, if, when one can rebuke, one keeps silent."
- 2Rom. 3, 8: Et non... faciamus mala, ut veniant bona. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.Rom. 3, 8: "And not... let us do evils, that goods may come." Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.
- 3Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXII. c. 1. — Inferius pro etiam mortem quod habent codd. A E F H S, alii et edd. in mortem.See above, the text of the Master, d. XXXII, c. 1. — Below, for etiam mortem, which codices A E F H S have, others and the editions [read] in mortem.
- 4Matth. 19, 8.Matt. 19, 8.
- 5Cod. U rebelles et proni. Mox pro laberentur in peius codd. I K peiores fierent.Codex U [reads] rebellious and prone. Presently, for laberentur in peius, codices I K [read] peiores fierent ["they would become worse"].
- 6Nonnulli codd. perfectio Sacramenti in coniugio.Several codices [read] the perfection of the Sacrament in marriage.
- 7Epist. I. Cor. 7, 7-9. et 25. seqq. — De secundo modo cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2; de quarto modo I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3.Epistle, 1 Cor. 7, 7-9 and 25 ff. — On the second mode cf. II Sent., d. 42, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2; on the fourth mode, I Sent., d. 47, q. 3.
- 8Cfr. Chrysost., Homil. 17. in Matth. 5, 31. n. 4; et Homil. 32. in Matth. (op. imperfect.) 19, 8; Hieron. in Matth. 5, 31. et 19, 8; Ambros., VIII. Expos. in Luc. 16, 18. n. 7. seq. — Pro fornicationis cod. K (I a secunda manu) fornicatorum.Cf. Chrysostom, Homily 17 on Matthew 5, 31, n. 4; and Homily 32 on Matthew (opus imperfectum) 19, 8; Jerome, on Matthew 5, 31 and 19, 8; Ambrose, Exposition on Luke VIII, 16, 18, n. 7 f. — For fornicationis, codex K (I by a second hand) [reads] fornicatorum.
- 9Gen. 2, 21. seq. et I. Cor. 11, 8. — Seq. locus est Gen. 3, 16. — Mox pro mulier cod. R a muliere (Eccli. 25, 33: A muliere initium factum est peccati).Gen. 2, 21 f. and 1 Cor. 11, 8. — The following passage is Gen. 3, 16. — Presently, for mulier, codex R [reads] a muliere (Ecclus. 25, 33: "From a woman was the beginning of sin").