Bonaventure

Articulus I. De subversione voluntatis damnatorum.

Quaestio I. Utrum damnati velint, se peccasse.

De numeratione notarum. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page. The labels below are page-qualified: `p1035c` = the Notae ad Commentarium register of page 1035 (that page also carries a separate register for the Master's text, which belongs to the littera chunk), then notes 1–11 of page 1036 and notes 1–3 of page 1037.

Quantum ergo ad primum proceditur sic, et ostenditur, quod damnati vellent, se peccasse:

1. Quia Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum¹ dicit, quod «bonam habere nullatenus poterunt voluntatem»; sed nolle, se peccasse, est voluntatis bonae: ergo non poterunt hoc habere: ergo si considerabunt peccatum suum, cum non possint nolle, necesse habent velle.

2. Item, voluntas hominis post mortem est invertibilis, sicut voluntas angeli mali¹; sed angelus malus vult, se peccasse: ergo etc.

3. Item, malitia inclinat voluntatem ad malum, sicut gratia ad bonum; sed malitia remanebit in damnatis, sicut et gratia in Beatis: ergo sicut Beati bona, quae semel voluerunt, semper volunt; ita damnati semper volunt mala.

4. Item, quod quis dimittat actum peccandi in praesenti, non potest esse sine gratia gratis data², multo fortius de peccandi voluntate: ergo si nulla gratia datur ipsis reprobis, nec natura melioratur; ergo peccandi voluntatem nunquam amittunt.

Contra:

1. Sapientiae quinto³: Dicent intra se, poenitentiam agentes etc.; constat, quod illa est consideratio rationis deliberantis: ergo videtur, quod velint non peccasse.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum⁴: «Videmus, inquit, ferissimas bestias dolore poenarum a maximis voluptatibus abstinere»; sed damnati non ardentius appetunt quam bestiae atroces, et maxime cruciantur: ergo eorum appetitus retrahitur, et sic etc.

3. Item, peccatum non placebat, quia peccatum, sed propter libidinosam delectationem⁵; sed in damnatis exclusa est omnis libidinosa delectatio: ergo nullum peccatum eis placet.

4. Item, mala voluntas eo ipso, quod mala est, est contra Deum, et eo ipso, quod est contra Deum, est meritoria poenae: ergo semper merentur poenam, et ita debet semper eis poena augeri, et sic in infinitum. Sed sic non dicitur⁶: ergo etc.

5. Item, voluntas mala eo ipso, quod mala, est inordinata: ergo quando exit in actum novum, de novo inordinatur; sed nihil potest Deus relinquere inordinatum: ergo si peccatum non ordinatur nisi in poena⁷, et est nova inordinatio; ergo nova poena, et ita semper cresceret.

6. Item, esto quod damnatis daretur libertas peccandi, nunquam fornicarentur; si redirent ad corpora et locum haberent, constat, quod nollent peccare, cum magis horreant tantam poenam, quam delectationem peccati diligant⁸: ergo videtur etc.

Conclusio

Damnati nolunt, se peccasse, loquendo de actu, non vero de habitu voluntatis malae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod mala voluntas dicitur dupliciter, scilicet actus et habitus. Dico ergo, quod timor servilis peccatoribus non aufert habitum malae voluntatis, sed aufert actum⁹ — iste enim non vult luxuriari, quia timet puniri — de ipsa voluntate tamen habitum non aufert; quod patet, quia, si speraretur impunitas, vellet utique luxuriari. — Sic intelligendum in damnatis, quod dolor poenalis aufert ab ipsorum voluntate actum volendi peccare, quia revera damnati non appetunt luxuriari nec dominari propter poenas, quas ex illis actibus sentiunt se incurrisse; habent tamen habitum voluntatis malae, per quam appeterent peccare, si non crederent, se ex hoc puniri. — Si ergo quaeras, utrum damnati nolint peccasse; dico, quod nolunt, non propter hoc, quod peccatum eis displiceat, quia iniustum, sed quia eis displicet poena iusta¹⁰. Et ideo malam habent voluntatem hoc volendo, et ideo adhuc vivit in eis voluntas peccandi, licet dolore poenarum impediatur, ne exeat in actum suum.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. Et sic patet responsio ad primum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas est invertibilis; dicendum, quod verum est de voluntate¹¹ quantum ad habitum, in qua fit plena versio; sed non est verum de vertibilitate quantum ad actum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malitia inclinat sicut gratia; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia motus gratiae praemiatur in simili et convenienti, sed motus libidinis in dissimili, ut in dolore; et ideo impeditur, sed motus gratiae consummatur.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod abstinere a voluntate peccandi non est sine gratia; dicendum, quod loquendo de voluntate-habitu, non est sine gratia; sed in voluntate-actu distinguendum est: quia aut abstinet ab actu malo, quia contra Deum et quia iniquum; et hoc non est sine gratia gratis data — haec enim praeparat ad ulteriorem gratiam — aut quia hoc est laesivum, sicut aliquis dimittit forni-p. 1037cari vel inebriari, quia amittit visum¹; et talis est per naturam puram. Similiter dico, quod damnati refugiunt propter timorem poenae.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod habent poenitentiam; dicendum, quod verum est; sed illa poenitentia est stimulus poenitudinis, non correctio voluntatis²; unde si daretur libertas peccandi, ut speraretur omnino impunitas, dico, quod peccarent; sed si deberent ita puniri pro aliis, quae facerent, sicut pro his quae fecerunt, nunquam vellent peccare.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum habeant aliquam inordinationem actualem voluntatis; potest dici, quod sic; sed illa inordinatio est eis versa in poenam, sicut Beatis bona voluntas in gloriam; unde sicut isti non merentur amplius bona voluntate, ita nec illi demerentur mala; et hoc dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera³.

