Dist. 33, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 33
Articulus III. De repudio.
Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de repudio. Et circa hoc tria quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum licitum fuerit uxorem repudiare. Secundo, utrum debuerit permitti. Tertio quaeritur de ipsius repudiatae reconciliatione.
Quaestio I. Utrum fuerit licitum uxorem repudiare.
Circa primum, quod fuerit licitum, ostenditur sic.
1. Lex Moysi illicita puniebat, quod ergo non puniebatur in Lege tempore Legis erat licitum; sed repudiatio non puniebatur: ergo etc.
2. Item, licitum est quod nulla lege prohibetur; sed Iudaei non erant astricti alii legi quam sibi a Deo datae: ergo licitum erat omne quod in lege illa non prohibebatur. Sed repudium non prohibebatur in illa: ergo etc.
3. Item, licitum est omne quod divina inspiratione mandatur; sed Moyses, divina inspiratione afflatus, dedit legem secundam, scilicet Deuteronomium, in quo vigesimo quarto capitulo5 praecipit, libellum repudii dari: ergo videtur, quod sit licitum.
4. Item, licitum est quod fit rationabili causa; sed rationabilis causa est, ut odiosa societas separaretur, maxime quando surgit ex causa exterius movente: ergo si vir propter deformitatem habebat uxorem exosam, videtur6 etc.
5. Item, lex matrimonii perfectior est in nova quam in veteri; sed in nova licitum est ab uxore separari aliqua de causa, ut puta causa fornicationis7: ergo videtur, quod in lege veteri licuit, aliqua de causa fieri repudium.
Contra: 1. Nihil est licitum, quod est contra divinam institutionem; sed divortium est contra divinam institutionem, quia Deus coniunxit masculum et feminam8: ergo etc.
2. Item, nihil est licitum, quod est contra ius naturae; sed ius naturae dictat, ut non faciat quis alii quod sibi non vult fieri9: ergo cum vir nollet repudiari ab uxore, non debet repudiare eam.
3. Item, nihil licet, in quo est peccatum; sed in divortio est peccatum, quia dicit Chrysostomus1, quod «qui secundum Legem dimittit quatuor committit iniquitates, quia apud Deum est homicida» etc.: ergo etc.
4. Item, maior est unio viri et uxoris quam patris et filii, quia dicitur secundo Genesis2: Relinquet homo patrem et matrem etc.; sed nulli licet repudiare patrem: ergo etc.
5. Item, auctoritate Domini, Matthaei decimo nono3: Non licet dimittere uxorem, excepta causa fornicationis; sed propter illam non erat divortium, immo mulier lapidabatur; nec alia causa fuit: ergo nunquam fuit licitum.
Conclusio.
Repudium uxoris nunquam fuit licitum, ut fieret sine culpa, sed tantum sine poena.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, secundum quod Dominus dicit4, repudium uxoris nunquam fuit licitum, ut sine culpa fieret; fuit tamen licitum, ut fieret sine poena. Unde aliquid licere alicui hoc est duplici de causa: aut quia non obviat iuris rectitudo, et sic non fuit repudium licitum; aut quia non obviat iuris punitio, et hoc modo licuit uxorem repudiare, quia tunc non obviavit iuris punitio.
Ad argumenta in oppositum: Ad 1, 2. Ex hoc igitur patet quod obiicit, quod non puniebat lex Moysi nec prohibebat. Quamvis enim lex Moysi non prohiberet, quia non decreverat punire; tamen nihilominus lex naturae et dictamen rationis contrarium dicebat5.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Moyses mandat; dicendum, quod Moyses aliquid prohibuit in repudio, aliquid mandavit, aliquid permisit: prohibuit uxorem dimittere sine causa; permisit uxorem dimittere ex causa foeditatis; et praecepit, libellum dari6; et in datione libelli non erat peccatum, sed in dimissione.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de causa rationabili, dicendum, quod vir et uxor individualiter coniunguntur a Deo; ideo nulla potest esse causa separationis quoad vinculum; quoad debitum potest esse causa defectus fidei, quia unus non servat alteri fidem; et quia ista tunc non fuit causa, ideo nulla fuit rationabilis causa.
Ad 5. Ultimum vero patet: quia nulla causa, ut patebit infra7, potest esse, quare uxor non possit viro debitum reddere nisi fornicatio, quia, in quo peccat quis, in hoc et torquetur; et illa tunc non fuit, nec alia potest esse: et ideo etc.
