Dist. 38, Divisio Textus
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 38
## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII. ### Qualiter per peccatum depravatio fiat in ipsa voluntate.
Post praedicta de voluntate eiusque fine etc.
DIVISIO TEXTUS.
Supra ostendit Magister, quid sit malum sive peccatum in generali; in hac parte determinat, qualiter peccatum per actum voluntatis habeat introduci. Dividitur autem pars ista in partes tres. In quarum prima determinat Magister, qualiter peccatum a voluntate habeat ortum in generali. In secunda vero descendit ad speciales differentias peccati, infra distinctione quadragesima secunda: Cum autem voluntas mala et operatio sint etc. In tertia vero inquirit, unde1 ortum habeat in ipsa voluntate potestas peccandi, infra distinctione quadragesima quarta: Post praedicta, consideratione dignum occurrit etc.
Prima pars habet duas. In prima inquirit Magister, qualiter ipsa voluntas habeat depravari. Secundo vero, qualiter ex pravitate voluntatis fiat depravatio in actu exteriori, infra distinctione quadragesima: Post haec de actibus adiiciendum videtur. Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat, qualiter voluntas habeat depravari. In secunda vero inquirit, quare magis depravetur voluntas quam alia potentia2, infra distinctione trigesima nona: Hic autem oritur quaestio satis necessaria.
Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, habet duas partes. Quoniam enim depravatio et rectificatio voluntatis attenditur penes finem, et voluntas habet comparari ad finem mediante intentione; ideo pars ista duas partes habet. In quarum prima determinat Magister de rectificatione et depravatione voluntatis ex parte finis. Secundo vero inquirit differentiam voluntatis et intentionis3, ibi: Solet etiam quaeri, quid distet inter voluntatem et intentionem. Prima pars habet quatuor partes. Quia enim obliquatio cognosci habet per rectitudinem — «nam rectum iudex est sui et obliqui4» — ideo in prima parte ostendit Magister, quod ex parte finis venit rectitudo voluntatis. Secundo determinat, quis sit ille finis, ibi: Qui ergo caritatem sibi ponit finem. In tertia vero determinat de unitate finis respectu bonarum voluntatum, ibi: Sed quaeritur, utrum omnes bonae voluntates etc. Quarto vero movet quoddam dubium et determinat, ibi: Verumtamen huic sententiae, qua dictum est etc. Secunda vero pars, in qua determinat de differentia voluntatis et intentionis, habet duas. In quarum prima quaerit differentiam secundum rationem, ibi: Solet etiam quaeri etc. Secundo de differentia secundum rem, ibi: Sed quaeritur, utrum intentio talis sit voluntas. — Et secundum hoc duo determinantur in parte ista, scilicet de comparatione voluntatis ad finem, et de differentia intentionis et voluntatis.
TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.
Ad intelligentiam igitur huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa duo.
Et primo quaeritur de comparatione voluntatis ad suum finem.
Secundo vero quaeritur de differentia intentionis ad voluntatem.
Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor.
Primo quaeritur, utrum voluntas ratione finis sit commendabilis.
Secundo quaeritur, quis sit ille finis.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum bonae voluntates habeant unum finem, vel diversos.
Quarto quaeritur, utrum malae voluntates communicent in fine, an constituant sibi fines alios et alios.
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## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVIII. ### How through sin a depravation comes about in the will itself.
After the foregoing concerning the will and its end, etc.
DIVISION OF THE TEXT.
Above, the Master showed what evil or sin is in general; in this part he determines how sin is introduced through an act of the will. Now this part is divided into three parts. In the first of these the Master determines how sin has its origin from the will in general. In the second he descends to the special differences of sin, below in the forty-second distinction: But when the evil will and the operation, etc. In the third he inquires whence1 the power of sinning has its origin in the will itself, below in the forty-fourth distinction: After the foregoing, something worthy of consideration arises, etc.
The first part has two. In the first the Master inquires how the will itself comes to be depraved. In the second, how from the pravity of the will a depravation comes about in the exterior act, below in the fortieth distinction: After these things, something must be added concerning acts. The first part has two. In the first he determines how the will comes to be depraved. In the second he inquires why the will is depraved more than another power2, below in the thirty-ninth distinction: But here arises a question of considerable necessity.
The first part, which contains the present distinction, has two parts. For since the depravation and the rectification of the will is regarded with respect to the end, and the will is to be compared to the end by the mediation of intention; therefore this part has two parts. In the first of these the Master determines concerning the rectification and depravation of the will on the side of the end. In the second he inquires into the difference between will and intention3, at the place: It is also wont to be asked what distinguishes will from intention. The first part has four parts. For since obliquity comes to be known through rectitude — «for the straight is the judge of itself and of the oblique4» — therefore in the first part the Master shows that the rectitude of the will comes on the side of the end. Secondly he determines what that end is, at the place: He, therefore, who sets charity as his end. In the third he determines concerning the unity of the end in respect of good wills, at the place: But it is asked whether all good wills, etc. In the fourth he raises a certain doubt and determines it, at the place: Nevertheless, against this opinion, by which it has been said, etc. The second part, in which he determines concerning the difference between will and intention, has two. In the first of these he seeks the difference according to reason, at the place: It is also wont to be asked, etc. Secondly the difference according to the thing, at the place: But it is asked whether such an intention is a will. — And according to this two things are determined in this part, namely concerning the comparison of the will to the end, and concerning the difference between intention and will.
TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.
For the understanding, then, of this part, a question arises here concerning two matters.
And first it is asked concerning the comparison of the will to its end.
Secondly it is asked concerning the difference of intention from will.
Concerning the first, four things are asked.
First it is asked whether the will is commendable by reason of its end.
Secondly it is asked what that end is.
Thirdly it is asked whether good wills have one end, or diverse ones.
Fourthly it is asked whether evil wills share in a common end, or set up for themselves ends differing from one another.
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- Codd. nullis.The codices read nullis.
- Edd., excepta I, utrum.The editions, except the first, read utrum.
- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4: voluntas in suo actu, quam aliqua alia potentia.The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads: the will in its act, than any other power.
- Vat. et edd. 3, 4 hic adiungunt et finis, quae verba etiam infra, ubi divisio secundae partis habetur, verbis de differentia voluntatis et intentionis addunt. — Secundum Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 83. (c. 3.).The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 here add and of the end, which words they also add below, where the division of the second part is given, to the words concerning the difference of will and intention. — According to Aristotle, On the Soul I, text 83 (c. 3). ---