Article I. On the subversion of the will of the damned.

Question I. Whether the damned will that they had sinned.

As to the first, then, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the damned would will that they had sinned:

1. Because Augustine On the Faith, to Peter¹ says that "they shall in no way be able to have a good will"; but to be unwilling to have sinned is [the mark] of a good will: therefore they will not be able to have this: therefore if they shall consider their sin, since they cannot be unwilling, they must needs will [it].

2. Likewise, the will of man after death is unchangeable, like the will of the evil angel¹; but the evil angel wills that he had sinned: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, malice inclines the will to evil, as grace does to good; but malice will remain in the damned, as grace also does in the Blessed: therefore, just as the Blessed always will the good things which they once willed, so the damned always will evil things.

4. Likewise, that anyone should give up the act of sinning in the present cannot be without grace freely given², much more [is this so] concerning the will to sin: therefore if no grace is given to the reprobate themselves, neither is their nature bettered; therefore they never lose the will to sin.

On the contrary:

1. Wisdom, chapter five³: They shall say within themselves, repenting etc.; and it is agreed that this is the consideration of deliberating reason: therefore it seems that they will not to have sinned.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book Of Eighty-three Questions⁴: "We see," he says, "that the wildest beasts abstain from the greatest pleasures through the pain of punishments"; but the damned do not desire more ardently than savage beasts, and they are tormented in the highest degree: therefore their appetite is drawn back, and so etc.

3. Likewise, sin was not pleasing because it was sin, but on account of the lustful delight⁵; but in the damned every lustful delight is excluded: therefore no sin pleases them.

4. Likewise, an evil will, by the very fact that it is evil, is against God, and by the very fact that it is against God, is deserving of punishment: therefore they always merit punishment, and so their punishment ought always to be increased, and thus to infinity. But it is not so said⁶: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, an evil will, by the very fact that it is evil, is disordered: therefore when it goes forth into a new act, it is newly disordered; but God can leave nothing disordered: therefore if sin is not set in order except in punishment⁷, and there is a new disorder; therefore [there is] a new punishment, and so it would always be increasing.

6. Likewise, granted that liberty of sinning were given to the damned, they would never fornicate; if they returned to their bodies and had opportunity, it is agreed that they would be unwilling to sin, since they dread so great a punishment more than they love the delight of sin⁸: therefore it seems etc.

Conclusion

The damned are unwilling to have sinned, speaking of the act, but not of the habit of the evil will.

I respond: It must be said that an evil will is spoken of in two ways, namely as act and as habit. I say, then, that servile fear does not take away from sinners the habit of an evil will, but takes away the act⁹ — for such a man does not will to be lustful, because he fears to be punished — yet from the will itself it does not take away the habit; which is plain, because, if impunity were hoped for, he would certainly will to be lustful. — So it is to be understood in the damned, that penal grief takes away from their will the act of willing to sin, because in truth the damned do not desire to be lustful nor to dominate, on account of the punishments which they feel themselves to have incurred from those acts; yet they have the habit of an evil will, through which they would desire to sin, if they did not believe that they would be punished for it. — If, then, you ask whether the damned are unwilling to have sinned; I say that they are unwilling, not because sin displeases them as unjust, but because the just punishment displeases them¹⁰. And therefore they have an evil will in willing this, and therefore the will of sinning still lives in them, although it is impeded by the grief of punishments from going forth into its act.

To the arguments for the affirmative side:

To 1. And thus the answer to the first is plain.

To 2. To that which is objected, that the will is unchangeable; it must be said that this is true of the will¹¹ as regards the habit, in which a full turning takes place; but it is not true of changeableness as regards the act.

To 3. To that which is objected, that malice inclines as grace does; it must be said that it is not alike: because the motion of grace is rewarded in what is like and fitting, but the motion of lust in what is unlike, namely in grief; and therefore it is impeded, whereas the motion of grace is brought to completion.

To 4. To that which is objected, that to abstain from the will of sinning is not without grace; it must be said that, speaking of the will-as-habit, it is not without grace; but in the will-as-act a distinction must be drawn: for either one abstains from the evil act because it is against God and because it is iniquitous; and this is not without grace freely given — for this prepares [one] for further grace — or because this is harmful, as when someone gives up fornicating or getting drunk because he is losing his sight¹; and such a man is [acting] by pure nature. Likewise I say that the damned shrink back on account of the fear of punishment.

To the arguments for the negative side:

To 1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that they have repentance; it must be said that it is true; but that repentance is a goad of remorse, not a correction of the will²; hence if liberty of sinning were given, such that complete impunity were hoped for, I say that they would sin; but if they were to be punished in the same way for the other things they would do as for those which they have done, they would never will to sin.

To 5. To that which is asked, whether they have any actual disorder of the will; it can be said that they do; but that disorder has been turned into punishment for them, as for the Blessed a good will [is turned] into glory; hence just as the latter do not merit further by a good will, so neither do the former demerit by an evil one; and this Augustine says, and it is had in the text³.