I. Quaestio de libello repudii a Moysi permisso spectat ad quaestionem generalem de divortio et de indissolubilitate matrimonii, de quo vide plura infra d. 35. — Circa principium principale, de quo agitur in 1. quaestione, solutio S. Bonaventurae inter antiquos fuit communior, quam praeter plures Patres, Magistrum et Gulielmos Parisiensem et Antissiod. sustinent Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 46. m. 2. a. 1-6.), qui diffuse et in pluribus quaest. de hoc disputat; Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 3. a. 1.); Thom. de Argentina (hic. q. 3.), et praecipue Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2, qui etiam fundamentum contrariae opinionis non concedendum esse vult, quod scilicet Deus in V. T. non ostenderit, repudium uxoris esse vitiosum). Huic sententiae ipse S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 2. 3; Suppl. 67. a. 2-7.) magis favet. Relata enim etiam altera opinione asserente, repudium per se malum cum libello illo et dispensatione divina Iudaeis factum esse licitum, de hac secunda sic iudicat: «Quamvis hoc probabiliter dicatur, tamen primum communius sustinetur; ideo ad utrasque rationes respondendum est». Simili modo procedit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. I. 2.). — Secundae opinioni magis favent B. Albert. (hic a 23-25.) et Durand. (hic q. 3.) et, ut videtur, etiam Scot. (hic q. 3.), qui tamen utramque opinionem probabilem esse declarat. — Suis principiis constans S. Bonav. cum aliis ipsi consentientibus respondet ad 2. quaestionem, quod permissio illa non fuerit nisi privatio punitionis, et ad 3. quaestionem, quod uxori repudiatae non fuerit permissum nubere alii, vivente viro; quod ipsi licebat secundum aliam opinionem, quae supponit, Deum dispensasse circa indissolubilitatem matrimonii.
De his tribus quaestionibus cum variis materiae divisionibus auctores tractant citt. quaestionibus et articulis.
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Article III. On repudiation.
Next, as regards the third article, inquiry is made concerning repudiation. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether it was licit to repudiate a wife. Secondly, whether it ought to have been permitted. Thirdly, inquiry is made concerning the reconciliation of the repudiated woman herself.
Question I. Whether it was licit to repudiate a wife.
As to the first, that it was licit is shown thus.
1. The Law of Moses punished illicit things; therefore what was not punished under the Law, in the time of the Law, was licit; but repudiation was not punished: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, that is licit which is prohibited by no law; but the Jews were not bound to any law other than the one given to them by God: therefore everything was licit that was not prohibited in that law. But repudiation was not prohibited in it: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, everything is licit that is commanded by divine inspiration; but Moses, breathed upon by divine inspiration, gave a second law, namely Deuteronomy, in which, in the twenty-fourth chapter5, he commands that a bill of divorce be given: therefore it seems that it is licit.
4. Likewise, that is licit which is done for a reasonable cause; but it is a reasonable cause that a hateful partnership be separated, especially when it arises from an externally moving cause: therefore if a man, on account of her deformity, held his wife hateful, it seems6 [licit] etc.
5. Likewise, the law of matrimony is more perfect in the new [dispensation] than in the old; but in the new it is licit to be separated from a wife for some cause, such as the cause of fornication7: therefore it seems that in the old law too it was licit, for some cause, that repudiation be made.
On the contrary: 1. Nothing is licit that is against the divine institution; but divorce is against the divine institution, since God joined together male and female8: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, nothing is licit that is against the law of nature; but the law of nature dictates that one should not do to another what he does not wish to be done to himself9: therefore, since a man would not wish to be repudiated by his wife, he ought not to repudiate her.
3. Likewise, nothing is licit in which there is sin; but in divorce there is sin, because Chrysostom says1 that «he who according to the Law dismisses [his wife] commits four iniquities, since before God he is a homicide» etc.: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, the union of husband and wife is greater than that of father and son, because it is said in the second [chapter] of Genesis2: A man shall leave his father and mother etc.; but it is licit for no one to repudiate his father: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, on the authority of the Lord, in Matthew the nineteenth3: It is not licit to dismiss a wife, except for the cause of fornication; but on account of that there was no divorce, rather the woman was stoned; and there was no other cause: therefore it was never licit.
Conclusion.
The repudiation of a wife was never licit so as to be done without fault, but only [so as to be done] without penalty.
I respond: It must be said that, according to what the Lord says4, the repudiation of a wife was never licit so as to be done without fault; yet it was licit so as to be done without penalty. Hence that something is licit for someone is so for a twofold reason: either because the rectitude of the law does not stand in the way — and in this sense repudiation was not licit; or because the punishment of the law does not stand in the way — and in this manner it was licit to repudiate a wife, since then the punishment of the law did not stand in the way.
To the arguments on the opposite side: To 1, 2. From this, then, is clear what he objects, namely that the Law of Moses did not punish nor prohibit [it]. For although the Law of Moses did not prohibit it, because it had not decreed to punish it; nevertheless the law of nature and the dictate of reason said the contrary5.
To 3. As to what is objected, that Moses commands [it]; it must be said that Moses prohibited one thing in repudiation, commanded another, permitted another: he prohibited dismissing a wife without cause; he permitted dismissing a wife for the cause of foulness; and he commanded that a bill be given6; and in the giving of the bill there was no sin, but [rather] in the dismissal.
To 4. As to what is objected concerning a reasonable cause, it must be said that husband and wife are joined by God individually [i.e. indivisibly]; therefore there can be no cause of separation as regards the bond; as regards the debt there can be a cause [in] a defect of faith [fidelity], since one does not keep faith with the other; and because that was not then a cause, therefore there was no reasonable cause.
To 5. And the last is clear: because there can be no cause, as will be shown below7, why a wife may not render the debt to her husband except fornication, since by what things a man sins, by these also he is tormented; and that [cause] did not then exist, nor can any other: and therefore etc.
I. The question of the bill of divorce permitted by Moses pertains to the general question of divorce and of the indissolubility of matrimony, concerning which see more below at d. 35. — Concerning the principal point, which is treated in the first question, the solution of St. Bonaventure was the more common among the ancients, which — besides many Fathers, the Master, and the Williams, [William] of Paris and [William] of Auxerre — is upheld by Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. III, q. 46, m. 2, a. 1-6), who disputes it at length and in several questions; Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 3, a. 1); Thomas of Strasbourg (here q. 3); and especially Denis the Carthusian (here q. 2, who also holds that the foundation of the contrary opinion is not to be granted, namely that God in the Old Testament did not show the repudiation of a wife to be sinful). St. Thomas himself (here q. 2, a. 2, 3; Supplement 67, a. 2-7) rather favors this view. For, having reported the other opinion as well, which asserts that repudiation — evil in itself — was, with that bill and by divine dispensation, made licit for the Jews, he judges of this second [opinion] thus: «Although this is said with probability, nevertheless the first is more commonly upheld; therefore both sets of reasons are to be answered». Richard of Middleton proceeds in a similar way (here a. 3, q. I, 2). — The second opinion is rather favored by Blessed Albert (here a. 23-25) and Durandus (here q. 3), and, as it seems, also Scotus (here q. 3), who nevertheless declares each opinion to be probable. — Consistent with his own principles, St. Bonaventure, with others agreeing with him, responds to the second question that that permission was nothing but a privation of punishment, and to the third question that it was not permitted to a repudiated wife to marry another while her husband was living; [a thing] which was licit for her according to the other opinion, which supposes that God dispensed concerning the indissolubility of matrimony.
Concerning these three questions, with various divisions of the material, the authors treat in the cited questions and articles.
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- 5Vers. 1. Cfr. Malach. 2, 15. seq.[Deuteronomy 24,] verse 1. Cf. Malachi 2, 15 ff.
- 6Cfr. Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 10. c. 4. — Verbo surgit cod. Y praemittit odium.Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics tr. 10, c. 4. — To the word arises (surgit) cod. Y prefixes hatred (odium).
- 7Matth. 5, 32. et 19, 9.Matthew 5, 32 and 19, 9.
- 8Matth. 19, 4. seq. — Vat. addit: sed quos Deus coniunxit homo separare non debet (ibid. v. 6.).Matthew 19, 4 ff. — The Vatican edition adds: but those whom God has joined man ought not to separate (ibid. v. 6).
- 9Tob. 4, 16; Matth. 7, 12. et Luc. 6, 31.Tobit 4, 16; Matthew 7, 12 and Luke 6, 31.
- 1Homil. 12. in Matth. (op. imperfect.) 5, 32: Qui secundum... homicida; secundam, quia dimisit non fornicantem; tertiam, quia fecit eam adulterari; quartam, quia et accipiens eam fecit adulterium.Homily 12 on Matthew (Opus imperfectum), on 5, 32: He who according to [the Law dismisses his wife is] a homicide; the second [iniquity], because he dismissed one not fornicating; the third, because he made her commit adultery; the fourth, because he who takes her also commits adultery.
- 2Vers. 24. Cfr. Matth. 19, 5.[Genesis 2,] verse 24. Cf. Matthew 19, 5.
- 3Vers. 9: Dico autem vobis, quia, quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, nisi ob fornicationem, et aliam duxerit, moechatur etc. Cfr. ibid. 5, 32. In seq. propos. respicitur Lev. 20, 10; Deut. 22, 22. et Ioan. 8, 5.[Matthew 19,] verse 9: But I say to you, that whoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery etc. Cf. ibid. 5, 32. In the following proposition reference is made to Leviticus 20, 10; Deuteronomy 22, 22 and John 8, 5.
- 4Matth. 19, 8. seq.Matthew 19, 8 ff.
- 5Cfr. August., XIX. contra Faustum, c. 26. et 29, et I. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 14. n. 39.Cf. Augustine, Against Faustus bk. 19, c. 26 and 29, and On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount bk. 1, c. 14, n. 39.
- 6Vide Deut. 24, 1. — Pro sine causa plures codd. sine culpa.See Deuteronomy 24, 1. — For without cause (sine causa) several codices [read] without fault (sine culpa).
- 7Dist. 35. q. 1. seqq. — Seq. locus Scripturae est Sap. 11, 17: Quia, per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur. — Ex codd. LOPQY (E a secunda manu) supplevimus quia nulla causa, edd. legunt: quia fornicatio potest esse ratio, quare etc., omisso subinde nisi fornicatio, quae etiam inferius post tunc perperam omittunt non.Dist. 35, q. 1 ff. — The following scriptural passage is Wisdom 11, 17: For by what things a man sins, by these also he is tormented. — From codd. LOPQY (E by a second hand) we have supplied because no cause (quia nulla causa); the editions read: because fornication can be the reason why etc., omitting thereupon except fornication (nisi fornicatio), which [editions] also below, after then (tunc), wrongly omit not (non). ---